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Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis examines the unclear political nature of the European Union and current 
academic theories on how to understand and classify the EU. Placing the EU in the 
macrohistorical context from which it emerged, the project first critiques competing 
definitions of “empire” before examining the etymological and philosophical genealogy of 
imperium. It then uses textual analysis to trace how evolving interpretations of imperium and 
“empire” have influenced European historiography and political philosophy. This analysis 
demonstrates that “empire” is not a descriptive taxonomy but a normative discourse, 
expressing an imagination of power, legitimacy and sole sovereignty, used to validate the 
inherent inequality and manifest destiny of an imagined European community. This discourse 
must be publicly expressed in order to have validity, and it is most effectively conveyed in 
visual language. The study demonstrates that of the many forms of visual language, by far the 
most powerful is cartography. But while maps represent the world rather than reflect it, 
mapreaders ascribe to maps an authority that is rarely questioned, accepting maps’ portrayals 
as truthful. 
 Having established and justified a methodology based in semiotics and semantics, the 
project moves into an analytical focus by semiotically deconstructing the most publicly-
accessible EU maps in print and virtual form and on Euro currency. These analyses 
demonstrate that EU maps intersect with EU iconography and inadvertently construct an 
imagined community defined by the discourse of empire. Such maps show the Union not as it 
is but as it should be – the sole sovereign of European civilisation, with supreme power, 
exclusive legitimacy, a manifest destiny to unite the Europeans, and inhabited by an imagined 
community whose imagined history partly masks an inherent, yet acknowledged, inequality. 
This dissertation concludes that the EU is not a sui generis construct but instead embodies a 
familiar historical discourse – the European Union as Empire. 
 
Unless specified, all images have been digitally photographed by the author from the 
cited books or copied from the cited websites, in accordance with the Copyright Licensing 
Act (2006) of UUK/SCOP Higher Education institutions. All websites referenced in the text 
were last accessed on the date of binding, 1
st
 October 2013. Any errors of fact or 
interpretation remain the author’s own. 
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‘EUROPE manageth all Arts and Sciences with such 
dexterity, that for the invention of manie things shee 
may truely be called a Mother, and for the 
conservation of many rare things, to beare the title of 
a Nurturing Mother of humane wisdome: shee hath 
in her most excellent Academies, for all manner of 
learning, whereas other Countries are all of them, 
overspread with Barbarisme.’1 
 
Gerardus Mercator 
Atlas, 1595 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Gerardus Mercator, Atlas [Amsterdam, 1606 English edition (orig. 1595)] (Amsterdam: Novus Theatrum 
Orbis Terrarum, 1968), p. xxiv. 
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Introduction 
The Non-Imperial Empire 
 
‘Sometimes I like to compare the European Union, as a creation, to the 
organisation of empires. Empires! Because we have the dimensions of 
empires. But there is a great difference. The empires were usually made 
through force, with a centre that was imposing a diktat, a will, on the 
others. And now we have what some authors call the first “non-imperial 
empire”.’ 
José Barroso 
President of the European Commission 
10
th
 July 2007 
 
 At a press conference in Brussels in July 2007, José Barroso, President of the 
European Commission, answered a reporter’s question on the nature of the European Union 
with a comparison to empire. Within minutes his words had been transcribed, and video 
footage of his speech uploaded, onto that limitless repository of instant-access, one-click 
information – the World Wide Web – proclaiming his perceptions to the planet.2 Yet aside 
from a few predictably peeved pundits in Britain’s eternally eurosceptic broadsheets the next 
morning,
3
 remarkably little attention seems to have been paid to his words. This is surprising. 
For not only is “empire” a dirty word in today’s political arenas, a term from which 
politicians go to great effort to distance themselves,
4
 but even more significantly Barroso 
equates the European Union with what appears to be a logical paradox. A ‘non-imperial 
empire’. This frames our initial research question: what is empire to begin with, and how 
could empire exist in the form of the European Union?  
 Together, these are the principal questions which this thesis seeks to answer. Empire 
is one of the most contested terms in contemporary International Relations and Political 
Geography: a word which refers not merely to the archaic hegemons of the ‘marble and sepia 
pasts’5 but a word whose subtleties and nuances are argued over at great length. It is a word 
                                                 
2
 José Barroso, ‘European Union is “non-imperial empire” (long version)’, 10 July 2007, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-I8M1T-GgRU. 
3
 ‘Barroso hails the European “empire”’, The Telegraph, 11 July 2007, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1557143/Barroso-hails-the-European-empire.html. 
4
 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe [trans. Ciaran Cronin] (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007),  
pp. 60-62. 
5
 Michael Cox, ‘The Empire’s Back in Town: or America’s Imperial Temptation – Again’, Millennium 32:1 
 (2003), pp. 1-28. 
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which is deployed loosely, even lazily, to castigate policies and polities which individual 
writers simply do not like.
6
 It is in this context that discussion of the European Union as 
empire has emerged. Barroso’s comment in 2007 was not the first mention of the EU as 
empire, neither was it the last.
7
 The imagination of EU Empire has been created, and it 
requires investigation.  
 
 
1.1 Background of the Project 
 
Studying the European Union as empire is germane for two reasons. The first is that the 
Union is a political structure which evades neat classification. It is what Jacques Delors calls 
an ‘unidentified political object’8 which stubbornly refuses to be pigeonholed into one of our 
neat, Western, post-Westphalian political categories.
9
 Even Barroso’s comment – a ‘non-
imperial empire’ – sheds light on the inability to catalogue the Union using modern concepts. 
This warrants critical and sustained investigation, particularly as the Union does not exist in 
static isolation. It does not stand still but is expanding, racing to gobble up the remnants of its 
fallen Soviet rival, rushing towards the horizon yet at the same time drawing a line and 
stating that this is where “Europe” ends. Neither does the European Union exist in isolation – 
it serves as the standard to which other regional organisations, especially its African 
counterpart, earnestly measure themselves.
10
 
 The second reason for studying EU empire is more immediate. When this research 
project began, the Union was a proud and unassailable fortress: the standard of civilisation by 
which non-Union European states were measured, the progressive political project petitioned 
by polities desirous of gaining membership in what appeared to be ‘EU-topia’.11 Yet since the 
project began, the severe weakening of the Union’s financial foundation has left the European 
Union, as of the time of writing, facing not only economic collapse but also the potential 
                                                 
6
 Russell Foster, ‘Tege Imperium! A defence of empire’, Global Discourse 1:ii (2009), pp. 2-23. 
7
 Russia Today, ‘EU – empire destroying peoples’ freedom’, 8 April 2013, http://rt.com/op-edge/eu-destroys-
freedom-marine-lepen-488/. 
8
 Cited in Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 7. 
9
 For discussions of the EU’s unclear nature see, among others, Luiza Bialasiewicz, ‘The Uncertain State(s) of 
Europe?’, European Urban and Regional Studies 15:1 (2008), pp. 71-82; Gerard Delanty, ‘The Idea of a 
Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Significance of Europeanization’, International Review of Sociology – 
Revue Internationale de Sociologie 15:3 (2005), pp. 405-421. 
10
 Samuel Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and 
Governance (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 3-7. 
11
 S.E. Gross and A. Benavot, ‘Realizing “EU-TOPIA”: Insiders’ views on an emerging EU research 
community’, Innovation – The European Journal of Social Science Research 20:3 (2007), pp. 287-301. 
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withdrawal of members.
12
 We can but hope that this organisation, which has created (or 
coincided with) the longest period of peace in Europe’s hostile history, weathers the storm. 
But the Union’s prestige is apparently unaffected. Even if it succumbs and the European 
Union vanishes into the history books, its legacy will resonate through Europe far into the 
future. For if the study of Europe teaches us anything, it is that the continent has always 
spawned movements to unify Europeans into a single community.
13
 The European Union 
emerged from the European Community, and before that the European Coal and Steel 
Community, emerging from the ashes of a world war fought to defeat the previous, ghastly 
attempt at European unification. That prior attempt was the partial result of an earlier world 
war wrought in part by the aggrandising aggressions of Victorian vainglory and Bismarckian 
braggadocio – and these movements, too, were shaped and formed by the past, emerging 
from the centuries of struggle between Europe’s self-anointed sovereigns distantly descended 
from those peoples, lost in the mists of time, who scavenged over the carcass of Caesar’s 
Rome. 
This is putting it simplistically, but the idea of a historical chain linking all efforts at 
European integration – past, present, and future – is well-commented upon.14 Like all 
attempts at unifying Europe – violent and peaceful, long-lived and fleeting – the European 
Union is part of a historical chain: one more link connecting the disparate peoples of the 
continent with their imagined pasts and their unrealised futures. The drive to unify Europe 
has endured for millennia and it continues today, and we can confidently presume that it will 
continue to be maintained or sought under Europeans who are as far distant in time from the 
bureaucrats and legislators currently quibbling in the glittering glass conference-halls of 
                                                 
12
 Anita Kiamba, ‘Commentary – Crisis in the System of States: The Financial Crisis in the European Union’, 
Geopolitics 18: 1 (2013), pp. 1-5; Veit Bachmann, ‘Commentary – Europe’s Lack of Visions’, Geopolitics 18:2 
(2013), pp. 1-7. 
13
 Derek Heater, The Idea of European Unity (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992). 
14
 For various discussions of the idea of a historical chain in European politics, see among others: William 
Outhwaite, European Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 1-43; Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe: 
From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [passim];  Mikael af 
Malmborg and Bo Stråth (eds.), The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations 
(Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), pp. 1-50; Derek Heater, The Idea of European Unity (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1992) [passim]; Bronisław Gremek, The Common Roots of Europe [trans. Jan 
Aleksandrowicz, J.K. Fedorowicz, Rosemary Hunt, Agnieszka Kołakowska and Shayne Mitchell] (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996) [passim]; Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, ‘European Union: A Polity in Search of a Mission?’, 
European Journal of Science and Theology 8:1 (2012), pp. 15-27; Bo Stråth, ‘A European Identity: To the 
Historical Limits of a Concept’, European Journal of Social Theory 5:4 (2002), pp. 387-401; Gary Marks, 
‘Europe and its Empires: From Rome to the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 50:1 (2012), 
pp. 1-20; Nicholas Henry, ‘Politics beyond the state: Europe as civilization and as empire’, Comparative 
European Politics 8:2 (2010), pp. 262-280; Magali Gravier, ‘The Next European Empire?’, European Societies 
11:5 (2009), pp. 627-647. Even before the European Union existed, this chain was recognised – and indeed was 
predicted to produce a pan-European community: Richard Hoggart and Douglas Johnson, An Idea of Europe 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1987), pp. 5-27, 105-150. 
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Brussels, as we are from the praetors and proconsuls who ambled amidst the marble 
monuments of Rome. And like all efforts to create a single community, the legacy of the 
Union will endure far longer than the polity itself. It is for these reasons that this study has 
been written. This thesis is a response to the contemporary curiosity on just what the 
European Union is, and how its nature is conveyed to its populace.  
The title of the thesis reflects the nature of “empire” by using the ultimately 
untranslatable word imperium.
15
 As we shall see in the next chapter, although this Roman 
word is the root of the noun “empire” in modern English and its equivalents in all 
contemporary Romance and Baltic languages, imperium cannot be neatly distilled into a 
dictionary definition. As L.G. Price comments, ‘we cannot help speaking Latin and using 
Roman terms’,16 when our current languages lack an equivalent. Yet what allows us to unfold 
one particular set of assumptions about imperium, and not another? We may look to the 
original language to elucidate meaning, but we cannot simply use imperium as the Romans 
did. We must first acknowledge our historiographical position.  
If history is what we know about the societies which formed us, historiography is how 
we know this. And as a result of us looking back through modern eyes, historiography has 
inherent problems. As historian E.H. Carr writes: 
  
 ‘We can view the past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only 
through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own age, and is 
bound to it by the conditions of human existence. The very words which he 
uses – words like democracy, empire, war, revolution – have current 
connotations from which he cannot divorce them.’17 
 
Carr does concede that there is a way around this: using original terminology. 
But this solution carries its own pitfalls: 
 
                                                 
15
 I am grateful to Prof. Jakob Wisse, Chair of Latin at the School of Classics, Newcastle University, for his help with  
the grammar. Tabulae Imperii corresponds to Maps of Empire/Power, while the verb clause suggests change and 
development over time. It must be noted that Tabula can be translated as “map” or “picture” – the Romans apparently 
did not make a distinction. See O.A.W. Dilke, ‘Itineraries and Geographical Maps in the Early and Late Roman 
Empires’, chapter in J.B. Harley and David Woodward, The History of Cartography Vol. I (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 252-257. 
16
 L. G. Price, The Story of Titles: How The King Became His Majesty (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 
1969), p. 42. 
17
 E.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 25. 
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‘Ancient historians have taken to using words like polis and plebs in the 
original, just in order to show that they have not fallen into this trap. This 
does not help them. They, too, live in the present, and cannot cheat 
themselves into the past by using unfamiliar or obsolete words, any more 
than they would become better Greek or Roman historians if they delivered 
their lectures in a chlamys or toga.’18 
 
This leaves us at an apparent impasse. We cannot use empire, as it is too wrapped up 
in modern associations – size, power, oppression, territory. Equally we cannot use imperium, 
as we are reading a Roman word through modern eyes. Perhaps we can avoid this modern 
gaze by reading primary sources to elucidate the meaning of imperium? This seems on the 
surface to be a suitable method, but it also has its own problems. In the words of Boyd Hill: 
 
‘Even when the sources tell us why the king did something, we would be 
foolish to take the statement at face value. Perhaps the chronicler had an 
axe to grind. Maybe he was simply currying favour. Or perhaps (worst of 
all) the king himself did not really understand his own motives any more 
than we can always understand our own.’19 
 
We are still at the impasse. Previous scholars, seeking to understand the past in order 
to validate efforts at uniting Europe, have seen a vision of history which was ‘distorted by 
rose-tinted spectacles’,20 seeing what they wanted to see rather than what actually existed. 
We cannot be sure what exactly the Romans meant, and neither could other scholars before 
us. Equally, we cannot simply read primary sources and declare that we have peered into the 
minds of the dead, when they themselves were undoubtedly just as confused about their own 
understandings of words as we are today. However, there is a potential solution to our 
problem.  
While we cannot truly appreciate what earlier scholars meant by empire, nor 
explicitly why they used the word, we can see how they used it. It is these uses which lead us 
to the meaning of imperium. Not as it was intended by the Romans but as it has been 
interpreted since. Through document analysis we can see in what context the word was 
                                                 
18
 Carr, What is History?, p. 25. 
19
 Boyd Hill, Medieval Monarchy in Action: The German Empire from Henry I to Henry IV (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 17. 
20
 Heater, Idea of European Unity, p. 111. 
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deployed, which may reflect various meanings ascribed to it. This establishes our 
historiographical position. We are not arbitrarily connecting the European Union to the 
Roman Empire according to cherry-picked characteristics, nor are we lazily using modern 
concepts to examine the past, nor are we claiming to understand the intricate and ultimately 
unknowable meanings of concepts held by people two millennia in their graves. We are 
instead tracing the perception of empire since the Romans, analysing how the use, rather than 
the meaning, of empire has determined our understanding of the word. This research is thus 
located in the Nietzschean-Foucauldian tradition of political genealogy,
21
 arguing that the 
present can only be understood by reference to the past from which it emerged. The 
consequence is that empire is not a static and unchanging category but an idea whose 
meaning shifts in different times and different places. This places the European Union in a 
situation analogous to the Early Middle Ages when, as Julia Smith argues, ‘empire and 
emperors were often in the eye of the beholder’.22 
 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Europe is no stranger to empire. Throughout our continent’s history has run a trend of rulers 
and governments seeking to legitimise their ambitions and their very existence by referring 
back to the Roman state.
23
 This phenomenon has spent much of its history as a popular one, 
and while the imagination of imperium has shifted in the last two centuries – uneasily 
balanced between the exemplar of order and a model for progressive states to emulate,
24
 and 
the epitome of violence, discrimination, and atrocity which deserves, as Michael Cox asserts, 
                                                 
21
 For seminal texts in this tradition which establish the utility and validity of political and philosophical 
genealogy, see: Friederich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo [trans. Walter Kaufmann] 
(New York: Random House, 1989); Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980) [passim]; Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: 
Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2013); Rudi Visker, 
‘Michel Foucault, philosopher? A note on genealogy and archaeology’, Parrhesia 5 (2009), pp. 9-18; Karl 
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia [orig. 1929] (London: Routledge, 1960). 
22
 Julia Smith, Europe after Rome: A New Cultural History, 500-1000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p. 275. 
23
 Andrew Erskine, Roman Imperialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 4-5; Heater, Idea of 
European Unity, pp. 1-60; Neville Morley, Antiquity and Modernity (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 
117-163; Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-
c.1800 (Yale: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 1-62. 
24
 Jonathan Hart, Comparing Empires: European Colonialism from Portugese Expansion to the Spanish-American  
War (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 23-48. 
8 
 
to be abandoned to ‘the marble and sepia pasts’25 – the spectre of empire has remained 
prevalent in the imagination.  
This is examined at length in our first substantial section. In Chapter Two a review of 
literature on the subject is critically interrogated, examining how various political scientists 
comprehend European empire. The consensus reached is that there is no consensus and that 
“empire” has become a term signifying almost anything the scholar wishes. The chapter 
subsequently argues that conceiving of empire as a category of state is insufficient. The 
investigation seeks to understand “empire” by returning to its linguistic roots in Republican 
Rome, using textual analysis to trace its etymological evolution into a word signifying 
legitimacy, sovereignty, duty, destiny, and superiority. This concept became the subject of an 
intense struggle for prestige between the powerful monarchs of Early Medieval Europe. In 
the subsequent political squabble the term “empire” emerged as a title signifying civilisation, 
sovereignty, legitimacy, duty, and destiny. The chapter then examines how this discourse is 
expressed and spread in symbols, and concludes that this is how we should interpret “empire” 
– not as a reflection of what a state is but a representation of what it should be, a discourse of 
superiority professed by those who deem themselves the guardians of civilisation. This latest 
manifestation of empire is the European Union. 
 In Chapter Three the focus turns to our second object of study – maps. As in Chapter 
Two, a spectrum of literature is drawn upon to establish an understanding, allowing us to 
reject the simplistic understanding of maps as tools which reflect the world. Like empire, 
maps do not reflect the world but represent our perceptions of it, and maps are not 
understood in scientific, neutral terms but are interpreted according to culturally-bound 
conventions. With the exception of extreme cases of cartographic manipulation, we 
mapreaders are not even aware of maps’ power. This gives maps an authority which is almost 
never questioned, enabling even the subtlest political messages within them – even if they are 
not intended – to be accepted as truths. As such, this chapter argues that EU maps promote an 
imperial imagination through the novel phenomenon of cartoimperialism – the selective use 
of cartographic elements and styles to produce new territorialities and political imaginations 
wherein space and place become fused into a single concept defining what it means to be 
‘European’, defined by an imagination of legitimacy, superiority, and destiny.26 
                                                 
25
 Cox, ‘The Empire’s Back in Town’, pp. 1-28. 
26
 For an earlier version of the new theory of cartoimperialism, see Russell Foster, ‘Tabula Imperii 
Europae: A Cartographic Approach to the Current Debate on the European Union as Empire’, Geopolitics 
18:2 (2013), pp. 371-402. 
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 In Chapter Four we consider an appropriate methodology. Literature is drawn upon to 
establish maps not as reflections but as representations which are saturated with political 
messages. It is argued that maps’ greatest power comes not from the specific visual language 
of their component parts but from such phenomena as where maps are placed, what politics 
they are visually associated with, what purpose they serve, and who their intended audiences 
are. Contrary to traditional studies of cartography which focus on the symbols of maps, our 
examination will focus more on maps’ broader context and material nature, including such 
considerations as where EU maps are located, what other forms of visual language 
accompany and intersect them, and who sees the maps.  
 Chapter Five is the first analytical chapter, analysing a selection of maps produced by 
EU institutions in order to identify how such maps contain the imperial discourse of 
legitimacy, superiority, sovereignty, duty, and destiny. We examine European Union visual 
icons, including the flag, as maps in their own right, before examining more conventional 
cartographies. The chapter examines how the Union’s maps appeal to an artificial 
imagination – an ‘imagined community’ – and employs techniques of ‘banal nationalism’ to 
propagate a discourse through its visual iconography. Importantly, it is argued that this is not 
a devious and deliberate scheme on the Union’s part but that it is an inescapable consequence 
of relying on cartography to symbolise the new Europe.  
 In Chapter Six we focus on a medium in which European Union mapping reaches the 
pinnacle of cartoimperialism – the maps and visual iconography featured on the Union’s 
continental currency. A broad selection of critical studies are examined in order to argue that 
currency is the most powerful vehicle for the transmission of political discourses, 
intentionally or not, and that the Union’s choice of a single currency is itself a powerful 
discursive expression of empire. However, the apparently innocent maps on Euro coins and 
banknotes transform currency into the ultimate expression of empire within the Union, and all 
of Europe, by showing not what the Union is but what it should be. 
 Chapter Seven concludes our investigation. We argue that the European Union is not 
an empire; the European Union is empire.
27
 It is the precise same expression of legitimacy, 
sovereignty, superiority, duty and destiny – reinforced by appealing to a manufactured history 
and an imagined community – which characterised the emergence of empire as a discourse in 
the tense international politics of Early Medieval Europe. The chapter also argues that this 
                                                 
27
 While modern languages distinguish between empire, imperial, and imperialism, Latin does not always 
clearly distinguish between nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, particularly with legal terminology such as 
imperium (see page 42). The wording here reflects the Latin expression of Imperium Europaeum – Europe as 
empire, Europe embodying empire, Europe possessing empire, and Europe exercising empire. I am grateful to 
Prof. Jakob Wisse, Chair of Latin at the School of Classics and History, Newcastle University, for his insights. 
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study might be the beginning of a new research avenue into empire as a discourse, and the 
power of political maps. The findings of cartoimperialism in this thesis, it is argued, could 
serve as foundations for similar studies in the future. 
 
 
1.3 Limits of the Project 
 
To understand what this study is, it is also necessary to say what it is not. This is not a claim 
that “empire” is a taxonomy, a category into which we can slot certain political projects 
which we do not classify as nation-states, federations, and such. Neither is this an argument 
that the EU is an empire according to a prefabricated set of “imperial” characteristics or a 
priori assumptions. Instead the study examines the EU not as a sui generis brave new world, 
but instead as part of a political continuum whereby the Union is inextricable from its 
historical roots and predecessors. This is not a book of history and it makes no pretence to be, 
but the Union does not stand outside of time and we cannot understand empire and the Union 
without considering the historical contexts in which they emerged and developed. Our world 
did not suddenly appear from nowhere, and equally our civilisation is not the end point of 
some Whiggish teleology. We are part of a continuum whereby our present was created by 
the past, and whereby our present will create the future. The EU cannot be detached from 
Europe’s history, and so a consideration of the macrohistorical context of the EU is essential. 
As we shall see in Chapter Two, this is by no means the first study to claim that the 
European Union embodies empire, but it is unique in examining how the symbolism and 
political metanarratives woven into EU cartography proclaim an imagination of empire. As 
such, the first part of the study is an examination of the macrohistorical roots of empire, 
concluding with the assertion that empire is a discourse, and that this discourse is expressed 
in symbolic cartography. The second part of the study examines EU maps.  
 This too is nothing new. As Chapter Three demonstrates, politicised maps are not 
recent inventions. Their prototypes were drawn by nomadic hunter-gatherers who stalked 
woolly mammoths across the frozen tundras of the last Ice Age, and the viewers of the 
European Union’s sleek, computer-created charts on the internet or in their purses use exactly 
the same mental mechanisms as Cro-Magnons huddling around their fires, gazing at the maps 
etched onto their cave walls with elk bones. This section demonstrates that the power of 
cartography is ontogenetic – not only is mapreading learned in the subconscious, it is 
believed. 
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 Again, this is nothing new. The colossus of cartography J.B. Harley demonstrated this 
exact argument in the 1980s
28
 – not to mention those presidents, priests, and Pharaohs who 
were well aware of the power of maps to persuade their people of a desirable political 
imagination.
29
 What is unique in this thesis’ approach is the merging of cartographic, 
iconographic, and semiographic theories to argue that EU maps are not neutral, value-free 
reflections of the real world, but that they are political texts inextricable from political 
imaginations embedded within Europeans’ consciousness. 
Importantly, this is not a study of the features and content of every single map 
produced by a pan-European institution, from the seating plan at the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 to the latest EU-sanctioned map uploaded to an EU website or printed in an 
EU pamphlet. Such an exhaustive study would require dozens of volumes and decades of 
research and, aside from being rather boring, would miss the point entirely. This thesis 
uniquely argues that EU maps in general engender a particular political imagination among 
the European public, whether that imagination is intentional or not (or both). An examination 
of EU maps’ projections, scale, graticules, colours, symbols, and so forth would be 
insufficient. Instead the thesis examines EU maps specifically marketed towards three 
hundred million Europeans as holistic devices. Put briefly, this thesis examines the theory 
that maps as a whole inevitably express a European political ambition, rather than 
positivistically pigeonholing the Union or laboriously dissecting every chart produced for 
Brussels in the last sixty years.
30
 
A broad variety of European symbols and icons exist, and some pioneering studies 
have already examined the various interpretations and meanings which can be elucidated 
from such symbols as the Union’s anthem, motto, flag, and currency, alongside more 
peripheral or emergent symbols including architecture, fashion, cuisine, religion, and 
                                                 
28
 For an exhaustive discussion see: J.B. Harley and David Woodward, The History of Cartography Vols. I-III  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); see especially Volume I Chapter One, ‘The Map and the 
Development of the History of Cartography’; Vol. I Chapter Two, Catherine Delano-Smith, ‘Prehistoric Maps 
and the History of Cartography: An Introduction’; and Vol. I Chapter Three, G. Malcolm Lewis, ‘The Origins of 
Cartography’. All volumes of the History of Cartography are now available free online courtesy of the 
University of Chicago Press: http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/HOC/HOC_V1/Volume1.html. 
29
 Jeremy Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2000); Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion, 2000); Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
30
 Michael Greenhalgh argues the same case in his examination of how Roman artefacts were received in the 
medieval world: ‘because intellectual history is wedded to ideas rather than objects, it does not necessarily help 
us with an investigation of what antiquities were available during the Middle Ages – but only with an 
explanation of the new context given to antique “traditions” and “influences”’. Like antiquities, this study is not 
concerned with listing what exists, but how these artefacts create discourses. Michael Greenhalgh, The Survival 
of Roman Antiquities in the Middle Ages (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 5 (emphasis added). 
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documents such as stamps and passports.
31
 While these studies vary in the meanings ascribed 
to particular symbols, there are some key themes which remain constant, and applicable to 
this study. First is the acknowledgement that there is no universal meaning which can be 
attached to a symbol. Second is the focus not on the intentions of a symbol’s creators, but the 
interpretations of its users. This is key for three reasons.  
Firstly, European symbols – like those of any organisation – are only understandable 
in reference to others. This is a classic element of semiotics. The individual words in this 
sentence have meanings on their own, but an overall, holistic meaning can only be derived by 
placing each word in relation to the others in the sentence. It is precisely the same with 
symbols. As we will see later, a map is a meaningless mess unless we can establish meaning 
by cross-referencing it against other emblems. To appreciate the discourses embedded in 
maps, we must refer to other icons which intersect with and overlap maps – colours, flags, 
mottos, icons, and so forth.  
Secondly, European Union symbols are not always deliberately created by a faraway 
elite in Brussels and Strasbourg. The European Union follows in the footsteps of the Soviet 
Union in soliciting public competitions for symbols, with the public (or a bureaucratic 
committee) choosing their favourites. The EU’s flag, anthem, motto, currency, and other 
symbols were all chosen this way. Whether this is a matter of choosing a favourite, such as 
Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, or picking the best of a bad bunch, as in the case of the name of the 
currency, is irrelevant. European symbols are overwhelmingly the result of mass involvement 
or were already in wide use before simply being given a stamp of approval by an EU body,
32
 
and symbolic systems of the EU deliberately created by political elites have been, on the 
whole, dismal failures.
33
 Thus, the intentions of a symbol’s creator are not only less important 
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Importantly, see: Johan Fornhäs, Signifying €urope (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Michael 
Wintle, The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography Throughout the Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
32
 Fornhäs, Signifying €urope, pp. 103-112.  
33
 Johan Fornhäs semiotically deconstructs a curious example. Partly in response to a popular Italian children’s 
comic whose dastardly villain was named “Euroman”, and partly to encourage European childrens’ positive 
views of the Union and the coming single currency, in 1998 the European Commission sought to preach the 
values of the Union by commissioning artist Nicolas de Santis to create a superhero comic strip. Its main 
character – the blue-and-gold clad Nietzschean superman “Captain Euro” (whose catchprase is ‘Merciful 
Minerva!’) – is assisted by his rich, elitist sidekicks “Europa”, “Pythagoras”, and the Romanian wolf “Lupo” in 
using ‘culture and logic - not violence - to take control’ in various quests to defend the European Union and 
European culture. Such high-octane, edge-of-the-seat missions befitting a continent-defending superhero 
include: playing tennis, ensuring that museums remain open to the public, turning off taps to save water, and 
somewhat bizarrely, building sapient, chess-playing robots which are then inexplicably possessed by the souls 
of Ancient Greek philosophers who are somehow familiar with latest EU cultural policies. The comic series’ 
master villain is (strangely) the laissez-faire capitalist “Dr D. Vider”, who seeks ‘to divide Europe and create his 
own empire’. Whether this is a criticism of his own or of empire is unclear. Curiously, the secret lairs of both 
Captain Euro and Dr D. Vider are inscribed with enormous maps ‘representing a world without boundaries 
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than interpretation, but focusing on intention over interpretation might actually be counter-
productive.  
Thirdly, this thesis is based on the a priori assumption that the meanings of symbols 
and symbolic language matter to we, the public. It must be conceded that this could be a 
faulty premise. Perhaps symbols and icons do not matter, and thus this study would be 
completely pointless. This apparent impasse could only be proved or disproved by 
conducting interviews – and as a small selection of Europeans is not necessarily indicative of 
wider trends, let alone generational, political, cultural and geographical variations which 
could produce wildly different answers in different areas of Europe,
34
 a definitive conclusion 
could only be arrived at by interviewing every one of the three hundred and thirty-two 
million citizens of the European Union who are exposed to EU emblems. Aside from the 
somewhat weighty data which this number of interviews would generate, participant research 
has not been conducted for reasons which are elaborated in Chapters Four and Five, including 
the ultimate problem of trying to determine whether peoples’ thoughts are really their own, 
and whether people are really as influenced by emblems as they might claim in an interview. 
EU citizens cannot agree on the political connotations of Nazi and Soviet symbols, let alone 
share a universal interpretation of the power, significance, and meaning of the European 
Union’s symbols. This suggests that symbols do matter to European Union citizens, and also 
points at another solution to this third problem – whether symbols really matter to people or 
not, political elites believe that they matter. Manufacturing EU pamphlets, EU websites, EU 
flags, EU holidays, EU competitions, and EU coffee mugs – all proudly emblazoned with 
                                                                                                                                                        
where no country is favoured - or spared!’. The comics are not so much entertaining as painfully embarrassing, 
and the comic strip appears to have fizzled out after critics pointed out that the contrast between the snobbish, 
Aryan, irritatingly perfect Übermensch superheroes and the ethnic, pop-culture peddling, circus-owning villains 
was unsettlingly sinister. Existing issues can still be viewed at http://www.captaineuro.com/. Fornhäs 
semiotically deconstructs the discourse-laden comics in detail not simply because they are so terrible, but 
because they illustrate just how difficult it is, even with Europe’s rich history, for EU bodies to manufacture a 
singly identity myth – one must emerge of its own accord, not be imposed from above. Fornhäs, Signifying 
€urope, pp. 27-36. As of 2013, Captain Euro has been joined by a new comic strip featuring ‘Anna and Alex’, 
two teenage vigilantes dedicated to overthrowing forgers of Euro banknotes. See: http://www.new-euro-
banknotes.eu/press/pdfonline/ANNA_ALEX_EN/index.html. For an early discussion of the power of European 
media and material culture in promoting an EU identity, see Michael Wintle (ed.), Culture and Identity in 
Europe (Avebury: Ashgate Publishing, 1996), pp. 1-9, 177-200. 
34
 A foreshadowing of this is visible in EU citizens’ attitudes to non-EU political symbols. During Germany’s 
presidency of the EU in 2007, the German government proposed a bill which would ban the swastika across the 
European Union, but the bill was defeated after protests from the British Sikh and Hindu communities who still 
use the swastika as a religious icon. Further East a similar problem emerged with the symbolic relics of the 
USSR – despite prohibition of Soviet symbols in Poland and Lithuania, similar attempts to ban the hammer and 
sickle across the EU have been defeated by Western European MEPs after debates in the European Parliament, 
much to the chagrin of Eastern European EU members. ‘Swastika ban left out of EU’s racism law’, The 
Scotsman 23 July 2013, http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/swastika-ban-left-out-of-eu-s-racism-law-
1-680863; ‘EU refuses to ban denial of communist crimes’, Russia Today 23 December 2010, 
http://rt.com/politics/european-commission-communist-crimes/; ‘New Polish law equates Communist and Nazi 
symbols’, Russia Today 30 November 2009, http://rt.com/politics/poland-bans-communist-symbols/. 
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political symbols – is not cheap,35 and political actors would not produce these symbols 
unless they believed that symbols really do influence people. Even if political symbols are 
completely ignored by Europeans (which, based on evidence of heated squabbles in the 
European Parliament over the visibility of Nazi and Soviet symbols in the Union, is unlikely 
in the extreme), the organisations which disseminate these symbols believe that symbols have 
power, and act upon that belief. The result is perhaps a self-fulfilling prophecy: elites believe 
that symbols matter to the masses, thus elites manufacture millions of symbols and market 
them to the populace who thus believe, on the basis of this bombardment, that symbols 
matter.  
All of these three points will be examined in turn throughout the chapters of the 
thesis. We have established the structure, limits, and focus of the research project. Thus with 
José Barroso’s description of European Empire as our starting point, we begin – with empire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 To cite one example: in 2011 the EU’s borders agency, Frontex, spent €36,781.31 on gifts to be given out free 
at corporate conferences, emblazoned with the organisation’s new logo. At this cost, disseminating visual 
identity is clearly deemed important by Union agencies. See: ‘Annual list of law contracts (between 25,000 and 
60,000 EUR) concluded by Frontex in 2011’, available at: 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Contracts_awarded/Contracts_awa
rded_in_2011.pdf. 
15 
 
Chapter Two 
All Roads Lead to Rome 
 
‘Only that which has no history is definable.’36 
 
Friederich Nietzsche 
On the Genealogy of Morals, II.13 
 
Our quest for empire begins in what might at first be thought an unusual place. We 
commence not in the gleaming glass conference halls of the European Parliament, where 
elected officials applaud our Unity in Diversity. Nor in the conspiratorial corridors of Queen 
Victoria’s Colonial Office, where bewhiskered bureaucrats dissect their maps and wipe out 
nations with the stroke of a pen, all in the apparent name of civilisation. Nor even in the 
treacherous marble rotunda of the Roman Senate, where plutocrats pontificate on the 
privileges of patrocinium, blissfully unaware that their dying Republic will soon be trampled 
beneath the heels of Julius Caesar’s coming legions. Our story, the genesis and evolution of 
empire, begins in a rather more colourful place. 
We find ourselves in a gaudy, over-decorated room in the Bucoleon Palace of 
Constantinople,
37
 capital of the ‘Byzantine’ or Eastern Roman Empire, on a Saturday 
afternoon in the summer of 968 AD, where two high-ranking diplomats are engaged in a 
furious shouting-match over a word neither of them seems to quite understand. One man is 
the Frankish bishop, Liudprand of Cremona, on temporary secondment as ambassador from 
Otto I of the Holy Roman Empire. The other is the princely Leo Phokas, Master of 
Ceremonies for the court of Constantinople and brother of the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus 
II. The argument in the Bucoleon Palace that day was recorded in a long, sycophantic diary 
kept by Liudprand to show to his monarch back home, and it is worth investigating in full. 
For the episode casts light upon the very essence of that single, monumentally troublesome 
word over which our contemporary politicians, journalists, and scholars tirelessly replicate 
the same fierce argument of that angry afternoon in Constantinople. 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Friederich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo [trans. Walter Kaufmann] (New York: 
Random House, 1989), p. 62. 
37
 John Rosser, The A-Z of Byzantium (Lanham, MA: Scarecrow Press, 2006), p. 177; Edward Luttwak, The 
Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 185; John Julius 
Norwich, Byzantium: The Early Centuries (London: Viking, 1988), p. 386.  
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 ‘On the fourth of June we arrived at Constantinople, and after a miserable 
reception, meant as an insult to yourselves, we were given the most miserable and 
disgusting quarters. The palace where we were confined was certainly large and 
open, but it neither kept out the cold nor kept in the heat. Armed soldiers were set out 
to guard us and prevent my people from going out, and any others from coming in. 
This dwelling, only accessible to us who were shut inside it, was so far distant from 
the Emperor’s residence that we were quite out of breath when we walked there – we 
did not ride. To add to our troubles, the Greek wine we found undrinkable because of 
the mixture in it of pitch, resin and plaster. The house itself had no water and we 
could not even buy any to quench our thirst. All this was a serious “Oh dear me!”, 
but there was another “Oh dear me” even worse, and that was our warden, the man 
who provided us with our daily wants. If you were to seek another like him, you 
certainly would not find him on earth; you might perhaps in Hell. Like a raging 
torrent he poured upon us every calamity, every extortion, every expense, every grief 
and misery that he could invent. In our one hundred and twenty days not one passed 
without bringing to us groaning and lamentation. 
On the fourth of June, as I said above, we arrived at Constantinople and 
waited with our horses in heavy rain outside the Carian Gate until five o’clock in the 
afternoon. At five o’clock [Emperor] Nicephorus ordered us to be admitted on foot, 
for he did not think us worthy to use the horses with which your clemency had 
provided us, and we were escorted to the aforesaid hateful, waterless, draughty stone 
house. On the sixth of June, which was the Saturday before Pentecost, I was brought 
before the Emperor’s brother Leo, Marshal of the Court and Chancellor; and there 
we tired ourselves with a fierce argument over your imperial title. He called you not 
“emperor”, which is Basileus in his tongue, but – most insultingly – Rex, which is 
“king” in ours. I told him that the thing meant was the same though the word was 
different, and he then said that I had come not to make peace but to stir up strife. 
Finally he got up in a rage...’38 
Liudprand of Cremona 
Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana I-II 
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 John Julius Norwich, A Short History of Byzantium (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 193-194; F.A. Wright 
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It would be difficult to disagree with the historian John Julius Norwich’s assessment 
that more than a thousand years after his death, Liudprand still deserves some retrospective 
sympathy for his especially bad day.
39
 But discounting for the moment a wry smile, let us 
consider how Liudprand’s complaint reveals the essence of empire.  
 Upon arrival into the capital city of a Greek monarch who perceives himself to be 
God’s hand-picked regent and equal of the Apostles,40 and who looks down upon Western 
Europeans as presumptuous, conceited barbarians, Liudprand is, by his own admission, 
thirsty, cold, exhausted, far from home as he has travelled the breadth of the world known to 
tenth-century Europeans,
41
 soaked to the bone after spending the whole day lingering 
pointlessly outside the city walls in a torrential downpour, incessantly harangued by the 
hellish concierge of his wretched accommodations, and when refreshment finally arrives it 
comes in the form of a wine cocktail that would make even the most courageous connoisseur 
think twice.
42
 Yet what is most curious in Liudprand’s litany of woe is that the gravest 
offence – in his own words ‘most insultingly’ – comes not from any of these physical 
hardships, but from a dispute over the correct form of address for his monarch.  
This critical aspect is easily overlooked given the almost comical catalogue of doom 
which Liudprand subsequently records during his depressing sojourn in Constantinople.
43
 But 
the initial spat between Liudprand and Leo, easily dismissed as just another example of the 
Byzantines’ legendary belligerence over single words,44 or merely one of many of the 
characteristic diplomatic squabbles sparked by Frankish swaggering and the Byzantines’ self-
anointed supremacy, is invaluably important.  
Exasperated, Liudprand records that he and Leo argued to the point of exhaustion 
over how to refer to Liudprand’s superior: the recently-crowned Otto I of the Holy Roman 
Empire, referred to in the West using the Latin word Imperator. This word had once 
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designated a military honour in the Roman Republic, but as we shall see later the term 
morphed into one of several titles bestowed upon Roman rulers in Late Antiquity. Meanwhile 
the monarch of Constantinople, Nicephorus II, also referring to himself as an emperor by 
using the approximate Greek term Basileus,
45
 rejects Otto’s equivalent title. When the 
Byzantine Chancellor refers to Otto as a lowly rex (king) rather than a full Imperator, 
Liudprand’s vitriolic response is to claim that Basileus and Imperator have the same meaning 
despite being different words, and that he will not suffer to refer to his Imperator Otto as a 
mere rex.
46
 The Chancellor, as Liudprand records, storms away in a huff, refusing to 
acknowledge Otto as an equal to Nicephorus who, as Basileus of Constantinople, is the 
rightful – and only – Emperor of the Roman Empire. This may appear little more than an 
amusing aside into the intricacies of difficult diplomacy between two equally unhelpful 
ambassadors, but in fact it illuminates the very nature of empire. 
 In their room at the Bucoleon Palace, Liudprand and Leo are squabbling over a single 
word. Although the two men are shouting at each other in Greek,
47
 the word causing so much 
trouble is Latin. This is Otto’s title of Imperator, a derivative of imperium. Liudprand and 
Leo’s argument over the use of Imperator is not mere pettiness. The word imperium is the 
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root of our modern word empire and its equivalents in all contemporary Romance and Baltic 
languages:
48
 the word over which modern scholars replicate Leo and Liudprand’s shouting 
match. And disagreements over the use and even the validity of the word, more than a mere 
symptom of Byzantium’s ‘obsession with empty titles’, 49 had long preceded Liudprand’s 
arrival in Constantinople. Indeed the origin of our fluid word empire, and its existence as a 
discourse rather than a specific term, is found not in the writings and proclamations of 
classical Rome but yet again in the Early Middle Ages, spawning numerous episodes 
exacerbating the already tense international politics between Franks and Byzantines. To 
illustrate, let us examine a later extract from Liudprand’s diary: 
 
‘To increase my calamities, on the day of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary 
the holy mother of God, an ill-omened embassy came from the apostolic and 
universal Pope John with a letter asking Nicephorus “the emperor of the 
Greeks” to conclude an alliance and firm friendship with his beloved and 
spiritual son Otto, “august emperor of the Romans”. If you ask me how these 
words, and manner of address, which to the Greeks seem sinful audacity, did 
not cost the bearer his life and overwhelm it even before they were read, I 
cannot answer. On other points I have often shown a fine and copious flow of 
words; on this I am as dumb as a fish. The Greeks abused the sea, cursed the 
waves, and wondered exceedingly how they could have transported such an 
iniquity, and why the deep had not opened up to swallow the ship. “The 
audacity of it!” they cried, “to call the universal emperor of the Romans, the 
one and only Nicephorus, the great, the august, ‘emperor of the Greeks’! And 
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to style a poor barbaric creature ‘emperor of the Romans!’ O sky! O earth! O 
sea! What shall we do with these scoundrels?”’50 
Liudprand of Cremona 
Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana XLVII 
 
As Liudprand records, the Byzantines of the tenth century were not exactly happy at 
treating the Frankish monarch as an equal to their own emperor, nor were they overjoyed at 
being expected to share the title Emperor of Rome with Otto, a man they saw as a primitive 
savage. To receive such a letter from ‘a jumped-up barbarian chieftain ... now calling himself 
Emperor’51 was not only a grotesque insult to the Byzantines but an affront to political and 
theological propriety. For it was Constantinople, not Rome, which was the continuation of 
“Rome”. This is an invaluable point, so let us more closely examine this moment in the 
Bucoleon Palace.  
The court of Constantinople is in a rage at the Pope’s letter and as the nearest Western 
European within earshot, Liudprand is now being harangued by angry Byzantine courtiers. 
Following its abandonment as the Imperial capital centuries before and having been besieged 
and sacked a dozen times since by barbarians and Byzantines, the actual town of Rome is 
now ‘a sad and distinctly seedy city, decimated by malaria and showing little trace of its 
former splendour’,52 inhabited – in the words of the Chief Eunuch of the Bucoleon Palace – 
by ‘vile slaves, fishermen, confectioners, poulterers, bastards, plebeians, underlings’, under a 
‘silly blockhead of a Pope’.53 For, as the eunuch makes clear, ‘the sacred Constantine 
transferred to this city [Constantinople] the imperial sceptre, the Senate, and all the Roman 
knighthood’.54 This is crucial. “Rome” is not, in the Byzantines’ eyes, the actual town. It is 
not even the bricks and mortar of Constantinople. Instead, it is Constantinople as inheritor of 
an ideal. For while the Italian city – in Byzantine eyes – was abandoned by Emperor 
Constantine and subsequently slid into a squatters’ slum, it is Constantinople which continues 
the ideal of what Rome used to be before the glittering city of Severus and Seneca was laid 
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low by the barbarian ancestors of Liudprand and Otto – who now dares call himself emperor. 
It was to Constantinople, the Byzantines believe, that Constantine the Great brought the best 
of “Rome”, leaving the rest to rot in the dying West. And as they worship Jesus rather than 
Jupiter, the Byzantines represent not only what Rome used to be, but what Rome should be.
55
  
The concept that “Rome” is a malleable idea rather than something fixed in a 
particular space and a particular time, is the very essence of empire as a discourse. The angry 
courtiers insulting Liudprand over Pope John’s letter shed light on this distinction. Empire – 
for them Imperium Romanorum – exists not in space or time, but in the collective 
consciousness. It is a discourse: something which the classical Romans, aware of the 
cosmology of “Rome” as an ideal destined to rule the world, had been quite aware.56 This is 
tricky, so in order to clarify the argument being made let us return again to the past. This 
time, to the very origin of empire as a discourse.  
 Our scene shifts from a Byzantine summer in 968 to an Italian winter over a century 
and a half earlier. It is shortly before noon on Christmas Day, 800 AD, and we find ourselves 
amidst a small huddle of bishops and nobles shivering in the gloomy Romanesque nave of the 
old St. Peter’s Basilica, in the heart of Rome. At the altar, Pope Leo III is hiding a crown 
randomly rummaged from the Vatican’s treasury57 while mentally rehearsing a Latin 
translation of the Byzantine rite for proclaiming a new emperor, waiting to begin Mass. 
Meanwhile the ageing Frankish warlord Charlemagne, King of the Franks and conqueror of 
the largest single polity in Western Europe since the days of the Caesars, shuffles up the aisle 
to pray. The scene is recorded by four scholars: Charlemagne’s friend Einhard (who may or 
may not have actually been there),
58
 an anonymous scribe compiling the official Frankish 
records in the abbey of Lorsch, an equally anonymous scribe writing the official Papal 
records in Rome, and some eight decades later the Frankish chronicler Notker the Stammerer: 
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‘Thus Charles [Charlemagne] travelled to Rome to restore the state of the 
Church, which was extremely disturbed, and he spent the whole winter there. 
It was at this time that he received the title of Emperor [Imperator] and 
Augustus. At first he disliked this so much that he said that he would not have 
entered the church that day, even though it was a great feast day, if he had 
known in advance of the Pope’s plan. But he bore the animosity that the 
assumption of this title caused with great patience, for the Roman emperors 
[the Byzantines] were angry about it.’59 
Einhard 
Vita Karoli, xxix 
 
 
‘On the most holy day of Christmas, when the king [Charlemagne] rose from 
prayer in front of the shrine of blessed apostle Peter, to take part in the Mass, 
Pope Leo placed a crown on his head, and he was hailed by the whole Roman 
people: To the august Charles, crowned by God, the great and peaceful 
Imperator of the Romans, life and victory! After the acclamations the pope 
addressed him in the manner of the old imperators. The name of Patricius 
was now abandoned and he was called Imperator and Augustus.’60 
Anon. 
Royal Frankish Annals, 801 
 
 
‘Afterwards when the birthday of our Lord Jesus Christ arrived, they [the 
nobles and clergy] gathered again in St Peter’s. Then with his own hands the 
venerable bountiful pontiff crowned him [Charlemagne] with a precious 
crown, and all the faithful Romans seeing how much he defended and how 
greatly he loved the holy Roman church and its vicar ... cried aloud with one 
accord: “To Charles, pious Augustus crowned by God, great and pacific 
Imperator, life and victory!” ... and by them all he was established as 
Imperator of the Romans.’61 
Anon. 
Liber Pontificalis, II.xxiii 
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‘As Charles stayed in Rome for a few days for the sake of the army, the 
bishop of the apostolic see [the Pope] called together all who were able to 
come from the neighbouring districts and then, in their presence and in the 
presence of all the counts of the unconquered Charles [Charlemagne],  he 
declared him to be Imperator and Defender of the Roman Church. Now 
Charles had no guess of what was coming; and, though he could not refuse 
what seemed to have been divinely preordained for him, nevertheless he 
received his new title with no show of thankfulness. For first he thought that 
the Greeks [the Byzantines] would be fired by greater envy than ever and 
would plan some harm against the kingdom of the Franks.’62 
Notker the Stammerer 
Gesta Karoli, xxvi 
 
 
 What is the relevance, it might be asked, of this moment when Pope Leo gave 
Charlemagne the apparently unexpected title Imperator?
63
 The official records on both sides 
– the Royal Frankish Annals and the Liber Pontificalis – report the events of Christmas Day 
800 in a very matter-of-fact way, with little commentary. The answer partly lies in the 
comments made by Einhard and Notker the Stammerer: the Byzantines were perturbed. Their 
indignation was not simply due to their sense of protocol being piqued,
64
 but that in 
bestowing the title Imperator on Charlemagne and proclaiming Imperium, Pope Leo 
committed two acts.  
The first was to publicly declare to Byzantium that the Franks were not those same 
barbarians who scavenged from the carcass of Rome in the twilight of Antiquity, but were 
now civilised possessors of equal (if not greater) prestige, dignity, privilege, legitimacy, and 
authority as the self-styled “Romans” (Rhōmaiō) in Constantinople. The subsequent tension 
explains why, one hundred and eighty-six years later, Liudprand of Cremona found himself 
an unwelcome guest in Constantinople, as ambassador from a Westerner who perceived 
himself to be the equal of the monarch in the East. The Pope’s second act, though, was of 
infinitely greater importance. For on Christmas Day 800, Pope Leo manufactured an 
imaginary history and a self-anointed status of “civilisation”, and insodoing unwittingly 
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created a discourse which, over the next twelve centuries, would evolve into the concept over 
which so much ink is angrily spilled today. 
 In St. Peter’s in 800, the Bucoleon Palace in 968, and innumerable other episodes in 
which Franks, Byzantines, and the successors of both, competed for the privilege, legitimacy, 
authority, and prestige afforded by recognition as defenders of civilisation and order, the 
word causing so much tension remained the same. This was imperium – the Imperium 
Romanum which Constantinople’s medieval rulers claimed to have inherited, in an unbroken 
chain, when Constantine the Great moved the capital and thus the essence of “Rome” from a 
dying West to the vigorous East, and the rival Imperium Romanum which Pope Leo 
resurrected in defiance of Constantinople. It is little wonder that, as Liudprand records, he 
and Prince Leo spent a whole day arguing over which word to use. For imperium is one of the 
most discussed yet ill-defined terms in politics. 
 We will return to the Franks and the Byzantines, and what their squabbles tell us 
about empire, in due course. But first it is necessary to examine how contemporary scholars 
still cannot agree on what empire is, and the consequences this has for academic research. 
Otherwise, like Liudprand in the Bucoleon Palace, despite our fine and copious flow of words 
we may find ourselves as dumb as a fish. 
 
 
2.1 ‘My empire is of the imagination’65  
 
So speaks Ayesha, the ruthless white queen of a mythical African realm in H. Rider 
Haggard’s classic 1887 novel She. Aware that her coercive power over her populace is 
virtually nil, and that her hobby of dabbling in random atrocities is insufficient to control her 
brutalised people, Ayesha clings onto her crown not through actual power but the image of 
power. By encouraging a particular imagination among the population, she can manipulate 
her masses. Her power thus lies not in a reflection of actual rule, but in a representation of 
supreme sovereignty and legitimacy through connection to a fabricated past, and by peddling 
to her people an illusory history which justifies the present. 
Europe is no stranger to illusory histories. Following the gradual fading-away of 
Caesar’s Rome, the continent ‘divided into so many independent and hostile states’,66 
phantoms of imperium legitimising their own existence through overt connections back to a 
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version of Rome which suited their imaginations. Nor has Europe only been empire, it has 
had “empire”: a critical distinction.67 The Age of Discovery took Europe’s squabbles to the 
rest of the world, eventually carving up the Earth in a scramble for exploitable colonies to 
fuel rivalry at home. It is only in the last half-century, following the cataclysm of two world 
wars driven in part by aggressive ambitions among European states seeking to impose their 
version of order and legitimacy upon the landmass, that the continent has settled. Yet this is 
not to say that Europeans have abandoned empire in the murky mists of history.  
 In recent decades, academia, journalism, and popular commentary have seen a 
renaissance in discussions of political empire.
68
 Much of this has been directed at the world’s 
last surviving hyperpower and its geopolitical, cultural, and economic reach since the end of 
the Cold War.
69
 The quantity of literature on modern post-Cold War empire suggests that the 
phenomenon is far from dead. We might not go as far as John Darwin in stating that empire 
remains alive to the extent that we live in Tamerlane’s shadow,70 but the point remains 
pertinent. We face not only the legacies of empire, but its continued existence in new 
incarnations.  
Framing the European Union as empire has obvious implications because, as Stephen 
Howe unequivocally reminds us, empire and imperialism are ‘inherently immoral or 
illegitimate’ concepts in the politics of the modern world.71 Imperial is an undesirable tag, 
one with connotations of monopolistic violence and unequal social relations, manifest as 
hierarchies of gender, race, religion, or class. It is understandable why governments deny the 
imperial label with such vehemence, and why the use of the term causes controversy when 
applied to the European Union. Empire is equally undesirable: a word invoking those 
political projects which ‘ought to remain buried in the marble and sepia pasts’.72 As Michael 
Ignatieff asserts, ‘nobody likes empires’.73 Yet this is far from an obituary of empire. 
Amongst the states seeking to establish and reinforce new identities in a world which is 
simultaneously undergoing globalisation and regionalisation, perhaps none are as unusual, 
and as difficult to categorise, as the European Union. This ‘somewhat strange 
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hermaphrodite’74 exhibits the traits of many polities. It has features of a nation-state, 
indicators of a federation, and – as a growing body of International Relations theorists posit – 
characteristics of empire.  
 As a mere word, empire means different things to different scholars. It is both specific 
and vague, both ad hoc and established. This is both a strength and a weakness for the critical 
researcher. Empire is adaptable and can be seen in many geopolitical forms, but at the same 
time it is a vague and slippery portmanteau which eludes even the most basic of universal 
definitions. If we are to examine whether the European Union is empire, it is necessary first 
to examine just what we mean.  
 It is perhaps ironic that although the concept of single, exclusive sovereignty has 
existed in European intellectual thought since the Delian League of Classical Greece,
75
 
arriving at a definition for empire is the equivalent of untying the Gordian Knot. A cursory 
glance at academic literature from only the last decade reveals that empire defies all efforts to 
restrict it to a bounded definition – a pattern seemingly constant throughout intellectual 
history. Imaginations of empire are influenced by the historiography of chroniclers writing at 
their own time,
76
 while public perceptions of empire oscillate over time between adoration 
and embarrassment – as perceptions of British colonialism in the last hundred years 
demonstrate.
77
 In light of such erratic interpretations of what empire is and should be, an 
examination of its characteristics must proceed with intellectual caution.  
 What is empire? This question is asked by a broad spectrum of scholars, many of 
whose works
78
 begin with the same inquiry in order to construct a plausible definition, a neat 
term which encompasses the core theories, concepts, and characteristics of the word within 
well-defined and clearly-delineated terminological borders. But it is not surprising that this 
approach – a conceptual hangover from the well-intentioned but misguided days of objective 
geography and positivist political science – is a ‘notoriously ambivalent and highly contested 
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concept’.79 Like its historical and theoretical cousins globalisation,80 modernity,81 and 
postcolonialism,
82
 empire defies attempts to fix a standard definition.
83
 As a word it means 
everything and nothing.
84
 Stephen Howe acknowledges this tendency to understand empire 
only as one aspect of a broader project involving such terms as ‘informal empire, sub-
imperialism, cultural imperialism, internal colonialism, Postcolonialism, and many more’.85 
Yet to understand a word only by relating to similarly poorly-defined words, is equally 
unsatisfactory.  
Literature on the nature of empire is vast, intersecting interdisciplinary links and 
creating chronological connections across the history of the humanities and social sciences. 
As such, a comprehensive survey of academic works discussing the nature of empire will not 
be presented. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, tackling this volume of academic 
literature is a labour worthy of Hercules. This is not to say that a thorough and rigorous 
review of the literature is impossible, but rather that a clear focus must be maintained on 
European understandings. The majority of academic discussions of modern empire – such as 
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those offered by Michael Ignatieff,
86
 Bernard Porter,
87
 Michael Cox,
88
 and Simon Dalby
89
 – 
focus on the United States, with only cursory mentions of Europe. Much of this literature is 
itself bound up in discussions of ‘Might and Right’ in military and diplomatic terminology,90 
while even recent polemics on historical empire cannot escape explicit connections with our 
own time.
91
 We are not particularly interested in this vast literature as it has no connection to 
discussions of the European Union, whose military impotence and virtual absence of 
American-style jingoistic and self-righteous nationalism disqualify the EU from being 
considered empire under the criteria laid out by scholarly discussions of post-Cold War 
“American Empire”. 
Secondly, much of the literature on empire focuses, explicitly or implicitly, on 
empirical examples from human history. Europe certainly has no shortage of empirical 
empire, but only one case study is to be examined – the European Union. Attempts to link the 
European Union with historical themes and even specific polities will be examined, but only 
because these links are self-fulfilling prophecies. It is not necessary to sift through the 
countless examples of empire in order to construct an arbitrary and arguably pointless link 
between the contemporary European Union and one of the spectres of Europe’s imperial past. 
Thirdly, an exhaustive review of all the different thoughts on what empire is will not 
lead us towards our ultimate goal. It is not the intention here to construct a framework 
through which we can accuse the European Union of empire, pointing to the policies and 
actions of Brussels in search of an imperial agenda. This itself is not feasible for two reasons. 
One is that such an approach to empire, seeking to identify clear and unique characteristics, is 
fundamentally flawed. Empire defies categorisation – every crime laid at its feet,92 and every 
imperial virtue praised by its supporters,
93
 exists in the context of other forms of government 
from the city-states of monarchical Mesopotamia to the nation-states of the democratising, 
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Digital Age world. Another is that, as Philip Pomper makes clear, ‘states fulfilling the formal 
definitions of empire are not to be found’.94 This is not to say that empire has vanished, but 
rather that the term empire is no longer a word which is triumphantly and publicly 
proclaimed. In order to understand Europe we must first – in light of the above – understand 
how different scholars interpret empire in a specifically European context.  
Empire, as the editors of the Dictionary of Human Geography suggest, is commonly 
understood in its classic sense as ‘an extensive territory and polity, encompassing diverse 
lands and peoples, that is ruled, more or less directly and effectively, by a single person’.95 
This would appear to be a model answer, even allowing the editors to confidently assert that 
‘there have been over 70 empires in history – including those created by the Romans, Incas, 
Habsburgs and Ottomans, and by Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union’.96 Notwithstanding 
that the Incas, Habsburgs, and Japan were not even aware of each others’ existence, and that 
the Soviet Union defined itself as opposed to empire,
97
 it is perhaps a stretch to imagine that 
the precise same form of political organisation (and legitimisation) has existed in complete 
isolation in different parts and eras of human history. It is thus unsurprising that an immediate 
qualifier is attached to the model answer: ‘Empire has taken diverse forms and eludes a single 
meaning or definition’.98 Yet this definition nevertheless points to a near-universal theme in 
defining empire – that it is, at its most basic level, a specific and territorial phenomenon. 
Empire means many things to many writers. Bernard Porter highlights this semantic 
difficulty by reminding us that not only the meaning, but the interpretation and perception, of 
empire and its semantic sibling imperialism has shifted significantly over time, with the result 
that identifying empire becomes a near-impossible task.
99
 Much existing literature only 
exacerbates this problem, by stretching the definitions of the word until empire can mean 
anything we want it to.
100
 While it is an ironic ‘imperialism of categories’101 to impose a 
single definition upon an extraordinarily complex collection – such as the aforementioned 
crowbarring of Inca, Habsburg, and Soviet political philosophies into a handy, “one-size-fits-
all” definition of empire – some form of order is nevertheless necessary if we are to make 
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sense of this conceptual chaos. As such, the literature examined below is grouped into two 
categories based upon their fundamental answers as to what empire is. These are: empire as 
defined by characteristics, and empire as a historical phenomenon. 
 
 
2.1.1 ‘Murder, incest, and the wearing of expensive jewellery’102 
 
Treating empire as a phenomenon based upon its characteristics, is – as the above tongue-in-
cheek definition offered by Peter Davidson suggests – far from satisfactory. The immediate 
problem is that a writer can define empire according to whatever characteristics they wish. 
This is a circular problem. In the absence of an agreed definition, scholars are forced to create 
their own, yet this only perpetuates the absence of an agreed definition. Attempting to break 
out of this loop by insisting on a single checklist of characteristics is even less satisfactory – 
for who is qualified to declare, ex cathedra, what does and does not count? 
This brings us back to each definition being unique, united only in their diversity. In 
seeking to identify an imperial ontology, Charles Maier asserts that societies popularly 
termed empire share fundamental features, that ‘no matter how they differ in culture and 
governance, they reveal many common characteristics’.103 But scholars who identify empire 
as the expression of a particular combination of characteristics, rarely, if ever, agree on the 
nature of said features. In the absence of a more negotiable structure, these can be divided 
into empire as defined by size and diversity, and empire as defined by exclusive violence. 
Perhaps the most common characteristic cited in identification of empire is the 
existence of what Howe describes as ‘a large, composite, multi-ethnic or multinational 
political unit, usually created by conquest, divided between a dominant centre and 
subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries’.104 This combination, or an approximation 
thereof, forms the basis for a number of mainstream interpretations of empire. Ulrich Beck 
and Edgar Grande adopt such an approach, defining the EU as empire by ten characteristics 
ranging from asymmetrical political order through to emancipatory cosmopolitanism.
105
 Yet 
as many subscribers to the characterisable camp acknowledge,
106
 themes such as broad 
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territorial holdings, territorial integrity or continuity, and the existence of a multi-cultural 
populace, can be applied to any number of polities – including nation-states and federations 
who vociferously deny any link to empire.
107
  
Territorial integrity is an immediate problem. A.N. Wilson identifies this in relation to 
Britain’s self-proclaimed declaration of Empire in 1876, wherein concern was raised that 
calling Britain’s far-flung maritime colonies “empire” was invalid as empire was popularly 
interpreted as being territorially coherent.
108
 Yet this does not dissuade scholarship from 
referring to the British “Empire”. To again cite a more recent example, we might feel 
justified in following Ryszard Kapuściński by labelling the Soviet Union as Empire.109 But 
for all the USSR’s vast size and territorial coherence this is not enough to casually label it as 
such. The modern Russian Federation still comprises the vast majority of Soviet territory, still 
retains large multi-ethnic populations, and is still, with the exception of the Kaliningrad 
Oblast, territorially coherent. And yet the Kremlin does not term its governance empire. 
Neither, of course, did the Soviets. While modern scholars and contemporary commentators 
did, and do, refer to a Soviet Empire,
110
 it is doubtful that any career-conscious commissar 
would describe their brave new world as empire.  
As for empire as being characterisable purely by territorial size or ethnic diversity, 
where do we draw the line? While the question was raised by Dante in De Monarchia
111
 and 
more recently by Yannis Stivachtis,
112
 this is an obvious but overlooked question. There is no 
tipping-point at which annexing another square metre of land, or incorporating a few people 
who speak a vaguely different dialect, suddenly transforms a state into empire. This is 
illustrated by the coronation of Charlemagne: ‘the imperial crown brought with it not a single 
new subject or soldier, nor an acre of new territory’,113 and is illustrated in reverse by the 
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decline of Byzantium which, from a Mediterranean-spanning superpower in the sixth century, 
had by 1400 shrunk to the city of Constantinople and a few square miles beyond the walls, 
inhabited by a dwindling handful of mercenaries and monks. Yet this does not dissuade 
scholars from clearly differentiating between Charlemagne’s Kingdom and Charlemagne’s 
Empire, and no scholar argues that Byzantium suddenly transformed from empire to petty 
fiefdom once it shrivelled to a certain size. 
This concern over scale is also applicable to definitions of empire as an unequal 
relationship between ‘core and periphery’,114 wherein a powerful hegemon controls its 
neighbours for the purpose of shameless extraction and pillage. The model is certainly a valid 
one and reveals much concerning connections and clashes between cultural, political, social, 
and economic forces, and it is certainly easy to see core-periphery relationships in historical 
polities wherein a definitive urban, ethnic, or class-based core – such as the city of Rome, 
Victorian Britons, or the lickspittles at Napoleon’s court – conquered provinces, pillaged their 
underlings, and adopted the cultures of those they conquered.
115
 But defining empire purely 
based on this system is equally tricky. Core-periphery inequality can be identified in all 
manner of political systems. It would be difficult to claim that medieval manorial feudalism, 
wherein a core manor extracted surplus from, and wielded power over, peripheral peasant 
farmsteads, was a form of empire. And if it were so, we are left with a definition of empire 
which is again too broad to be useful. Classifying core-periphery as imperial by virtue of a 
vast scale, as does Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Empires theory,116 is again an invaluable 
insight but leaves us with the same question we identified above – where do we draw the line 
between non-empire and empire? If there is indeed a tipping-point, it is somewhere in the 
vast grey area between the two and identifying it is purely at the whim of the researcher, with 
no universal consensus. 
Territorial size aside, another frequently-cited and apparently definitive characteristic 
of empire is violence. Maier, who goes so far as to assert that the foundation of empire is 
blood,
117
 argues that ‘the ambition of empire, its territorial agenda, and its problematic 
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frontiers create an intimate and recurring bond with the recourse to force’.118 Richard Drayton 
takes this to a more emphatic conclusion, arguing that empire is little more than ‘the 
subordination of one community to a power that has the monopoly on legitimate violence 
within a frontier’.119 This characteristic of monopolistic violence is perhaps applicable to 
some polities which have called themselves “empire”, and is illustrated by those imaginations 
of the USA as an ‘American Empire’ reliant on its unparalleled military machine to wage a 
perpetual war on ‘barbaric threats to civilization’120. But this characteristic is neither 
definitive of empire nor is it pertinent to the EU. Violence is by no means exclusive to 
empire.
121
 It is arguable that the very nature of the State – any State – is that the State alone 
has the authority and legitimacy to perpetrate acts of violence against its populace.
122
 
Manifest violence is found in all manner of polities, while even structural violence is far from 
exclusive to the so-called empires.
123
 And if there is one polity which does not appear to be 
built on blood, it is the European Union. Perhaps instead, the answer lies in empire as a 
historical phase. 
 
 
2.1.2 ‘The Last Gasp of a Moribund System’ 124 
 
Thus is the description given by Lenin in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, 
perceiving imperialism and empire to be a stage in an inevitable historical process. While the 
exact nature of the stage can be disputed, the idea that empire is a phenomenon (specific to 
time and space) is an established interpretation. 
Empire is, as John Darwin argues, frequently perceived as a recent historical 
phenomenon rooted in European territories and European attitudes, a Modern Age expression 
of economic avarice and systemised social prejudice in which the non-industrial world 
became subordinated to Europe’s squabbling hegemonies in a quest for resources, power, and 
vainglorious pomp.
125
 Building upon the distinction between being and having empire, 
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Darwin acknowledges that appropriative empire – in which resources and peoples are 
extracted, usually violently, for the benefit of a static core – is perhaps understandable as a 
European invention of recent centuries. Similarly, a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of empire 
is historically based. While Marx himself had remarkably little to say on empire,
126
 Lenin’s 
hypothesis interprets empire and imperialism as the inevitable consequence of the capitalist 
mode of production and capitalism’s quest for new markets.127 Thus, empire in this sense 
emerges only at a particular period in the historical dialectic, as part of a unique and distinct 
merging of economy and geopolitics, and at a specific place and a particular moment in 
human history. Two problems emerge with this chronological approach of viewing empire as 
a time- and place-specific phenomenon.  
First is the blurring of empire and imperialism. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey 
remind us that the two may be related, but are distinguishable and not necessarily mutually 
inclusive.
128
 It is possible – as human history demonstrates – for a state which scholars would 
not hesitate to call empire to reject an imperial policy of actively annexing territory and 
assimilating other populations. The self-styled, pre-capitalist empires of Early Modern 
Europe, in particular the Holy Roman Empire, bear witness to empire’s ability to remain 
geopolitically fixed without trying to assimilate the world.
129
 Simultaneously, it is equally 
possible for a “non-empire”, for example an ethnically homogeneous nation-state, to pursue a 
foreign policy few would hesitate to dub imperial. Historical examples illustrate this. We 
could easily identify such a phenomenon in the rise of Venice, which, despite the city’s 
miniscule size in comparison to the vast hegemons of mainland Europe and despite its 
equally tiny and ethnically near-identical population, pursued a highly aggressive imperial 
policy of expansion, extraction, and conquest throughout the Early Modern Period.
130
 
Similarly, the jingoistic colonisers of late nineteenth-century Europe – particularly Britain 
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and France – demonstrated this tendency towards democratic, nationalistic imperialism:131 
the antithesis of empire’s purported polyculturalist assimilationism.132 Without wishing to 
obfuscate the issue, it is therefore necessary in this understanding to separate empire and 
imperialism as polity and policy. The policy of imperialism can be, and has been, pursued by 
all manner of political figureheads from Pharaohs to Presidents. Imperialism does not 
necessarily occur alongside, nor is exclusive to, empire. 
The second, related problem, is interpreting empire as the inevitable consequence of 
historical forces. We might concede that imperialism is a relatively recent by-product of 
capitalism. A term perhaps even more contested than empire, imperialism did not enter the 
modern lexicon until the early twentieth century
133
 and its meaning, established by Lenin and 
Hobson, stressed economic forces.
134
 It was not until Joseph Schumpeter that imperialism 
came to acquire a meaning of hard economic and military power, which even then was still 
bound up in the context of military power simply as a means to an economic, not geopolitical, 
end.
135
 
But this monocausal approach does not fit, even in the late-Victorian heyday of 
imperialism. Jonathan Hart points out the spectrum of factors which contributed to 
imperialist expansion – the desire for prestige, mission civilisatrice, geopolitical rivalry, and 
the actions of individuals expanding empire without consulting their governments
136
 – of 
which economic forces are only one factor.
137
  Indeed, given the extraordinarily low levels of 
colonial trade and investment which characterised non-British Victorian imperialism,
138
 the 
Marxist approach to viewing empire and imperialism as the product of commercial interests, 
is negligible. Furthermore, empire – in the understanding of a large, territorially-bound polity 
– far predates imperialism and indeed is older than any other form of organised society above 
the level of the Copper Age city-state.
139
 We are forced to conclude that while imperialism 
may offer an invaluable tool for understanding relations in the age of capitalism, this 
deterministic, historical-phenomenological approach to understanding empire in the entirety 
of human history is not completely adequate. 
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2.2 European Empire 
 
As Maier points out, attempting to conclusively apply or reject the label empire to any polity 
on the basis of its characteristics inevitably traps the argument in a logical loop, whereby the 
conclusion compels readers to return to the definition offered at the beginning.
140
 No single 
model which claims to define empire – be it through monopolistic access to violence, cultural 
heterogeneity, or geopolitical size – is either universal or satisfactory at distinguishing empire 
from a nation-state. Charles Porter sees the same problem when stating that empire ‘is only a 
word. You can use it any way you like (so long as you make that definition clear)’.141 This is 
empire’s greatest strength and most vulnerable weakness – the word is flexible and nuanced, 
but can so easily become vague or inappropriate. Ultimately it is as futile to establish a 
check-list of imperial characteristics as it is to construct links – and distinguish them from 
other political forms – between the purported empires of Incas, Habsburgs, and Soviets. 
It is neither necessary nor possible to examine the manifold ways in which empire has 
been interpreted even in recent years. Much contemporary discourse on empire surrounds the 
United States, which is not relevant to this thesis, while even in a specifically European 
context arguments are constructed upon the EU’s policies. This is equally irrelevant here. 
However, a review of existing imaginations of European Empire and their ‘different, fiercely 
contested meanings’142 in relation to the EU. It is to this point that we turn. 
 
 
2.2.1 Colonial Europe 
 
We will examine theories of European Empire both chronologically and thematically, as this 
approach enables us to construct a logical approach leading towards the next section’s 
discussion of empire as a discourse. This first segment therefore addresses the earliest 
reference to Europe as empire in the scholarly literature: József Böröcz’s claim of neo-
colonialism and economic empire. 
Böröcz highlights the Union’s Eastern Enlargement as the defining feature of 
European empire, a modern continuation of Western Europe’s historical role as prime 
advocate of an imperial-colonial teleology.
143
 Böröcz’s argument that the Union considers 
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itself to be the Europe to the exclusion of non-EU Europe, and that the Union enforces this 
through a conscious policy of exclusion, is perhaps the dominant characteristic of this 
imperial model. Böröcz interprets the Union as an exclusionist polity which pursues a 
somewhat haphazard and ad hoc approach to empire, reflective of the on-the-spot nature of 
so much nineteenth-century European foreign policy.
144
 Of particular relevance is the issue of 
whether Eastern Enlargement reflects not only an imperialist policy of territorial expansion, 
but whether this also reflects a desire to establish a visible boundary between the empire and 
the ‘wild zones’ beyond the eastern frontier. Furthermore, Böröcz’s claim that the Union 
defines itself through a policy of ‘inequality, marginalization, and exclusion’145 relates not 
only to this issue of the external frontier, but also to Böröcz’s own assertion that the 
European Union perceives itself to be Europe.  
Böröcz’s theory is classically Leninist, and is ultimately defined by economic 
inequality:
146
 namely that the Union expands in order to monopolise markets and impose its 
own economic hegemony on an area. Further, Böröcz’s contention that the EU deliberately 
maintains the East in an economically inferior position in order to benefit the West, has 
strong Leninist connotations. It may be possible to imagine the Union as a specifically 
territorial manifestation of Hardt and Negri’s Empire: an entity defined by economic rather 
than political force, and yet an empire in that it is territorially limited and seeks to expand its 
control for the benefit not of the whole, but a privileged group (i.e. the Western EU). This 
interpretation of European Empire contrasts with the next theme, that of neo-medievalism. 
Yet there is one significant similarity: inequality. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Holy European Empire
147
 
 
Jan Zielonka perceives the EU not as a conglomerate of dominant states pressuring their 
weaker neighbours, but rather as a ‘neo-medieval’ state built on a blurred and decentralised 
structure. In this imagination the EU is a system of inherent inequality, yet one in which all 
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members are equally unable to gain dominance.
148
 In his discussion of the difficulties of 
establishing a homogenised European culture, centralised power, and pan-European 
institutions with defined roles and parameters – a goal made more difficult with the 
incorporation of Eastern European members – Zielonka thus equates the current EU with the 
medieval version of the Holy Roman Empire.  
For Zielonka, the medieval Reich is the logical equivalent of the EU; a polity defined 
by ‘multilevel governance… of concentric circles, fuzzy borders, and soft forms of external 
power [predating] the rise of nation states, democracy, and capitalism’.149 Zielonka’s Europe 
is defined by ‘overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional 
arrangements, and multiple identities’ co-existing in a single loose organisation.150 This 
concept posits that the European Union is held together not through political coercion but 
through a sense of common identity as ‘Europeans’, enabling Zielonka to equate the 
pluralistic EU with the loose alliance of the pre-Westphalian Holy Roman Empire – two 
universalising entities which define themselves through contrast to a constructed and 
artificially enhanced Other, and which have multiple layers of relatively limited political or 
economic control organised in a decentralised structure. 
These are bold claims which run in direct contrast to the theories of Böröcz and Beck 
and Grande, who perceive the Union as one of hard borders and an overt capitalist mission. 
We do not need to delve into Zielonka’s policy-based critiques in order to assess the value of 
his argument, as this is neither relevant to the research nor necessary, as three critical 
concerns are raised immediately.
151
 
Our first concern is the nature of the Holy Roman Empire, and particularly the late-
medieval version with which Zielonka equates the EU.
152
 As Peter Wilson makes clear, the 
Holy Roman Empire was a highly complex, frequently contradictory entity which went 
through many territorial and policy shifts.
153
 Indeed for Thomas Blanning, ‘the only way to 
approach [the HRE] is to love anomaly, as the Empire did not fit any recognized pattern’.154  
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This is crucial, as Zielonka does not specify historical parameters and it cannot be inferred 
just which particular permutation of the Reich he is examining,
155
 and his version borders on 
a pastiche of different versions of the Reich which did not exist simultaneously.
156
 This is not 
mere nitpicking: as Wilson reminds us, the Empire underwent drastic constitutional and 
territorial changes throughout its life, and especially between the Papal Bull of 1356 and the 
Reichstag of 1495.
157
 Both of these dates fall within Zielonka’s unclear timeframe, to say 
nothing of the other nine hundred years of the Reich’s existence. Zielonka is right to call the 
European Union an ‘unidentified political object’,158 but it is not entirely satisfactory to 
equate the Union with a polity whose very nature was as confusing and contradictory to its 
own subjects
159
 as it is to us.
160
  
 The second, related critique to be raised is the historiographic concern. Our 
interpretation, understanding, and knowledge of the Reich are tangled in a web of 
historiographical problems.
161
 Zielonka interprets the Holy Roman Empire in a particular 
way, and ultimately arrives at a model of the Reich which is cobbled together from 
anachronistic characteristics and themes. And while it could be argued that it is the themes of 
the Reich, rather than the specifics which Zielonka wishes to examine, these themes 
themselves shifted substantially during the Empire’s long and confused lifetime.162 
 The third critique is that Zielonka falls victim to the same desire for a checklist as 
Beck and Grande. His chapters make extensive use of comparative charts to contrast features 
of the ‘Westphalian model’ against the ‘Neo-medieval model’,163 an admirable effort but one 
which is hampered by his model’s foundations built upon an artificial and anachronistic 
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model of the Empire, and a historiographic interpretation which does not take into account 
the remarkably complex, self-contradictory, and perpetually shifting political nature of the 
medieval Reich. Further, by constructing a model of the Holy Roman Empire against which 
he can compare the Union, Zielonka’s thesis becomes caught up in a circular logic – the 
European Union is a neo-medieval empire simply because it fits the criteria of neo-medieval 
imperialism set out at the beginning.
164
 This is precisely what Maier warns us of – that 
examining empire based upon its characteristics is perfectly acceptable if “empire” is defined 
at the outset, but that a definition of empire which relies on a checklist of characteristics will 
simply ‘compel readers to return to the beginning’ in an endless loop.165 
 However, this is not to say that Zielonka’s model is without use. Reading Zielonka 
has obliged us to examine the nature of the Holy Roman Empire, and the imaginative 
discourses in which this unusual state remains wrapped.
166
 This will be returned to later in the 
chapter. One such characteristic is the curious and self-contradictory status of European 
universalism. Holy Roman Emperors, as Wilson points out, were frequently guided by a 
concept of Universal Monarchy: a medieval Manifest Destiny of ‘pan-European 
pretensions’167 whereby the rulers of the Reich imagined that their sovereignty was, and 
should be, global.
168
 Many Kaisers ‘claim[ed] to represent the secular arm of a single 
Christian Europe ... with an assumed pre-eminence over all European rulers’; when combined 
with ‘the empire’s pan-European pretensions, and the fragmented nature of [its] sovereignty 
with its diffusion of political authority and overlapping jurisdictions’, a curious similarity is 
drawn out.
169
 A fundamental characteristic of the Empire was evidently its pretensions to 
European universality, with the executive office perceiving itself to be ‘the direct 
continuation of the universal ideal of Rome’.170 This hearkening back to Rome is crucial for 
two reasons. Firstly, it establishes discourse – this will be addressed later in the chapter. 
Secondly, it links Zielonka’s model on a conceptual level with the next chronological 
imagination of European Empire – one which similarly identifies a continuation of an 
imperial discourse.  
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2.2.3 Fortress Europe 
 
It was identified above that a recurring theme in discussions of empire is expansion. Indeed 
for Edward Gibbon, expansion was critical to maintaining the stability of empire – and in the 
absence of either the motive or method to broaden imperial frontiers, empire will inevitably 
disintegrate.
171
 In the context of the EU, it is certainly possible to see expansion. The Union 
has enlarged significantly and selectively in the last decade, absorbing new territories in 
Eastern and Southern Europe while consolidating its presence in existing member-states. Yet 
according to the interpretations of our first category, Europe pursues an external policy which 
is far more exclusionary than inviting. This is Fortress Europe. 
Hartmut Behr perceives the Union as an entity embedded in nineteenth-century 
‘Standards of Civilization’, whereby members of a civilized Core project their standards onto 
an ‘unmodernised’ Periphery. 172 This occurs, arguably, on both the internal level between 
EU members and also on an external level, between the Union and non-Union European 
states. Of particular interest is Behr’s assertion that the Union’s external frontier is 
continually strengthened while internal borders dissolve, establishing a ‘Fortress Europe’ of 
shared civilisation defined against the Eastern Other, and that the Union constitutes a Core 
with ‘potential imperiality’173 surrounded by and pushing outwards to absorb a Periphery of 
prospective members. In a continuation of what we have identified in Böröcz and Zielonka, 
the value of Behr’s imperial image is not that it offers a conglomerate of quantifiable 
characteristics, but that it rests upon a discourse – in this case, ‘Standards of Civilisation’.  
Ernst Kantorowicz underlines the singularity inherent to the Holy Roman Empire: the 
notion that the laws and customs of the Reich – and only the Reich’s – were valid 
universally.
174
 The concept that the Holy Roman Emperor was the one and only source of 
necessitas, justitia, and providentia – justice, truth, and destiny175 – anointed by the grace of 
the Pope, became a defining feature of the Holy Roman Empire. We see the same pattern in 
the Union: the Union’s laws and customs, and only those of the Union, are considered valid 
and universal. Behr’s investigation of the European Union is indistinguishable from 
Kantorowicz’s summary of the Holy Roman Empire – only the standards of the polity in 
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question are considered valid. All others are deviant, and it is the Empire’s duty and destiny 
to triumph over them. 
These self-proclaimed standards do not exist in isolation but, as Behr points out, are 
grounded in a historical imagination of European norms.
176 
These norms form a discourse 
traceable to an entity and an idea which not only forms a model of European Empire in its 
own right, but connects the discourses of Böröcz, Zielonka, and Behr, and forms a foundation 
for our ultimate understanding of empire as a discourse. This is the entity which later 
societies sought to emulate, in so doing creating the discourse of empire. This road leads back 
to Rome. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Senate and People of Europe
177
 
 
‘The reader of any Latin text’, asserts Niall Rudd, ‘is likely to encounter some words which 
have no exact equivalent in English’.178 There is perhaps no term of which this is more true 
than “empire”.  
Empire is an etymological evolution of the Latin term imperium, a sophisticated word 
with no exact equivalent in modern linguistics, and which is an ineffective translation of the 
Latin term. The Latin imperium is ultimately untranslatable as the many concepts 
encompassed by the word cannot be condensed into a single term. Imperium can be translated 
as: a command, order or direction; the right of power or commanding authority; command; 
class; supreme power; sovereignty, sway, or dominion; chief command; military or civil 
command; government, governance or governing; rule; parental or spousal authority; office 
or magistracy; discipline, commander (in rare form), a particular instance of dominion 
attached to a population, and to give orders.
179
 All of these can exist in either the civilian or 
military form, in connection to the divine world or the natural world, and can mean one of 
these, or several – in any combination – at the same time.  
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Imperium is obviously a very complex term, and at first glance, this variation only 
intensifies the exasperating vagueness of the word. It is one problem to use a word whose 
meaning is debated, but it is quite a different problem altogether to rely upon a twenty-
century-old loan word from a long-dead language, the terminological intricacies and subtle 
complexities of which have not survived two thousand years of linguistic evolution. What, 
then, can be done to enhance our understanding of the concept of empire?  
The answer to this lies not only in the colossus of Roman political philosophy – 
Marcus Tullius Cicero – but the historiographic and political discourses in which empire has 
been interwoven since Cicero’s day. The value of Cicero’s writings is that they make a clear 
distinction between the subtleties contained within the concept and establish two 
distinguishable – and manageable – terms. And as Cicero was one of the few Roman scholars 
whose works survived in almost-complete form in Western Europe following the fall of 
Rome, his writings have profoundly influenced European thought. 
In his works In Verrum
180
 and De Officiis,
181
 Cicero distinguishes two related yet 
theoretically separate ideas. These are the twin concepts of imperium and patrocinium. Both 
of these ideas are crucial to our understanding of empire, yet both have been neglected in 
discussions of the post-Roman concept of “empire”.  
In his polemics on the Roman state, Cicero speaks of two forms of empire – imperium 
and patrocinium. The first, imperium, Cicero defines as the ‘power’ / ‘government’ / ‘rule’ / 
‘sovereignty’ of Rome – the imperium populi Romani necessary to establish Rome’s 
‘dominance’ / ‘command’ / ‘government’ over its non-Roman neighbours.182 This use of 
imperium is characterised by hard force, which Cicero identified with the early stages of 
Rome’s expansion. Clearly, this is a concept far too intricate to condense into the single 
(in)convenient word empire, not least because the very word imperium has conflicting 
meanings. And as J.S. Richardson highlights, imperium has very different meanings 
depending upon its domi (domestic governance) or militiae (provincial governance) 
contexts.
183
 Such imperium, as Cicero identifies, is not solely brute force used for the 
nefarious purposes of conquest and brutal coercion to create a single hegemony, but rather a 
combination of different policies of control necessary for the establishment of what Cicero 
sees as the essence of empire: patrocinium.  
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Like imperium, patrocinium is a difficult word. Patrocinium, while difficult to 
translate, is somewhat easier to define. Behr places the word into its context as a distinct and 
manageable concept: ‘an international commonwealth’184 of shared interests and shared 
power, a patrocinium orbis terrae.
185
 This is what Cicero defined as a ‘government [which] 
could more accurately be called a protectorate of the world rather than an empire’.186 This 
distinction between the two terms is critical – patrocinium is the end goal, the polity, while 
imperium is (one) means of reaching such a goal, the policy.  
Thus we immediately see a conceptual distinction in Cicero’s work between the two 
distinct, yet interwoven, aspects of empire. It is clear that the European Union does not 
pursue anything like the hard-power imperium which Cicero identifies as the defining 
characteristic of Rome’s expansion. Equally, it is impossible to ignore the not-insignificant 
paternalistic attitude demonstrated by the Union’s institutions. Behr, Böröcz, Zielonka, and 
Beck and Grande all acknowledge the paternalistic influence of the Union in that prospective 
applicants are required to remodel their political constitutions, legal frameworks, economic 
infrastructures, and social institutions to match those of the Union. The link to Cicero’s 
patrocinium is unmistakeable. 
It might be asserted at this point that the essence of empire has been identified.
187
 
Empire, when viewed through the conceptual lens of Cicero – whose works had such a 
significant influence upon medieval and Early Modern European thought – is a benign 
commonwealth defined by unequally shared power and shared sovereignty, under the 
paternalistic guidance of a core authority. We could cease our investigation here, and begin 
searching for these themes in the European Union. Yet in the same vein as the already-
examined scholars of European Empire, using Cicero creates three problems. 
First, Cicero spoke of Rome as a harmonising, universalising power whose self-
anointed status of “superiority” justified expansion into neighbouring territories. Yet while 
Cicero believed that: 
 
‘our Senate is the harbour and refuge of kings, tribes, nations… [seeking] to 
obtain the highest praise from this one thing – the guarding of the interests of 
our provinces and our allies by equity and good faith.’188 
 
                                                 
184
 Behr, History of Political Theory, p. 36. 
185
 S.E. Smethurst quoted in Behr, History of Political Theory, p. 45. 
186
 Cicero, On Moral Duties II:8, quoted in Steel, Rhetoric and Empire, p. 193. 
187
 Russell Foster, ‘Tege Imperium! A defence of empire’, Global Discourse 1:ii (2009), pp. 2-23. 
188
 On Moral Duties in Cicero, Selected Works [trans. Michael Grant] (London: Penguin, 1960), pp. 157-211. 
45 
 
this did not sway his agreement with Cato’s concrete conviction that ‘the government of 
Rome [is] superior to that of all other states’.189 Cicero’s writings are not careful, considered 
treatises on the mechanisms and nature of Roman political power, but are courtroom speeches 
written to defend or accuse his fellow Senators during Rome’s slide from a corrupt 
Republican plutocracy to a totalitarian military dictatorship – consequently his beliefs on the 
Roman state are highly emotive polemics on what Rome should be, rather than what it 
actually does. And as Andrew Dyck comments, Cicero did not always practice the high 
morals which he preached.
190
 The result is that Cicero’s writings are ambiguous, almost 
schizophrenic. Caroline Steel
191
 highlights this ambivalence in his work, wherein a ‘strange 
mixture of Roman paternalism, patriotic particularism, and philanthropic universalism’192 
leave Cicero’s ultimate concept of Imperium an unresolved blur: at one moment Rome’s 
imperium is benign and generous; the next, it is a harsh hegemon justifying the riposte which 
Tacitus puts in the mouth of the defeated rebel Calgacus:  ‘To plunder, slaughter, and rapine 
they falsely give the name “empire”. They make a desolation and they call it “peace”’.193 
Second, Cicero was a Roman, and – as we shall see – the Romans did not understand 
their world as a patchwork of neat, bordered countries on a map. Andrew Dyck identifies an 
inherent problem in the translation of  Cicero’s preference for patrocinium: this implies the 
supreme rule not of imperium (an abstract legal concept with limitless scope and power) but 
the patronus (a person or group of people acting in the role of a patron or parent, with limited 
scope and power). Cicero, like his predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, viewed 
Rome not as a single state with borders and territories, but as a city which played the role of 
parent watching over its provincial children, intervening in local affairs only in emergencies. 
Patrocinium thus implies that the provincials’ rights must be protected by the Roman parent – 
something Cicero clearly admires, even if not quite true – in contrast to imperium’s 
implication that Rome wields limitless and brutal power over its cringeing provincial 
subordinates. And in both imperium and patrocinium, the emphasis is on social, not spatial, 
relationships. This is very different to how we generally understand empire today. 
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Third, it is not the purpose of this chapter to identify empire based upon a checklist of 
characteristics or parallels with any of human history’s universalising polities. Turning to 
Cicero may be useful, but ultimately amounts to a little more than a list which is as 
unsatisfactory as any other. 
 
We have now identified two distinct but related problems. The first is ontological – 
what is an empire? The second is an issue of epistemology – how can we know that first 
answer?  
The first problem has been approached by numerous scholars who have sought to 
identify the characteristics of an empire. This broad interpretive strategy is sometimes 
frustrating but as Bernard Porter concedes, it is acceptable to interpret empire in any way we 
wish – so long as we make our definition clear.194 This enables an initial separation of those 
scholars who use “empire” in a vague and undefined way, and those who at least offer a 
reasonable explanation of what is meant. Yet this is not wholly satisfactory. Literature 
belonging to the first group is overly vague, while the second category suffers from the 
perpetual problem of attempting to list characteristics. There is no single authority to set a 
definition, and we would face the unanswerable question of asking which of human history’s 
infinitely broad polities and policies can, and which cannot, be considered empire. In the 
context of specifically European Empire, this problem is even more pronounced. For an 
analysis of what defines European Empire, what have we learned? 
Firstly, we have identified that “empire” defies attempts at categorisation and while 
constructing a list of traits to define empire may be acceptable in isolated studies, it is wholly 
inappropriate for a study of the European Union as empire. We are not interested in only one 
view, and as has been seen, the existing conceptions of European Empire – those of Behr, 
Böröcz, Zielonka, Beck and Grande, and even interpretations based in Cicero
195
 – do not tally 
together. If the EU is an empire, it cannot be the empire imagined by all of these writers. 
Böröcz and Zielonka are mutually exclusive; Cicero’s universalism and Behr’s exclusionism 
are diametrically opposed; Beck and Grande’s lists of imperial traits seem arbitrary and 
incompatible with similar lists.  
Secondly, we have identified that empire is a concept even more slippery than was 
first imagined. When does a state become empire? As has been argued, there is no clear 
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threshold. A state does not become imperial simply by acquiring a certain amount of territory, 
adopting a particular style of government, or applying selective policies. Yet it is frequently 
so interwoven with other forms of social ordering that empire becomes indistinguishable.  
Faced with these seemingly unsatisfactory findings, we might be tempted to abandon 
this line of research and settle for what Stephen Maier acknowledges as the only universal 
characteristic of imperial study – creating an ad hoc definition of empire to act as a 
framework. This is not a bad approach. As Maier rightly reminds us, it is perfectly acceptable 
to construct a unique vision of empire which suits the study in question, because empire is 
such an elusive concept.
196
 Yet this method is unfeasible here, as the existing interpretations 
of European Empire can be only roughly synthesised into an imperial framework which is at 
best an impromptu and unstable framework, at worst a weak conceptual strawman.  
However, the preceding review has highlighted one avenue of research which remains 
as-yet unexplored, and a direction which can lead to a far more thorough understanding of 
what empire is. This avenue ties together the existing theories of European Empire based 
upon an unusual shared feature. This approach begins with the theory we examined last – 
Cicero’s.  
As has been seen, it would appear on the surface that Cicero cannot provide a solution 
to the lack of an imperial ontology, and that the foremost politician of the archetypal empire 
leaves us in just as much of a quandary as anyone else. This is problematic in itself, but 
another problem immediately emerges. Why should we adopt a Roman understanding, when 
Rome fell? 
The answer is that Rome did not really fall. It survived as a martyr which has 
influenced Western political and intellectual life for fifteen centuries. Contrary to the dire 
content of history books from St. Augustine’s De Civitate Dei to Edward Gibbon’s Decline 
and Fall, the overwhelming majority of whom lamented the fiery fall of Rome to what St. 
Gildas termed the ‘dark throngs of worms’ from northern Europe,197 the idea of Rome 
endured. While the multiple arguments on whether Rome collapsed or transformed need not 
concern us here, it is a fair summary to state that rather than falling victim to cataclysm, the 
Western Roman Empire merely fizzled out.
198
 The deposition in 476 of the last Imperator, 
Romulus Augustulus, ‘excited barely a ripple at the time’,199 as Roman government in the 
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West had effectively ceased long before. And crucially, although the West ended in 476 the 
East survived – and frequently prospered – for another thousand years. This requires a 
fundamental reappraisal, and there remains one invaluable inroad which a study of Cicero 
offers. While imperium in his own lifetime – and that of the Roman state itself – may not 
have referred to a method of state organisation, the word quickly came to stand for the 
archetypal “civilised” state, in spite of its original meanings. But returning to the origins of 
the term itself, is not as fruitful an avenue as might previously have been thought. As Andrew 
Erskine points out, our understandings of Roman ideology are determined to a significant 
degree not by what the Romans themselves thought, but how we perceive them. Our own 
understanding of Rome is so influenced by the international relations of our own time, by the 
experiences of empire that we have endured, that we cannot be certain just what the Roman 
system of imperium was.
200
 This historiographic problem is nothing new, and was familiar at 
least as far back as Edward Gibbon’s multi-faceted monumental study of the Roman state.201 
It is not easy to pick a path through this intellectual quagmire in which perceptions determine 
other perceptions.
202
 Yet this reveals a curious aspect of empire.  
 Even returning to Cicero in search of the original meanings and implications of the 
word is insufficient. Cicero did not coin the words imperium and patrocinium, and even if he 
had, we cannot peer into his mind to extract the meaning he gave to them. Relying upon his 
surviving writings to construct a definition can only go so far as Cicero’s own views on 
Rome and her hegemony fluctuated to a significant degree. As a man who oscillated between 
philanthropic paternalism and benign universalism, but also a rhetorical cocktail of scathing 
snobbery and fierce municipal patriotism,
203
 Cicero’s approach to patrocinial empire is 
confusingly muddled. Furthermore, attempting to peer back into the past to search for truth – 
or at least verisimilitude – is not a viable strategy. Our interpretations of the past are as 
contradictory, conjectural, and prone to personal bias as are our perceptions of the present or 
our forecasts for the future.  
However this does not mean that nothing useful can be extracted from these findings. 
Quite the opposite. The problems identified in the preceding sections – the lack of academic 
consensus on empire, the ontological and epistemological dead-ends, the problem of shifting 
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meanings and individual interpretations  are all evidence of empire as a discourse. And to 
appreciate the discourse of empire we return to where we began – Rome.  
Rome’s political and military infrastructure indeed ended, but the ideal of Rome – 
what it used to be, and what it continued to be in the East – endured and was emulated by the 
new Germanic peoples of Western Europe: Roman religion, Roman fashion, Roman 
language, and Roman imperium.
204
 Or rather, what the new rulers of Europe imagined 
imperium to be. We thus return not to Rome as it existed in space and time, an Italian city and 
its hinterlands in the late Iron Age, but “Rome” as it existed in the imaginations of Greeks 
and Germans in the Early Middle Ages. This is the cornerstone of medieval historiography: 
the transference of power, better known as translatio imperii. 
 
 
2.3 TRANSLATIO IMPERII 
 
‘Who may hear, without being upset, the question being debated among these 
learned fellows, whether the Roman imperium be in Rome? With the 
kingdoms of the Parthians, Persians and Medes located among the Parthians, 
Persians and Medes, are we then to believe that the imperium of the Romans 
will wander around? Who can stomach such vile stuff? Who would not rather 
heave it up from the very pit of his being? If the Roman imperium is not in 
Rome then where, I ask, is it?’ 205 
Petrarch 
Liber Sine Nomine, Letter IV 
 
 The concept of translatio imperii is not to every scholar’s taste. Petrarch’s rhetorical 
rescript in Liber Sine Nomine is written as a condemnation of the by-then established idea 
that the civilising mission of Caesar and Augustus had been appropriated by newcomers. 
Writing the above passage in the autumn of 1352, the words of this fourteenth-century poet – 
his pride chafing from his friend’s recent arrest by the authorities of the Heiliges Reich206 –  
are not so dissimilar from Liudprand’s diatribe nearly four centuries previously. For just as 
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the Italian Liudprand had complained about imperium being appropriated by the Greeks, the 
Italian Petrarch complains about it being appropriated by the Germans. In his bitterness, 
Petrarch asks a rhetorical question to state that Roman imperium is still solely in Rome, 
despite what the Teutons claim. However, there is a problem. 
When Petrarch was writing, his beloved Rome, abandoned even by the Papacy who 
had fled to Avignon, was ‘a malarial, malodorous city known to be in the last stages of 
dilapidation and decay, perpetually torn apart by a corrupt aristocracy and a famously 
unpredictable rabble’207 whose complete lack of power in the face of even the collapsing 
“Rome” of the Greeks and the stagnant “Rome” of the Germans208 made the shabby, run-
down Rome of Liudprand’s day look positively attractive. This only makes Petrarch’s 
sarcastic question even more pertinent for us. If imperium is really not in Rome, where is it? 
The answer, as we shall see here, is that empire exists purely in the mind. 
We began this chapter by eavesdropping on Liudprand and Leo’s angry argument 
over who, and what, may legitimately claim imperium. It appears on the surface that limited 
progress has been made towards answering this question. By analysing those imaginations of 
European Empire prevalent in academic writing, some useful themes have been drawn out, 
most notably the theme of inequality. But by rejecting historical phenomenalism and 
characteristics, the investigation has seemingly become bogged down in loose conceptions 
which are only vaguely related to one another. József Böröcz argues that a model of 
European Empire must begin with a minimalist concept,
209
 and while Anthony Pagden is 
correct in stressing the limited utility of simple definitions for so broad a concept as 
empire,
210
 a foundation is required. Have we come any closer to reaching this foundation? 
Can we identify European Empire? The answer is yes – albeit not by constructing a check-list 
of characteristics which render a state “imperial”, but by identifying the issues which lead us 
to propose that empire is a discourse. 
 
Discourse means different things to different scholars, but key features are shared. 
Discourses exist in language and are perpetually evolving: ‘discourses are primarily 
instrumental devices that can foster common perceptions and understandings’.211 Crucially, 
‘everyday attitudes and behaviour, along with our perceptions of what we believe to be 
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reality, are shaped and influenced by the discursive practices and interactions we engage in 
and are exposed or subjected to’.212 
We can expand on this. David Campbell outlines two critical characteristics of 
discourse. Discourses are firstly heterogeneous, ‘ not the product of a single author or 
institution … they come to have a dominant form over time, but … they are constantly 
having to be reproduced’. Secondly, they are embedded ‘in institutions, practices, and 
subject-positions’.213 A political idea such as empire might thus be thought of not as a polity, 
but as ‘a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are 
produced.’214 – empire as a discourse.215  
Imagining empire as discourse is not entirely novel. In his imagination of European 
Empire, Behr hints in this direction when briefly mentioning the ability of political agents to 
‘formulate a particular vision of the political world in order to act upon it’,216 while Erskine 
stresses that the idea of Rome is more powerful than the truth of Rome – regardless of the 
polity’s actual nature.217 And Richardson explores how, in all of its manifestations from 
‘Charlemagne to the Tsars, from British imperialism to Italian Fascism’, the imaginative 
paraphernalia of the Romans ‘have been essential elements in the self-expression of imperial 
power’.218 This meme of replicating Rome is what Michael McCormick terms ‘imitatio 
imperii’,219 a common phenomenon in Early Medieval Europe in both West and East220 
which formed part of the emerging discourse of translatio imperii. 
A state, a society, a civilisation, does not become empire when it reaches a 
geopolitical and social critical mass. There is no stage at which sufficient factors – size of 
territory, diversity of population, number of monarchs serving an “emperor” – fuse together 
into empire. Sargon of Akkad did not build Earth’s first empire when he had conquered a 
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particular number of neighbouring towns.
221
 Instead it is through the invocation of the word 
“empire” in the discourses surrounding a polity or policy, which renders an entity imperial. 
To explain this tricky thought, let us return not specifically to Cicero, but more broadly to the 
Roman state. 
As the archetypal empire – the state with which medieval,222 Early Modern,223 
Victorian,
224
 and even twentieth-century polities
225
 attempted to link themselves – returning 
to Rome offers a potential solution to this quandary. Erskine asserts that ‘no empire is the 
same, but all this makes Rome good to think with and shows too that imperialism often defies 
easy categorisation’.226 This latter statement is patently true. The former claim – that Rome is 
a good model with which to examine empire – is accurate for the wrong reason. We have 
identified the manifold interpretations and uses of imperium, a word connoting much to do 
with the Roman state. Yet it is curious to note that the Romans themselves did not refer to 
their state using this word. It is this apparent piece of trivia which sheds light upon empire as 
a discourse, and as such a historical examination of this discursive development is warranted. 
Imperium clearly appears in the original writings of such classical Roman writers as 
Cicero, Livy, Suetonius, and Tacitus. Unsurprisingly, as it is after all a Roman word. Yet its 
use by the Romans was markedly different from the many ways in which we use empire. 
Similarly, we must avoid the word imperialism. The Romans lacked such a word, and indeed 
the very concept.
227
 Moreover, since its inception imperialism has been bound up in specific 
historical metanarratives such as those of Hobson, Lenin, and Schumpeter,
228
 and questions 
of political morality to the point whereby it has become a catch-all portmanteau applied 
indiscriminately to any unsavoury political project.
229
 We have already seen how Cicero 
sought to explain the term politically – we shall go a little further, to the very origins of the 
word.  
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2.3.1 ‘The Possession of the Supreme Power’ 
 
We begin with the proto-Indo-European verb pera, from which springs the early Latin word 
imperare, roughly translated as “to command” or “to order [something] to be done”.230 From 
imperare developed imperator, ‘a Latin title of portentous ambiguity’231 which is the ultimate 
root of our word emperor and its equivalents in most European languages. Yet its meaning 
today, as a formal rank in the hierarchy of monarchs and palace protocol, is very different to 
its original meaning as a military honorific.  
The origin of imperator was well-known to contemporaries in both ancient Rome and 
medieval Europe. As the Byzantine chronicler John Zonaras wrote of Republican Rome: 
 
‘When any great victory worthy of a triumph had been won, the soldiers 
immediately hailed the general as imperator’.232  
John Zonaras 
Historias VII.xxi 
 
 
However the word appears to have been nuanced even as early as Republican Rome. 
Writing long before John Zonaras, Cassius Dio’s third-century chronicle already recounted 
that: 
 
‘[Julius Caesar] assumed the title of imperator. I do not here refer to the title 
which had occasionally been bestowed, in accordance with the ancient 
custom, upon generals in recognition of their victories ... but rather the title in 
its other use, which signifies the possession of the supreme power’.233 
Cassius Dio 
Histories LII.xlii.iii 
 
And writing in medieval Spain some two centuries after the Western Roman Empire 
officially ended, Isidore of Seville records that:  
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 ‘For the Romans, the title imperator was at first given only to those on whom 
supremacy in military affairs was settled, and therefore the imperatores were 
so called from “commanding” (imperare) the army. But although generals 
held command for a long time with the title of imperator, the senate decreed 
that this was [to be] the name of Augustus Caesar only, and he would be 
distinguished by this title from other “kings” of nations. To this day the 
successive Caesars have employed this title’.234  
Isidore of Seville 
Etymologiae IX.iii.14 
 
Imperator, then, was originally an adulatory and vague title. Many imperators existed 
in the Roman Republic, and under the lengthy military dictatorship of Sulla this military 
word acquired connotations of supreme military and political power. By the civil wars of the 
first century BC, the right to use the title was highly contested between military-political 
rivals.
235
 By the time Rome staggered out from a half-century of civil wars, suicides, and 
assassinations which eliminated all other Imperators – Marius, Sulla, Crassus, Pompey the 
Great, Julius Caesar, Marc Antony, Metellus Scipio, and Brutus – the only Imperator to 
survive in the now-highly militarised and politically centralised Roman world was Caesar’s 
adopted son Octavian. When the remnant of the Roman Senate, eager to avoid another round 
of civil wars, named Octavian Caesar and Augustus and confirmed his personal monopoly on 
the title of Imperator, the word became a solitary title signifying supreme rule.
236
 Following 
Augustus’ death and the passing of his executive powers to his own adopted son Tiberius – 
and thence to Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and so forth – the title Imperator became, alongside 
Dominus,
237
 Augustus, Princeps,
238
 Pontifex Maximus, Pater Patriae,
239
 and Caesar,
240
 one 
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of several titles awarded by soldiers or Senators to signify the concentration of legislative, 
religious, military, and executive power in a single individual, totalling one hundred and 
forty-seven men between 27 BC and 476 AD who historians consider “Roman Emperors”.241 
Thus the word acquired connotations of what Dio describes above as ‘the possession of the 
supreme power’: the supreme power of imperium.  
Imperium also derives from imperare. The word originally designated an imperator’s 
command of a Roman military unit, ‘and by extension, the geographical area where such a 
command would be obeyed’.242 From this, the term evolved. Richardson identifies that as 
early as the second century AD, imperium had shifted in meaning from a word signifying the 
specific military authority wielded by certain individuals, to a word signifying the concept of 
authority itself – and the government apparatus with which it was associated.243 Indeed for 
Cassius Dio, imperium had already acquired multiple meanings all at the same time.
244
 But 
while imperium meant many things in the context of the state, at no point did imperium refer 
to the state itself.
245
 It remained, like its associated terms maiestas and auctoritas,
246
 one of 
several words signifying a particular form of political power bestowed by the Senate upon 
certain office-holders. To illustrate, let us consider a selection of passages from the original 
Cicero who, as a novo homus or “New Man”, did not speak and write in Greek as did his rich, 
Greek-educated Roman peers, but instead in the everyday Latin of the Roman masses whose 
submission and support required the wielding of visible imperium: 
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Latin                         English 247 
‘Verres post imperium constitutum 
primus imperavit ut ea pecunia omnis 
a civitatibus sibi adnumeraretur.’ 
 
In Verrum II.V:lx 
 
‘Verres, however, was the first man since 
our rule began, to have ordered that all 
funds should be counted out by the 
provincial communities’.  
Against Verres 2.5.60 
 
‘M. Marius, loqueretur, ut negotium 
susciperes, ut, cum penes te 
praetorium imperium ac nomen 
esset.’ 
 
In Verrum II.V:xl 
 ‘The eloquent, high-ranking Marcus 
Marius, requested you to deal with the 
situation there. You possessed the authority 
and position of governor’. 
 
Against Verres 2.5.40  
 
  
‘Illi aditum litoris Syracusanis 
ademerunt, tu imperium maritimum 
concessisti.’ 
 
In Verrum II.V:lxxxv 
 
 
‘What they did was to debar the Syracusans 
from access to the coast, what you did was 
to allow them complete control of the sea’. 
 
Against Verres 2.5.75 
‘Atque ut vos una mente unaque voce 
dubitare vos negatis, sic modo 
decrevit senatus D. Brutum optime de 
re publica mereri, cum senatus 
auctoritatem populique Romani 
libertatem imperiumque 
defenderet.’ 
Phillipica IV:viii 
 
‘And so does the Senate, which has just 
decreed that Decimus Brutus has performed 
a very great service to the state, by standing 
up for the authority of the Senate and the 
freedom and imperium of the Roman 
people’. 
 
Phillipics 4.8 
‘Itaque illud patrocinium orbis 
terrae verius quam imperium 
poterat nominari.’ 
De Officiis II:xxvi 
‘Therefore it might be said that we are the 
patrocinium of the world, rather than the 
imperium.’ 
On Duties 2.26 
 
 
In these passages from Cicero we see that by the time of the civil wars of the first 
century BC, imperium already meant a wide variety of things. The last usage above, from De 
Officiis, is almost impossible to translate into a suitable word. This is only a selection but it is 
replicated in other classic Latin texts. Consider imperium’s meaning in the highly influential 
Vulgate Bible of St. Jerome:
248
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   Biblia Sacra Vulgata    King James Version 249 
 
‘Feceruntque filii Israel ut eis mandatum 
fuerat quibus dedit Ioseph plaustra, 
secundum Pharaonis imperium: et 
cibaria in itinere.’ 
Genesis XLV:xxi 
‘And the children of Israel did so, and 
Joseph gave them waggons, according to 
the commandment of Pharaoh, and gave 
them provision for the way.’ 
Genesis 45:21 
 
 
‘Afferte Domino familiae populorum: 
afferte Domino gloriam et imperium.’ 
 
I Paralipomenon XVI:xxviii  
‘Give unto the LORD, ye kindreds of the 
people: give unto the LORD glory and 
strength.’ 
1 Chronicles 16:28 
 
  
‘Ipsi imperium in saecula saeculorum: 
Amen.’ 
I Petri V:xi 
‘To Him be glory and dominion for ever 
and ever. Amen.’ 
1 Peter 5:11
250
 
 
In all of these examples, secular and spiritual, we see the same pattern. The word 
imperium means many things in relation to power, command, and the state, but never “the 
State” itself. Harriet Flower goes further, and demonstrates that the Romans lacked the very 
concept of the “State”, a modern imagination which would have been alien to the plebeians 
and patricians of Rome.
251
 Instead the Romans used a variety of terms to signify the 
community formed from the city of Rome, its various classes, its vast hinterlands and 
provinces around the Mediterranean, and gradually coming to also signify the concept of 
government. As we see in Cicero’s works above, what we would term “State” is rendered 
variously as Res Publica (or de re publica, referring to the general population),
252
 
Communem Libertatem (shared political community),
253
 or Senatus Populusque Romanorum 
(the people as a whole represented by their political leadership). Imperium Romanum – or 
variations thereof – did exist as a phrase254 but as Erskine points out, this referred 
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linguistically to the concept of the collective power of the people as represented by the Senate 
(or emperor), rather than power as represented by a geographically bounded and abstract 
“state”. This pseudo-democratic façade was maintained long after the aforementioned civil 
wars and Rome’s transition to military dictatorship and de facto (if not de jure) absolute 
monarchy,
255
 and even by Late Antiquity and the fracturing of the unified Roman state into a 
patchwork of squabbling fiefdoms, imperium still did not refer to the polity. Timothy 
McDermott highlights how even the late use of imperium by late Roman writers and the 
Church Fathers still referred to the concept of power (particularly normative power)
256
 rather 
than power manifest as a specific, territorial polity with borders, bureaucrats, a shape on a 
map, a name, and all the other paraphernalia we moderns associate with a country.
257
 The 
distinction here is between spatial politics and social politics. For the Romans, international 
relations did not consist of distinct shapes on a map – instead, international politics was 
always understood by Romans in terms of personal, social relationships between patron and 
client. Rome’s patrocinium was thus understood by the Romans not as the relationship 
between borders and territory but as the (unequal) relationships of a family, with the Romans 
– and their Emperor, the Pater Patriae or Father – at the top, acting as provider, protector, 
and punisher of unruly children: the peoples, not the places, of Earth.
258
  
Evidence of this is offered by Richardson, who demonstrates that in surviving texts 
the Romans viewed their world not in terms of bounded countries, but rather as networks of 
cities linked by conduits, with connections personified by local elites operating under Roman 
governors who, other than enforcing taxation and later the worship of the Emperor, had 
remarkably little involvement or interest in the day-to-day running of their provinces.
259
 Even 
Roman frontiers, which we retrospectively view as fixed and definable borders fortified with 
walls and palisades, were in reality permeable membranes beyond which Roman control 
                                                                                                                                                        
Romanorum and Romani mean “Romans”. Romanum refers to “Rome” as a population. Only Roma means 
“Rome” as a geographical entity. 
255
 Dio, Roman History, Book LIII, Ch. 17, pp. 235-236. 
256
 St. Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans [trans. Henry Bettenson] (London and New 
York: Penguin, 2003), pp. 846-8; Behr, History of International Political Thought, p. 60. 
257
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation [ed. Timothy McDermott] (Notre Dame, IL: 
Christian Classics, 1991), pp. 3-5. 
258
 Jakob Wisse, ‘The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorical Works’, in J.M. May (ed.), Brill's 
Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 331-374. 
259
 Richardson, ‘Imperium Romanum’. This is supported by Roman cartography such as the Tabula Peutingeriana, 
which depicts Rome’s civilisation as towns (including non-Roman cities) connected by roads, rather than as bounded 
shapes on a map. Katherine Rawson points out that while the Romans made plenty of maps, these were almost all 
itinerarii – Roman A-Z maps which simply showed the route between one town and the next. Roman military officers 
used local guides rather than maps, no maps were made of rivers or seas, while ‘their surveyors, the gromatici, were 
perhaps not … capable of the accurate, large-scale maps that would have been useful for military operations’. M.J. 
Ferrar, ‘The Venerable Bede and the Tabula Peutingeriana’, The Cartographic Journal 42:2 (2005), pp. 157-167; 
Katherine Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 259. 
59 
 
existed in different forms.
260
 This interpretation would appear to be supported by their 
cartographic conventions, wherein there are no dividing lines between different societies.
261
 
Thus we see that the Romans, the archetypal imperialists, did not refer to their own realm as 
an imperium, but simply as imperium.  
 In De Civitate Dei, written some six decades before the end of the Roman West, St 
Augustine uses imperium to signify not merely the temporal power of the Roman 
government, but also spiritual power. In this sense, the word appears in the context of religion 
to signify the power of the church –a power associated with an exclusive and bounded 
territory beyond which godlessness reigned.
262
 Hence as a way of describing Christendom, 
imperium became affiliated, but not synonymous, with a territorial area.
263
 Holland writes that 
while other vestiges of Roman rule vanished outside Italy, imperator and imperium survived 
in Europe due to their connotations of conquest. The Franks who were later bestowed by 
Pope Leo with the status of imperium were warriors defined not by pax, pontifex, or 
patrocinium but by the savage reality of military combat.
264
 Hence imperator, ‘a Latin title of 
portentous ambiguity’,265 became the sole term employed in the West to signify supreme 
sovereignty both temporal and spiritual. This was not novel, as the Romans themselves had 
multiple levels of meaning for the word. Consider the explanation given by Gibbon in 
Decline and Fall:  
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‘Those modest titles were laid aside [during the Classical era]; and, if they 
still distinguished their high station by the appellation of Emperor, or 
Imperator, that word was understood in a new and more dignified sense, and 
no longer denoted the general of the Roman armies, but the sovereign of the 
Roman world’.266 
 
It was thus during the Classical period that imperium and imperator acquired an 
association with the head of state and thus the concept of supreme, exclusive rule,
267
 and 
while it must be conceded that Imperator was merely one of several titles used to denote the 
inconsistent and vague office that we retrospectively term “Roman Emperor”,268 Susan 
Mattern highlights that imperator was the title most recorded on Classical Roman statues, 
monuments, and coins,
269
 and it is reasonable to conclude that by the Early Middle Ages 
imperator and imperium were the words most closely associated with the classical Romans 
and the dignity of the imperial office.  
Although the formal end of a single Roman state in the West came in the fifth 
century, imperium survived. We must bear in mind that from Augustus onwards, Rome was 
effectively a military dictatorship – it is not surprising that words associated with civilian 
power, such as maiestas and auctoritas, waned in favour of the military connotations of 
imperium. The Imperator derived his legitimacy not from divine favour but from his troops 
and military imperium: thus in Roman art and literature from Augustus onwards the Head of 
State increasingly appeared not as a statesman but a soldier, concerned not with maiestas and 
auctoritas but with the imperium required to fight off Rome’s encroaching enemies.270 By the 
time the last Western Imperator was deposed in 476, imperium had acquired at least some 
connotations of supreme power, sovereignty, and legitimacy.  
This brings us back to St Peter’s Basilica on Christmas morning, 800 AD. A host of 
speculations exist as to Leo’s reasons for proclaiming imperium in this context. We are not 
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particularly concerned with trying to peer into the Pope’s mind,271 and we must be careful not 
to stray too far into the diplomatic delicacies of the Early Middle Ages. Our focus remains 
the European Union, not the fiefdoms of the Franks and the Basileus of Byzantium. There 
are, though, some essential points to consider when discussing the resuscitation of ancient 
titles.  
The resurrection of imperator and imperium by Pope Leo was on the one hand not 
particularly important. The words had already existed for centuries, and if we believe Einhard 
and Notker, the coronation apparently passed with only peripheral acknowledgement from 
contemporary observers. And as we see from their chronicles, imperator was only one of 
multiple titles awarded to Charlemagne both in 800, and again in 812 following the 
Byzantines’ gritted-teeth acknowledgement of his imperial title.272 Yet Charlemagne’s other 
pseudo-Classical titles – Augustus,273 Caesar, Patricius, and the Greek approximations 
Basileus, Autocrator, and Sebastocrator – were short-lived. Notwithstanding scholarly 
disagreement as to just how long, and to what extent, Leo and Charlemagne had been 
planning an imperial coronation,
274
 from Einhard’s account it might be wondered why 
Charlemagne was officially reluctant to accept imperium in 800. Old Roman titles, whether 
deliberately resurrected in modified form or lingering on, half-forgotten, were common 
ceremonial characteristics.
275
 Less than thirty years after the abdication of the last Western 
Emperor in Rome, the Eastern Emperor had named the Frankish warlord Clovis consul, a title 
which had been increasingly irrelevant under the classical Romans but was resurrected to 
denote power.
276
 And half a century before Liudprand’s journey, Charlemagne’s father Pepin 
the Short had been bestowed with the new title Patricius Romanorum – “Protector of the 
Romans” – by Pope Stephen II.277 Explaining the actions and reactions of Pope and 
Imperator is not our goal here, but it deserves mention as it is in the events of 799-800 that 
empire emerges. 
First, why did the Pope proclaim imperium when it still existed in the East? Ernst 
Kantorowicz argues that in medieval eschatology, not only had Rome been merely suspended 
in the West rather than ended (hence Charlemagne was not the inheritor of a new imperium, 
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but merely a classical Roman emperor following a temporary interregnum), but also that an 
Imperator had to exist in order to unify Earth against the Devil – whose predicted imminent 
arrival was a cause of some not-inconsiderable concern among Europeans approaching the 
first millennium.
278
 Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innes, and Simon MacLean hint that 
Charlemagne, desperately in need of legitimacy as a Christian monarch following his failure 
to subjugate Moorish Spain and ward off the Vikings, and following his execution of 
thousands of Christian German prisoners – an act which had earned him the unflattering 
epithet ‘Karl the Saxon-Slaughterer’ throughout Europe279 – instigated the procedure on his 
own, twisting the Pope’s hand.280 Similarly, Matthias Becher points to a variety of broader 
international incidents which contributed to the events of Christmas Day: the contemporary 
power vacuum in Italy following the Byzantines’ defeat by the Lombards, the Lombards’ 
defeat by the Franks, and the omnipresent threat to imperium christiorum of the new Islamic 
Caliphate, alongside the increasingly hostile relations between the Pope and the Basileus. It is 
even suggested that the Sultan of Baghdad, Harun al-Rashid, nudged Charlemagne and Leo 
towards imperial status as he desired a Christian monarch of equal rank to himself, other than 
the stubborn Basileus, with whom he could negotiate between Christendom and Caliphate.
281
 
Meanwhile John Julius Norwich suggests a more personal reason: hated by the powerful 
supporters of the previous Pope Hadrian, Pope Leo’s unpopularity was such that he had been 
beaten unconscious in the streets of Rome and upon fleeing to the safety of Charlemagne’s 
court in Paderborn, found himself indicted of various ecclesiastical crimes of which he could 
only be cleared by judgement from a higher temporal power – but ‘who, after all, was 
qualified to pass judgement on the Vicar of Christ?’282 Certainly not the reigning 
Imperator/Basileus in Constantinople, Empress Irene, whose Islamic-inspired iconoclasm 
against church property had rendered her deeply unpopular in the West, and furthermore 
because as a female, Irene was not acknowledged as sovereign under the Franks’ Salic 
Law.
283
 Hence, Norwich suggests, Leo proclaimed Charlemagne Imperator purely to secure 
personal protection, in exchange for bestowing legitimacy upon Charlemagne as Imperator 
Christianorum,
284
 supreme sovereign of the Christians, with Byzantine anger a price worth 
paying. On one hand it is thus little wonder that the events of December 25
th
 800 are barely 
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even mentioned by Einhard, Notker the Stammerer, and the anonymous scribes of the Liber 
Pontificalis and the Royal Frankish Annals. Perhaps they too were a little confused on the 
import and meaning of the word.
285
 
Second, why was Charlemagne was so anxious about being bestowed with the vague 
prestige of imperium? His apparent unease was possibly a literary convention of the time,
286
 
but if it was real, what did he have to fear? As the records of Charlemagne’s advisor Alcuin 
demonstrate, Charlemagne was already an Imperator in all but name.
287
 Legally he was 
already Patricius Romanorum (Protector of the Romans) and the faraway Byzantines – who 
had far more pressing problems than ‘this boorish Frank in his ridiculously cross-gartered 
scarlet leggings, speaking an incomprehensible language and unable even to sign his name 
except by stencilling it through a plate’288 – already recognised this title. For ceremonial 
occasions he already dressed, ate, and handed down ceremonial decrees in the manner of a 
Basileus.
289
 Politically, Charlemagne had been throwing his weight around with the 
Byzantines and the Papacy for years,
290
 and for the remainder of his reign was decidedly 
ambivalent about his imperial status.
291
 He did not even bother to mention his Imperial title in 
the Divisio Imperii, the post-800 document planning how to divide the realm between his 
three sons,
292
 and aside from a short proxy war between the Franks and Byzantines over their 
allies’ control of southern Italy (not over the imperial title),293 Charlemagne spent the 
remainder of his life pursuing fruitless alliances and marriage proposals with the Byzantines 
in hope of uniting West and East
294
 rather than encouraging a rivalry with Byzantium.  
Faced with these reasonings we might well conclude that Christmas Day 800 was 
nothing more than a ceremonial gesture. As supporting evidence Hywel Williams notes that, 
although it chafed him physically and politically, Charlemagne entered St Peter’s Basilica 
already dressed in the costume of an ancient Roman nobleman and in spite of the cold was 
not wearing a hat – an opportunity for a swift crowning which is too convenient to be a 
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coincidence.
295
 Charlemagne must have been perfectly aware of what was happening, and 
accepted Imperium for whatever reason(s) he and Leo had. It is therefore unsurprising to find 
that contemporary documents barely mention the day, as Frankish and Papal chroniclers 
evidently considered other events far more significant than a brief and barely-attended 
ceremony in which the Pope dusted off an old crown, plagiarised a Byzantine liturgy, and 
thus formalised what had in all likelihood been prearranged.  
At this stage it might be wondered why we have bothered to unpick the international 
politics and personal careerism woven into the accounts of Einhard, Notker, and Alcuin. This 
is not a work of history and thus it might well be asked what relation, if any, there is between 
this trip down the historical rabbit-hole and the European Union. The answer is simple. 
Charlemagne, and perhaps Pope Leo, may not have particularly cared about a quick 
ceremony one morning. But the successors of both – the Popes, and the Imperators of East 
and West – demonstrated far more interest in the coming centuries. Where Charlemagne was 
apparently uninterested in his new job title, and Pope Leo perhaps nothing more than a 
political opportunist doing what was necessary in order to walk through the streets of Rome 
without being beaten up, Charlemagne’s son and co-imperator Louis the Pious – a fierce, 
fervent zealot convinced that he had been chosen by God for some grand mission
296
 – 
adopted the title with more than a degree of solemnity, sparking the centuries-long feud 
between the Imperator and the Pope which formed medieval history – which in turn 
influenced Europe’s development. And as with his father, Louis’ relationship with his title 
was again heavily influenced by international politics between Aachen and Constantinople. 
This development occurred quickly. By 812 the international situation had changed 
significantly as no less than three Basileis – the usurper Irene, her own usurper Nicephorus I 
who was soon killed in battle against the Bulgars, and his short-lived son Stauricus – had held 
the throne of Constantinople since 800. As the fourth ‘exceedingly weak’297 and ‘easily 
led’298 monarch to occupy the throne in ten years, faced with Islamic invasions, metropolitan 
riots, a mutinous army and a rebellious civilian population clamouring for a more powerful 
military leader to protect them from the coming Bulgars,
299
 the new Basileus Michael I sent 
ambassadors to Aachen to offer an insincere acknowledgement of Charlemagne as Imperator 
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of the West, with his son Louis as legitimate successor to the title.
300
 The subsequent Pax 
Nicephori between Franks and Byzantines grudgingly recognised that the Imperator was now 
on an equal footing with the Basileus.
301
 With official recognition from God’s appointed 
vicegerent in Constantinople, the discourse of sovereignty and legitimacy hence gained a 
legitimacy of its own. Although tensions remained, both Franks and Byzantines were now 
“Romans”: the ideal of a continued Roman imperium rather than its historical reality.  
It is at this point that we see the discourse developing, morphing from a word casually 
invoked at the rigged ceremony in St Peter’s, into a term suddenly fiercely contested by 
claimants to the supreme power. Under Louis the Pious, the discourse became a dynamic 
continuum over which the major powers of Europe were soon fiercely squabbling. 
Matthew Gabriel points out that Imperator and Imperium were sparingly used in 
Charlemagne’s lifetime, undoubtedly to avoid further antagonising the Byzantines and 
because the words’ connotations of Romanitas (Roman-ness), with connotations of paganism, 
sloth and effeminacy,
302
 was an awkward companion to the ardent Christianity and 
swaggering machismo of the Frankish knights whose support he needed.
303
 Yet following 
Charlemagne’s death in 814 Louis adopted the title with significant gravitas. Not only did he 
immediately change his title from the ambiguous Imperator, Romanum gubernans imperium 
(‘Imperator governing the imperium of the Romans’) to the much more direct Imperator 
Romanorum (‘Imperator of the Romans’),304 his Ordinato Imperii of 815 laid down specific 
rules and regulations for maintaining his realm as a single polity, in defiance of Frankish law 
which demanded that his possessions be divided equally between his sons.
305
 It is 
unsurprising that Louis spent the rest of his reign mediating between his three quarrelling 
sons, and even less of a surprise that following Louis’ death a cycle of fratricidal civil wars 
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erupted. With the signing of the 843 Treaty of Verdun, Louis’ son Lothair retained the title of 
Imperator, with imperium becoming officially invested in the rump state of East Francia. The 
impact of this upon the discourse was significant – with imperium now legally restricted to 
East Francia and its Germanic inhabitants, the Byzantines were extraordinarily reluctant to 
acknowledge the petty King of the Germans as Imperator of the entire West. 
 This is the context of the vignette at the Bucoleon Palace with which we began. The 
Pax Nicephori had become void by the time of Liudprand’s journey in 968, as Charlemagne’s 
Imperium had long since evaporated and claimants to the title in the West did not possess any 
legitimacy as imperator in Byzantine eyes.
306
 It is unsurprising that the Byzantines would 
scorn Liudprand’s demand that a German – castigated in contemporary writings as the same 
savages who had devastated classical Rome,
307
 and now dared to call themselves “Romans” – 
be styled the same as the ruler of the temporarily rejuvenated East. But it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the descendants of Charlemagne, Louis, and Lothair would continue to 
demand recognition of the word. In a terse letter to the Basileus, Lothair’s son Louis II asserts 
that: 
 
 ‘It is fitting that thou shouldst know that if we were not imperators of the 
Romans we should not be imperators of the Franks either. We have received 
this name and this title from the [classical] Romans, among whom the 
pinnacle of such great sublimity and such a distinguished appellation first 
shone with a brilliant light’308 
Imperator Louis II 
Letter to Basileus Basil I, c.855 
 
 
Yet the official position at the court of Constantinople did not dull with time. A 
century after this letter, during Liudprand’s visit, Basileus Nicephorus acidly asks Liudprand: 
 
‘The envoys of your rex Otto who were here before you last year promised 
me under oath – and the wording of the oath is extant – that they would never 
in any way cause scandal in our imperium. Do you want a greater scandal 
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than that [Otto] should call himself imperator and claim for himself provinces 
belonging to us? Both these things are intolerable; and if both are 
insupportable, that especially is not to be borne, nay, not to be heard of, that 
he calls himself imperator’.309 
Nicephorus Phokas 
Relatio De Legatione Constantinopolitana XXV 
 
It is clear here that the discourse has not merely survived, it has become far more 
significant than in 800. Basileus Irene had not cared about Charlemagne, and her successor 
Michael I lost nothing in sending a handful of ambassadors with an imperial title to smooth 
the ruffled feathers of such chroniclers as Widukind of Corvey, Hroswitha of Gandersheim, 
and Thietmar of Merseburg, who demanded that the monarch of the Germans be 
acknowledged as Imperator of the West.
310
 This brings us back to the Pax Nicephori. 
Signing the Pax Nicephori yet again illustrates the power of interpretation over 
intention. The treaty was simply typical Byzantine diplomacy – an inexpensive strategy of 
dangling a Roman-sounding bauble in front of potential enemies, thus keeping the Western 
barbarians quiet and allowing the Byzantines to focus on their endless wars with the 
Caliphate.
311
 Yet from the letters above it is apparent that before long, both factions were 
taking the issue seriously. The prestige is clearly important in the letters between Louis II and 
Basil I, and was so significant a century later that Nicephorus II, for all his dislike of 
Liudprand and Otto I, subsequently offers an astonishing deal: if Otto drops the title 
imperator, Nicephorus offers to cede to Otto the whole of southern Italy, over which West 
and East had been squabbling for centuries. For Nicephorus to surrender strategic security, 
taxes, grain, and a draftable population – all desperately needed by a Byzantine government 
faced with perpetual war against its neighbours
312
 – rather than publicly acknowledge the 
validity of a single word, points to the immense importance attached to the discourse which 
began in St. Peter’s Basilica.  
It is unlikely that we will ever know for what reason(s) Pope Leo resumed secular 
imperium in the West. Whether it was intended to be the founding of a single Christian polity 
to encompass the world, or an opportunist measure to quell rebellions against Charlemagne 
while simultaneously exonerating the Pope in a rigged ecclesiastical trial, is not particularly 
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significant here.
313
 What is of significance is not why Leo spoke the word, but what 
subsequently occurred: the transformation of imperium from a vague Roman military term 
into an even more vague, but malleable, expression of supreme, legitimate sovereignty, and 
an imagined community derived from an equally imagined history.  
 
 
2.3.2 ‘Divers sundry old authentic histories’ 
 
‘Rome, thy name is fatall in ruling countries.’314 
John Speed 
New Mappe of the Roman Empire, 1627 
 
An unclear word to begin with, imperium by the Early Middle Ages had become even 
less precise, signifying a general conception of supreme power. And as we have seen, this 
status could be – and was – claimed by many. As Julia Smith argues, ‘we should not think of 
“empire” only with reference to the two specific early medieval polities, Byzantine and (after 
800) western, whose rulers were formally vested with the title of emperor. Far more than that, 
“empire” was a widely used term for a particular kind of successful kingdom.’315 Doubtless, 
the appeal to medieval chroniclers and kings of linking themselves with Rome was simply 
too strong to resist – for Charlemagne and his descendants were not the only Europeans 
claiming to hold imperium. 
Conceiving of empire as an evolving discourse is novel, but not entirely without 
precedent. The medieval concept of translatio imperii provides a framework upon which we 
may assemble an expanded theory. The idea of empire as a transitory concept – a status 
defined by civilisation, superiority, sovereignty, and legitimacy, a status which is not tied to 
any particular geopolitical construct but rather passes from one to another through time – is 
well-attested in medieval and even late Classical thought. In De Civitate Dei, St Augustine 
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follows Eusebius of Caeserea, Orosius, and St Jerome in outlining Biblical eschatology:
316
 he 
perceives Rome to be the natural successor to a sequence consisting of Alexander the Great, 
Persia, and Babylonia. For the scholars of Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Rome 
was the inevitable successor: the fourth and final realm of civilisation outlined in the Book of 
Daniel whose existence was necessary for defence against the forces of the apparently 
imminent Apocalypse.
317
 It established the discourse of imperium over which Leo and 
Liudprand, Franks and Byzantines, and West and East more broadly, were soon arguing 
furiously. 
Imperium in the Early Middle Ages was not merely restricted to people rather than 
places, it was restricted to one person: the Imperator. Consider the letter written in 996 by 
Otto III to his grandmother, Adelaide, upon his coronation as Imperator: 
 
‘To Lady Adelaide, the always august imperatrix, Otto, by God’s grace 
imperator augustus. Because following your prayers and desires the 
Divinity has conferred the rights of imperium upon me by fortunate 
succession, we adore the Divinity, indeed, and we render thanks to you.’318 
 
Otto III to Adelaide 
Pavia, 996 AD 
 
Imperium by this point was thus still tied to an individual, as Roman imperium had 
been, but had acquired new characteristics. Firstly as we have seen, imperium embodied a 
tribal mentality whereby the imperium of the elected monarch was shared by the monarch’s 
people – Charlemagne was Rex Francorum not Rex Francia – King of the Franks, not King 
of France; Lothair was castigated in Italian writings as Imperator Germanorum, not 
Imperator Germania – Emperor of the Germans, not Emperor of Germany. Secondly, 
Jacques Le Goff identifies that by the beginning of the second millennium, imperium had 
become conceptually separated from sacerdotium, a division which did not exist for the 
ancient Romans. While the latter concerned the realm of theology and spiritual power, the 
former acquired a distinctly temporal, political meaning – although still related, as the 
temporal and spiritual would have to be united to hold off the Antichrist. Furthermore, argues 
Roger Collins, as ‘imperium is a much more malleable concept than is the title imperator ... a 
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ruler could exercise imperium, in the sense of rule... without holding the title of emperor, 
which was a claim to a universal authority’.319 The division into sacred and profane, Le Goff 
argues, helped defined the malleable idea of imperium as the translatio imperii in the Early 
and High Middle Ages; ‘in profane history the theme was that of the transfer of power. The 
world in every age had one heart; the rest of the universe lived according to its rhythm and 
impulse alone’.320 This concept, the translatio imperii, ‘proceeded at a double level, that of 
power and civilisation’.321 For medieval Europeans preoccupied with Caesar and Constantine, 
the imperium of Rome provided a perfect model to emulate. The idea that there had to be a 
supreme temporal power, and there could only be one, goes some way to explaining the 
Pope’s actions on December 25th 800: imperium, the essence of being the heart of the world, 
was to be wrought from the seemingly ineffective Byzantines and invested in the West; in so 
doing publicly proclaiming the West as the realm of order, civilisation, legitimacy, and 
superiority by deliberate association with a manufactured past.  
This is not a case of what E.H. Carr identified in Chapter One – presentism, whereby 
scholars impose anachronistic concepts upon the past. The concept of translatio imperii, and 
of imperium as a concept embodying certain ideals, clearly existed historically. This is 
evident from contemporary writings of political philosophy, most significantly Isidore of 
Seville’s hugely influential Etymologies – the medieval scholar’s ‘concise guide to classical 
culture’322 – in which Isidore asserts that ‘other reigns and other kings are considered mere 
appendices of [Rome]’.323 This ‘nostalgia for Rome’324 influenced the evolution of the 
discourse and the awareness of the self as the defender of civilisation. Thus by the Early 
Middle Ages, the words imperium and imperator were used in two ways: firstly ‘to 
[neutrally] describe an exceptionally powerful ruler’, and secondly ‘as a “puff”, to talk up the 
influence and prestige of kings’ as successors of Caesar and Constantine.325 In the former 
case, chroniclers such as the Venerable Bede and Isidore of Seville used imperium as a 
general descriptor of the actions and destiny of powerful monarchs, while in the latter case 
medieval writers including Otto of Freising, Chrétien of Troyes, and Richard of Bury adopted 
the words in order to justify the Heiliges Reich, the Kingdom of France, and the Kingdom of 
England, respectively, as the sole inheritor of Rome and the self-anointed defender of 
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civilisation – the heart to whose beat the rest of the world moved.326 ‘We are dwarves 
mounted on giants’ shoulders’, wrote Bernard of Chartres concerning the Kingdom of France, 
‘but we see further than they did’.327 Contemporary scholars were well aware of the discourse 
of superiority that was imperium, as a proclamation not only of succession from Rome but of 
independence from, and equality to, the Holy Roman Empire. We need no Voltaire to remind 
us that the Western Imperium – ‘this entity which called itself, and continues to call itself, the 
Holy Roman Empire, was, and is, neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.’328 The realm 
proclaimed in 800 bore only a passing resemblance to classical Rome in terms geographical, 
liturgical, political, ecclesiastical, or indeed any other form. The only connection was the 
word used to describe it. Thus imperium was not only a diplomatic snub to the Basileus in 
Constantinople nor was it exclusively a pretext to hold a rigged Papal trial and fill Rome with 
armoured Franks. It was a deliberate hearkening back to an imagination of a Rome which 
never existed, but whose aura of sovereignty, legitimacy, community, and divine civilising 
mission, were now to be taken up again by a single power.
329
 
Notwithstanding the medieval theory that the Imperator possessed supreme sovereign 
power over the other political figureheads of the world – including the Byzantine Basileus – 
and that he was the sole possessor of Imperium – exercising the rights of Universal Monarchy 
over the world
330
 – other contemporary leaders deployed the word in order to justify their 
crowns. Thus among the fractured states of Saxon England, Æthelstan, Edgar, and Cnut
331
 
declared themselves Imperators. In Castile and Léon, Ordoño II, Alfonso III, and Ferdinand I 
adopted the imperial title to justify their emerging Reconquista against the Caliphate.
332
 And 
even in Scotland, Ireland and far-distant Germany, which had never been drawn into the orbit 
of the Caesars, ‘Oswald ... and Brian Boru were emperors in the opinion of the learned men 
of their times, in much the same way as Theoderic, Pippin of Herstal, and others’.333 This is 
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what Otto of Freising identified as ‘auctoritas ad quam totius orbis spectat patrocinium – an 
authority to which pertains the protection over the whole world’.334 As demonstrated by the 
political pretensions of Saxon chieftains, Merovingian majordomos, Spanish princes and 
Byzantine eunuchs, ‘the various barbarian kingdoms which succeeded the Roman empire in 
the West saw themselves as part of a Roman continuum’335 – ‘a continuum with many grey 
areas and overlaps’.336  
Imperium was clearly a discourse appropriated by persons other than the succession of 
Germans prostrating themselves before the Pontiff in the malarial miasma of medieval Rome. 
As demonstrated by Robert Dyson
337
 and Hans Hummer,
338
 this was in line with the medieval 
habit of using deliberately vague titles reflecting the vague nature and erratic pace of 
medieval governance:
339
 titles which could be expanded or contracted at will to claim or deny 
responsibility, and which acted as general markers of prestige which could be passed from 
one courtier to another without bothersome legal issues over territory. By the High Middle 
Ages the word was already losing whatever specific and exclusive Roman imagination(s) had 
been ascribed to it by Pope Leo, and was morphing into a word implying a more general 
imagination of civilisation, sovereignty, legitimacy, and superiority. 
It is in the Humanist movement, spanning the nebulous transition from the Late 
Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period which we term “Renaissance”,340 that we see the 
flowering of the imperial discourse as a more general and transferable philosophy. Let us 
dwell for a moment on another moment. It is 1492, in a Europe already irrevocably changed 
by the Turks’ conquest of Constantinople and about to be changed yet further as Columbus 
sails back east with reports of a New World, and the crumbling, stagnant Reich’s leading 
professor of classical rhetoric and pioneer of German Humanism,
341
 the Imperial Laureate 
Conrad Celtis,
342
 is addressing the faculty of the University of Ingolstadt at the heart of the 
Heiliges Römisches Reich: 
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‘Noble men and lofty-minded youth, to whom because of the ancestral virtue and 
that unconquerable strength of Germany the imperium of Italy has passed … I 
exhort you to devote yourselves first of all to those studies which will render your 
minds more refined and cultured and summon you away from the way of the 
common herd to give yourselves over to higher pursuits. Hold before your eyes 
the true nobility of spirit remembering that you bring not credit but dishonour to 
our imperium if you neglect the study of letters … Emulate, noble men, the ancient 
Roman nobility, which, after succeeding to the imperium of the Greeks, took over 
also all their wisdom and eloquence ... So you also having taken over the 
imperium of the Italians ought to reject shameful barbarism and become 
enthusiasts for the Roman arts. Remove that old infamy of the Germans in Greek, 
Latin, and Hebrew writers who ascribe to us drunkenness, inhumanity, cruelty, 
and every other evil approximating bestiality and immorality ... It should cause us 
shame, noble men, that certain modern historians … should refer to our most 
famous princes merely as “the barbarians”…’343 
Conrad Celtis, Oratio 
Ingolstadt, August 31
st
 1492 
 
In his impassioned speech to the students and savants, Celtis appeals to a 
reinvigorated and illusory discourse. Germany is, in his fellow Humanists’ eyes, casting off 
the manacles of the medieval monastic mind and seeking a new path – and for guidance they 
look to Rome. The stagnant and enfeebled Heiliges Reich, in Conrad’s eyes, should seek a 
transcendence, moving beyond the connotations of the ancients who had disparaged the 
Germanics: 
 
‘The Germanic (Germanicus) nations are so called because they are 
immense (immanis) in body, and they are savage (immanis) tribes hardened 
by very severe cold ... The monstrosity of their barbarism gives a fearsome 
quality even to their names.’344 
Isidore of Seville 
Etymologiae IX.ii.92 
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It is no coincidence that despite his own halting grammar and stammering diction, 
Celtis insists on stuttering to the faculty not in fluent German but in his rusty Latin.
345
 For 
while Germanics such as Liudprand, Otto, and Charlemagne had once been looked down 
upon by the Italians and Greeks as the savage nemesis of civilisation and imperium, Celtis 
appropriates Roman traits to argue that the Germans ought now consider themselves to be 
civilisation, and the new manifestation of the old imperium. The Caesars and the 
Constantines are gone and the translatio imperii has been passed, argues Celtis, from Italy to 
Greece to Germany: from Romani to Rhōmaiōn to Römisches. This is the phenomenon which 
prompted Petrarch’s protestations, and was the basis for the Byzantines’ belittling of 
Liudprand. But now the Reich is, in Celtis’ eyes, the sole and legitimate successor to 
Rome.
346
 Crucially, Celtis urges, his fellow Holy Romans should look backwards to an 
imagined history, a legitimisation of the present by appropriating – and where necessary, 
stealing and doctoring – the relics of the past to enforce this claim.347 Celtis is clearly aware 
that his world is very different from that of Caesar and Augustus, but the principle of a single 
upholder of civilisation remains.  
However, a problem emerges. Even in the Early Middle Ages, petty princelings from 
Northumbria to Navarre had styled themselves imperators. This trend had accelerated by the 
time of Conrad von Celtis, for ‘the idea of a translatio imperii was fundamental to the ethos 
of the Reich: the prestige of the emperor was immeasurably enhanced by the notion that he 
held supreme power inherited from the emperors in Rome’.348 But while the rulers of 
medieval Europe had once been required to explicitly state their position in relation to the 
Kaiser, the Renaissance sees a change.
349
 For all Conrad’s insistence that the translatio 
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imperii has passed the sceptre and civilising mission of Caesar exclusively to the Germans, 
and for all the German Humanists’ invention of a mythical noble history to justify passing 
imperium from the decadent wastrels of Italy to the virtuous heroes of Conrad Celtis’ 
nostalgic fantasies,
350
 the logicians and literati of Nuremberg and Nördlingen – who embrace 
their own manufactured “history” to the extent of changing their German names to Roman-
sounding gibberish
351
 – are by no means alone in claiming that they are the new embodiment 
of imperium. 
Our scene changes and we find ourselves, only a few decades later, in Henry VIII’s 
palace at Richmond-upon-Thames in the spring of 1533. Eighty years have passed since the 
fall of Constantinople, and more than half a millennium has transpired since Liudprand 
argued with Prince Leo. Imperium, the imagination of power, authority, superiority, and 
legitimacy, has been appropriated by new self-anointed imperators. In the Grand Duchy of 
Muscovy, Vasily III calls himself Caesar and energetically promotes Philotheus of Pskov’s 
description of Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’, claiming authority via his father Ivan III’s 
marriage to the last Byzantine princess fleeing the fall of her ancient city,
352
 and recent 
written recognition of his imperial title from the Holy Roman Emperor.
353
 In Central Europe 
that same Holy Roman Emperor, Caesar Augustus Charles V, rules over his bloated Heiliges 
Römisches Reich, justifying his title through his coronation by the Pope
354
 and his great-
grandfather’s purchase of the legal rights to the words Imperium and Imperator from the 
exiled, bankrupt nephew of the final Byzantine Basileus cut down in Constantinople.
355
 And 
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in that city, now the glittering jewel in the Caliphate’s crown, Sultan Suleiman the 
Magnificent has declared himself Kaysar-i-Rûm – Caesar of Rome.356  
The actual town of Rome is now a derelict slum of squatters and shacks, ‘its total 
population having shrunk ... hopelessly demoralised and in many cases half-starving’,357 
overshadowed by the new merchant capitals of northern Europe and Mediterranean Asia, and 
is now utterly inconsequential.
358
 Instead, three Romes and three self-styled Roman Emperors 
now exist: a Catholic in Germany, an Orthodox in Russia, and a Muslim in Asia Minor. Yet 
this is apparently not enough, for in the capital of one of the petty little kingdoms surrounding 
the power-centres of the Reich, Spain and France,
359
 Henry VIII formally breaks from the 
Church of Rome and justifies his protestation by asserting that he possesses the legitimacy, 
dignity, and supreme sovereignty bestowed only upon those who embody imperium:
360
   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Constantinople. Thomas’ eldest son Andreas, bankrupt in Rome, twice sold his Latinised title Imperator 
Constantinopolitanus to the invading Charles VIII of France (who died in 1498 without an heir, rendering the 
continuation of the imperial title legally dubious) and John II of Aragon (father of Ferdinand II, who unified 
Spain by marrying Isabella of Castile, who in turn were grandparents of Charles V). Meanwhile Thomas’ sister 
Sophia Palaiologos, married off by the Pope to Ivan III in Moscow in vain hope of a joint Catholic-Orthodox 
crusade to liberate Constantinople, had passed her own semi-legal imperial status to the emerging Russians. 
John Julius Norwich traces the offshoot of Thomas Palaiologos’ illegitimate son John, who fled to London and 
whose descendants, in turn fleeing the English Civil War, were recorded as late as 1679 in Barbados. The last 
claimant to the Roman imperial office, Godscall Palaeologus, disappears from historical records in London in 
1693. It is currently unknown if the last Roman dynasty died with her. Byzantine legend, however, asserts that 
when the final world conflict between Christendom and the Antichrist begins, Constantine XI Palaiologos will 
return to lead the revived Roman Imperium. See Ostrowski, ‘The growth of Muscovy’, p. 233 in Perrie (ed.), 
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‘Where by divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles it is manifestly 
declared and expressed that this realm of England is an empire, and so hath 
been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and king having 
the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same...’361 
 
Statute in Restraint of Appeals 
Henry VIII, 1533 
 
 Let us momentarily set aside the turbulent politics of Renaissance Europe and 
consider the evolution of the discourse. Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottomans styles 
himself Kaysar, Charles V of the Heiliges Reich is Kaiser, Vasily III of Muscovy is a 
Czar,
362
 and now Henry VIII, while not claiming the title, declares that his realm is empire. 
Each man is a Caesar, an Imperator of his own making. But not one of these four men has 
more than the vaguest of connections to the broken-down Italian town in their contemporary 
sixteenth century, and none whatsoever to the metropolitan memory of Caesar, Cicero, and 
Cincinnatus. Instead, each man adopts the word as evidence of his self-anointed status as the 
defender of civilisation, the supreme order with authority over all other temporal rulers, the 
rightful inheritor of imperium.
363
  
 As we saw in the writings of Richard of Bury, Henry VIII was not the first 
Englishman to dabble with the imperial discourse. Nor would he be the last.
364
 Yet it starkly 
                                                 
361
 24 Hen 8 c 12 (Ecclesiastical Appeals Act 1532 / Statute in Restraint of Appeals), His Majesty’s 
Government, The Statutes At Large: From the First Year of King Richard III to the Thirty-First Year of King 
Henry VIII, inclusive [Vol. IV] (Cambridge: Joseph Bentham’s University Press, 1763), pp. 257-261; Frances 
Yates, Astraea: the imperial theme in the sixteenth century (London: Routledge, 1975), p. 39. 
362
 Maureen Perrie (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia: Vol. I, From Early Rus’ to 1689 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Paul Dukes, A History of Russia c.882-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998), p. 43. 
363
 It is around this time that the word empire begins to be applied to non-European societies. Jeremy Black 
records that among European explorers, ‘there was the difficulty of discussing and conceptualizing what was 
poorly, if at all, understood outside the zone of interaction’: as European diplomats were accustomed to defining 
their prestige by comparison to the Reich, placing their realms on a hierarchy with politically alien societies in 
Africa, Asia, and the New World created distinct diplomatic problems. As Black records, ‘This pattern of 
interaction became more insistent as competition between European states spread into the overseas world, 
notably in commerce and colonization. As a result, foreign states were understood largely in terms of their 
alignments with rival European powers, as well as with the pattern of European politics’. Jeremy Black, A 
History of Diplomacy (London: Reaktion, 2010), pp. 50-52. Matthew Gabriel argues that many of the historical 
and recent non-European polities we call “empire” are a result of Victorian translations of foreign texts, using 
“empire” as a portmanteau word for powerful societies – precisely the same way as medieval scholars used the 
word imperium. Matthew Gabriel, An Empire of Memory: The Legend of Charlemagne, the Franks, and 
Jerusalem before the First Crusade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. xi-xix. 
364
 Following George III’s quiet abandonment in 1801 of the title ‘King of France’ at Napoleon’s insistence, and 
the recent incorporation of (Catholic) Ireland into the (Protestant) United Kingdom, at a cabinet meeting on 5
th
 
November 1801 a suggestion was raised that George III should adopt the title “Emperor of the British Isles”. 
While the circumstances are unclear, the contemporary fear of a strong Papist presence in the otherwise 
Anglican government, and the perceived need for George to emphasise his equality with his ally the Holy 
Roman Emperor, to give Britain equal prestige in the Allies’ negotiations with Napoleon’s France, allow us to 
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illustrates how far the discourse of imperium has evolved. Like all who came before him, 
from Charlemagne and Constantine XI Palaiologos to Suleiman the Magnificent and Ivan III, 
Henry VIII is appealing to a history which is a blend of fact and fantasy,
365
 a concocted 
community which never existed but which justifies his present-day actions. The appeal to 
imagination confers legitimacy upon his momentous decision to secede from Catholicism. He 
declares England to be not only a supreme sovereign – a superior partner in the 
caesaropapist
366
 squabble that has upset the medieval union between church and state – but 
by extension the sole arbiter and authority of civilisation. 
As we move yet closer to the present day, we see a similar pattern. Our scene changes 
again, this time to the interior of Notre-Dame de Paris on the morning of 2
nd
 December 1804, 
to a ceremony both ‘lavish and sumptuous, heavy with the symbolism of state authority and 
personal power’.367 Against a backdrop of wobbly cardboard sets368 and hastily-manufactured 
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relics unconvincingly claimed to stretch back to Charlemagne,
369
 in the presence of an angry 
Pope dragged against his will from the Vatican,
370
 the erstwhile Consul of the French 
Revolution’s Res Publica, Napoleon Bonaparte, places a Roman-style laurel wreath upon his 
own brow and proclaims himself Empereur of L’Empire des Français.371 It is no coincidence 
that Napoleon’s imperial coronation preceded his dismembering of the rival Holy Roman 
Empire two years later. This was a necessary formality, as according to the translatio, 
imperium was exclusive and the Reich, for centuries a personal possession of the House of 
Habsburg and now extinct in all but name,
372
 was apparently no longer worthy of possessing 
imperium. Civilisation, sovereignty, and legitimacy, for Napoleon, were no longer upheld by 
the decadent and decaying monarchies of Europe, but were now found in the youthful and 
energetic Revolutionary Republic of France following in the footsteps of the ancient Roman 
Republic by throwing out its hated kings – and so too was Napoleon, in his mind, following 
in the footsteps of his hero Julius Caesar by rescuing the Republic from corruption and 
uniting it under a brutal military dictatorship.
373
 Thus imperium, in Napoleon’s mind, had 
passed back to the descendants of Charlemagne – the new civilisation of order, dignity, and 
legitimacy. Thus the situation in the French Senate in May 1804, declaring the Empire: ‘the 
tribunes are drunk on history, explaining to themselves their present reality by construing odd 
visions of the past, extracting strange truths from it’, summarised by one tribune who states 
that ‘“Nobody here can ignore – we’ve lived it too long – the empire of words and the 
prestige of names”’.374 
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It is therefore no coincidence that Napoleon’s coronation and subsequent de facto 
monarchy were saturated with symbols borrowed from the iconography of Classical Rome
375
 
and Carolingian France,
376
 continuing the façade in later years by bestowing upon his son the 
title ‘King of the Romans’ (with accompanying iconography);377 the traditional title for the 
first sons of Holy Roman Emperors.
378
 In the trappings of his subsequent imperial household 
and imperial style across Europe, Napoleon was simply continuing the translatio imperii, 
declaring that he and France embodied Imperator
379
 and Imperium respectively.
380
 This 
discourse further evolved in France’s Second Empire,381 and prompted a ‘sudden cultus of the 
imperial title’ in European and Latin American countries in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.
382
 
Again our scene changes, this time to the despatch box of the House of Commons on 
17
th
 February 1876 where, to angry objections from Liberal MPs,
383
 the wily leader of the 
Conservative Party, Benjamin Disraeli, is announcing to Parliament a bill which will grant 
Queen Victoria the unusual title of Kaiser-i-Hind – to be officially rendered in documents as 
Indiae Imperatrix
384
 or Empress of India.
385
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Disraeli’s ‘flashy stunt’ – later announcing the passage of the Act on the steps of the 
Stock Exchange, in the rain, to a fanfare of trumpets from a hired brass band
386
 – was not to 
everyone’s taste. It ‘struck ... many Liberals, as an inglorious, unnecessary, un-British aping 
of foreign autocracies’,387 and ‘to some ... [Empress of India] was more suggestive of a pig or 
a railway engine than a constitutional monarch’.388 And curiously, British elites in the early 
and mid-nineteenth century had been outright hostile towards imperial titles – even shunning 
the phrase “British Empire” – as imperium was too closely associated with Napoleonic 
tyranny and ancient Italian savagery towards the Britons.
389
 Yet by the 1870s the discourse 
was clearly evolving further. 
From records of the period we can infer that the choice of the title might have had as 
much to do with Disraeli seeking royal patronage of his own political career as with public 
prestige – similar to Pope Leo and Charlemagne – but the importance of prestige cannot be 
understated. As A.N. Wilson notes,
390
 Disraeli’s choice of title came not long after the 
erstwhile King of Prussia had become Kaiser of Germany, a new industrial and military 
superpower whose rapid rise was the cause of some not-inconsiderable worry to a Britain 
sliding into commercial complacency.
391
 And with France having recently renounced Empire 
for Republic,
392
 this left a lack of rivals against Imperial Germany. An Imperial Britain 
‘would be an Imperium...to rival the European Dreikaiserbund’.393 This is ironic, as Wilson 
notes, considering that in 1876 Victoria’s political power had never been lower while her 
unpopularity with the British public had never been higher.
394
 Yet while the adoption of the 
imperial discourse had clear personal motivations on the part of Disraeli, and perhaps 
Victoria herself,
395
 the issue of sovereignty, legitimacy, and supreme power remained clearly 
visible in the form of justifying British Imperium. Following the 1857 Indian Mutiny, British 
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India had recently passed from control of the East India Company to direct crown control,
396
 
and in the absence of the Mughal Padshah or Raja
397
 – the Company’s puppet figurehead 
whose title was rendered in British newspapers as Emperor
398
 – Disraeli clearly deemed it 
necessary to justify British rule over the many royal rulers on whose collaboration British 
rule would rely. This would require a powerful public statement of sovereignty and 
legitimacy. Victoria ‘could scarcely be the empress of Britain, and although her government 
now had a toe-hold in most discovered corners of the planet, it would have been vainglorious 
to style herself empress of the world’:399 Empress of India solved these problems by elevating 
Victoria to an equal level with her growing rival in Berlin, expressed supreme sovereignty 
over her hundreds of millions of new subjects on the subcontinent, and made a powerful 
public statement to the world that British Raj was, in British minds, justified. Thus 
commenced a brief British fad for all things classically Roman,
400
 and a short-lived tradition 
of the British monarch being styled as Rex et Imperator/Imperatrix – King and 
Emperor/Empress – in an unambiguous public statement of imperial Britain’s self-appointed 
status as guardian and defender of civilisation.
401
  
As our scene moves into the twentieth century and we witness Europe’s stranglehold 
on the world beginning to crumble, two totalitarian tyrants seek to legitimise their hastily-
constructed regimes by appropriating the symbolism, iconography, and visual and verbal 
language of Ancient Rome. By mimicking eagles, architecture, gestures, language, and the 
garish pomp of sinister ceremonies attempting to replicate the triumphs of Roman Imperators 
and medieval Kaisers, the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis,
402
 slavishly mimicking 
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Mussolini’s pantomime,403 declare that they are the rightful and sole inheritors of supreme 
sovereignty, authority, legitimacy, and power – defined by their self-proclaimed superiority 
over all others. By the time Europeans emerged from the ashes of the subsequent 
Armageddon and began the mismanaged dissolution of their colonial conquests, the discourse 
of empire was no longer something to be admired but instead to be abhorred
404
 – a pattern 
replicated in Europe’s transatlantic offspring.  
In the heady days of American liberty, Thomas Jefferson had described the fledgling 
United States as an ‘empire of liberty’405 as the USA had, in his mind, taken up the mantle of 
Republican Rome. This echo of Conrad Celtis’ exhortations did not go unnoticed. As Hugh 
Henry Breckinridge, ardent opponent of Britain’s empire in North America, wrote following 
the American Revolution: 
 
‘You are now citizens of a new empire: an empire, not the effect of 
chance, not hewn out by the sword; but formed from the skill of sages, 
and the design of wise men ... You have acquired superior strength; you 
are become a great people.’ 406 
 
It may seem incongruous, perhaps even ridiculous, that a people so recently freed 
from the shackles of the British Empire would appropriate the word to describe their 
consciously anti-imperial project. Yet just as Europeans abandoned the term, so did the 
Europeans’ offspring in the New World. Ronald Reagan’s 1983 labelling of the Soviet Union 
as an ‘evil empire’,407 and more recently Donald Rumsfeld’s assertion that the United States 
is ‘not about empire’, as we earlier saw, reflect this. 
In all of these historical vignettes, from the palace of Bucoleon to the press room of 
the White House, we see the same precise pattern. Empire, Emperor, Empress, Imperium, 
Kaiser, Czar, Kaysar – whether to be loved or hated – all are complete fabrications, yet all 
have a common root. The root is that Christmas morning when the Pontiff proclaimed 
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Imperium, setting in motion the subsequent evolution of the discourse. In the cases we have 
examined, all invocations of imperium seek the same things: to proclaim superiority over 
others, to confer legitimacy upon the present by appealing to an appropriated past, to 
construct an imagined community which justifies the present as a continuation of the ancient 
past, and ultimately to express history not as it was but how it should have been. The Rome 
which existed in the minds of medieval and modern monarchs was not the Rome which really 
existed, but the Rome which ought to have been, and which had to have been for their feudal 
fiefdoms and Enlightenment regimes to be bestowed with legitimacy. 
This has continued since. From the early days of European expansion in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, to the heyday of Europe’s jingoistic imperialism in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, empire was a discourse to be admired. At the same time empire 
became embedded as a discourse of intellectual life – it is in the nineteenth century that we 
see historians naming the civilisations of the ancient world as “empires”, imposing an 
imagination of order, strength, and dignity upon the past in precisely the same way as Pope 
Leo had done a thousand years previously.
408
 The consequence of this was, as John 
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perceived strength, sovereignty, and dignity. Historian Eric Hobsbawm attributes this to the intellectual and 
political dominance of Europe and European traditions of thought from the sixteenth century onwards. As 
Europeans encountered the non-European world they inevitably interacted on the European basis with which 
they were familiar. Thus non-European words and complex political concepts, which cannot be easily translated 
into a single European word, were simply slotted into a convenient lumpencategory of “Empires”: 中華帝國 
became “The Chinese Empire”;              became “The Mughal Empire”; 大日本帝國 became “The Empire of 
Japan”, and so forth, a habit which has survived into the present and continues to colour our interpretation of the 
non-European past. Exactly the same happened as Europeans began to discover and write non-European history, 
always on a comparative basis to Europe. Thus the Achaemenid dynasty of Persia became the “Achaemenid 
Empire”, Sargon of Akkad was written about as ruler of the “Akkadian Empire”, and so forth. Even societies 
which did not think of themselves in spatial terms received such treatment. Thus the Zulus, who viewed their 
society as a network of amabutho and amakhanda family groups rather than a shape on a map, were reported in 
British newspapers as a “Zulu Empire”; Ancient Egypt, whose inhabitants had simply called their world ‘km.t’ 
(“The Black”, a reference to the Nile’s diluvian soil), was termed by nineteenth-century archaeologists as the 
“Egyptian Empire”. In all of these cases Europeans filled what Benedict Anderson calls ‘empty time’ with 
European ideas and Euroepan imaginations. This is a powerful consequence of the translatio imperii: there have 
been no “empires” outside of European history from 800 AD onwards – such “empires” have existed purely in 
European imagination and discourse. See: E.H. Carr, What is History? pp. 24-26; Richard Evans, In Defence of 
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Mackenzie argues, a mass mobilisation of the general public in support of empire as an ideal 
towards which the nation could collectively strive.
409
 Examining the geographical, political, 
and historiographical literature on empire, we see an intellectual domino-effect taking place. 
Today we criticise what Michael Cox terms ‘America’s imperial temptation’ based on our 
interpretations of Europe’s imperial activity a century ago. Yet the imperialists of yesteryear 
were themselves influenced by a desire to link their order with that of the Romans and 
establish their rights against the universal pretensions of the Holy Roman Empire – an entity 
which was itself grounded in Pope Leo’s desire to confer legitimacy and dignity upon his 
protector Charlemagne, by invoking an imagination of the past. Empire is, to use the 
terminology of Raimundas Lopata and Nortautas Statkus, more a practice of ‘imperiography’: 
empire does not exist externally, it is only created when we speak, write, and invoke the 
concept.
410
  
Those who proclaim themselves to be the self-anointed guardians of civilisation are 
proclaiming empire; the laudatory announcement that We are better than Them, because We 
are a single, indivisible people, because We have formed a community which is greater than 
merely the sum of its parts, and because We have an authority and legitimacy which none 
may rightfully resist and which none can truly match. Many have claimed their lineage as 
descendants of Rome – Rhōmaiō, Rûm, Römisches – and thereby have perpetuated the 
translatio imperii: what Robert Folz describes as ‘the fragmentation of the idea of empire’.411 
Yet as Jacques Le Goff reminds us, ‘although it could be partial, the idea of empire was 
always connected to the idea of unity, however fragmentary’.412 The idea that there was, and 
is, only one legitimate sovereign of the civilised world, whose duty and destiny it is to defend 
order against chaos, is what defines the discourse. It matters not that the Union does not 
consciously resuscitate the language of Rome, for the discourse has evolved beyond the need 
for clumsy, sledgehammered insistences peddled to the people. For centuries the translatio 
has been expressed in a far more subtle form. 
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2.4 Crowning the King of Diamonds 
 
‘A newly-born Government must dazzle and astonish.  
When it ceases to do that, it falls.’413 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
1800 
 
Empire is clearly a discourse constituting, and bound up in, near-limitless power. This 
was recognised by the father of a relatively recent attempt at European unification – 
Napoleon Bonaparte. However, this discourse of supreme power needs to be expressed. 
Napoleon’s above words in 1800, spoken to his skeptical secretary Bourienne, capture this 
requirement. As consul (another Roman word appropriated to lend a sense of legitimacy and 
civilisation to the present) of a bankrupt and besieged France and leader of the seventh 
French government in ten years, Napoleon perfectly understood the need to continually 
impress the people of his realm and powerful outsiders. A master of public propaganda based 
on overt connections to Charlemagne and Caesar,
414
 expressed in public art, monuments, 
exhibitions and ceremonies, Napoleon sought to legitimise the Revolution and France’s 
conquest of much of mainland Europe by expressing that his rule was not only right, but 
destined. It is thus little surprise that Napoleon went further than his monarchical 
predecessors
415
 and contemporaries
416
 by not merely invoking the image of Rome but its very 
name – in early 1804 the Senate declared, or was ordered to declare, Napoleon as Empereur 
of the Empire des Français.
417
 
Napoleon’s above words remain as true today as they were two centuries ago. 
Consciously or not, the translatio imperii must be communicated to people whose opinions 
matter. Yet it is not confined to the realms of writing and rhetoric. It exists, today, less in 
verbal language and more in visual. 
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We saw earlier how in Early Medieval Europe, petty rulers adopted imperator ‘as a 
“puff”, to talk up [their] influence and prestige’.418 This was also done visually. ‘Imperial 
practices’, asserts Julia Smith, ‘provided a repertoire of inherited ways of presenting and 
enacting royal power for showy display and enhanced legitimacy: almost everywhere, kings 
avidly drew upon this stock of motifs, adding an imperial lustre to less grandiose realities’.419 
This ‘imperial lustre’ has taken a wide variety of forms. Charlemagne did not walk into St. 
Peter’s in the scruffy Frankish travelling-clothes which he preferred, but in the antique tunic 
and purple cloak of an Imperator. Napoleon did not make up his coronation accessories on a 
whim: his throne was a copy of the Roman Imperator’s, his choice of bumblebees as a 
personal emblem was inspired by the Frankish Merovingians,
420
 while Napoleon’s 
ostentatious outfit was ‘designed to recall the antique splendour of imperial Rome as well as 
to produce a sense of awe among onlookers’:421 an affair seen by Napoleon as a proud 
proclamation that he was the successor of Caesar and Charlemagne, but seen by critics as a 
farce whereby the pudgy, overdecorated Empereur
422
 more closely ‘resembled the King of 
Diamonds’423 than a noble Imperator. Similarly the first Kaiser of late nineteenth-century 
Germany – whose coronation prompted Disraeli’s imperial scheme – wore an imitation of the 
gaudy diadem used to crown Charlemagne
424
 (a crown which, despite fooling the Habsburg 
dynasty and a more recent Austrian tyrant,
425
 was an imitation only made several centuries 
after Charlemagne’s death426) while medieval Holy Roman Emperors were crowned with ‘a 
faithful copy of the crowns of the Byzantine emperors’.427 Following Ivan III’s marriage to 
Sophia Palaiologos, the Muscovian czars were crowned with genuine Byzantine headgear 
smuggled away during the fall of Constantinople,
428
 while the Norman conquerors of 
Byzantine Sicily adopted the Basileus’s habit of eagle-embroidered shoes.429 Even today the 
British monarch is still dressed, at coronation, in a copy of the Byzantine emperors’ colobium 
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sindonis and supertunica,
430
 and as such it is hardly surprising to see a proliferation of statues 
and paintings of European monarchs from the Early Modern period onwards looking mildly 
ridiculous in archaic fancy dress,
431
 wearing Roman laurel wreaths or the costumes of 
senators and imperators centuries after the Rome of the Caesars faded into historical 
memory. Meanwhile Czars and Kaisers of the Early Modern era unleashed a visual 
bombardment of paintings, statues, and ceremonies publicly associating themselves with the 
classical Imperators,
432
 aped by Western Europeans desirous of expressing their legitimacy 
against the Kaiser, while across Eastern Europe royal coronations adopted clearly 
Byzantinesque rituals and artefacts to claim equality with the Czar.
433
  
As Napoleon’s above words suggest, this is perhaps more noticeable in emergent 
rather than established powers. New regimes must justify their rule to their populations, they 
must dazzle or fall, for without the support of political powerbrokers the sovereign cannot 
rule. For Ivan III and his ‘pretensions of greatness’,434 struggling to fashion the Grand Duchy 
of Muscovy into a major power, ‘his occasional use of the title “tsar”, his marriage to the 
Byzantine princess Sofiia Palaeologa, and his employment of Byzantine-style seals and 
ceremonies, clothed those skeletal theories in grand symbols and imagery’,435 while even ‘the 
warlords who established kingdoms within the provinces of the crumbling western Roman 
Empire had legitimized their position by eagerly appropriating symbols of Roman rule – 
portraits on coins, seals, dress, insignia of office, [and] flattering epithets’.436 
This visual evolution, like its linguistic counterpart, is not new. It has been 
progressing since the Romans themselves. It is not by coincidence that the usurper of the 
deposer of the last Western Imperator, Theoderic, ‘maintained himself and his court at 
Ravenna in imperial splendour’, dressing, eating, entertaining, and minting coins like an 
Imperator,
437
 nor was it concomitant that the Anglo-Saxon monarch Cnut styled himself an 
Imperator after being awed by the glittering coronation of Conrad II in St. Peter’s. Not for 
nothing did Byzantine Basileis dazzle foreign legates with lavish ceremonies, permit private 
audiences with the holiest of relics, and make ambassadors and emissaries kneel before the 
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Throne of Solomon – a hydraulically-powered chair complete with roaring mechanical lions, 
which physically elevated God’s self-appointed Vicegerent a couple of metres closer to 
Heaven.
438
 Maximilian, Mussolini, and Napoleon were not simply careless with money when 
publicly excavating Roman and Frankish ruins and erecting Neoclassical monuments in their 
capitols, acting as anchors for convoluted ceremonies to which the powerbrokers of the day 
were invited or dragged. It is no coincidence that the Nazis plundered the Imperial Regalia of 
the Holy Roman Empire for their own ceremonies of translatio imperii, and attempted to hide 
their relics from the Allies for a future resurrection;
439
 and in the same vein it is no 
coincidence that the European Union’s most prestigious award, the modern equivalent of the 
Légion d’honneur, is named the Charlemagne Prize.440 As with titles, many of these displays 
were connections to Charlemagne or Constantinople, and thence ultimately to Rome. The 
discourse of appealing to a fabricated history to legitimise the present – by despots, dictators, 
and democracies – is clearly visible in verbal language, but the power of the visual is 
unmatched. After all, ‘empire had been cobbled together, now it had to be made to fuse: in 
other words, it had to be invented in the imaginations and mentalities of its elites’.441  
This point requires illustration. As we saw earlier, Napoleon’s declaration of Empire 
influenced European attitudes to the word throughout the late nineteenth century, even 
encouraging the British and the Germans – who had formed national identities on their 
opposition to L’Empire des Français442 – to eventually appropriate the word to describe their 
own realms. As a man who so significantly influenced European attitudes to empire, we will 
let Napoleon illustrate his own insight on the need to ‘dazzle and astonish’ the people, by 
examining an example of visual imperium: the famous painting by Revolutionary and 
Imperial France’s de facto chief propagandist – the ‘art dictator of France’, Jacques-Louis 
David
443
 – of Napoleon’s coronation in Notre-Dame: 
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        Fig. 2.1: Coronation of Napoleon I 
444
 
                                                 
444
 Sacre de l'empereur Napoléon Ier et couronnement de l'impératrice Joséphine dans la cathédrale Notre-
Dame de Paris, le 2 décembre 1804. Jacques-Louis David, 1805-1807. Oil on canvas. Musée du Louvre, Paris. 
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 Where is imperium in this image? An immediate answer is that it is present in 
symbols, icons, and the purpose of the image itself. By examining a detail, we can analyse the 
image to discover that it is in fact saturated with political discourses: 
 
 
     Fig. 2.2: Coronation of Napoleon I (detail) 
 
The image is political on two levels. The first level is the content of the picture, which 
express political messages. Aside from the garish glitter, we notice several things about the 
content, characteristics common to forms of visual propaganda from Pharaonic friezes to 
Digital-Age snapshots. Firstly the state takes precedence: although many characters are 
present, everyone is looking at Napoleon, who is bathed in light. There is no question as to 
who is in charge at this moment, nor who embodies imperium. Secondly we see that the 
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chosen moment is not Napoleon crowning himself but crowning his wife, appearing not as a 
bloodthirsty conqueror but as a merciful statesman and a chivalrous husband.
445
 As the image 
is frozen at this moment in time, Napoleon is depicted as perpetually in this state. This is a 
key characteristic of visual politics – the image is static and unchanging, its subject matter 
thus becoming eternal. 
More explicit political symbols are replete. Napoleon is wearing a gold laurel wreath 
– originally a Roman honorific, reappropriated here as a symbol of supreme power,446 while 
his gaudy costume is deliberately reminiscent of an ancient Roman toga. One of his lackeys 
on the right is holding a staff whose tip (upper left above the Pope) is topped with an Imperial 
Eagle – which overlays and is higher than the Pope, signifying temporal power over spiritual. 
Even the gesture being made towards Napoleon by the Pope, the ‘Hand of Blessing’,447 is a 
political icon harking back to a Roman theme. The liturgical gesture is aimed at Napoleon 
and implies, despite the intensely poor relationship between Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII
448
 – 
to the extent that the Pope did not really make the gesture, and instead Napoleon ordered 
David to include it in the painting – that Napoleon has divine approval. These various details 
all add together to imply that Bonaparte, and only Bonaparte, holds the supreme power of 
imperium over the world. 
So much for the political discourses of the image’s content. But there is second level 
of politics – the image itself is a political discourse. A gaudy painting of Napoleon would do 
little to legitimise his rule if it quietly gathered dust in a palace corridor. Neither would it be 
appropriate to paint what actually happened at the coronation – which was not solemn and 
sombre but instead a circus of interminable delays caused by a fussy Napoleon, incompetent 
planning, and vicious infighting between Napoleon’s family.449 We know that the painting is 
not meant to be a faithful reflection of what actually happened in Notre-Dame, with Jacques-
Louis David doing the best he could to capture a moment in time in the days before 
photography. In truth, the painting is just as staged as a studio portrait, and includes details 
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which were not present at the actual event.
450
 We also know that the painting was to be the 
government’s official depiction of the coronation, intended not to gather dust in a private 
gallery but to be publicly displayed.
451
 Even when not at an exhibition, the painting was 
intended to be a centrepiece shown off to foreign ambassadors, emissaries, and sovereigns 
who visited Napoleon
452
 – an unambiguous statement that Napoleon, and only Napoleon, was 
the rightful supreme ruler of the continent. Instead of trying to reflect reality, the image thus 
represents a version of reality, glosses over the circus of 4
th
 December 1804 with its wobbly 
cardboard, angry Pope, family feuds, and Napoleon’s ridiculous appearance, in order to 
present a much more politically appealing imagination.  
Collectively, these characteristics all add up. The Coronation of Napoleon is a 
historical snapshot which captures the power of visual imperium. France’s elites are all 
shown gazing adoringly at Napoleon, who is not only dressed as an Imperator and has the 
blessing of God but is depicted as simultaneously powerful and merciful. And all is wrapped 
up in an aesthetically pleasing package designed to be seen by the elites and political 
powerbrokers of a world otherwise warring against Bonaparte. By publicly depicting 
Napoleon as the successor to Caesar in paintings, monuments, plays, and currency, his self-
anointed supremacy over Europe is powerfully proclaimed to the people who mattered. As 
one successor to Napoleon’s new-born government, the European Union too finds itself 
dazzling and astonishing those whose opinions matter. 
However, there is a significant difference. Napoleon, Charlemagne, Henry VIII and 
Constantine Palaiologos were able only (or needed only) to dazzle the rich and powerful: 
counts and commanders-in-chief, ambassadors and archbishops. Hence the creation of royal 
courts with their convoluted ceremonies, visual displays, and the restriction of public 
involvement. But impressing only the rich and powerful of modern society, in the instant-
access, on-demand, live-streaming, digitised democracy that is the European Union, is 
insufficient. Such overt visual connections to the past as The Coronation of Napoleon can no 
longer be restricted to crowned heads: the general public must be just as exposed to, and 
included in, this phenomenon.  
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To a limited extent, public involvement by invoking an imagined past has always 
been a part of visual politics. Ritualistic and liturgical gestures, including genuflection,
453
 the 
above Hand of Blessing, and the salute adopted by Fascists and Nazis, are relics of Roman 
actions (in the Papal case)
454
 or as identified with Jacques-Louis David, interpretations of 
Roman art. The fasces, originally a bundle of sticks and an axe carried by early Roman 
magistrates to mete out corporal and capital punishment respectively, became a general 
symbol of Roman power during the days of the Republic and was adopted in more recent 
centuries by Revolutionary French and Americans, and Mussolini’s Fascists, as a clear visual 
link connecting their version of Republic and justice to an imagined Roman precedent. It is 
easy to see the same phenomenon in architecture. We can take a leisurely stroll around any 
Western capital city today and see visual imperium everywhere. Ionic columns, friezed 
architraves, marble pediments and equestrian statues in pseudo-Roman costumes, decorating 
not Jovian temples but stock exchanges, state banks, the national museums in which we 
dutifully peer at those artefacts which connect us to an imagined national past,
455
 and the 
meeting-halls of legislative assemblies assured that they are continuing the legacy of Rome. 
Even the names of these buildings – Senate, Capitol, Palace – are discursive, linguistic relics 
of the names given to the buildings and hills of Rome, adopted in order to confer legitimacy 
upon those Western states from the late eighteenth to mid-twentieth century’s who perceived 
themselves to be the rightful guardians of civilisation.
456
 And in these realms – public 
gestures, public art, public ceremonies, public iconography, public architecture, and public 
images – we the people become just as much a part of the translatio as any self-proclaimed 
imperator brooding on his throne. This is not mere coincidence, it is crucial: for public 
opinion is a powerful force. 
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2.4.1 ‘The Most Powerful of Forces’ 
 
‘Public opinion is the most powerful of forces ... which like religion 
penetrates the most obscure recess, where administrative actions are 
ineffective; to misunderstand public opinion is as dangerous as to 
misunderstand moral principles.’457 
Prince von Metternich 
1808 
 
Thus wrote the colossus of early nineteenth-century international politics a mere two 
years after Francis von Habsburg, fearful that Napoleon would get himself elected to the 
office, legally renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor to become the mere Austrian 
Emperor. Andrew Wheatcroft draws attention to the crucial context of Metternich’s words – 
in 1806 the long-ignored Reich had finally been dissolved but ‘there was no provision in law 
for the Empire to be wound up, like some bankrupt business’.458 A lot of ex-Imperial citizens 
lost jobs or commercial and political privileges while the new title ‘“Austrian Emperor” 
carried virtually no resonance or meaning in any part of the non-German-speaking 
provinces’.459 It is therefore no surprise that the wily Metternich, now Chancellor to the new 
Austrian Emperor and faced with holding together a simultaneously new and antique absolute 
monarchy in an era of revolutionary republicanism, underscores the importance of gaining 
the masses’ support. 
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For most of human history the opinions of we, the public, seem to have mattered little, 
with gaudy ceremonies and visual declarations of imperium seen only by elite powerbrokers 
– aristocrats, senior clergy, ambassadors, and incidentally by the metropolitan populace. Even 
when the general public were consulted, wielders of imperium were able to disseminate 
disingenuous dispatches
460
 or fob off the populace with heroic pageants and hollow 
plebiscites,
461
 and needlessly fiddle the figures to suggest implausibly overwhelming 
support.
462
 But since the communications and literacy revolutions of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, such trickery is not quite as easy. The citizens of today’s European Union 
– if they so choose – are exposed to politics on a perpetual basis, with the ability to scrutinise 
every word emanating from Brussels and Strasbourg.  
In times past it may have been possible to dazzle people with a ‘flashy stunt’463 – 
hydraulic thrones, cheap copies of Charlemagne’s sword, even vast, self-congratulatory 
jubilees complete with newspaper coverage and millions of mass-produced souvenirs
464
 – but 
this is no longer effective. Those who try to resurrect the ceremonial of the past are doomed. 
For Anthony Pagden, ‘Victoria’s coronation as “Empress of India” was the most fully 
elaborated attempt the modern world has ever witnessed to recreate the ancient Roman 
imperium’.465 But one hundred and one years after Victoria, a much more obvious attempt 
occurred when the erstwhile President of the Central African Republic and disciple of his 
hero Napoleon, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, ordered his party to declare him Empereur before 
organising a garish coronation which made Napoleon’s pantomime in Nôtre-Dame look 
almost dignified: 
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     Fig. 2.3 – Empereur Jean-Bédel Bokassa, 1977466 
 
We might understand Bokassa’s desire to add an aura of legitimacy and community to 
his regime – rejecting the invented ‘Africanisation’ of Zaire’s President Mobutu, and seeking 
to fill the vacuum of African prestige left by the fall of Haile Selassie’s empire a few years 
earlier
467
 – by declaring that he holds imperium. But we can only wince at the chosen 
medium for this expression.
468
 Imperial coronations may have been awe-inspiring for 
Charlemagne and his successors, in the era of divine right and personal sovereignty.
469
 Yet 
even by 1804 the format was deemed so pretentious that as we saw, Napoleon was publicly 
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ridiculed,
470
  even by his own family.
471
 By 1977, the format was deemed so absurd, so filled 
with ‘obnoxious excesses’ and ‘clowning glory’,472 that Bokassa’s imperial coronation 
prompted not merely ridicule but diagnoses of serious mental health problems. For all his 
clear awareness of the translatio imperii in visual and symbolic form, he was soon 
deposed.
473
 Aside from domestic and international ridicule, there are two principal reasons 
why such overt visual displays of imperium are no longer effective: format and audience. 
The established format of declaring imperium – triumphs, parades, and glitter – no 
longer works. It is true that once it did. To cite but one example, Symon of the Bulgars, 
scourge of the Byzantines, was bought off when the Byzantines, faced with a crushing defeat, 
staged a cheap ceremony to declare him Basileus of the Bulgars. Symon was so awed by the 
ritual that he fell to his knees before the Basileus of Constantinople and switched from bitter 
enemy to staunch ally.
474
 But as Bokassa, Victoria, and Napoleon demonstrate, such days are 
past – we no longer exult Emperors, we excoriate them. This hints at the second reason for 
rejecting traditional forms of showcasing imperium: audience. 
Physical manifestations of imperium just do not go far enough. One-off events such as 
coronations, military parades, processions of relics, or gaudy royal rituals – even televised475 
– are not seen by everyone, and only last a few hours at most. Material artefacts such as 
paintings and statues are a better option: as Charles V recognised, symbolic artworks, 
strategically placed around the palace, are a permanent and effective means of awing or 
intimidating ambassadors.
476
 But today they gather dust in art galleries or still hang on palace 
walls, unseen by the public, while grandiose monuments squat in capital cities, seen only 
occasionally – if at all – at a distance on television and in magazines by the vast majority of 
the state’s population. And in the twenty-first century, the handful of remaining royals in 
Europe entertain no aspirations to the Universal Monarchy of imperators and basileis, much 
less possess any degree of power or obligation beyond looking vaguely regal for the duration 
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of antique ceremonies which are far too restricted a medium to influence the politically 
powerful public. 
For most of history this visual manifestation of imperium appears to have worked 
well, as powerbrokers were few and far between and could gain easy access to palaces and 
parades. But today, the sovereign is somewhat larger than a single human body – it is the 
entire population of a democratic state, constantly bombarded by visual media, and whose 
attention must be competed for.
477
 Elite ceremonies no longer accomplish this. Gaudy 
costumes and eagle-motif banquets may have awed powerbrokers in the eras of Caesars and 
Basileis, but such ostentation today is ludicrous. To effectively convey the imagination of 
legitimacy and sovereignty, a wider visual language is required: one capable of reaching 
more people than a ceremony which, whether in St Peter’s Basilica in 800 or on live 
planetwide broadcasts, is restricted in attendance and duration.
478
 Something is needed which 
is more concrete, more ubiquitous, more permanent. Something which connects the viewer to 
the sovereign with a mere glance, something which transcends verbal language to unite the 
population as a whole, and something whose authority is apparently assured as a faithful 
reflection of reality. This something, as we shall shortly see, is the map.  
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS  
 
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. 
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in ... creating 
something that has never yet existed ... they anxiously conjure up the spirits 
of the past to their service’.479 
Karl Marx 
The Eighteenth Brumaire 
 
 Writing his caustic commentary on the events of 1851, wherein Louis-Napoleon 
Bonaparte swapped his presidency of the French Republic for the crown of an Empereur, 
Karl Marx touches upon the very essence of the translatio imperii. Nothing in our world 
exists outside of time. The civilisations that we build cannot be extracted from the context of 
the histories which formed them, and nowhere is this more true than the European Union. It is 
no coincidence that the Union is hard to define. It is what Jacques Delors terms an 
‘unidentified political object’,480 and what Volker Bornschier calls ‘a somewhat strange 
hermaphrodite’.481 The Union is built upon the political graves of dozens of previous attempts 
at unifying the European peoples under a single rule. For obvious reasons the bureaucrats of 
Brussels do not wish to be tarred with the imperial brush, but ultimately the Union is merely 
one more link in an ongoing translatio which began at the altar of St Peter’s more than 
twelve centuries ago. 
We have come quite a long way since that Saturday afternoon in 968 AD where we 
started. Let us briefly return to that room in the Bucoleon Palace, to eavesdrop once more 
upon Liudprand of Cremona and Leo Phokas.  
John Julius Norwich believes that it would have cheered Liudprand up to know that 
more than a thousand years after his death, people were still reading his acerbic diary.
482
 But 
equally Liudprand could listen in to today’s discussions in despair that we are no closer to 
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understanding empire than he and Leo were. Or so it might seem. Modern scholars still 
tirelessly replicate the same fierce argument between Liudprand and Leo, perennially seeking 
to catalogue, classify, define and deny a most troublesome word. But conceiving of empire as 
a discourse demonstrates that all roads lead to Rome. Not the gritty, squalid, or banal Rome 
which existed in the historical reality of Caesar and Augustus,
483
 but the dignified, 
indefatigable, supremely righteous Rome that existed only in the imaginations of the 
squabbling Popes, Patriarchs, Basileis, and Kaisers of European political history.   
The European Union does not, of course, term itself a New Rome. The days of such 
bold public proclamations of the discourse are long gone, and if they are to return, they will 
not do so in the foreseeable future. The politicians and pundits of the European Union – José 
Barroso aside – categorically deny any association with empire. But the discourse is alive and 
well, indeed vigorous and growing stronger, within the Union. For it is in today’s Union that 
we see the same act being played out all over again. The discourse of this imagined 
community has returned, defined by contrasting its apparently superior, self-adulatory 
civilisation against the barbarians beyond, appealing to an artificial history in which Europe 
was always one, legitimising the yearning for the power, prestige, and sovereignty. The 
Commissioners, Directors-General, and Members of Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg 
refrain from swaddling themselves in purple togas, avoid genuflecting before Pope or 
Patriarch to receive a crown, and turn down the opportunity to declare the President of the 
European Commission the new Caesar Augustus. But the dynamic discourse is as alive today 
in the hallways of the EU’s institutions as it was in Napoleon’s Nôtre-Dame, Henry VIII’s 
Richmond Palace, Ivan III’s Kremlin, Suleiman’s Sublime Porte, Nicephorus’ Bucoleon 
Palace, and St. Peter’s Basilica. The translatio imperii is not quite extinct in verbal language, 
but it is dormant. For now, ‘nobody likes empires’.484 But in visual language it is alive and 
well: the graphic depiction of sovereignty, legitimacy, and destiny. And this visual rhetoric is 
currently hidden in a peerlessly powerful vehicle for the propagation of the imperial 
imagination. 
As the preceding pages demonstrate, attempts to identify empire using a checklist of 
political criteria fail to encapsulate what empire is, and are unable to distinguish empire from 
a multitude of competing geopolitical constructs. Attempting to examine empire as an 
ontology applicable across the world is unsatisfactory, as it has all the hallmarks of Victorian 
scholarship: an admirable but misguided quest based in grand theory, seeking universal 
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patterns in the infinitely complex diversity of human societies, twinned with a nefarious 
agenda of legitimising contemporary policies by insisting that empire is a natural 
phenomenon.
485
 But it evidently is not. What, then, is it? 
First, we have identified that empire is a discourse. Rooted in a historiographic 
European nostalgia for an imagined past, a concept exported to the rest of the world and 
subsequently left to evolve into the rich diversity of postcolonial, neo-imperial, and similar 
methodological frameworks, empire remains rooted in a specifically European mixture of 
historiography and the longing for unity, dignity, and power which oscillates, in the collective 
European mind, between vigorous support and embarrassed guilt. In academia’s search for 
the nature of empire, we may have been looking in the wrong place. Scholars of empire, 
treating it as a form of state organisation, frequently cite the phenomenon as traceable back to 
Sargon of Akkad.
486
 There is perhaps a grain of truth in this, but for the wrong reason. 
Sargon’s realm – like so many which followed it – indeed was empire, but only because we 
interpret it according to a discourse which has been embedded in European thought since the 
Early Middle Ages. In spite of the mission of historians,
487
  political analysts,
488
 and human 
geographers
489
 to find a link between ‘Incas, Habsburgs ... and Soviets’, there is precious 
little to connect historical expressions of empire: even less if we bring in those regimes from 
non-European history who, as a relic of diplomats, explorers and cartographers of the 
European Age of Discovery, we call empire.  
 Second, we see that the discourse is of several components. Exclusive rule and the 
rejection of rivals, supreme sovereignty over a given area, a divine mission or manifest 
destiny, a dichotomy between civilised and savage and hence an open acknowledgement of 
inequality. It is an imagined expression of civilisation over barbarism. Hence it is a discourse 
which is not only inextricable from unequal dichotomous thinking – it needs inequality in 
order to exist. Empire as an imagination only works when there is something against which it 
can be contrasted and proclaimed to be superior. For Pope Leo, the counterpart of his self-
serving Imperium Romanorum was the non-Christian world. For Charlemagne and his 
emulators through the centuries, the imagined mission of empire was to bring civilisation to 
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the barbarians, to create order out of chaos. This dichotomous discourse is alive and well 
today, and as always this dualism must be maintained and publicly expressed. Indeed this is 
manifestly so in the case of the European Union, an entity which – as Behr, Böröcz, Beck and 
Grande, and Zielonka all recognise – has demonstrated its unwillingness to allow universal 
membership. The Union is not guilty of ‘confounding [its] monarchy with the globe of the 
Earth,’ as Edward Gibbon described Rome, but equally the Union is not so dissimilar from 
the classical Roman imperium in that Europe declines the applications of ‘the fiercest 
barbarians ... refused the honour which they came to solicit, of being admitted into the rank of 
subjects’.490 It might therefore be said that if there indeed is one universal characteristic of 
empire, it is open and freely acknowledged inequality.  
Third, the discourse of empire relies upon manifestation and perpetuation in the 
material world. For Pope Leo, the hastily-fashioned crown and the borrowed word Basileus 
were enough, morphing over the millennia into the pompous materialism of coronations and 
coinage before reaching an apex in the early twentieth-century immersion of European 
societies in a perpetual flood of commodities, media, and social norms loudly proclaiming the 
imperial imagination.
491
 But the age of personal sovereignty, with power invested in the body 
of king or imperator, is past. In the age of popular sovereignty, imperium is shared. 
Michael Cox is arguably wrong in stating that empire ‘belongs in the marble and sepia 
pasts’.492 As a discourse, it is very much alive and well in material manifestations. Primary 
among these imperial channels is cartography. Maps are a vehicle for expressing 
discourses,
493
 but they are also complex discourses in their own right. When these two traits 
are combined in pursuit of a political agenda, cartoimperialism is born. And as a defining 
characteristic of this discourse is that such themes are ‘constantly having to be reproduced’ 
due to their inability to remain static and uniform in the collective consciousness,
494
 empire is 
constituted in a perpetual saturation of European society in European cartographies. The 
discourse of empire is founded on a representation of reality, not a reflection of it: and this is 
precisely what renders the vehicles of the discourse so powerful. For there is no more 
effective vehicle for the propagation of political propaganda – even unknowingly – than 
visual images. And there is no more effective visual image for the blurring of representation 
and reality than a map. 
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Chapter Three 
Through the Looking-Glass 
 
‘In the palace is found a mirror which is of marvellous grandeur, the ascent to which 
consists of one hundred and twenty-five steps richly finished in porphyry, serpentine ... 
crystal, jasper, and sardonyx .... Up to this mirror climbs His Majesty, who sits down, 
and through it gains knowledge of all his realms, for this mirror allows him to view all 
faraway lands and peoples. Via this knowledge can preparations be made, and by the 
power of this device he can perfectly see and uncover the truth in all places, seeing 
wars and the forces of our enemies, and all over the world wherever we wish to wage 
war ... The mirror is guarded day and night by three thousand armed men, so it is not 
possible for this apparatus to be torn down or broken, nor is it possible for our enemies 
to use it.’495 
Extract from the Letter of Prester John 
Europe, c.1165 
 
A few days after the canonisation of Charlemagne in 1165, scholars and theologians 
began circulating copies of a letter purporting to have been sent to the four most politically 
powerful, mutually suspicious figureheads in Europe – Basileus Manuel Komnenus, 
Imperator Frederick I ‘Barbarossa’, King Philip II of France, and Pope Alexander III – from 
‘Prester John’, ruler of a Christian realm lost somewhere in the mystical Orient, asking advice 
on up-to-date Christian dogma. The letter was filled with smug rhetorical questions to 
Byzantine bishops alongside fawning praise for Western cardinals, underscoring the doctrinal 
differences between Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, and the Letter very 
helpfully appeared at the precise moment when Barbarossa needed the prestige of 
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Charlemagne’s imperium to thaw the extraordinarily frosty relationship between the Reich, 
the Byzantines, and the Holy See
496
 – which under the previous pro-French, anti-Reich pope 
had been building bridges with the Basileus while burning them with Barbarossa. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Letter of Prester John, with its emphatic anti-Byzantine and 
pro-Barbarossa discourses, should appear in Rome at such a convenient moment.  
Notwithstanding its forged origins, the Letter pandered to Western tastes for the 
exotic by detailing a litany of geographical wonders and social marvels to dazzle medieval 
Europeans: fountains of youth, elixirs of life, luxuries beyond measure, soldiers more 
numerous than the stars, religious relics long thought lost by the Europeans, and assurances 
that innumerable monarchs of the faraway East bowed before Prester John’s throne.497 
Perhaps foremost among these wonders was the king’s fabled mirror.498 This imaginative 
apparatus – a hybrid of cartography, clairvoyance, and medieval fantasy – was claimed to 
give Prester John the ability to see the entirety of his sprawling kingdom and all lands 
beyond. A God’s-Eye perspective of every part of the world at a single glance. And all 
without having to leave the comfort of his own palace. 
Despite the beliefs of earnest European scholars interpreting the Letter as true,
499
 
Prester John was a complete fabrication.
500
 Sadly, so was his magical mirror. Yet the idea of 
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possessing a God’s-Eye perspective on the world has been a quest of scholars and their 
ambitious, self-aggrandising political patrons since the dawn of civilisation. The closest that 
anyone has come, from the priests of nascent Mesopotamian kingdoms whose inhabitants 
were only just learning how to work metals,
501
 to the engineers of the several thousand 
Geographical Information System satellites currently orbiting our planet,
502
 is the map. 
A map is not a mirror,
503
 but in spite of the special nature of the map we continue to 
believe that simply by looking upon a chart, we are seeing a reflection of the world as it 
really is. But like the letter circulating in the courts and cloisters of twelfth-century Europe, 
this idea is pure fantasy. 
Thus far we have examined one of the two core components of cartoimperialism – the 
concept of empire – and identified it as a discourse. Yet as we have seen, a political discourse 
is meaningless without a way of being communicated.
504
 Maps communicate discourses but 
like so many of the artefacts, ceremonies, and paraphernalia which we encountered in the 
previous chapter, maps may end up communicating discourses wildly different from their 
creators’ intentions. 
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3.2 ‘A ludicrously inept solution’505 
 
‘Let none dare to attribute the shame 
Of misuse of projections to Mercator’s name’.506 
  
Charles Deetz’s and Oscar Adams’ ditty on the Mercator projection hints towards a 
concern in cartography – the mapmaker’s intentions. There are innumerable methods for 
propagating a discourse, and it could persuasively be argued that all artefacts are vehicles of 
political discourse. Arthur Berger is right to point out that we can go too far in unpicking 
political meanings where none exist,
507
 but equally it would be naïve to suggest that objects 
exist outside of politics. As we saw in the previous chapter, even such apparently innocuous 
artefacts as Napoleon’s costume, papal gestures, and the fasces icon, are vehicles for the 
expression of political ideals. Architecture and anthems convey discourses, but politics are 
also embedded in such banal objects as Coca-Cola cans,
508
 carpets, cakes,
509
 and cartography. 
And crucially, artefacts can convey politics which were never implied by their designers but 
are inferred by their users.
510
  
A classic example from cartography illustrates this. Consider Figs 3.1 and 3.2: 
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   Fig 3.1 – The Mercator Projection511 
 
 
    Fig. 3.2 – The Gall-Peters Projection512 
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 Map retrieved from the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/acq/devpol/colloverviews/geography.html.  
512
 Ibid. 
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Here we see two solutions to what Carl Friederich Gauss identified as an impossible 
task:
513
 accurately transferring the distances and shapes of the curved, three-dimensional 
surface of Earth – with fidelity of distance, shape, and angles – to a flat, two-dimensional 
map. This is mathematically impossible and has been known since the Iron Age.
514
 Thus from 
Claudius Ptolemy onwards, cartographers have developed a variety of mathematical 
projections to try and depict the world’s surface as best as they can, but this can only be done 
by sacrificing some part of the planet’s surface – shape, angles, or size.  
Here we see two famous projections, by Gerardus Mercator and Arno Peters. The 
Peters projection (Fig. 3.2) is a direct 1970s response to Mercator’s 1570s method and is 
arguably cartography’s most famous controversy, involving politics which are viciously 
contested
515
 but which were never intended by their creators.  
Mercator’s projection was developed for arguably apolitical reasons. Ancient and 
medieval mariners had hugged the coastline as they sailed along, referencing their position 
via landmarks on the shore.
516
 But with increasing (and increasingly profitable) transoceanic 
deep-water voyages after 1492, new tools of navigation were needed for navigating the open 
sea. The Mercator projection was designed purely for this purpose – the map sacrifices an 
accurate depiction of the size of Earth’s continents, instead maintaining accurate angles in a 
neat, mathematical way conducive to compass and sextant. Yet in recent centuries, the 
Mercator projection has received often vitriolic criticism
517
 for this distortion of land, with 
critics arguing that by stretching the poles and shrinking the Equator, the projection makes 
Europe and North America look bigger – and thus more important – than Africa, South 
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America, and southern Asia.
518
 It is in this context that the (Gall-)Peters projection
519
 has 
been championed, seeking to right the apparent wrongs of the Mercator projection.  
Yet the Peters projection is even more political than the Mercator, and just as 
distorted – so much so that cartographer John Snyder sarcastically released another 
projection, partly a criticism of Peters and partly a cartographic in-joke, which like the Gall-
Peters projection maintains the fidelity of continents’ size and shape: 
 
 
     Fig. 3.3 – The Snyder Projection520 
 
 The Mercator projection was created in response to a perceived political discourse of 
aggressive imperialism, rampant racism, and triumphalist Westernism – a discourse which 
did not exist when it was created, but which has now become welded to the Mercator 
projection.
521
 The result is that maps using either the Mercator or Gall-Peters projection 
become not direction-finders but political pawns.
522
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The visual is a powerful means of communicating a broad variety of ideas both 
intentional and accidental, conscious or unrealised. In so polyglot a polity as the European 
Union it is perhaps unsurprising that a discourse is expressed through a medium which 
transcends boundaries of language and geography, a medium which is arguably more 
powerful than any other in persuading the participant observer that the message embedded 
within – the discourse – is true.  
It was observed in the previous chapter that empire is an amorphous concept. In 
comparison, maps appear at first glance to be easier to work with. Maps are far older than the 
concept of empire, but maps are a much more concrete and functional collection of objects 
with apparently clear definitions and purposes. Given the proliferation of maps in 
contemporary Western society, it would appear that the core concepts of cartography have 
already been identified, allowing us to quickly move on to an analysis of European 
cartoimperialism. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reality is far from simple. The physical maps, whether 
paper or digital which we consult are merely the end product of a vast unseen network of 
neurolinguistics, semiotic persuasion, and political decisions both deliberate and unrealised. 
Maps are merely the tip of an immense theoretical iceberg. The power of semiotics, the role 
of mapmakers and mapreaders, and the mechanisms, technologies, and conventions through 
which people create and interpret maps, will be examined in later chapters. While it is 
essential to acknowledge that maps are merely one aspect of a complex, evolving,
523
 and 
perpetually-occurring network of people,
524
 technologies,
525
 and discourses, we must first 
begin with a much more basic question. 
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3.3 Cartographies of Fiction 
 
‘What is a map?’526 
 
This opening question to Christian Jacob’s study of political mapping appears at first 
glance to be strange. Perhaps even unnecessary. Academic literature on maps is both diverse 
and vast, addressing a broad spectrum of issues pertaining to the power of maps,
527
 the 
history of maps,
528
 and the technologies of maps,
529
 branching out into such emergent 
experimental studies as participatory mapping,
530
 tactile mapping,
531
 ‘cartographies of 
performance’532 and cartographic methodologies.533 Yet throughout this rich and increasingly 
diversified literature, remarkably little is said about what a map is. 
It is tempting to both begin and end with a neat, descriptive explanation of maps. For 
Douglas Gohm, ‘by definition a map is a graphic statement of contour and direction’,534 while 
for Mark Monmonier, a map is ‘a representation of all or a portion of the planet or some other 
vast environment: the typical map is graphic and includes discernible elements of scale, 
projection and symbolization’.535  
On the surface, this appears to be a perfectly satisfactory answer. The map is a 
constructed, two-dimensional diagram designed to depict the world around us. It is a 
reflection of an external reality, a representation remains fixed and universal – remains “true” 
– regardless of how we individuals perceive that same world. Such a drawing exists for 
purely practical purposes allowing us, like Prester John, to gain a God’s Eye view of the 
world which enables us to plan, predict, and understand our surroundings.  
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Furthermore, maps are omnipresent. As of the time of writing, we have mapped 
nearly all physical space from the tips of the Himalayas to the solid iron ball at Earth’s inner 
core,
536
 while aeroplane and satellite cameras have captured almost every square centimetre 
of the planet’s land surface.537 We have mapped our solar system from the swirling surface of 
the Sun to the frozen planetoids orbiting beyond Neptune.
538
 We have mapped the structure 
and composition of single atoms, and entire galaxies so far away their light began travelling 
to us when our own Sun was still just a shapeless cloud of hydrogen.
539
 We have mapped 
continents and civilisations which rose and fell far in the past
540
 and drawn cartographies of 
the distant future
541
 (and we have been drawing past and future worlds for a long time)
542
 and 
perhaps most significantly, we have drawn maps of worlds which exist entirely in our 
imaginations. Our cartographic conquest of existence appears to be almost complete, 
providing us with infinite realms conveniently packaged as handy, manipulable, mobile 
maps. 
Such an answer to our initial question “What is a map?” is reassuringly simple. 
Certainly, in contrast to the complexity of defining empire, arriving at a definition of map 
seems remarkably easy. So much so that the perception of maps as convenient two-
dimensional diagrams, designed to give readers a sense of space, is the foundation of so many 
works on cartography.
543
 Indeed, Robin Flowerdew and David Martin treat maps exclusively 
as scientific objects, asserting that ‘a map is a primary multipurpose tool … for exploring 
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spatial variations’544 while dismissing the artistic and political aspects of maps as a romantic 
relic of bygone days in which European explorers steered their ships towards the uncharted 
horizon.
545
 With this in mind, we might boldly plunge straightaway into a critical, considered 
analysis of those charts churned out by the bodies of the European Union. 
However, we are to be disappointed. Or perhaps excited. For it is unsurprising to 
discover that this neat, simple definition is an illusion. Immediately following his initial 
definition, Monmonier qualifies his statement to alert us that ‘delineating the notion of map is 
hardly straightforward’.546  
Maps are merely the tip of a complex network of interactive relationships and 
iterative processes between mapmaker, mapreader, map, and territory.
547
 Maps exist as 
mental images, and as memories consciously recalled at appropriate moments. Even in the 
familiar form of a physical object that we can see and touch, maps can (and do) exist in so 
abstract and symbolic a form that they are impenetrable and ultimately baffling to a 
mapreader who is unfamiliar with the exotic content and the esoteric contexts of their 
creation and meaning. A cursory glance at any textbook of cartographic history will quickly 
reveal that among the immeasurably diverse range of human cultures, societies, and histories, 
maps are just as rich and varied in form, style, and purpose. This variety extends to the point 
where, to the untrained eye, an object or image which has no apparent connection whatsoever 
to space is in fact a sophisticated map. The sleek GIS charts with which Western publics are 
so familiar are merely one manifestation of mapping. As such, Jeremy Black is arguably 
correct in asserting that ‘the one definition that simply will not do, therefore, is that a map is a 
representation of reality’. 548 
A partial cause of this confusion, as John Keates identifies, is that we of the twenty-
first century are so saturated with these two-dimensional pictorial maps we are largely 
unaware of the processes which make the map what it is.
549
 The map is simply one part of a 
complex thought process, and in order to analyse European Union maps we must understand 
this process. This is not intellectual hair-splitting. Just as it was necessary to understand the 
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processes which engender empire, it is necessary to understand the processes which engender 
map.  
In his discussion of imperial maps, James Akerman
550
 offers a starting-point. 
Recognising that the map is not merely an object, Akerman advances the issue by reminding 
us that maps are not always images and not always even physical.
551
 Maps can be drawn, 
written, spoken, gestured, performed, or merely imagined. While most of these are intriguing 
avenues of cartographic and cartoimperial research, they are not relevant to a study of 
European Union cartographies, as the Union uses only visual maps. However, the latter 
strand is of use in establishing the map. The physical map can only be comprehended in the 
context of abstract thought, and thus it is not only possible but necessary to divide the two. 
Maps can be categorised into two distinct yet overlapping facets. These are Maps and 
Mapping. Each of these categories is unique, yet the map does not sit neatly within any one. 
Rather, the categories blur, with the advantages and authorities of each variety merging into a 
unique form of power possessed by few – if any – other forms of data. By examining each of 
these categories in turn, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of what the map is, and 
how maps have such extraordinary power over us. While Maps are the physical objects with 
which we are all familiar, it is necessary to begin with Mapping.  
 
 
3.2.1 Mapping 
 
Mapping, put simply, is awareness of the immediate physical world around us.
552
 It is a 
process of acquiring and mentally storing spatial information for future use, a dynamic 
process which is transient and constantly in action.
553
 Mapping is ontogenetic, a piece of 
‘neurophysiological hardware’554 which, like an essential computer programme, runs in the 
background of our subconscious mind without us even realising, allowing us to navigate and 
negotiate physical space in our everyday lives.
555
 It is neither necessary nor possible here to 
delve into the rich and contested scientific literature on neurological theory, but equally it is 
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impossible to understand how maps work – and why they are politically important – without 
an examination of how mental mapping works.  
John Goss argues that while we are used to ‘consulting history books or 
encyclopaedias to check the exact date of an item’s discovery or invention’,556 Mapping and 
Maps defy this easy categorisation. Sifting through archives is not enough, and we have to 
dig a little deeper.  
Archaeology reveals that humans have been making physical drawings of our 
surroundings since at least the Upper Palaeolithic Era, some 40,000 years ago.
557
 While there 
is disagreement among scholars about where to draw the line between a picture and a 
“map”,558 John Rennie Short opines that maps can be dated from this period.559 The very 
oldest maps appear to be star-charts or symbolic representations of the phases of human life, 
as are still made by pre-industrial indigenous peoples today.
560
 But demonstrable maps of the 
physical world are at least 10,000 years old, far predating any form of writing. Consider Figs. 
3.4 and 3.5 below: 
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         Fig. 3.4 – Abauntz Map, Spain (c. 11,600 BC)561 
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Fig. 3.5 – Map Rock, Idaho (c. 10,000 BC)562 
 
Tony Campbell argues that ‘it can be said, with forgivable exaggeration, that maps are 
as old and as broad as civilisation itself’.563 As the above images demonstrate, the landscape 
around us has certainly been drawn for a long time. The Abauntz Map appears to show the 
environment around the cave in which it was carved, complete with landmarks such as 
flooded land and a river, and even gives the rough location of the cave-dwellers’ next dinner. 
Meanwhile, John Rennie Short convincingly demonstrates that Fig. 3.5, Map Rock in Idaho, 
depicts the course of the Snake River with nearby mountains. So recognisable is the depiction 
that American pioneers in the nineteenth century, long before unpacking their theodolites and 
compasses to make a topographic survey, recognised it as a map – hence the name of the 
rock.
564
 Yet these carvings did not suddenly appear one Stone Age night. They are merely the 
oldest known survivors, demonstrating already-established conventions of symbolism and 
representation which would be interpreted by their viewers. And crucially, maps such as 
these are evidence of a key aspect of cartography – maps are not standalone images, they are 
the product of mental processes which stretch far back through our evolutionary history.  
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Jochen Smolka and Jan Hemmi demonstrate a crucial point
565
 – all complex animals 
are capable of finding their way around their habitats, and storing spatial information for 
future reference.
566
 Mapping is instinctive, having emerged among the amphibians which 
crawled from the primordial sludge far back in ‘Deep Time’.567 We do not merely discover 
and retain Mapping knowledge – because it is hardwired into our brains, we trust it. We have 
to. The Abauntz Map is a perfect illustration. The deer, bovids, and the ibex herds are 
spatially close to a river, because the river supports the animals’ lives. The humans are 
spatially close to the ibex herds, because the animals in turn support the humans’ lives. Both 
must perform Mapping  to know where these resources are, for without Mapping they would 
starve to death. Our faith in Mapping may be just as hardwired as our ability to perform it. 
As a consequence, Mapping exists at the level Sigmund Freud defines as the 
‘preconscious’, a vague limbo between conscious and subconscious thought.568 It overlaps 
both: we are occasionally aware of Mapping, but do not always need to think about it. An 
unfamiliar place or journey will cause us to consciously retrace our steps, consult signs and 
landmarks, and ask directions – but a routine journey in the house or along a familiar street 
does not require conscious thought. As inadvertent proof of this, Freud’s notes from 
psychoanalysis sessions demonstrate that, even if Freud’s interpretations raise a few 
eyebrows, we cannot deny that in dreams we perform the same basic Mapping functions as 
during the waking day.
569
 Many dreams are set in familiar locations from real life which we 
can already navigate without having to think about it, and even when we find ourselves in 
dreams set in unknown landscapes, we can find our way around, consult landmarks, and 
move – just like in waking life. This may appear to be irrelevant, but the preconscious habitat 
of Mapping is crucial,
570
 as the subsequent sections demonstrate, for understanding how maps 
communicate imperial imaginations. For it is through Mapping, argues Chris Perkins, that 
‘Maps are called into being’.571  
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3.2.2 Maps 
 
We perform Mapping on a daily basis. Every waking moment involves spatial awareness, and 
as Freud hints, Mapping keeps running even when our conscious minds shut down for the 
night. Equally, we are all capable of creating Maps. Lauren Myers and Lynn Liben point out 
how Mapmaking is so common among young children that it may be an inherent ability 
resulting from Mapping being hardwired into our brains,
572
 while Borden Dent acknowledges 
that as adults we continue to constantly create maps
573
 (albeit usually gestured, spoken, 
written, or mentally planned rather than drawn. Of course, adults do draw actual physical 
depictions of the world on very rare occasions).
574
 However, not all Maps are treated equally. 
Those produced by authorities – government, religious, military, and so forth – are almost 
always perceived by people to be more accurate, reliable, and trustworthy.
575
  
While Maps vary in form and function, Daniel Dorling and David Fairburn point to 
one similar characteristic: they are all efforts to “go” somewhere, to ‘reconcile interpretation 
and reality’.576 This applies to all maps, from making drawings in the sand with a stick to 
scrolling through Google Earth. J.B. Harley reminds us that there are ‘no binary oppositions 
between maps that are “true and false”, “accurate and inaccurate”, “objective and subjective”, 
“literal and symbolic”, or that are based on “scientific integrity” as opposed to “ideological 
distortion”’.577 Consequently, all maps exist in a limbo between true and false.  
           In Monmonier’s opinion, mapmakers may try to accurately represent the world as best 
they can, but ultimately, maps lie – even when they do not mean to. ‘No map,’ Monmonier 
claims, ‘is a thoroughly objective, value-neutral device’, and no map can tell the truth.578 
Moreover, there is no ‘external reality’ common to all viewers – as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
reminds us, each individual is constrained by their own personal perspectives and ultimately 
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incapable of extracting themselves from their ‘historically effected consciousness’.579 Thus, a 
map cannot express a single truth. It can express a discourse which is similarly interpreted by 
viewers, but it is not “truth”. Ultimately, mapmaking is the process of creating cartographies 
of fiction, which are accepted as fact. 
Combined together, maps and mapping form what Black terms ‘a dynamic 
information system’ – the constant process of data acquisition, characterised by the static map 
image taking precedence over the perpetually-changing mental maps we create on a daily 
basis.
580
 This faith has been known for at least two thousand years.
581
 And as both John 
Pickles
582
 and Matthew Edney
583
 point out, Mapping is a process which does not end with the 
completion of a Map but which begins anew every time a Map is seen, assessed, and judged. 
We have thus established three principles of cartographic faith. We trust Maps for 
three reasons – biological, political, and educational. Biologically, Maps are the result of 
Mapping which, as with all animals, has kept us fed and sheltered from predators since our 
ancestors crawled out of the sea.
584
 We instinctively trust Maps, and only in cases of extreme 
manipulation or inaccuracy do we question them.
585
 Politically, we have faith in maps which 
are produced by governments or professionals – we are more likely to trust an Ordnance 
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Survey map than a child’s scribble. Educationally, maps are everywhere and we are so 
exposed to the cartographic conquest of the universe that Maps become banal, almost boring, 
as they are so commonplace. We use Maps so many times each day, to navigate our way 
along train lines or to geographically place a story in our newspapers, that our faith in them is 
simply reinforced further, and we forget to question whether the map is right. 
Having come suitably closer towards understanding a map – which overlaps the 
physical and mental realms, and can heavily influence viewers simply by being affiliated with 
a perceived authority – we can now explore recently-mentioned themes by asking a question 
which is as important as asking what a map is. This new direction asks what the link is 
between maps and empire.  
 
 
3.3 Symbiosis 
 
‘In vain I strive and rail against those powers 
 That mean t' invest me in a higher throne, 
 As much too high for this disdainful earth. 
Give me a map; then let me see how much 
 Is left for me to conquer all the world, 
 That these, my boys, may finish all my wants.’586 
 
Tamburlaine the Great 
V.iii 
 
So laments Tamerlane, Great Khan of the Timurids, in the final scene of Christopher 
Marlowe’s classic work. The purpose of Tamerlane’s speech is purely dramatic, bemoaning 
his imminent death and his unfinished conquest of Earth. But the lines offer an insight into an 
acknowledged truth of cartography – politics and maps not only make each other,587 but 
could not exist without one other. Without maps, empire is an illusion. Without empire, maps 
as we know them would not exist.  
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This symbiosis between maps and politics has long been recognised among 
geographers generally and cartographers more specifically. Neil Smith,
588
 David 
Livingstone,
589
 Anne Godlewska,
590
 Jeffers Lennox,
591
 Christian Jacob,
592
 and James 
Akerman
593
 all point to there being a mutual reliance between the two phenomena of empire 
and maps. Cartographic historians point to the early nineteenth century as the dominant era of 
symbiosis. Identifying roots in the endless global wars between Napoleon and the European 
monarchies, they see the origins of overtly political mass cartography in the desire to remain 
one step ahead of one’s enemy. Following Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, the gradually 
industrialising powers of Europe turned to cartographers in pursuit of overseas trade, 
colonisation, and expansion at the expense of their rivals. This gave birth to the Victorian 
preoccupation with cartography during the height of self-appointed European and American 
missions civilisatrices.
594
 It is true that political maps have existed for millennia, but it was 
the military, commercial, and scientific maps which emerged during the nineteenth century, 
which moved cartography out of the realm of a few elites and into the public arena, forming 
the genesis of new national cartographies enabling all citizens of a state to familiarise 
themselves with its shape, its frontiers, its neighbours, its ambitions, and its imaginations. 
And perhaps more importantly, it was in the nineteenth century that maps acquired, in the 
consciousness of populations increasingly exposed on a daily basis to geography classrooms 
and illustrated newspapers, the inherent trust which we still place in maps to this day. 
Peter Barber and Tom Harper point out that the link between maps and imperial 
political projects was as familiar to Renaissance statesmen
595
 as it was to Republican 
imperators
596
 and Babylonian kings.
597
 And while empire may be a discourse rooted in 
European imaginations of a shared Roman past, the symbiosis between cartography and 
political ambition is far from restricted to Europe. Virginia Aksan identifies the link in the 
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Ottoman state.
598
 Mei-Ling Hsu points to its existence in  pre-Han China,
599
 while Alan 
Hodgkiss highlights the phenomenon in maps from pre-Columbian North America.
600
 
Contrary to being a mere blip in the development of European cartography, the concept of 
imperial mapping spreads across space and time.  
The colossus of twentieth-century cartography, J.B. Harley, famously asserted that ‘as 
much as guns and warships, maps have been the weapons of empire’.601 This is a bold and 
contentious statement, particularly in an investigation of the European Union. The EU may 
have its detractors, but few commentators accuse the Union of sending out gunboats. Yet it is 
a claim with which many contemporary critical cartographers – including Mark Monmonier, 
Denis Wood, Jeremy Black, Peter Barber, Jeffers Lennox, Christian Jacob, and James 
Akerman – concur. Works of cartographic history stress the link between the two phenomena 
as self-evident, undeniable, unarguable. In the face of this apparently unanimous agreement, 
it must be asked just what this “imperial-cartographic symbiosis” is.  
Unlike our novel concept of cartoimperialism, the link between empire and 
cartography is far from unique. It is possible to identify the link not only through the writings 
of critical cartographers, but through examples written on by cartographic theorists and map 
historians. Maps and politics have gone hand-in-hand for millennia. Physical maps have been 
a part of diverse civilisations since the last Ice Age, and politically, maps have been used to 
propagate discourses since recorded history began.
602
 In search, then, of what Black terms ‘a 
specifically imperial way of mapping’,603 demonstration is required. To avoid confusion with 
the modern maps examined in subsequent chapters, three historical examples will be 
considered here. These illustrate not only the age of the symbiosis, but the very 
characteristics still apparent in contemporary cartographies. These examples are: the coffin 
map of the Ancient Egyptian physician Gua, the Babylonian World Map, and the Forma 
urbis Roma: 
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    Fig. 3.6 – The coffin map of Gua (c. 1800 BC)604 
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Fig. 3.7 – The Babylon World Map, (c. 600 BC)605 
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Fig. 3.8 – Forma urbis Romae (c. 200 AD)606 
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What do we see here? In Fig. 3.5 we see, in the coffin of the physician Gua, a handy 
map of the afterlife (the winding blue river is recognisable, alongside an adjacent path 
through Egypt’s black soil) which Gua commissioned from priests in order to help his soul 
navigate the path to immortality, avoiding whatever eldritch horrors block his way to an 
eternity toiling for his gods.
607
 Fig. 3.6, meanwhile, is the oldest surviving map of the entire 
world. The map, which puts Babylon at the centre of the known world, comes with a 
convenient cuneiform inscription helpfully reminding the reader that all peoples of the world 
bow before Babylon – or at least they should. Finally, Fig. 3.7 is a surviving fragment of the 
Forma urbis Romae, a gargantuan map of the entire city of Rome in almost obsessive detail – 
even showing staircases and individual pillars – which was hung on a wall of the Temple of 
Peace so high nobody could appreciate it.
608
 At first glance, these examples are so different to 
each other, as well as to those maps produced in the contemporary West, that it may well be 
wondered why they warrant any examination whatsoever. We do not even need to refer to the 
myriad of works on the history of cartography to recognise that, like the glyphs carved onto 
rocks by hunter-gatherers, these glimpses of distant worlds are so different, and so bizarre, 
that at first glance they have no relation whatsoever to the sleek, scientific charts 
disseminated by a Digital-Age superstate.  
Jeffers Lennox argues that historically, geopolities we would term “empires” were 
vague in both territory and population, deploying not maps of ‘value-free geographic 
imagination’ but rather ‘imperially favourable geographic imaginations’.609 This is a 
characteristic of the imperial-cartographic symbiosis, and one that is evident in the above 
examples. It is notable that the coffin map and clay tablet were made in societies which 
already had relatively “practical” Euclidean cartography designed for direction finding, 
administration and taxation, and even military planning.
610
 But when mapping the entirety of 
their realm, a very different message is propagated. Even the Forum map, while seductively 
neutral in its accurate plotting of the city, performs the same trick purely due to its location 
and the purpose of its creation. The coffin map, clay tablet, and street plan demonstrate what 
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is arguably the fundamental element of the empire-cartography symbiosis: firstly that maps 
depict an imagination not simply of how the world is, but depict the world with a powerful 
political message that this is the way it should be; and additionally, maps do not merely show 
the world but make it. It is not sufficient to depict reality. Instead, “reality” and 
“representation” blur, and maps insist that a particular group – the sons and daughters of 
Amun-Ra, the King of Kings in Babylon, and the patricians and plebeians of the Eternal City 
– have both a right and a duty to impose their version of order and control upon the world. 
These maps, though, are fundamental to understanding the relationship between 
empire – identified in the preceding chapter as a powerful imagination and discourse – and 
cartography. Since the emergence of definable polities during the Copper Age, cartography 
has coexisted alongside government.
611
 As Monmonier acknowledges, the map is ‘the perfect 
symbol of the state’.612 By plotting physical features, marking the state with a bold and 
visible name, and drawing ‘a heavy, distinct boundary around as much territory as you dare 
claim’, the state becomes real.613 Neil Smith goes even further in reminding us that 
‘geography ha[s] always been a handmaiden to the state, often in quite insalubrious ways’,614 
and most particularly in the context of empire.
615
 It does not even matter whether the places 
depicted are real or imaginary – by plotting the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Roman 
worldviews in a tangible form using recognisable symbols and recognisable visual language, 
these political imaginations become as “real” as a navigational map of the Nile, the 
Euphrates, or the Tiber. 
This characteristic of territorial ambition connects strongly with what Jeremy Black 
terms the ‘cartographic pretensions’ of a polity.616 As the collections assembled by Peter 
Barber,
617
 and Ashley and Miles Baynton-Williams,
618
 demonstrate, this has long been a 
characteristic of maps. It is additionally still very much alive today: as evidenced not only by 
the visually seductive cartographies collected by Frank Jacobs
619
 but by the continuing 
deployment of maps in states’ perpetual quest to dominate and control.620 It is clear that maps 
and mapping practices pursued by “states” – including the European Union – have had, still 
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have, and will continue to have, the power to persuade audiences that their distorted 
depictions of the world somehow reflect an external reality.  
This is a critical element of cartoimperialism: the use of the map, and the careful 
deployment of the sophisticated subtleties of cartographic techniques, to portray a normative 
ambition which goes beyond actuality, instead merging reality and representation. Instead, 
the cartoimperial map depicts a polity’s ambitions, desires, imagined past, and self-assured 
legitimacy as fact. In the case of the Union, a collective identity is arguably one desired goal. 
This is constantly reinforced by the deployment of maps, devices of fixing this nascent 
collective identity not with a shared culture, sovereign or set of social norms, but with a 
shared control, legitimacy, and ambition, which is expressed through the imperial discourse. 
Let us return to the above three maps. As the earliest identifiable world map, it is not 
surprising to find that the Babylonian World Map frames the known world not in terms of 
direction-finding or exploitable resources as earlier, smaller-scale local maps of the ancient 
world generally had done
621
 – what Harley terms ‘Euclidean’ maps622 – but in political, 
imperial terms. By plotting Babylon as the centre of the world, a sacred space ringed by 
protective deities who shield civilisation from the savages beyond, a dichotomy is established 
of two mutually-exclusive groups defined not by ethnicity or nationality, but by association 
with the polity; a ‘civilised’ world and its ‘barbaric’ twin.  
This is noticeable in other imperial maps. The coffin map juxtaposes topographic 
representations of the Nile alongside features of the spiritual realm and afterlife, framed 
within the concepts of ma’at (Order) and isfet (Chaos).623 The consequence is a map which 
similarly blurs fact and fantasy, portraying the land not in a neutral, topographic manner but 
instead as an affirmation of the political obligation and moral duty of the collective 
civilisation to impose their version of control (empire) upon the surrounding world. Similarly, 
the Formae urbis Roma, a mammoth map of Rome centred upon the Empire’s cultural and 
governmental nucleus at the Capitoline Hill and the imperium’s symbolic heart at the 
emperor’s Palatine residence, blurred fiction and fact in a bragging proclamation of Rome’s 
ability and obligation to enforce control. The Formae urbis Roma proclaimed the power of a 
unified and unifying polity – conveniently ignoring the politically fractured, economically 
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devastated, and civil war-torn reality of late third-century Rome
624
 – in order to propagate an 
image of coherence in the face of disharmony and imperial integrity over local squabbling. 
Or, to draw a not-inaccurate parallel with the European Union’s official motto: unity in 
diversity. 
It is evident that these three examples, separated by time, space, and imagination, 
share a common similarity which demonstrates the symbiosis of empire and map – they blur 
reality and imagination in pursuit of a specific political discourse. This is the essence of 
cartoimperialism – a discourse of legitimacy, obligation, and control, manifest in a depiction 
of Order over Chaos which spreads a normative political message and encourages the 
imagination of a collective identity defined by “outsiders”,625 made plausible by being 
represented in topographic, geographic terms. This fusion of geography and politics, a 
‘human identity-hunger’ as termed by Philip Pomper,626 remains a strong force today.  
Lennox draws attention to this key characteristic of the empire-map symbiosis as 
being the creation and display of cartographic knowledge fixing identity with land. 
Historically, this determined and continues to determine imperial interaction with others on 
the basis of whether or not they could be classified as fellow-citizens or outsiders.
627
 This 
symbiotic characteristic is visible in non-European maps of similar geopolities legitimising 
their existence based upon an imagined discourse – ‘certain designs and distortions were 
introduced on many maps in order to express ideological points of view’.628 Imperial 
mapping is remarkable both in its longevity and its existence beyond the specifically 
European discourse of empire. Not even humanity’s cartographic conquest of the world has 
eliminated this imperial approach to mapping. Grayson Perry, in his discussion of Earth’s 
latest colonial squabble – navigational access and mineral rights at the North Pole in the 
“Scramble for the Arctic” – has generated controversial cartographies in which claimant 
nations stretch the truth, expressing their perceived legitimacy and obligation to impose their 
version of order, wrapped up in the apparently neutral language of maps.
629
 Frank Jacobs is 
right to term these – and indeed all maps created in the imperial-cartographic context – as 
‘lies in the clothing of truth’.630 
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Yet in fairness, as Monmonier repeatedly reminds us, all maps are lies. To a degree. 
There are some who disagree: sociologist Bruno Latour asserts that maps are neutral, that 
with maps ‘there is nothing hidden or convoluted, no shadows, no ‘double entendre’.631 But 
even the notion of the map, something which offers us the ability to glance the world at once 
– the ‘ecumenical eye’632 akin to Prester John’s mirror – is unrealistic. John Pickles posits 
that maps are ultimately incapable of providing a full representation of the world, due to basic 
principles of Cartesian Perspectivalism.
633
 We cannot see the entire world at once, and a map 
has to misrepresent. A very simple test illustrates this.  
Let us take a moment to glance up from this page, and look at our surroundings. What 
do we see? A room. Perhaps there is a window, and if we look out of the window, again we 
do not see anything which resembles cartography. If we are lucky enough to be reading this 
outdoors on a pleasant day and look around, we still do not see what maps show. Instead we 
look around and see a jumble of natural and artificial artefacts, all framed within the 
restricted vision of human eyes which offer a field of vision whose angle is narrow, whose 
range is restricted, and from a viewpoint which is usually only a few feet above the floor. 
Even if we look out of the window of a tall building, peer from the porthole of an aeroplane, 
or happen to glance down at the planet while performing a spacewalk,
634
 we still do not see 
the world as maps show it. We do not see the world reflected in Prester John’s mirror – we 
have to look at the world represented on a map. 
Partly this is biological. Our vision is restricted by the bodies in which we live. 
Creatures with compound or turreted eyes can see substantially more than us, but we humans 
are restricted by the mechanism, shape, and housing of our eyes, neurons, and synapses, and 
by the electrical charges and chemical receptors in optical cord and brain which allow our 
eyes and brains to transform rays of light into vision.
635
 The test we have just performed 
demonstrates this – we cannot even see the whole of the room we are currently in or even the 
whole of our bodies at once, let alone see the entire surface of the planet in a single glance. 
We are constrained by Cartesian Perspectivalism from which we cannot escape.  
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Michael Gibbons reminds us that ‘there is no God’s eye perspective’636 whatsoever, 
and hence maps, as Monmonier believes, lie. Yet it might be going a little too far to say that 
maps lie. Mapmakers are not pursuing some devious conspiracy. But cartography has 
fundamental restrictions which require us to reconsider the nature of maps, not as Prester 
John’s mirror reflecting the world, but rather as media which can do little more than 
represent the world according to a particular discourse. 
 
 
3.4 Mapping Discourse 
 
‘In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single 
Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a 
Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographer 
Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided 
point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of 
Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not 
without some Pitilessness was it that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and 
Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, 
inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines 
of Geography.’ 637 
 
Jorge Luis Borges  
On Exactitude in Science 
 
Jorge Luis Borges’ satirical fiction is both entertaining and insightful. For of all the 
discourses constructed and perpetuated in human history, perhaps none is as powerful, as 
compelling, as the map. In so many discursive situations – political, religious, economic, 
environmental, military, medical, and so on – the most powerful evidence for an argument, 
and often the final decision-maker, is a map.
638
  
Maps communicate knowledge in an unusual form, existing as images, texts, icons, 
vehicles of discourse, and discourses in their own right – all at the same time. They are 
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deliberate constructs which possess emotional and intellectual appeal,
639
 and can potentially 
form a unique category of propaganda.
640
 Trevor Barnes and James Duncan highlight the 
unarguable truth that ‘pieces of the world … do not come with their own labels’ and that as a 
consequence of the world being unable to represent itself, it must be represented using forms 
of human language, which humans will understand.
641
 It is not possible for maps to 
accurately mirror our world, as each cartographer has a unique perception of reality: 
consequently, their products ‘are inevitably stamped with [their] own particular set of local 
interests, standards, and so on’. Barnes and Duncan support this point vigorously, stating 
flatly that ‘representations are not a mirror copy of some external reality’.642 The 
consequence is that mapmakers all work, to some degree, within a realm of fiction, an 
alternative version of reality. Thus their plausible lies possess almost limitless power to 
persuade. 
Clearly, maps have power. They can persuade governments and publics, they can 
deceive and deflect, they can win or lose battles, campaigns, and entire wars
643
 through their 
knowledge claims, their representations, and their disseminations. Indeed for Catherine 
Delano-Smith, ‘the map is the ultimate tool of knowledge’ as it compresses the infinitely 
complex and physically imperceptible world into a neat data package which allows us to 
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‘scrutinise, control, and dominate’ our environments.644 As such, maps persuade and 
indoctrinate, stretch the truth and tell outright lies. Indeed ‘maps,’ as Jeremy Black and John 
Clark recognise, ‘have the capacity to open worlds of reality and imagination; to depict, in 
their lines, points, and spaces, both hopes and fears, to urge the wanderings and wonderings 
of the human mind.’645 It is often repeated by critical cartographers such as Black, 
Monmonier, Wood,
646
 and Hodgkiss
647
 that mapreaders automatically place complete trust in 
the veracity and authority of maps, accepting them as unerringly accurate, mirror-image 
reflections of the world we live in – realistic models of the broader world beyond that which 
our restricted biological vision is capable of perceiving.
648
 ‘At the root of [maps’] power’, 
claims Monmonier, ‘is our frequent unquestioning acceptance of cartographic messages.’649  
Much has been written on the power of maps, and particularly in a European context. 
It was cartography which enabled Europeans to navigate the oceans, seize lands, wage wars, 
and control much of the world through their dominance of spatial knowledge.  It is 
recognised that maps are powerful media through which discourses can be expressed. Of 
course, this in and of itself, does not make maps unique. Discourses are expressed using a 
broad spectrum of media – written language, spoken language, images, and performance, to 
name but a few of the most familiar. What makes maps so special? 
 The power of maps as discursive vehicles is that, as Denis Cosgrove points out, maps 
are the media which we, as individuals, question least and trust most.
650
 This is arguably 
because the map, more than any other media, combines a subjective message with a format 
that is widely perceived to be objective. This is a knotty paradox, yet it can be explained 
using what is perhaps a surprising turn for critical cartography – postmodernism. 
In the same passage in which he extols the virtues of cartography, Black qualifies his 
assertion of maps’ benign potentials with a cautionary warning: ‘the history of cartography 
… is indivisible from the history of grasping space, both imaginatively and in reality’.651 
Maps indeed have the ability to expand our vision and allow imaginations to roam unfettered, 
but at the same time maps have the capacity to exploit this ability in order to promote a view 
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of the world that is not a reflection of reality, but rather an image of what the mapmaker 
wants their audience to see.  
This exploitable characteristic of cartography is as old as maps themselves. From the 
above Iron-Age depictions of civilisations pursuing self-anointed missions of Order over 
Chaos
652
 and medieval mappaemundi using Scripture to portray a sinful world teetering on 
the brink of Apocalypse,
653
 to boastful Victorian maps annexing far-flung territories
654
 and 
dishonest map projections falsely plotting the size (and associated strength) of rival states on 
the eve of world wars,
655
 maps have been consciously constructed according to particular 
discourses in order to adhere to a predetermined political cause.  
Lloyd Brown identified this exact trait among populations recently emerged from six 
years of cartographic bombardments by their own (and rival) news agencies and governments 
in the Second World War. When faced with a map produced by a state authority, the viewer 
will inevitably assign that particular image a greater authority and veracity than their mental 
image.
656
 We turn to maps when we require spatial information, but when information is 
presented by different and possibly conflicting sources, we put our faith in that produced by 
an apparently more competent authority. Even if said authority has no cartographic expertise 
and only derives its status through connection to, or approval from, a government, we tend to 
believe it.
657
  
This trend has been exacerbated by what Gillian Rose sees as the ‘ocularcentric 
immersion’ of contemporary Western culture.658 Western societies are saturated with 
imagery, and the individual sees and processes hundreds of thousands of images every day.
659
 
Inevitably, the map becomes treated as just another image, and as Michael Peterson points 
out, this faith is reinforced because maps – especially internet maps which are omnipresent 
and easy to access – satisfy this collective need in modern society for information presented 
in a visual form.
660
 Yet while the map becomes treated as a mere image, it acquires additional 
authority purely by dint of association with the state – including the European Union. This 
trusting attitude towards maps is important to the study of modern European cartography and 
warrants deeper examination.  
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Our collective cartographic naïveté is a consequence of what Derek Gregory terms 
‘cartophobia’.661 As Gregory reminds us, cartophobia and ‘cartographic anxiety’ are high 
among the population.
662
 This results in innate trust; and the reason for this unquestioning 
trust is, as Peter Goin argues, caused by ‘a lack of graphicacy [graphical literacy]’.663 We are 
trained to treat written sources with a healthy scepticism, yet with cartography we routinely 
accept the messages propagated by mapmakers as maps retain, as Alan Hodgkiss points out, 
the exalted (and incorrect) assumption that they accurately reflect the world.
664
  
While this may begin as an individual characteristic, it is combined collectively. Prior 
to the Industrial Revolution, as Peter Barber explains, maps were the province almost 
exclusively of political, commercial, and religious elites.
665
 Two of the three historical 
examples examined above were for private, not public, consumption, while the Formae urbis 
Roma was a rare example of public cartography not replicated until the Victorian era. And 
while other areas of the world experienced different epochal evolution to that of Europe, 
maps in civilisations as diverse as Japan,
666
 India,
667
 and the Islamic Caliphate
668
 shared their 
European counterparts’ restricted access. Public access to maps – and by extension, public 
deference to maps – is a societal relic of the explosion in literacy, commercial advertising, 
newspapers, and public education in the late nineteenth century.
669
 Here, we see a 
phenomenon which explains much about the imperial-cartographic symbiosis. 
It was identified in the previous section that our modern concept of cartography is 
largely the result of political, military, and commercial developments in the nineteenth 
century, without which cartography in Europe might well have remained the jealously-
guarded realm of a small cabal of curio-collectors rather than becoming the nationalised and 
nationalising public projects which dominated nineteenth-century political geography. 
As Black,
670
 Hodgkiss,
671
 and Allen
672
 agree, it was large-scale war between 
European revolutionaries and reactionaries in the early nineteenth century which encouraged 
the growth of the artistic science of cartography, and played a significant role in crystallising 
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European ideas of nationhood – enabling the newly-educated publics of industrial societies to 
consume mass maps for the first time in human history. This is not merely historically 
interesting: it is essential to understanding the power that imperial maps had and, as we 
encountered previously on the current cartographic squabbling over the Arctic, this still 
exists. To better understand this phenomenon, we may turn to postmodernism.  
 
 
3.4.1 Postmodern Mapping 
 
Postmodernism is an amorphous term with highly contested definitions. The value and 
justification of these various approaches are not to be discussed here, but in the next chapter. 
This is not yet a discussion of methodology, and as such the focus here is on what 
postmodern theory can reveal about maps’ existing in a limbo between fiction and fact – a 
trait which lends maps their perceived authority and acceptance by mapviewers. Suffice it 
here to say that postmodern approaches are familiar to critical cartographers. Here, a more 
restricted application of postmodern theory will be drawn upon to explain the imperial-
cartographic symbiosis. We shall approach this through the assertion of Jean-François 
Lyotard that postmodernism is characterised by ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’.673  
The rejection of map metanarratives has been acknowledged by critical cartographers 
for some time. Alan MacEachren perceives the ‘traditional metanarrative’ of cartography as 
the approach to maps as objective, politically-neutral tools of scientific enquiry.
674
 This is, as 
MacEachren points out, a fallacy. A map is more than a mere picture. It is a fusion of forms 
endowed with multiple layers of meaning, crossing boundaries of textual sources, images, 
and socio-political icons.
 675
 This, argue Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, places the map on 
the level of the text.
 676
 Maps’ multifarious nature requires precisely the ‘incredulity’ towards 
the “objective scientific” tools that Lyotard hints at; and postmodernism offers a more useful  
framework through which to understand the mutually-reliant relationship between the 
abstract and subjective concept of empire, and the abstract subjectivity of maps. 
Postmodernism is nothing new to cartography, and Barber and Harper highlight that 
the notion of cartographic positivist objectivity is a relatively recent phenomenon resulting 
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from the scientific approach to mapping in the European Age of Discovery.
677
 Before this 
period maps were created, used, and acknowledged as art forms, visual histories, and 
imaginative icons. Similarly, the methods of postmodern enquiry have been established in 
critical cartography for quite some time.
678
 Deconstruction of map symbols, marginalia,
679
 
production context, use: all of these are hallmarks of a postmodern approach to maps-as-texts 
which has been pursued for decades. Indeed, MacEachren begins his monumental work on 
cartography (which itself draws upon a wide variety of theoretical approaches) with what 
might be described as a lament at the preponderance of postmodernism in contemporary 
critical cartography.
680
 One answer to this, drawing on the postmodern paradigm, is to be 
found in the work of Jean Baudrillard. 
In his Simulations, Baudrillard sets out a thesis with curious connotations for 
cartography. For Baudrillard, contemporary Western society has become so infused with 
symbols and signs that reality and representation have fused into one. We do not live in 
reality but rather a simulation of reality that is composed of artificial and arbitrary 
symbols.
681
 This alternate and imaginative reality is divisible into three sequential historical 
epochs. The first corresponds to the premodern period, in which the rarity and uniqueness of 
images and symbols resulted in their remaining simply representations. The second 
corresponds to the Industrial Revolution, wherein a surge in symbols and signs causes a 
blurring between reality and representation, as the representation becomes tailored to 
expectations rather than actuality. The final phase – the postmodern era, which Baudrillard 
argues we now inhabit – is characterised by a total merge of reality and representation 
whereby technological commercialism so detaches us from “reality”, that our representations 
become utterly meaningless, and we are unable to distinguish between different imaginations. 
This might seem a curious framework through which to view cartography and empire. 
We might go so far as to say that cartography has always been ‘postmodern’, in that what 
maps represent has never been “reality”. Indeed, Gwilym Eades suggests that there is no 
means whatsoever whereby reality can be portrayed in a static medium – whether by Stone-
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Age scratchings or by Google Earth
682
 – as spatial “reality” is inherently subjective and 
perpetually changing. Instead, the utility of Baudrillard’s thesis involves his ‘Second Order’ 
and ‘Third Order’ of time. 
To illustrate, let us reconsider that for centuries, perhaps millennia, we have been 
making maps of fictional places.
683
 This is crucial for two reasons. The first is that, as 
Monmonier stresses, it is largely irrelevant whether a map is factual or fictitious.
684
 All maps 
are based upon the same principles and all use the same mechanisms to convey their meaning 
to us. A great many fictional maps exist – in the frontpapers of novels, hanging on the walls 
in galleries and museum exhibitions, consulted by characters on our television screens – and 
we can easily understand them. The second, related point to consider is that there is very little 
distinction between a map of a “real” place and a map of an imaginary realm. Monmonier 
summarises this in plain language – ‘all maps lie’.685 
Thus, Black and Baudrillard both point to the phenomenon of imperial mapping 
emerging under specific circumstances. Both are correct in pointing out that it was during the 
industrial nineteenth century that symbols – particularly maps – expanded at an exponential 
rate. Maps themselves did not change, in the sense that maps have always blurred reality and 
representation, but change occurred in that this very blurring expanded from the pre-
industrial elite who used cartography, to entire national populations. Additionally, 
Baudrillard points out that this mass cartographic consumption occurred at a time when 
images and texts in general were blurring the boundaries between reality and fantasy, while 
Black points out that public-consumption maps acquired such authority in the collective mind 
precisely because they were released from an elite apparently – to the newly-educated 
populaces of industrial Europe – already so familiar with maps and the world as to be 
trustworthy sources regardless of the map’s content. Thus maps became part of what Jean 
Baudrillard terms ‘hyperreality’. 
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3.4 Hyperreality 
 
‘All maps lie flat. Therefore, all flat maps lie’.686 
 
Mark Monmonier is not alone in his skepticism of maps. Henrikson’s above words are 
a criticism of map projections. It is true that maps do not portray the world as it appears to 
our limited biological vision, but we might be going a little too far, as Denis Wood opines on 
Monmonier,
687
 in saying that maps lie. Maps do not make themselves, and to say that 
cartographers lie implies a deliberate, conscious, and malevolent act. There certainly have 
been deliberate lies in cartography,
688
 but given that cartographers are incapable of reflecting 
an immense and infinitely complex world in a folded piece of paper or smartphone software, 
it is unfair to say that maps lie. It is fairer to say that maps are hyperreal. 
It does not particularly matter whether a map is “real” (i.e.: showing part of the 
physical universe we live in) or “unreal”. Our interpretative mechanism, and our faith in 
them, is the same. The result is that real and unreal merge in maps, ultimately creating an 
image, a tool, a representation, which is hyperreal – an unreality which looks real. This is 
tricky, thus consider the figures below: 
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                Fig 3.9 – Subway Map I689 
                                                 
689
 Image retrieved from the Metropolitan Transport Authority of New York: 
http://www.mta.info/maps/submap.html.  
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        Fig. 3.10 – Subway Map II690 
 
                                                 
690
 Image retreived from the Grand Theft Auto wiki: 
http://images1.wikia.nocookie.net/__cb20130625023427/gtawiki/images/8/8f/Algonquin_only.png.  
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          Fig. 3.11 – Russian City I691 
 
 
                                                 
691
 Image retrieved from the US Embassy to the Russian Federation: 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/russia/231771/Photos/embassy_map.jpg.  
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    Fig. 3.12 – Russian City II692 
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 Image retrieved from Half-Life 2 (United States: Valve Corporation, 2004). 
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        Fig. 3.13 – Mappamundi I693 
                                                 
693
 Image retrieved from John Speed, Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine [London, 1611] (Amsterdam: 
Novus Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1966). With thanks to the Newman Library, Virginia Tech. 
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 Fig. 3.14 – Mappamundi II694 
 
                                                 
694
 Image retrieved from Clarke, 100 Maps, p. 241. 
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Here, in descending order of “reality”, we see how maps are reliant on a blend of fact 
and fiction which we read, and trust to be an accurate representation, ultimately rendering 
them a form of hyperreality.  
Consider Figs 3.9 and 3.10, two subway maps of a densely-populated island. The first 
one is probably familiar – we can see from the language of the map that it is Manhattan 
Island in New York City. The second is similar: a facsimile of a long, narrow island with a 
subway network connecting it to other inhabited urban areas. It is not real, but a map of the 
fictional Algonquin Island – a parody of Manhattan – from the Grand Theft Auto video game 
franchise.
695
 This parody place does not exist, but we can identify Fig. 3.9 as a subway map 
because of the visual language it uses: grid-plan, coloured train lines, and the simplified, 
clutter-free layout which is standard for urban transport maps.
696
 The next two maps go one 
step further, deceiving us in exactly the same way. Fig 3.11 is recognisable as a street map, 
complete with building outlines, contrasting colours, and Cyrillic script. It is in fact part of an 
official map on the website of the US embassy in Moscow, designed as an aid for visitors. 
Now consider Fig 3.12. The colours, contours, and symbols are all reminiscent of the 
predecessor, and we could easily be forgiven for thinking that this map also depicts some 
Eastern European city. It is in fact a map of a nameless and completely fictional town, “City 
17”, from another popular video game franchise.697 Yet we recognise this complete fiction as 
a map because of the language it uses. Finally we see how maps can take the blending of 
fiction and fact to its ultimate conclusion. Fig. 3.13 depicts the coastline of northeast Britain 
in the mid-sixteenth century, showing a rich palimpsest of place-names, rivers, stylised hills, 
and regions. Its companion, Fig. 3.14, has exactly the same place-names and features but it is 
not real – it is a map of Middle-Earth, the setting of J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, 
and is a pure fantasy designed to look like an Early Modern map. All of these maps are 
hyperreal, on all three of Baudrillard’s tiers.  
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Baudrillard’s conception of the hyperreal focuses on three tiers. At the first level, 
Baudrillard argues, we find counterfeits intended to look “real”, ‘the reflection of a profound 
reality’.698 The subway map of Algonquin Island is on this tier: a counterfeit of Manhattan 
island, a reflection based on specific reality. At the second level of simulacra are mass-
produced fakes which ‘mask and denature a profound reality’:699 the internet map of Moscow 
is a relic of the mass mapping of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the map of City 
17 tricks us into believing it is real because it is based upon the same coded language typical 
to mass-manufactured maps produced in industrial modernity. It is a reflection based on 
general reality (a city). Finally at Baudrillard’s third order of simulacra we encounter a map 
which ‘masks the absence of a profound reality’: Middle-Earth is a complete fiction devoid 
of links to the world we inhabit, other than that it looks recognisable. It is a reflection of a 
complete unreality.
700
 Yet because it is framed as a map, an object we are familiar with and 
trust, it acquires a reality of its own – a counterfactualism, a hyperreality. 
All of these maps exist at a praxis where fact and fantasy merge as 
counterfactualism,
701
 whose power has long been acknowledged in scholarship. Despite E. H. 
Carr’s belief that counterfactualism is a frivolous parlour game, Robert Cowley argues that it 
enables us to question assumptions by eliminating ‘hindsight bias’.702 Hobsbawm agrees, 
arguing that our interpretation of the world is subject to a “cannot-see-the-wood-for-the-
trees” phenomenon. In this phenomenon, hindsight bias and belief in reflection over 
representation become combined, and consequently we are unable to understand the 
methodologies and epistemologies of history and politics because we cannot extract ourselves 
from our predetermined biases and interpretations.
703
 As an example, he argues that Marxist 
historians might best understand their method of understanding history by dabbling in a 
counterfactual realm in which the Soviet Union never existed: this removes squabbling about 
things which really happened, and allows historians to gain awareness of the prejudgements 
and processes which allow them to interpret the past, and about which they would otherwise 
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be unaware.
704
 We can do exactly the same with maps. By looking at maps of places which 
never existed, we can unpick the language we use to understand maps, and the discourses 
woven into them. Like maps, history books are not reflections of what “really” happened; 
they are only representations. Counterfactualism is just as useful for understanding the 
relationship between viewer and map, as it for the relationship between reader and book.  
We can look at a map of Manhattan’s subways, Moscow’s streets, or the coastline of 
Northumbria and be vaguely aware that we are only looking at a representation, but we 
cannot truly become objective as there is still a strong implicit relationship between map and 
viewer. After all, there really is a real Manhattan, a real Moscow, a real Northumbria – thus 
we continue to believe that a map, any map, simply reflects some version of reality. It might 
well be argued that we can never be entirely objective. But by looking at a map of Algonquin 
Island, City 17, or Middle-Earth, we become aware of our a priori bias towards maps as 
being accurate depictions of “reality”. Like a counterfactual narrative, all of these maps 
portray an alternative perspective on the “real” world, and like any decent tale in 
counterfactual history,
705
 these maps are sufficiently plausible for us to believe them. Thus 
we can easily identify all of these figures as maps, not meaningless jumbles of shapes and 
colours, because they are framed in recognisable visual language following established rules 
of visual grammar. It is only when we are confronted with fictional maps that we realise the 
power of factual maps. We know what is being portrayed by a pseudo-medieval mappamundi 
of Tolkien’s Middle Earth, we can navigate the subway system of a counterfactual 
conurbation, and we can sneak past Metropolice in the infested canals of City 17.
706
 None of 
these places ever existed or ever will exist, yet we can understand maps of these places – just 
as we can understand Gua’s map to the afterlife and the etchings in the Abauntz Cave – 
because the maps follow the established conventions of cartography, with which we are 
familiar. The result is that a complete fiction can be passed off as a map of a “real” place, 
because we interpret these maps of hyperreality using the same embedded and acquired 
processes we use to decipher maps of reality:
707
 faith. 
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We earlier noted that the principle of faith in cartography, based on biological, 
political, and commercial premises, is well-established. Gregory’s ‘cartophobia’, Pickles’ 
‘lack of graphic literacy’, and Henrikson’s ‘cartohypnosis’ are relics of the nineteenth-
century proliferation of government-sponsored cartography. We are so used to using maps 
that trust in them is perhaps innate. As Denis Cosgrove astutely points out, the major events 
of the late nineteenth, twentieth, and early twenty-first centuries which have involved even 
greater cartographic proliferation, are associated with authority.
708
  
This element of authority is important and will be examined in-depth later. At present, 
it is necessary to acknowledge this phenomenon of carto-authority for two reasons. Firstly, 
such a source is what lends government-produced maps their privileged authoritative status, 
as viewers trust a map made by authorities to be accurate and reflective of reality on the 
ground.
709
 Secondly, it is relevant to maps’ spreading of authoritative discourses: as we see 
with the counterfactual maps here, maps do not necessarily reflect the world, or even attempt 
to, they can create a world of their own. To a degree, all maps are Baudrillard’s simulations – 
mass-produced signs which are ultimately incapable of reflecting an external reality and thus 
create their own version, merging reality (reflecting a world, factual or fictional) and fantasy 
(representing that world) in what is ultimately both, and neither, reality and/nor fantasy. And 
because of our innate trust that maps are accurate, we trust maps to reflect/represent the world 
better than our own vision can. Any map is thus hyperreal.
710 
Baudrillard’s contribution to understanding the power of maps is not without 
problems. Baudrillard himself, in the first lines of Simulations, dismisses cartography as 
being outside of hyperreality because, in his definition, hyperreality is something that is ‘real 
without origin or reality’.711 However as identified above, his theses are compatible with 
findings from the otherwise unrelated history of cartography: both postmodern theory and 
historical supposition point to the reasons for cartography’s power to persuade. Yet this 
merging itself, does not stand alone. It is the underpinning of a field of cartographic study 
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essential to explaining why we trust maps, and the political projects woven so subtly into 
them. This field is cartographic reason. 
Maps have to be hyperreal, as any attempt to faithfully reproduce everything in the 
spatial realm results in a map which, as with the aforementioned fictional map of the Empire 
recounted by Jorge Borges – the hyperreality of which Baudrillard is aware of712 – is either 
incomprehensible or useless. But at the same time as they lie, maps tell a form of truth. Just 
as they have to stretch the truth in order to portray a world (which we cannot see all at once 
with our own eyes) in the form of a handy chart, they have to tell the truth in order for us to 
recognise what it is they are meant to depict. This is how the maps we examined above work.  
They all perform the same trick, blurring reflection and representation together in a visual 
language which has to be vaguely true, vaguely understandable, for it to work. It has to be 
hyperreal. As we shall see this is the crux of cartoimperial maps – they merge political 
fantasy and political fact in a form we trust to be true. 
Indeed, Phillip and Juliana Muehrcke are justified in their assertion that ‘so many 
perversions of reality are inherent in mapping that the result is best viewed as an intricate, 
controlled fiction’.713 Yet despite maps’ having to distort reality, and despite Black’s 
reminder that ‘the language of cartography requires careful reading,’714 we the public retain 
our trust in maps’ objectivity and veracity. As Gillian Rose posits, current Western culture is 
deeply ocularcentric, saturated with subjective visual images. Her reminder that images do 
not reflect reality but that they ‘interpret the world... [and] display it in very particular 
ways’715 is perhaps nowhere more true than in the context of the map. Yet maps share one 
defining characteristic with their visual relatives in that, like all visual technologies, they are 
‘totally constructed visual experiences’716 deliberately constructed for the purpose of 
representing a particular aspect of the world – or at least, the world according to the 
cartographer – which the viewer instinctively trusts. And the cause of this innate trust is what 
John Pickles terms ‘cartographic reason’.717 
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Cartographic reason, as a theory, argues that maps embody a ‘functional authority’718 
which readers subscribe to, thereby providing the map with immediate legitimation regardless 
of its content. Kristin Kopp offers a clarification by declaring that ‘[maps] are not texts whose 
legitimacy is to be questioned; they are instead rationalized products of the most modern 
technologies’.719 The result, as Muehrcke and Muehrcke state, is that ‘we tend to accept the 
information on maps without question’.720  
However, the map cannot lie outright. As Barbara Piatti and Lorenz Hurni discuss in 
their analysis of the counterfactual cartographies of novels,
721
 and as Lorenz Hurni and Gerrit 
Sell assess, maps must contain enough truth to be plausible or they simply do not work.
722
 
Indeed, the phenomenon requires no nefarious or devious agenda on the part of the 
mapmaker. Deliberate distortions may go unnoticed by all but a few ‘carto-nerds’,723 but 
deliberate deviousness is rare. Instead, the phenomenon arises from the mapreaders 
themselves. We instinctively trust maps to be accurate and objective, particularly when 
affiliated with professional-sounding institutes or government bodies. Maps of the European 
Union do not require a sinister agenda to spread a discourse – as they are simply hyperreal. 
Charts made according to an imperial-cartographic symbiosis are an expression of the 
discourse of empire: legitimacy, power, superiority, and destiny, all expressed in spatial 
terms. This was certainly the case with maps until the rapid expansion of public cartographies 
in the political, social, and cultural revolutions of nineteenth-century Europe. Yet their legacy 
is today’s cartographic reason, cartohypnosis, cartocontroversy, and absence of graphicacy. 
Unlike their early-modern ancestors, visible only to the powerbrokers of the day in the 
private galleries of monarchs and emperors,
724
 today’s empire-map creations are bold public 
resuscitations of a politically-charged cartography extant since the coffin cartographies,  clay 
tablets, and marble municipal maps of the ancient past. And this works through a 
cartographic reason which is so deeply rooted in the collective mind – publicly since the 
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Steam Age, and privately since the Bronze Age – that we do not extend to hyperreal maps the 
same wariness and scepticism that we regularly impose upon written texts.  
Maps do not propagate imperial discourses through crude lies. Propaganda maps are 
easy to spot: even if we do not know to what extent they are lying, we at least know that they 
are lies – but through our own interpretation of hyperreality. The imperial discourse is 
constructed largely within our own minds as cartographic reason causes us to innately trust 
maps associated with authorities. From Babylon to Brussels, the discursive map which 
merges cartography with the imperial imagination, is able to convince its readers that it really 
does reflect reality. Meanwhile, its authoritative status – borrowed from centuries of 
cartographic reason and a subconsciously ingrained behavioural geography – gives the 
imperial map an unquestionable veracity and an aura that its political message is not a 
subjective representation, but rather an objective reflection of the world.  
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The legend of Prester John was never meant to be believed. Yet despite the naïveté of 
European diplomats who took the Letter at face value,
725
 faith in Prester John faded among 
Europeans as explorers of the Age of Discovery gradually mapped the world, moving Prester 
John and his palace from Arabia to Ethiopia, India, Sri Lanka,
726
 and in the late 1600s finally 
realising that his lost Christian kingdom in the mysterious East had in fact never existed. Yet 
while scholars long ago abandoned their quest for Prester John, the idea of his magical mirror 
– a device which allows us to view the whole of the “real world” in a single sweeping glance 
– retains a seductively powerful legacy.  
Even as Vasco de Gama and Amerigo Vespucci discovered the world, as Abraham 
Ortelius and Gerardus Mercator drew proof that Prester John was simply medieval wishful 
thinking, the very act of mapping the world ensured that his magical mirror remained in our 
minds. As European cartographers abandoned their Scripturalist T-and-O maps in favour of 
neat Euclidean surveying
727
 and Mercator’s handy maritime projection,728 the idea that maps 
could give a realistic God’s-Eye glance of the world became cemented in the collective 
                                                 
725
 Wintle, The Image of Europe, pp. 199, 203. 
726
 Abraham Cresques, Atlas Catalan [1375: trans. B.M. Charleston] (Zürich: URS Graf Publishing, 1978), 
Panel 4b, p. 78. 
727
 Dava Sobel, Longitude: the true story of a lone genius who solved the greatest scientific problem of his time (London: 
Fourth Estate, 1995), pp. 4-7. 
728
 Monmonier, Rhumb Lines and Map Wars, pp. 212-215. 
155 
 
imagination. And as maps colonised newspapers, advertisements, and food labels
729
 in the 
Age of Steam, entire populations came to accept any map associated with a perceived 
authority as a realistic reflection of the world. This continues in the Europe of today. Prester 
John’s mirror never existed, and sadly it never will. But the idea of possessing such an 
ability, in today’s ocularcentric, map-soaked society, is arguably stronger than ever before. 
In their discussion of cartographic principles, John Matthews and David Herbert 
advise us that ‘the terrae incognitae of early explorers have been replaced by those of the 
human mind.’730 This, as the preceding arguments have sought to demonstrate, is arguably 
true. Our innate cartophobia and lack of graphicacy leave us lost in an unexplored realm of 
visual representations; a confusing conceptual desert in which we turn, as a consequence of 
cartographic reason, to authority-produced maps. These cartographies help lead us out of the 
mental Terra Incognita, but at the price of subconsciously accepting the inherent political 
discourses of maps as truth. As Sarah Bendall underlines, ‘maps were, and still are, used as 
propaganda, and can exaggerate, suppress, or falsify information to create a particular 
impression.’731 Yet while this occurs in every map and we can see this in fictional maps, we 
are unaware of its existence in “real” maps. Charts which merge the discourse of empire – the 
real and the unreal – are the pinnacle of Cartesian perspectivalist domination.732 These 
hyperrealities endow the viewer with a sense of control and power, framed in a visual 
mechanism which we instinctively trust. This is the legacy of the imperial map which exists 
in today’s European Union. 
The map exists at a crossroads where a variety of disciplines intersect. Combining the 
characteristics of a reduced and generalised symbolic text and a diagrammatic technology 
presented in a picture-like visual image, the map exists as a praxis of literary, technological, 
symbological, and artistic conventions. The reassuring idea of the map as a neat, easily-
defined concept is, perhaps unsurprisingly, an illusion. The map is many things at once, and 
its multiple simultaneous existence as a conscious, agent-created work of art, science, and 
literature, iconography makes it an ontology which is easily manipulated for the purposes of 
political propaganda. A historical analysis of cartography confirms the countless instances 
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when maps have been deliberately distorted or misused to advance a particular agenda: Black 
has a point in describing cartography as ‘a Western knowledge system falsely claiming 
scientific precision and used to “appropriate” the rest of the world in the service of Western 
interests.’733 He similarly warns us that maps grasp space, and Baudrillard verifies this. Maps 
are hyperreal, and they exist within the simulacrum
734
 – the realm of simulated reality 
wherein maps are not ‘false images, nor ... obscuring truth behind a facade, but as that which 
hides the truth’s non-existence’.735 By depicting not reality but an ideologically-determined 
imagination, these maps spread the imperial discourse. Maps of Babylon and Rome, the 
Egyptian afterlife and ibex herds near a Spanish cave at the end of the last ice age – these 
maps do not portray the world. They make it.
736
 
The “unreal”, symbiotic, cartoimperial map does not use a different cartographic 
language to any familiar street map or sat-nav. Far from it. Indeed, it is the very ability of the 
cartoimperial map to use this language to blend in, to masquerade, which gives it its unique 
power. It is to the methods by which maps grasp space, and the methodologies we will use to 
translate map language and identify the imperial imagination in the visual discourses of the 
European Union, that we now turn. 
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Chapter Four 
Into the Mushroom Field 
 
Capt. Blackadder:  “Now, where the hell are we?” 
Lieut. George:  “Well it’s a bit difficult to say, Sir. According to the map, we appear to have   
  crawled into an area marked with mushrooms.” 
Capt. Blackadder:  “What do those symbols denote?” 
Lieut. George:  “Hmm. That we’re in a field of mushrooms?” 
Capt. Blackadder:  “Lieutenant, that is a military map. It is unlikely to list interesting flora 
    and fungi! Look at the key and you’ll discover that those mushrooms aren’t  
  for picking.” 
Lieut. George:  “Good Lord, you’re quite right Sir. It says ‘Mine’. So  –  these mushrooms  
  must belong to the man who made the map!” 
 
Blackadder Goes Forth
737
 
 
 The characters of the popular 1980s British broadcast Blackadder Goes Forth 
frequently find themselves in bizarre scenarios, the above scene being one of many. Here, 
between the trenches of No Man’s Land in the Great War, our heroes find themselves in a 
sticky situation due to the inability of the dim-witted Lieutenant George to read a map. Yet 
the scene is more than a piece of classic comedy. It is an apt demonstration of the tricky 
methodologies of interpreting cartography and its embedded discourses.  
Amidst the mud of the Western Front, the bumbling Lieutenant George misinterprets 
the language of his hyperreal military map, confusing symbols which have two very different 
meanings in different areas of knowledge.
738
 This cartographic blunder quickly results in the 
characters becoming trapped in a minefield, and all because of a misreading of the obscure 
and esoteric language of mapping.  
Denis Wood is right in stating that we have all misread or misunderstood a map, as 
our interpretive methods are imperfect.
739
 There are multiple reasons why we might read a 
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map in a manner different to that intended by the cartographer, but perhaps foremost among 
these reasons is that we the public are largely untrained in the subtleties of semantics and 
semiotics in the context of cartographic language. 
Cartography is a complex field which requires intense work for a mapreader to be 
able to understand what a map is, and what it is trying to depict. Yet despite this, the public 
retains a belief in cartographic objectivity, and through lack of graphicacy
740
 and 
cartohypnosis
741
 – and the implicit hyperreality of maps – adopts an attitude of passive 
consumption of maps without consideration of the complex discursive dynamics inherent to 
cartography.  Thus we might forgive the Lieutenant his blunder, especially when we consider 
that conflicting readings of map language are not confined to confused travellers
742
 or 
recycled comedy. Just as mistranslations and misinterpretations of spoken and written 
language can cause diplomatic incidents in the ‘real’ world, misreadings of map language can 
also hit national nerves – sometimes with serious political consequences.743   
Maps matter, and not just to academics and art historians. In 2013 a furore developed 
over maps of the Holy Land in Israeli and Palestinian textbooks, with each side’s school 
maps omitting the territory – and by extension, the sovereignty and even the existence – of 
the other.
744
 Closer to Europe, tensions between Greece and Turkey over the latter’s 
application to join the EU – almost leading to war in 1996 – resulted in each side focusing on 
maps of the Aegean which the opposing country included in the official documents submitted 
for EU arbitration.
745
 Only after EU intervention were EU-approved maps, showing the 
European Union’s determined frontier between Greece and Turkey, used to settle the dispute. 
Yet EU maps are not without their detractors.  
In January 2011, a diplomatic disagreement emerged between the neighbouring 
republics of Estonia, a then-recent newcomer to the European Union, and the Russian 
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Federation. Following Estonia’s accession to the Union, the euro currency replaced the kroon 
and in-keeping with European Central Bank policy, the reverse face of the new coins were to 
be decorated with an image chosen by Estonian authorities.
746
 Choosing a design submitted to 
a national competition held the previous year, the government of Estonia selected as its 
reverse-face icon a map: 
 
 
 
Fig 4.1 – Reverse face of Estonian euro coins, 2011747 
 
 This map of Estonia appears innocent enough. Yet mere days after the design was 
adopted, the Russian state news agency Russia Today reported diplomatic protests from the 
Kremlin, as Russian authorities complained about the chosen map having cartographically 
annexed Russian territory. Estonian – and thereby European Union – frontiers with Russia 
reflect a contested border ultimately reliant on contradictory and conflicting treaties between 
long-extinct governments in Riga, Moscow, and Berlin.
748
 As of the time of writing, this 
unusual debate is still ongoing. 
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 This is not an isolated incident. In 2010, the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras 
engaged in a bizarre game of diplomatic brinkmanship over their nations’ borders – as 
depicted not on official state cartographies, but on Google Maps.
749
 As the internet is by far 
the leading source for cartographic information
750
 and Google Maps is by far the internet’s 
cartographic leader, it is not difficult to imagine governments becoming concerned that so 
many people were viewing an incorrect frontier. This is nothing new – as we saw in the 
previous chapter, authorities have been drawing maps to suit their own political purposes 
since the Caesars. Yet in the Digital Age, an otherwise trivial incident becomes politicised as 
opponents compete to spread their version of cartographic “truth” to the potential billions 
logging on to the World-Wide Web. 
We must also consider that it is not simply the language of maps itself which can lead 
to misunderstandings. As semiologist Arthur Berger reminds us, the location of an object is 
as much a part of its language as its text, graphics or colour. Just as speech or script can have 
different meanings based upon the context in which they are spoken or written, so can 
maps.
751
  
 The manipulation of maps to convey a particular political discourse is nothing new, as 
we saw in the earlier discussion of the Forma urbis Romae, the coffin map, and the 
Babylonian World Map. And cartographers draw our attention to this practice throughout 
mapmaking history, with the discourse of empire reaching a zenith in late-nineteenth century 
Europeans’ cartographic colonisation of mass-manufactured commodities such as napkins, 
toys, and wine bottles.
752
 Yet it is not enough to merely state that this is an ancient practice. 
In order to understand the imagination of empire in maps, we must ask how and why maps, 
and their makers, convey particular imaginations. The latter question will be addressed in the 
next chapter. Here, we will discuss how maps convey their messages to an audience, by 
establishing a deconstructive visual methodology for critically interrogating the EU’s 
cartography based upon the above premises. Map language may appear either so obvious that 
it is not worth examining, or alternatively, so inscrutable that understanding it is a quest as 
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futile as searching for Prester John’s magical mirror. Yet as MacEachren,753 Monmonier,754 
and Wood
755
 demonstrate, map language can be understood through categorisation. The three 
categories appropriate to cartographic language are semantics, semiotics, and location, and 
through these methods it is possible to decipher the nuanced language of maps to identify 
messages embedded within.
756
 These embedded messages are discourses of power – 
including the discourse of empire – and thus assembling a framework for identifying them 
within map language is essential. But before we do this, it is necessary to examine precisely 
what map language is. 
 
 
4.2 Tropes 
 
‘Cartography does not qualify as an aesthetic art form ... Unless a map 
bears strong fidelity to reality, the purpose of mapping will not be 
served’.757  
 
Arthur Robinson’s above words, in instructional textbook on mapmaking, form a bold 
statement which is in-keeping with a handbook on constructing charts. Perhaps a little too 
bold. As we have seen, maps exist in the various degrees of hyperreality and simulation, and 
as Paul Laxton demonstrates, whose version of “reality” it is trying to depict is an altogether 
different problem.
758
 Yet it must be acknowledged that a significant aspect of cartography is 
indeed the symbolisation mapmakers use in their quest to represent the world around us. This 
is the most obvious form of cartographic language – tropes. 
 Tropes, as David Barnes and James Duncan clarify, are simply the visual symbols we 
see when we look at a map and are the cartographic equivalent of phonemes or letters in 
spoken or written language.
759
 Without delving too deeply into linguistic theory
760
 it is 
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appropriate to say that like verbal and textual language, the individual “words” or symbols of 
cartographic language have different functions, and are only comprehensible in relation to 
each other. Some are the equivalent of nouns and adjectives, signifying specific concepts. 
Others are more nuanced, collecting the whole into an understandable statement.  
 Much has been written on the ontology and origin of cartographic tropes – David 
Woodward’s and J.B. Harley’s multi-volume monument The History of Cartography offers a 
richly detailed interrogative narrative tracing the development of icons on the map.
761
 And 
while we may cast a casual eye over the extinct, quaint icons of premodern Western 
cartography – stylised bumps on the Waldseemüller Map to represent hills,762 little buildings 
on the Tabula Peuteringiana to indicate Roman towns,
763
 and snarling monsters on the 
Hereford mappamundi to denote non-Christian lands
764
 – the principle of such iconography is 
very much alive today. As MacEachren demonstrates, open any road atlas and we will be 
bombarded with a plethora of symbols, some actually resembling the things they are meant to 
denote (pictorial), some representing through stylised depictions (associative), and some 
entirely abstract (arbitrary or geometric).
765
 While iconic tropes are a crucial area of 
cartographic study, they are not relevant to an examination of EU mapping purely because 
they are not to be found. We are no more likely to find a euro-coin map which depicts rivers 
and railways than we are to encounter a map on an EU pamphlet which warns us that ‘Here 
be Dragons’. However, a long evolutionary history has seen tropes morph and adapt over the 
millennia, and while many icons have not survived the evolutionary process, have entirely 
changed their meanings, or are simply not found on the maps of Brussels and Strasbourg, 
other tropic elements remain crucial. 
Tropes are not merely the abstract or stylised icons which, like Lieutenant George’s 
mushrooms, we must try and interpret to make sense of the map. Tropes are also the broader 
aspects or themes which are the foundation of said symbols. Let us return to the analogy of 
written language. Some elements perform the same function as nouns – for sake of argument, 
we will simply call these “tropes”. Yet just as a random collection of words written on a page 
has no meaning without a unifying grammar, we cannot make sense of basic tropes without a 
broader theme to determine their meanings. Some tropes, then, have the function of forming a 
grammar through which we can make sense of the basics. We will call these broader ones 
“meta-tropes”. 
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The basic tropes consist of those icons for topographic and anthropographic features 
such as rivers and cities, and this visual paraphernalia is noticeably absent from EU maps. 
The meta-tropes, though, go beyond individual symbols. The first of these are spatial 
determinatives
766
 (which, like linguistic determinatives, are symbols which allow the reader 
to understand the context of other symbols) such as the use of one shade or hue to signify one 
nation’s territory, and the use of an alternate colour to signify someone else’s. These will 
inevitably be separated by some sort of line. This may appear insignificant, but recall that 
such seemingly harmless depictions have recently caused diplomatic brinkmanship between 
Moscow and Riga, and between Costa Rica and Honduras. Also included are legends or 
labels – the use of written words to expressly denote something. These “signifiers” will be 
examined in greater detail below. And finally, tropes which remain as important to modern 
maps as to the cartographers of the Copper Age, are visual signifiers such as shapes and 
colours.
767
 Maps are essentially a visual art form.
768
 While maps – as was argued in the 
previous chapters – exist at a peculiar crossroads where language, image, function and 
aesthetics meet, they remain artefacts who spread a message in a specifically visual form.  
Yet the map is more than a mere composite of aggregate linguistic components – it is 
equally powerful as a holistic device. Akerman reminds us that one of the most potent 
characteristics of a map is prominent display in order to communicate a grand visual 
message.
769
 Thus an equally important aspect of any map, and especially so for an imperial 
map, is its location and intended purpose.
770
 
 
 
4.3 Location 
 
It is not merely the contents of a visual medium which are worthy of examination. As we saw 
with The Coronation of Napoleon, location and intended audience is equally crucial. 
Consider the two examples with which we began this chapter. The 2010 map which 
erroneously depicted the Costa Rican-Honduran border might have been completely 
overlooked had it appeared in a different context. Yet it appeared on Google Maps, and as the 
internet is the primary source for people seeking maps
771
 (with Google Maps by far the 
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dominant provider in that dominant realm
772
), potentially millions of people could have been 
viewing that map each day. Similarly, the controversial depiction of the Estonian-Russian 
frontier could have gone unnoticed were it not for the fact that it graced the face of coins, 
which are not only powerful symbols of nationhood and identity
773
 but on a more practical 
level pass through the fingers and beneath the eyes of tens of millions of Estonian and Union 
(but, significantly, not Russian) citizens each day.  
When considering map language, then, we must be conscious of the power of what 
Denis Cosgrove terms ‘The Public Gaze’.774 This latter fundamental is the map’s existence, 
boldly proclaimed and proudly displayed, within public space. This is a conscious act with 
the intention of appealing to the public’s inherent scopophilia – the act of finding pleasure in 
viewing visual images which, as Freud asserts, is acquired subconsciously in childhood.
775
 
This power is as old as cartography itself. Maps which appear in public arenas must be 
comprehensible to a broad readership which, in the case of the Union, is distinctly polyglot. 
Thus, public maps are not only more simplified and understandable than the esoteric military, 
commercial, ecological, governmental, and transport maps of specialist users, but by dint of 
their association with a public body they are transformed into expressions of political 
discourse which have immense potential. As Tom Harper stresses, ‘open air maps fulfil a 
symbolic function… [and] such messages are powerfully expressed. The street contains 
emotions for the government to harness, and political maps do this well.’ 776 
‘Maps,’ states Sarah Bendall in her discussion of the cartographies of imperial China, 
‘were, and still are, used as propaganda, and can exaggerate, suppress, or falsify information 
to create a particular impression’.777 While not intended as a sweeping statement of all maps, 
this is arguably true – as the following discussion evidences. The principle applies not only to 
public maps broadly, but cartoimperialism more specifically. Let us consider, as illustrations, 
a selection of public maps. These are the Forma urbis Romae which we first encountered in 
the previous chapter, Leo Belgicus from sixteenth-century Holland, the eighteenth-century 
L’Empire d’Allemagne map of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Nova Orbis Terrarum 
Delineato: 
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Fig. 4.2 – Forma urbis Romae778 
                                                 
778
 The original Formae Urbis Roma was destroyed in the fifth century by Byzantine sieges, recycled as 
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Fig. 4.3 – Leo Belgicus779 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
building materials, and only partial fragments have been discovered since 1563. This fragment is one of 1,163 
currently held at Stanford University’s reconstruction project. See Barber and Harper, Magnificent Maps, pp. 
22-23; and Stanford University’s project at http://formaeurbis.stanford.edu/.  
779
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Fig. 4.4 – L’Empire d’Allemagne780  
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Fig 4.5 – Nova orbis terrarum delineatio781 
                                                                                                                                                        
mapmakers snobbishly ignored by the French elite, famous Nuremberg mapmakers such as Sebastian Münster, 
Matthäus Seutter, and Johann-Baptists Homänn made a living by taking commissions from other countries, 
especially by the eternally embattled French government with its insatiable demand for maps for taxation, 
defence, and invasion. It is also notable that by this time, French was the lingua franca for interactions between 
the rich and powerful of Europe, America, and the Ottoman world – while a map in German would be largely 
incomprehensible outside central Europe (and somewhat vulgar to the Francophonic elite of Germany), a map 
published in French could be read from Baltimore to Baghdad. See Baynton-Williams, New Worlds, pp. 60-61; 
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At first glance, there is nothing to connect a slab of marble and three ornate, 
ostentatious images of Early Modern imperial ambition, and their presence in a discussion of 
the methodology of twenty-first century Union cartography seems utterly unwarranted. Yet 
they are exemplars of how maps acquire a new dimension to their language based on where 
they are displayed.  
The Forma map, as identified earlier, was commissioned in the third century by 
Emperor Severus to hang on a wall in the Roman Forum. Here, in the very heart of Rome in a 
space saturated with political, historical, and spiritual significance, the Forma did not simply 
show confused travellers which streets were where. As Barber states, the map was too high 
on the wall and too laden with gold decoration to be of any practical use.
782
 Instead it boldly 
proclaimed the might and power of Rome to the hundreds of thousands who milled in the 
area. The Forma proclaimed the power of a unified and unifying polity, conveniently 
ignoring the reality of a Rome reeling in the political, military, economic, and social chaos of 
the Crisis of the Third Century
783
 in order to propagate an image of coherence in the face of 
disharmony, integrity over squabbling, or, to draw a not-inaccurate parallel with the 
European Union’s official motto, unity in diversity.784  
 In a mirror reversal, Leo Belgicus proclaims not collective coherence of Empire but 
national individualism against Empire. Commissioned by the Rotterdam buerghers in 1583 
during the war for Dutch independence from the Holy Roman Empire, the map is not 
designed to show the topographical reality of the Netherlands. Leo Belgicus, the first in a 
mimetic sequence of Dutch maps portraying the Netherlands as a lion rampant, roaring 
defiantly eastwards towards its old German overseers, was commissioned in a large 
zoomorphic style and its copies prominently displayed in public buildings throughout the 
Netherlands so that its message of fierce independence, desired power, and ambitions could 
be seen by soon-to-be-independent Dutch and chastened Holy Romans alike.
785
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 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that our third map is a partial reaction to this. 
Depicting the provinces of the Heiliges Römisches Reich in 1705, the map, again designed to 
be prominently displayed to powerbrokers in the political heart of the de facto capital of the 
Holy Roman Empire,
786
 displays a sense of unity in diversity, of a collective identity as 
Imperial citizens defined by contrast to the non-Imperials beyond the frontier. The map itself 
is rather unremarkable, as its basic tropes are rather unimpressive. Yet its marginalia and its 
location belie an unequivocable imperial discourse, propagating a message of power and 
authority. Yet like the Forma, the imperial discourse communicated by this map is a poor 
reflection of historical reality.
787
 Just as the Forma depicted as strong and unified a Roman 
Empire which was in reality crippled from civil wars and foreign incursions, the L’Empire 
d’Allemagne map utterly ignores the impotence and marginalisation of a Holy Roman Empire 
which had been increasingly irrelevant and ignored as component states pursued their own 
policies following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
788
 This is expressed in the fourth map, 
whose image of the Reichsadler clutching not only Germany but the entire planet is powerful 
enough – but it is even more powerful when we consider that at the time of publication, 
Nuremberg was the de facto capital for Imperial forces battling the Protestant League at the 
height of the devastating Thirty Years’ War. Like other maps of the period this was not 
intended to gather dust on a shelf, but to be seen by the political elite in the corridors of 
power, ‘glorifying the kingdom not the king’,789 while ‘the allegory of the Emperor’s mastery 
over the world is reinforced by the perfect symmetry of the design: the sense of equilibrium 
may be taken to represent peace, strength, justice, or any of the qualities that flow from good 
government’790 – at the height of a war whose conclusion left the Holy Roman Empire little 
more than a hollow name. 
By boastfully showing supreme sovereignty, legitimacy, exclusive rule, and the 
destiny of a defined community, these maps propagate the discourse of empire. And as we 
shall see, this is a fundamental of cartoimperialism which is very much alive and well in the 
Union. This map coincided with the rise of that same Humanism we encountered with 
                                                 
786
 The HRE never had a single capital city and as sovereignty was enshrined in the physical body of the 
Emperor, the capital was wherever the Emperor happened to be. Through their dominance of the Imperial 
throne, the Habsburgs made Vienna the de facto administrative centre, but as the ancient Imperial insignia and 
key Imperial bureaucracies were in Nuremberg, that city became the de facto ceremonial heart of the Imperium 
from the late fifteenth century onwards. See Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, pp. 34-44. 
787
 Note that the map portrays the Netherlands and Switzerland as imperial territories, in spite of those provinces 
having broken away in the sixteenth and thirteenth centuries respectively. 
788
 Wilson, Holy Roman Empire, pp. 52-55. 
789
 Barber and Harper, Magnificent Maps, pp. 70-71. 
790
 Peter Whitfield, The Image of the World: 20 Centuries of World Maps (London: British Library, 2010), pp. 
76-77. 
171 
 
Conrad Celtis: the movement of the Early Modern Period wherein German elites within the 
Reich sought to establish ethnic Germans as the rightful inheritors of Rome’s imperium.791 
This led subsequently to the promotion of all things Germanically “civilised”; art, literature, 
theology – and cartography.792 This passed, as we argued, through the translatio imperii until 
reaching today’s inheritor of the discourse of empire. 
These three maps are relevant and indeed crucial here. The basic tropes in the 
marginalia alone are worthy of critical examination – the gold-clad map of an economically 
devastated Imperium, the roaring lion representing a weak independent state, the snarling 
double-headed Aquila Imperialis clutching sword and sceptre in a vain effort to conceal the 
dying days of a moribund Heiliges Römisches Reich – yet these messages of what the polity 
portrayed wants to be are merely one aspect of cartographic tropes’ ability to communicate a 
discourse of imagined power, imagined identity, and grand ambition: the hallmarks of the 
discourse of empire. Equally significant is the location of these maps, and indeed it might be 
argued that one of the most significant aspects of cartoimperialism is where the map is found. 
The Forma Urbis Roma, Leo Belgicus, L’Empire d’Allemagne, and Nova Orbis Terrarum 
Delineatio were not designed to gather dust in quiet studies. They were made with the 
explicit intention of being hung from walls where tens of thousands of eyes would see them 
on a regular basis, each time being assured that the polity they depicted was strong. As the 
Roman chronicler Livy so astutely noted nearly two millennia ago, ‘empire endures only so 
long as its subjects rejoice in it’.793 By visually hammering home a message of unity, 
strength, legitimacy, and a collective identity to the largest possible number of viewers, the 
cartoimperial map uses (perhaps unintentionally) the language of tropes and locations to 
cause its viewers to rejoice: whether that map shimmers in the Roman Forum, glares from a 
city-hall entrance, or is stamped out by the European Central Bank. 
What, then, is the connection between the Forma, Leo Belgicus, and the Sacrum 
Imperium maps with those of the European Union? The answer is in their language. Their 
vocabulary may change but the basic tropes of dichotomy and division remain, and can be 
understood through applied symbological theory. Second, and perhaps most significantly, is 
that cartoimperial maps are geographically unnecessary yet politically motivated, located 
within a heavily-trafficked area of public space: the Forum, the city hall, the coin, the 
website. This final aspect is crucial, and the deliberate placement of maps in heavily-
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trafficked areas in order to pronounce their – and by extension their owners’ – power is 
nothing new.
794
 Jeremy Harwood asserts that ‘while it cannot be claimed that maps alone 
formed ... empires, they played important parts in helping colonisation and in convincing 
those at home of the legitimacy and enforceability of their imperial claims’.795  
We have identified, then, two primary aspects of cartographic language – tropes and 
location. In order to make sense of these areas of study a connecting theory is required, one 
which addresses the potential power of language. Chapter One argued that empire is a 
discourse, while Chapter Two outlined how maps are perhaps the perfect medium for 
expressing this discourse. The next logical step is to identify how this discourse is 
communicated, and the most appropriate tools for this are semantics and semiotics. 
 
 
4.4 The Semantics and Semiotics of Map Language 
 
‘Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.  
What’s Montague?  
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet!’ 796 
Romeo and Juliet 
II:1. 83-86 
 
This Shakespearean snippet is perhaps the most widely-used opening to semiotics. As 
a field of study, semiotics deals with the relationships between the components of languages, 
seeking to understand how otherwise abstract symbols acquire a meaning in the minds of 
viewers, and how those meanings are communicated and perpetuated.
797
 The object being 
studied remains constant regardless of the language used to study it – Romeo may be from 
the House of Montague, bitter rivals of her House of Capulet, but the man remains the man 
regardless of what collection of letters and sounds are used to denote him. Yet language 
itself, as Juliet mournfully muses, can affect our perception of the object and the message(s) 
it conveys.  
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In his analysis of these symbols and the discourses they communicate, Berger asserts 
that ‘nothing has meaning in itself; an object’s meaning always derives from the language 
and the network of relations in which it is embedded’.798 Like any object, a map has no 
intrinsic meaning in and of itself – it is merely a hyperreal artefact which we must interpret. 
MacEachren aptly summarises this by stating that ‘maps are as much a reflection of (or 
metaphor for) the culture that produces them as they are a representation of the earth or 
activities on it’.799 Consider, for example, the three subsequent images: 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6 – Polynesian stick-chart800 
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Fig 4.7 – Dreamtime801 
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   Fig 4.8 – Typus orbis terrarum802 
                                                 
802
 Image retrieved from John Clarke (ed.), 100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography Throughout 
History (New York: Sterling, 2005), p. 107. 
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Above, three artefacts are presented, and if we were to ask the question “Which one is 
a map?” we might be forgiven for stating that only the third qualifies. Yet all three are maps, 
and use a specific language to convey a message to their readers. The cartographic language 
they employ is hyperreal, and thus is understandable only within the context of the society in 
which the reader lives. Thus for the ancient Oceanian sailor, Fig. 4.6 is an easily-
understandable map of ocean currents, wave and weather patterns, bird migration routes, and 
convenient islands.
803
 For an Australian Aborigine, Fig. 4.7 accurately depicts the transitional 
back-and-forth relationship between the mutually interdependent realms of pre-life, life, and 
afterlife, coming full circle back to the beginning.
804
 For an Early Modern European, Fig. 4.8 
is a reasonable representation of the world known to contemporary sailors, framed within the 
navigationally handy Mercator Projection.
805
 Yet each deployment of cartographic language, 
while understandable in its context, is baffling to outsiders. The Leo Belgicus and Nova Orbis 
Terrarum Delineatio are hyper-real, but understandable within the context of Western 
cartography. Yet outside of this framework, they are just daubs of colour. The Polynesian and 
Aboriginal maps here are incomprehensible jumbles to a person not immersed in the visual 
rhetoric of the map – as would be the European map to a non-European. How then, do we 
understand map language?  
Semiotics offers a solution. Initially addressing the spoken elements of verbal 
languages and the graphic symbols of writing, semiotics has been applied to a broad spectrum 
of disciplines overlapping humanities and the natural and social sciences.
806
 The origins of 
semiotics lie in positivist grand theories of Victorian linguistics, and an intellectual hangover 
continues to linger as a consequence of early semiologists’ attempts to construct a grand 
theory – a ‘queen of the interpretive sciences’807 capable of explaining the totality of human 
existence. Thus, it may appear odd to apply semiotics to critical cartography. Yet the 
application of semiotics has advanced far beyond the linguistic philosophy of its nineteenth-
century pioneers, Ferdinand de Saussure
808
 and Charles Peirce.
809
 Semiotics is used to 
analyse the components of other forms of language – whether the language is verbal, visual, 
performative, conscious or not – and has been accepted within the social sciences as a 
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contested, debated, but nevertheless valid, approach to phenomena ranging from texts and 
images to architecture
810
 and illness.
811
 From its acceptance in other social science 
disciplines, it is evident that semiological analysis offers valuable insights to be made beyond 
the confines of its linguistic origins.  
 MacEachren flatly asserts that ‘we cannot eliminate the cultural baggage inherent in 
any human artifact’, urging mapmakers to consider the implications of their choices of 
cartographic language when making a map.
812
 Certainly, these aspects exist. Wood argues 
that a map is a text which is ‘read’ and interpreted in a similar way to a written piece.813 
Cartographic language consists, like any visual language, of a complex interaction of what 
Ferdinand de Saussure termed  signifiers (the symbols denoting a concept) and signified (the 
concept being denoted). For Saussure, these are bound together through a semantic 
‘grammar’ which enables viewers to combine the various elements of the image into a 
coherent whole.
814
 Semantic grammar can be confusing, so let us illustrate the argument with 
the Blackadder sketch with which we began.  
Lieutenant George is holding a map of a minefield. The minefield is the signified, it is 
the entity whose existence the mapmaker is trying to communicate. The mapmaker has done 
this by using cartographic language, or tropes – namely the repetition of an abstract symbol 
which apparently looks like a mushroom. These mushrooms are the signifiers, they represent 
the mines in the signified minefield. As a minefield is defined by the presence of mines, the 
signifiers collectively represent the signified – the signified is the sum of its parts. Yet as the 
sketch unwittingly demonstrates, the signifiers have no inherent value in and of themselves, 
and instead are random symbols. Lacking knowledge in the structural language of maps, the 
Lieutenant confounds signified and signifier, ultimately leading his comrades into what he 
interprets as a field of actual mushrooms.  
As Barber extensively discusses, map language is highly generalised and simplified in 
order to convey meanings to a broad readership.
815
 And like the phonemes and graphemes of 
any spoken or written language, these stylised symbological signifiers cannot be understood 
in isolation. They only make sense in unity, and can only be comprehended when structured 
within a mutually-agreed grammatical convention. Evidently this is beyond the abilities of 
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Lieutenant George, but appropriate tools are available to the critical cartographer. Map 
grammar is a holistic process uniting signs and signifiers, and ‘since nothing has meaning in 
itself, the relationships that exist among signs (i.e. grammar), are crucial’.816 And this 
grammar, as Charles Peirce argued, is of fundamental importance.
817
 In his semiological 
theory, Peirce identified the grammar uniting three varieties of signs: the iconic sign that 
signifies meaning through metaphorical resemblance to something else; the indexical sign 
that signifies meaning through cause and effect; and the symbolic sign that signifies an 
abstract meaning which must be mutually agreed-upon, and learned. While maps do contain 
an element of iconic significance in that they (partially) resemble the ‘real’ world around us, 
this is not automatically inferable to us. Our limited vision prevents us from seeing the world 
all at once, thus maps must communicate knowledge only through mutually-agreed 
grammatical conventions which must be learned. These agreed conventions are vulnerable to 
deliberate manipulation, and this forms a fundamental basis for the power of imperial maps. 
Thus, of the three aspects of Peirce’s semiological trichotomy, it is the symbolic sign which 
is of most relevance to cartographic semiotics. The mushrooms on the Lieutenant’s map are 
not stylised depictions of actual landmines, nor are they representations of the effects of a 
detonation. Rather, like the vast majority of tropes, they are abstract representations whose 
meaning must be learned – and the only way they can be learned is through immersion in 
cartographic semiotics. 
Semiotics, as defined by Flowerdew and Martin, ‘is concerned with the way words, 
things, pictures and actions come to be “signs”. That is to convey meanings in particular 
times and at particular places’,818 which only become understandable through a semiotic 
grammar. And as Berger
819
 reminds us, the interpretive link between a sign and a signifier ‘is 
based on associations we learn and then carry around with us’. These associations – the 
grammar of visual rhetoric – are acquired through the conscious replication of taught 
conventions. These conventions are learned in childhood,
820
 and throughout life via the 
unconscious accumulation of personal experience.
821
 When faced with a map, we fall back 
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upon these consciously- and subconsciously-acquired visual understandings in order to read 
the messages communicated by the map’s visual and symbolic language as ‘maps are imbued 
with meaning by virtue of semiotic relationships’.822 
 In addition to semiotics, hermeneutics offers a solution; specifically Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s theory of the ‘effective historical consciousness’.823 While the concept of infinite 
interpretability of a text lies at the heart of hermeneutics, Gadamer’s development of the 
effective historical consciousness hypothesis merges with semiotics. According to Gadamer’s 
hypothesis, we interpret a text (all things being ‘texts’) not in a potentially infinite number of 
ways, but rather through styles and conventions which are acquired throughout life and which 
are generalisable among the population.
824
 Taking Gadamer’s theories alongside those of 
modern semiologists, it is possible to approach maps through a “hermeneutic-semiotic” 
framework, as cartographic language is interpreted by mapreaders according to conventional 
grammar. 
At this point, it might be wondered what relation any of this theoretical material has to 
cartoimperialism. As a concept focusing upon the means by which maps may engender an 
imagination of empire among their viewers, does cartoimperialism need an understanding of 
map semantics and cartographic semiotics? Arguably yes, as the grammar through which we 
subconsciously interpret maps is vulnerable, due to its hyperreal nature and the perceived 
authority of state cartography, to manipulation for political ends. 
 
 ‘Semiotics,’ stated  Umberto Eco in his discussion of semiology, ‘is in principle the 
discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie.’825 In spoken and written 
discourse, lies work because they use the same semantics and conventions that we use to 
make truthful statements, and it can be extremely difficult to distinguish accuracy from 
misrepresentation when both use the same mechanisms of communication. Maps are far from 
exempt from this. Visual language is, like its spoken, written, and mental counterparts, based 
upon mutually-agreed conventions. And as Kress and van Leeuwen
826
 highlight, our 
interpretations of visual language take place within an established framework. This 
framework can, in principle, be manipulated by the mapmaker in order to communicate the 
message that “the world looks like this”, safe in the knowledge that such elements will be 
interpreted in a uniform manner framed through the visual rhetoric of cartographic semiotics. 
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Indeed, this is precisely how maps work. But as Eco’s statement suggests, this same language 
can be manipulated in order to communicate a false message which, due to the overwhelming 
faith we place in maps, is believable. And such application can be far from innocent. 
As Umberto Eco points out, one essence of semiotics is that signs are as equally 
capable of deceiving as they are of revealing. This transpires through manipulation of a 
related semiological trope – metonymic elements. A metonym, as Berger827 outlines, is a 
semiotic device which imbues a sign with meaning via association, similar to Peirce’s iconic 
sign. This technique is an ancient one in cartography, in which elements or areas of the map 
are assigned a positive or negative value by associating them with desirable or reprehensible 
traits.
828
 This is an arguably imperial act, as a false dichotomy is created between Self and 
Other, civilised and barbaric, order and chaos, defining which areas are which, and by 
metonymic association, which peoples are categorised into each. Frequently, this is achieved 
through synecdoche – a subcategory of metonym in which the part stands for the whole, or 
vice-versa. A simple example is cited by Fornäs who notes that the EU does not refer to its 
flag, anthem, motto, and so forth as “European Union flag”, “European Union anthem”, but 
as “European flag”, “European anthem”, and so forth.829 This is an imperial act of 
‘cartographic pretension’ as per Black’s830 definition, whereby polity and ambition become 
merged into a hyperreality, with the part (European Union) representing the whole (Europe). 
It is no different to the same synecdoches which we identified in the disconnected discourses 
of the Forma urbis Romae, L’Empire d’Allemagne, and Nova Orbis Terrarum Delineatio.  
 The concept that visual language can be manipulated in this way is neither new
831
 nor 
unique to cartography. Black discusses historical instances at length,
832
 while Kress and van 
Leeuwen highlight how critical discourse analysis has identified how ‘apparently-neutral, 
purely informative discourses of newspaper reporting, government publications, social 
science reports, and so on, may in fact convey ideological attitudes just as much as discourses 
which more explicitly propagandize’.833 Critical cartographers are right to stress the power 
that maps have, but a philosophical basis is required in order to validate these assertions. 
                                                 
827
 Berger, Media Analysis Techniques, pp. 22-23. 
828
 Tony Lestringant, Mapping the Renaissance World : the geographical imagination in the age of discovery 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1994), pp. 113-114. 
829
 Fornäs, Signifying €urope, pp. 64-76. 
830
 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion, 2000), p. 19. 
831
 Paul Zanker, The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus [trans. Alan Shapiro] (Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan Press, 1988), pp. 1-5. 
832
 Black, Maps and History. 
833
 Kress and van Leeuwen, Grammar of Visual Design, p. 12. 
181 
 
Cartography indeed has power – particularly when associated with state projects or empire – 
and a semiological methodology enables us to better understand this power.  
 Semiology, though, is but one epistemological framework of use to the critical 
cartographer. The signs and signifiers of map language are not only interpreted as stylised 
symbols which represent geographic features. The language of cartography operates by 
appropriating symbols in order to be understood – a symbology which is wrapped up in its 
own web of interpretive connotations which are best approached through appropriate 
methods of reading map language. 
 
 
4.4 Reading Map Language 
 
‘We live in a world of signs that lie and mislead,’ claims Berger, ‘and many of us spend a 
good deal of effort trying to determine whether or not we are being “conned”.’834 In everyday 
life, this is arguably so: yet not with cartography. Indeed, Bruno Latour goes so far as to 
comment that with maps, ‘there is nothing hidden or convoluted, no shadows, no ‘double 
entendre’.835 But maps lie. They have to, as any attempt to faithfully reproduce everything in 
the spatial realm results in a map that is either incomprehensible or useless. Indeed, 
Muehrcke and Muehrcke are justified in their assertion that ‘so many perversions of reality 
are inherent in mapping that the result is best viewed as an intricate, controlled fiction’.836 
Yet despite maps’ having to distort reality, and despite Black’s reminder that ‘the language of 
cartography requires careful reading,’ 837 the public – and geographers – retain trust in charts. 
The cause of this innate trust is what John Pickles terms ‘cartographic reason’.838 
Cartographic reason, as a theory, argues that maps embody a ‘functional authority’839 
which readers subscribe to, thereby providing the map with immediate legitimation regardless 
of its content. Kristin Kopp offers a clarification by declaring that ‘[maps] are not texts whose 
legitimacy is to be questioned; they are instead rationalized products of the most modern 
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technologies’.840 The result, as Muehrcke and Muehrcke state, is that ‘we tend to accept the 
information on maps without question’.841 Presuming that maps are neutral mirrors of nature, 
people retain an innate trust in them and the messages they propagate – and this cartographic 
reason is precisely what imperial maps capitalise upon in order to convince readers that the 
falsehoods contained within are in fact truths.  
However, the map cannot lie outright. As Barbara Piatti and Lorenz Hurni
842
 discuss 
in their analysis of the counterfactual cartographies of novels, and as Hurni and Gerrit Sell 
assess, maps must contain enough hyperreal truth to be plausible, or they simply do not 
work.
843
 The consequences for the imperial map are that the politically-motivated chart must 
portray a plausible semi-reality. While all maps exist in a cartographic limbo between truth 
and lies, the imperial map distorts its representations sufficiently to become what Benedict 
Anderson terms ‘the map-as-logo’844 and what Johan Fornäs terms the ‘logotype’.845 And as 
Kopp argues, such a map is ‘identified so strongly with a particular shape, the “logomap” is 
... wholly detached from its geographic context’.846 It becomes an imperial map not through 
its language, but through the very purpose of its creation, its ability to capitalise upon 
cartographic reason, and public graphic illiteracy to propagate a false vision. 
Throughout history mapmakers and mapreaders have developed their own ways of 
interpreting the language within. Perhaps the most common has been to frame the otherwise 
impenetrable language has been to place map language within a more recognisable 
metanarrative. For precolonial Aborigines, maps of the landscape were framed within 
ancestral myths of nature and the dreamtime or mythical prehistory, with these spiritual 
memes of a multidirectional prelife-life-afterlife-prelife cycle helping the drawers and 
viewers of maps to understand their themes. For medieval Europeans, the metanarrative was 
Christianity, and subsequently medieval mappaemundi bristle with text, imagery, and 
interpretation based on good versus evil and Biblical narrative.
847
 For Victorian colonists the 
metanarrative was progress and modernisation in the West’s imperialist image, with 
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Victorian maps eagerly depicting the displacement, enslavement, or outright genocide of 
those who did not subscribe to the Western conquest and assimilation of the planet according 
to its own warped ideals.
848
 Maps of the EU are no different in that they are interpreted 
through a metanarrative, a discourse, which helps us understand the subtleties of their 
language. And these metanarratives can be understood through a combination of the 
functional and lexical approaches. 
 
 
4.4.1 The Functional Approach 
 
There are multiple methodologies of maps, and in recent decades perhaps the most popular 
trend has been to interpret map language as objective, no more politically-biased than the 
entirely neutral mathematics, theodolites, and computers which enable their construction. 
This is what Harley called the ‘culture of the technics’,849 and which MacEachren terms the 
‘Functional Approach’. It denotes a methodology of cartography which focuses on the visual 
symbols of maps and the cognitive processes which our brains utilise to process and 
understand the abstract language of cartography.
850
 Certainly, this is the view encouraged by 
such cartographers as Judith Tyner, who insists that regardless of what they are depicting, 
whether toposphere, anthroposphere, or even noösphere,
851
 maps remain ‘neutral, value-free’ 
reflections of the world around us. This approach to maps is reassuring in its connotations of 
neat scientific accuracy, and can appear an attractive alternative to the slow emergence of 
postmodern studies which have gradually crept – usually with fierce resistance from the 
cartographic ancien regime – into critical cartography since the 1990s.852 Even Monmonier, 
arguably the most prolific writer of critical cartography today, hints at this; that ‘while I may 
feel like a heretic to say it, too much has been written on the apparent meanings in maps.’853 
There is arguably some truth in this, yet in spite of the tentative appeal of a clinical, 
objectivist approach to cartography, maps simply cannot be understood in this way. 
Scientific approaches to cartography are as numerous as maps themselves. Indeed, 
any respectable modern textbook on cartography will devote significant space to the 
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mathematics and science of constructing reliable charts, while giving only cursory mention – 
if indeed any mention at all – to the philosophies underpinning maps.854 By examining 
theoretical frameworks which offer insights into the philosophical and theoretical mechanics 
of mapping, but which are as-yet only gradually beginning to gain acceptance, this thesis 
seeks to examine not the mechanical nature of map creation, but the mechanisms by which 
we interpret maps. 
Traditionally, the study of map language has been dominated by this objectivist 
offshoot of the same strain of ‘scientification’ that emerged in late-nineteenth century 
history
855
 and early twentieth-century regional geographies.
856
 Despite the advances of 
critical cartographers, there remains some scholarly dismissal of maps as ‘peripheral and 
irrelevant’,857 purely objective technologies of scientific inquiry, or (in the case of imperial 
cartography) awkward relics of contemporary geography’s imperial origins.858 Consequently 
consigned to a ‘dry and unfashionable’ subset of geography,859 cartography and cartographers 
have not yet escaped quantitative methods. Beyond critical cartography, in more general 
human geography, this trend is exacerbated. Perkins, indeed, draws attention to the multitude 
of ways in which academics ‘take an atheoretical view of the map’ with little or no 
consideration of the complex historical, social, and associative contexts of the map in 
question.
860
 But as Trudy Suchan and Cynthia Brewer highlight, critical cartography has 
recently seen a methodological shift in which qualitative methods have gained – and continue 
to gain – popularity.861 As the foci of the cartographic analyst are, as Suchan and Brewer 
assert, ‘particular audiences, natural settings for research, and amplified explanation… 
hallmarks of qualitative research’,862 the functional approach is not entirely ideal.  
For Ron Johnston, it is intellectually dishonest and methodologically dangerous to 
create a false dichotomy between ‘the apparently mutually opposed techniques of quantitative 
and qualitative methods’.863 The same can arguably be said for approaches. Neither exists in 
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isolation, and a purely objectivist approach is arguably neither possible nor desirable, 
particularly in a discipline already fraught with accusations of over-emphasis on 
philosophical and theoretical work lacking a foundation in the sort of raw data which 
characterises the critical cartographer’s trade. A healthy skepticism of purely quantitative 
methods and objectivism is a hallmark of critical cartography,
864
 and by applying the 
techniques of an analysis which considers not merely the objects and mechanisms of the map 
but also the power-relations and discourses which underpin cartography, the ‘naïve 
empiricism’865 of the functional approach can be avoided. Ultimately, the assessment of 
imperial cartography can only be properly realised through the application of a flexible, 
reflexive, and interrogative qualitative methodology. This is what MacEachren terms the 
‘Lexical Approach’. 
 
 
4.4.2 The Lexical Approach 
 
‘If our goal’, writes MacEachren, ‘is to make effective maps, a functional approach to map 
representation offers a method of logical structuring of information. [But] if...we set for 
ourselves the broader goal of understanding how maps work, a functional approach 
alone...leaves us well short of that goal.’866 MacEachren is not alone in suggesting an 
approach which acknowledges the role of non-scientific methods.  Indeed, argues Geraldine 
Pratt, ‘the discipline of geography has a long tradition of qualitative methods’.867 Certainly, 
attempting to understand cartography without the use of the lexical approach is at best 
imprecise, at worst impossible.  
The lexical approach ‘bring[s] research closer to the problem-solving realms of 
mapmakers and map users.’868 As the product of a complex, interactive, and subjective 
construction process, maps are part of the hermeneutic/interpretative path with its focus upon 
‘the reading of texts and literature to explore people’s associations with and understanding of 
place’.869 And as a qualitative method, the lexical approach ensures that we ‘do not start out 
with the assumption that there is a pre-existing world that can be known, or measured, but 
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instead see the social world as something that is dynamic and changing, always being 
constructed through the intersection and connection of cultural, economic, social and political 
processes.’870 This is arguably visible in the functional approach, but by adopting a lexical 
approach it is possible to construct a solution to a perennial problem of critical cartography: 
the absence of a unifying philosophical framework, or what Robina Mohammed describes as 
a ‘tangled web of loose ends that needs to be woven into coherence’.871 
 Of course it must be asserted that qualitative methods, like any approach, are not 
without pitfalls. Limb and Dwyer underline of the criticism that conclusions arrived at 
through qualitative methods are ‘gained from unrepresentative ‘samples’ or from carefully 
selected quotes’.872 It is necessary to anticipate such critiques of this work, as the project is 
vulnerable to potential accusations of cartographic cherry-picking,
873
 selecting only those 
maps which fit a pre-determined notion of cartoimperialism and thus triumphantly 
constructing a cartographic strawman to neatly illustrate cartoimperialism. This study avoids 
this by examining all European currency maps and a broad selection of those print and virtual 
maps which are most frequently encountered on EU websites – the primary port of call for 
individuals seeking information on the Union.
874
 Yet as MacEachren identifies, part of the 
value of the lexical approach to hyperreality is that there is no right or wrong interpretation: 
there is merely the acknowledgement that multiple interpretations can and do exist. It is 
impossible to either conclusively prove or disprove that a map exhibits cartoimperialism (or 
indeed any discourse), yet the value remains in asserting that such a perception exists.  
The value of a lexical approach to cartoimperialism is that, as a concept, it does not 
treat maps in isolation as mere ontological objects, focusing only upon their physical 
elements. Rather, this approach treats the map as merely one aspect of a multifarious network 
of relations and contexts in which the purpose, creation, revision, and reproduction of the 
map – all of which take place not in a neat, mechanistic sequential order, but rather in an 
almost chaotic tangle of reciprocal relationships and interactive feedback loops – are subject 
to innumerable perceptions and interpretations. It is what Monmonier terms ‘carto-
anthropology’875 – the study of maps as institutionalised practises and processes, rather than 
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mere objects. All of these stages are potential sites of manipulation to produce a desired result 
and desired interpretation among mapreaders.  
In the search for European cartoimperialism, it must be borne in mind that an 
interpretation which perceives a discourse of empire is merely one among many.  The map is 
entirely unobjective, and the methodology of semiological analysis, not to mention 
qualitative methods themselves, are inherently subjective processes. Cartoimperialism is one 
interpretation – we cannot perform what Donna Haraway terms ‘the god-trick’876 by staring 
through Prester John’s mirror and seeing a single, accurate, reality – assuming that such a 
thing even exists.  But by acknowledging the boundaries of a lexical approach to 
cartoimperialism, a plausible methodology can be justified. This methodology must, as has 
been argued thus far, be grounded in semiology. It may appear subjective in contrast to the 
apparently crisp, scientific (yet inaccurate) quantitative approaches which dominate so much 
cartographic thinking, but nevertheless contains, as Haraway identifies, ‘the possibility of 
critical promise’.877  
This is not to say, of course, that the functional approach is without merit. Without the 
functional approach we might run the risk of being lost in an infinity of interpretations which 
would, in theory, be equally valid. Yet without the lexical approach we would simply 
replicate the erroneous idea that maps are objective and reducible to mathematical and 
diagnostic processes. Combining the two offers an intriguing potential method. The lexical 
approach acknowledges that there are multiple interpretations of map language, yet the 
functional approach reminds us that these interpretations are not infinite – their validity is 
directly linked to the actual language.  
 
As artefacts, maps combine the intellectual/analytical with the emotive and 
expressive;
878
 each element of the map’s unique language merging the semantics of map 
language and the connotations of location with the subconscious semiotics of a 
communicated discourse. Closely enmeshed with semiological analysis, as Rose highlights, is 
auteur theory. This approach assumes the premise that the intentions of an object’s creator 
are paramount for our understanding of the object’s meaning. In cartographic terms, this 
would mean that the intentions of the mapmaker are more important than the perceptions of 
the mapreader. A logical method, then, would be to interview the creator in order to ascertain 
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their intentions. This is a potentially interesting avenue of research, but for the purposes of 
this study it is a methodological dead-end. We will reject Auteur Theory for three reasons. 
 Firstly is the issue of practicality. While the makers of European maps are alive and 
contactable – and indeed have been contacted for the purposes of this study879 – it is not 
merely charts which act as European maps. This will be expounded upon in Chapter Five, but 
we need think only back to the preceding chapter in which it was demonstrated that actual 
maps are only the tip of the mapping iceberg. As a lexical approach to EU maps must be 
grounded in intertextuality – the mutually supportive relationship between symbols which 
ultimately allows the reader to elicit meaning
880
 – focusing only in the intentions of the 
mapmaker is focusing on only one aspect of a complex relationship between creator, viewer, 
and symbols. There are far more symbols which intersect with EU maps than merely the 
symbols of conventional cartography. Images and text which are official and unofficial 
representations of the Union – such as flags – are just as important in helping the mapreader 
to establish meaning. This is the argument which led Roland Barthes to declare the ‘death of 
the author’;881 for the image can only be comprehended in its relation to other images and 
symbols which that same author did not create. Further, while the makers of Europe’s current 
maps are alive and well the same cannot be said for the makers of other EU symbols, who 
were already men and women of advanced age during the nascence of Europe in the 1950s. 
Were we to apply auteur theory, we would only be able to speak with a handful of creators – 
and this would be inadequate. 
 Our second and related reason is hermeneutic. We could interview EU mapmakers 
and try to ascertain their intentions. Yet as we identified above, Gadamer reminds us that 
people may not be consciously aware of the influences upon them. We cannot peer into our 
own minds to deconstruct our own psyches, as so much of what forms our perception of the 
world lurks in the subconscious.
882
 We might consider the example of Arsène Heitz, who in 
1952 won the competition to design what is now the EU’s flag. After thirty years of public 
interpretations which connected the twelve stars of the Union to Christian iconography,
883
 in 
1987 Heitz admitted that his twelve-star design was inspired by images of the Virgin Mary. 
We could leave our investigation there, and take as our premise that the flag is essentially a 
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Catholic icon. But this example clearly highlights the shortcomings of auteur theory. Both 
Carlo Gialdino and Johan Fornäs note that there is absolutely no evidence to support Heitz’s 
1987 claim that his 1952 flag was inspired by Catholic iconography. Gialdino goes so far as 
to say that Heitz’s 1987 admission is a ‘trick of memory’, arguing that the link between Mary 
and the European flag was entirely coincidental, and only after thirty years of constantly 
being asked about it did Heitz convince himself of a link which had never really existed. But 
where does this leave us? The immediate answer is: a dead-end. Arsène Heitz has long since 
passed away, and even if we could ask him, his current testimony is not necessarily a 
reflection of his intentions at the time of creation. Like everyone else, mapmakers and 
iconographers cannot detach themselves from their own ‘effective historical consciousness’, 
and such an approach would thus be incomplete. 
 The third justification is most significant: intention is subordinate to interpretation. 
As Jonathan Leib and Gerald and Roberta Webster set forth in their study of postbellum 
Confederate symbolism in the United States, ‘the meaning[s] of these icons do not remain 
permanent throughout history but are continuously evolving’.884 This is demonstrably true. A 
designer may create a symbol for a particular purpose, but once that symbol has been released 
into the public realm it rapidly and eternally evolves, to the point that appropriations or 
variations of it may bear little or no resemblance to the intention.
885
 In such cases, the 
intentions of a symbol’s designer become entirely peripheral. 
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Just as imperium and imperator morphed over the millennia to signify different 
concepts to that which the words originally expressed, so too do the components of visual 
language evolve alongside verbal language. As such, they must be deconstructed. 
 
 
4.5 Semiotic Deconstruction 
 
While deconstruction has been broadly accepted by geographers,
886
 this hallmark of 
postmodern methodology remains a mostly unwelcome parvenu among the methodological 
establishment. In what is arguably the introduction of deconstruction to cartography, Harley 
identifies two fundamental aspects of the method. First, as he makes clear, is that there is no 
single deconstructionist approach. The theories of Michel Foucault are often at odds with 
those of Jacques Derrida, as the former emphasises systems while Derrida consistently urges 
the dismantling of the same.
887
 It is possible, as Harley argues, to occasionally merge 
different theories, but in-keeping with postmodernism itself there is no single approach which 
the study can offer. His second observation is that deconstruction makes no promises of 
finding a “truth” within cartography. There is no single interpretation of cartographic 
language and while it may be a stretch of the imagination to state that there is no right or 
wrong way of interpreting map language – Lieutenant George is evidently wrong in 
interpreting the mushroom-shaped symbols on his map as actual mushrooms – there are 
multiple interpretations which exist in a grey area between the two extremes. It is in this zone 
that cartoimperialism lies.  
In his discussion of the power of maps, Alan Henrikson
888
 identifies not only the three 
routes through which maps persuade – emblematic, synoptic, and hypnotic – but also places 
these cartographic conduits in a framework of semantic deconstruction. Henrikson
889
 
identifies the symbiotic relationship between the two: ‘maps may be embedded in the 
discourse of politics and cartography, just as political symbols can be embedded in the 
language of maps.’ And this is arguably accurate – as Berger890 states, ‘what we call a map is 
an example of a kind of language, symbols arranged in some kind of order’. These symbols 
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can serve political agendas which cannot be understood through a traditional focus only upon 
the component symbols of cartography. While maps can indeed be understood as generalised 
representations, the specific language of their semiotic parts is comprehensible only through a 
grammar of map semantics, and through semiology we can gain a greater understanding of 
the multi-layered, culturally conditioned interpretation process itself.  
Harley stresses that ‘deconstruction urges us to read between the lines of the map’ and 
using tropes, ‘discover that cartographic facts are only facts within a specific cultural 
perspective’.891 There is, as he rightly states, a very significant human element to interpreting 
map language. The language, as has already been argued, has no meaning of its own accord, 
and must be interpreted according to conventions which we have already acquired. These 
conventions, as Alan Henrikson implies
892
 and Mark Monmonier hints at,
893
 are more 
appreciable when viewed through the lens of semiology. 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
We began this chapter with a light-hearted jest at a bumbling mapreader’s cartographic 
illiteracy. Yet while viewers may laugh at Lieutenant George’s lack of graphicacy, this scene 
is a potent commentary on the complexities of cartographic language. Lieutenant George has 
not simply elicited a giggle, he has exposed the very nature of maps. The map only works by 
distilling the world around us into an oversimplified and abstract representation – a 
hyperreality – which is interpreted in various ways and has the capacity to convey far more 
significant discourses than merely telling us where things are.  
The map communicates its values through a sophisticated web of semiotic, 
psychological, and symbological channels which, while capturing our attention with dazzling 
displays, we may not even realise exist. As Monmonier asserts, ‘therein lies much of the 
power of maps – enchanting displays divert attention from their authors’ motives.’894 These 
motives vary. From the dreamtime charts of Aboriginal tradition through medieval 
mappaemundi and the gaudy, propagandist cartographies of Early Modern Europe, through to 
the sleek, sophisticated cartographies of coins and websites whose very existence causes 
contemporary governments to clash, maps are unique artefacts. But they are all artefacts 
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capable of being deconstructed through semiological and semantic methods. Novel methods 
are required in order to understand maps as discursive datasets understood and interpreted 
according to socially constructed conventions, and thereby justify the methodological 
considerations of cartoimperialism. Of course, the exact same methods cannot be applied 
universally, as basic tropes and meta-tropes are not consistent across time and space, instead 
varying from one society to another – an internet map of the Union would be as baffling to 
the sailors of Stone Age Oceania as their stick-charts are to our untrained eyes. Yet the 
concept of the methods remains universal, and with adjustment, the tools of semantics and 
semiotics, Functional and Lexical Approaches, and deconstruction, can be used to examine 
any chart – including the discursive, public, politically-charged maps of the Union. It is to 
these maps which we now turn. 
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Chapter Five 
First Among Equals 
 
“There are no ideals, however exalted in nature, which  
can afford to do without a symbol.”895 
 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe 
Paris, 16 July 1951 
 
 
“Europe should have an Emblem, connected with its flag, to serve as an 
instrument of propaganda – as the Soviet Star serves Bolshevism and the 
Swastika served Hitlerism.”896 
 
Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi 
Memorandum of the European Parliamentary Union 
Gstaatd, 27 July 1950 
 
 In a Europe emerging from the ashes of an evil unification, two political pioneers of 
integration spoke the above words. Jacques Camille Paris, Secretary-General of the Council of 
Europe, in a confidential memo of 16th July 1951 stresses the need for the emerging community 
to adopt a flag. And in a similar memo to the forerunner of today’s European Parliament, Richard 
von Coudenhove-Kalergi, President of the Pan-European Movement, calls for a single 
recognisable emblem, alongside the flag, to visually represent the not-too-distant ancestor of 
today’s European Union. This emblem, it was envisaged, would act as a rallying-point to connect 
Western Europeans just as Soviet symbols did for their Eastern counterparts. History is replete 
with grim coincidences, and it is ironic that the European community chose to connect its people 
through symbols: symbols submitted to competitions, in exactly the same way that the National 
                                                 
895
 Memorandum from the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe on the European flag (Strasbourg, 16 
July 1951). Council of Europe. Memorandum of the Secretariat General on the European Flag, AS/RPP II (3) 2. 
Strasbourg: Consultative Assembly, Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Sub-Committee on 
Immunities, 16 July 1951. Available at: 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/memorandum_from_the_secretariat_general_of_the_council_of_europe_on_the_europe
an_flag_strasbourg_16_july_1951-en-081673a8-1849-4930-a774-e23d0fbad413.htm. 
896
 Memorandum from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi on the European flag (Gstaad, 27 July 1950). Archives 
historiques du Conseil de l'Europe - Historical archives of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, F-67075 
Strasbourg, Cedex. Available at: http://info.coe.int/archives/hist/flag/default.asp. Le drapeau - The Flag, 2191. 
The European Flag, Memorandum presented to the Council of Europe by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
President of the Pan-European Movement, Secretary General of the European Parliamentary Union. Gstaad: 27 
July 1950. Available at: 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/memorandum_from_richard_coudenhove_kalergi_on_the_european_flag_gstaad_27_ju
ly_1950-en-ad9469d5-d9cf-46ae-95e0-897f96f94195.html.  
194 
 
Socialists and the Communist Party – with their swastikas, Reichsadler,897 stars, and hammers 
and sickles898 – had symbolised their own peoples’ pretensions of imperium through mass public 
iconography.  
This European emblem, according to Council documents, never officially emerged. 
Creating a flag for Europe was difficult enough, let alone an accompanying abstract emblem.899  
But as this chapter will argue, the icon sought by Coudenhove-Kalergi has been unofficially 
established. An emblem which serves alongside the flag as a perhaps unwitting instrument of 
propaganda to visually represent not only the European Union, but all of Europe as a single 
civilisation. This emblem is the map. 
 As emblems of state power and political discourses, maps are icons. At this stage a 
terminological distinction must be made. Symbols or emblems are visual markers, or 
signifiers, which bear only peripheral resemblance to the signs they are meant to represent – 
like Lieutenant George’s mushrooms. Icons, though, are visual signifiers which are 
sufficiently similar to that which they represent, that we can recognise it. The Christian cross 
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appropriated as a political emblem by Charlemagne acts as an example.
900
 And as established 
in Chapter Four, iconography is the tool
901
 via which we will examine EU maps. 
As Jonathan Leib and Gerald and Roberta Webster state in support of the wishes of 
political pioneers of 1950s Europe, ‘icons can act as centripetal forces binding a people 
together’.902 This has long been recognised by political leaders, who from the Babylonians 
onwards have employed emblems to denote an identity. The idea has also been long-
established in academia, as demonstrated by the dominance in such studies of Jean Gottman’s 
original 1951 thesis on the phenomenon of ‘common symbols [which are] used to help bind a 
group of people together within and to a territory’.903 The field is established, but we will 
look further.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine European Union-produced maps in search 
of what the above two activists sought – an emblem of European unity – and posit that this 
symbol is not part of the map, but is the map itself. Yet it is not merely the map which 
represents the European Union as it is, but rather what it should be – and is destined to 
become. As the European Commission is responsible for administration and management of 
all European Union bodies other than the Council of Europe, (Consilium) this study will 
focus on the maps and accompanying symbolism of the Commission. These visual materials 
are produced according to the Commission’s Visual Identity Guidelines.904 
While iconographical studies of political emblems have historically been dominated 
by nations or ethnic and religious sub-groups within a nation,
905
 this examination focuses on 
a supra- or meta-national entity. The Union perhaps does not have as great a visual presence 
as, for example, the governments of its component nation-states. We Europeans are still more 
likely to see our own country’s flag or map than those of the Union. Yet whenever the Union 
manifests itself in visual space – the pamphlet, the street, the television broadcast, the internet 
– its symbols are everywhere. It is this proliferation, what Pauliina Raento and Stanley Brunn 
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term ‘mundane omnipresence’,906 which gives these visual icons subtle yet significant 
political power. 
In Chapter Four we rejected auteur theory as a method. Nevertheless it is useful to 
consider the origins of European Union cartography. As the founder of scholarly 
iconography, the medievalist Erwin Panofsky, outlines,
907
 meaning can only be usefully 
elucidated from visual artefacts by cross-checking their provenance and the other artefacts 
alongside which they are displayed.
908
 This does not particularly help the viewer to interpret a 
specific meaning from the image, but it does allow us to avoid the nihilistic pitfalls of 
assuming that all interpretations are equally valid. We will never identify a single, objective 
meaning in a map, as in any visual artefact: but we can at least eliminate unlikely 
assumptions. This is as true for EU cartography as it is for any visual medium. 
Since the early 1990s, all maps used by the European Commission and its constituent 
institutions have been produced by a British commercial mapmaking company, Lowell Johns. 
Their ‘Cartographic Framework’ was awarded to the company by the European Commission 
as part of an open contract advertisement,
909
 and the maps produced according to the Visual 
Identity Guidelines. As Lowell Johns specifies, their only obligations specific to mapmaking 
– as colour and font are predetermined by the Visual Identity Guidelines – were to ensure 
‘that correct and authenticated map representations, for example country borders, are 
depicted at a point in time’.910 The Visual Identity Guidelines themselves are equally not part 
of some sinister scheme – EU graphic guidelines are composed by professional graphic 
designers, hired through public recruitment advertisements.
911
 By applying Panofsky’s 
framework we see clearly that, unlike maps deliberately distorted by scheming graphic artists 
in the Ministries of Information of yesteryear, EU maps are not part of a devious conspiracy 
to deceive the public. They admittedly promote a sort of lie, a hyperreality, but then so do all 
maps. Nevertheless, EU maps convey a political discourse. How can this apparent paradox be 
reconciled? 
Part of the answer lies in Chapter Three’s investigation of the nature of maps. No map 
is neutral. We cannot climb the marble stairs to Prester John’s mirror and see a reflection of 
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the world – the best that we can hope for is to glance at a representation. Another part of the 
answer is that European Union cartography does not appear in isolation. As we similarly saw 
in Chapter Three, a map on its own, with no accompanying signifiers to help explain its 
meaning, is utterly meaningless. The Aboriginal dreamtime map, Polynesian stick-chart, and 
Renaissance navigational aid we encountered in Chapter Four are meaningless squiggles 
unless we can cross-reference them against other forms of symbolic language. And in the 
absence of a creator who can verbally translate for us the esoteric visual language of paints, 
colours, and compass roses, the maps must be accompanied by other forms of language to 
help confused viewers establish meaning. In the case of the Union, this language takes one of 
two forms: verbal or visual. Verbal language accompanying the map comes in the form of 
text specific to the map, such as an explanatory key, or surrounding prose on the Union. The 
visual language may feature a potentially infinite collection of pictures and graphics. Both the 
verbal and the visual marginalia are important to EU cartography – as they always have been 
for maps
912
 – and can be examined by what we categorised in Chapter Four as tropes and 
meta-tropes. 
In the context of Union maps the tropes are those of any map, and are quite simple. 
Colours, shapes, lettering and legends, and any other aspects of the visual lexicon which 
makes up cartographic language, can be analysed. However for various reasons which will 
shortly become apparent, this on its own is insufficient. Despite the efforts of cartographic 
scholars, colours,
913
 shapes, and letters
914
 can only elucidate so much meaning, and only for 
viewers whose ‘cultural traditions [are] peculiar to a certain civilisation’,915 before any 
semblance of universal meaning is lost. And on their own, tropes – visual, verbal, audio, 
performative – are inherently meaningless. For clarification, let us consider an illustrative 
example provided by Panofsky.
916
 
We are walking along the street when an approaching gentleman, with whom we are 
casually acquainted, catches our eye and lifts his hat. What, we subconsciously ask ourselves, 
is the significance of this gesture? As Panofsky explains, the tropes of the gesture are utterly 
meaningless beyond mere mechanical activity – the man has lifted his arm and performed a 
slight physical action by manually manipulating his headgear. This is what Panofsky terms 
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primary or factual meaning – the tropes that are detectable with our physical senses, and 
devoid of any universal meaning. Yet the gesture has a secondary or conventional meaning as 
well – in this case, Panofsky opines, the hat-lifting is a cultural relic of the European Middle 
Ages to signify recognition between two knights. Crucially, as Panofsky demonstrates, this 
implicit friendliness in the pedestrian’s gesture is specific to a particular place and time – the 
West, and the modern age. ‘Neither an Australian bushman nor an ancient Greek,’ Panofsky 
writes, ‘could be expected to realize that the lifting of a hat is not only a practical event with 
certain expressional connotations, but also a sign of politeness’.917 This is what Atkinson and 
Cosgrove term ‘polyvocality’:918 we apply our own hermeneutic conventions to try and 
elucidate meaning, and the result is what Panofsky finally describes as intrinsic meaning. At 
this stage of recognition, the primary and secondary meanings merge and allow us to see in 
the mere tropes an implied discourse. We acknowledge that the pedestrian is not simply 
adjusting his hat, but is making a polite gesture of greeting. The hat-tipping is the signifier 
which represents the signified concept – in this case, friendship. In response we lift our own 
hats, and everyone politely goes about their business. Yet the entire incident and its various 
formal exchanges have only been possible, as Panofsky writes, because of the complex web 
of surrounding, culturally-bound signifiers which have allowed both us and the gentleman to 
acknowledge that the act of adjusting our headgear is a symbol of friendship.
919
 
The same phenomenon of elucidating meaning from surrounding signifiers, also 
applies to maps. Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the practical realm of EU 
cartography and Panofsky’s Arcadian world where pedestrians are remarkably polite and 
everyone wears a smart hat, the tropes of the map are just as meaningless as the tropes of the 
pedestrian’s gesture. As we saw with the Aboriginal, Polynesian, and Renaissance maps, the 
tropes of a map alone are insufficient to provide meaning or convey a discourse – whether 
said discourse is deliberately embedded or not. But like the pedestrian’s gesture, the tropes of 
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EU maps do not appear alone. They are displayed as part of an intricate assembly of icons 
and symbols which help to clarify each others’ meaning. We apply our own hermeneutic 
principles to establish a meaning based on the surrounding signifiers. Thus we are able to 
recognise the hat-tipping as a salutation and not a mere musculoskeletal motion, thus we are 
able to see a tangle of lines and primary colours as a graphic representation of part of the 
world.  
In the case of Union cartography, these surrounding elements are the meta-tropes, and 
it is they which are of greatest significance. Flags, pictures, texts, and locations appear 
alongside maps. Like the man doffing his hat to us in the street, these peripheral and linked 
signifiers construct new dimensions of meaning and significance.   
As it is the intrinsic meaning of meta-tropes and not the factual meanings and 
subjective, culture-bound conventional meanings of the tropes which are of key importance, 
this chapter will not examine every map produced by the Union’s component institutions. 
Neither will the study, like previous efforts,
920
 catalogue and categorise EU maps into neat 
classifications. While this can be useful, it is ultimately inadequate. Part of the reasoning 
behind this selection is that the Union has a remarkably small number of maps for public 
consumption, and also partially as the Union’s maps lack the gaudy visual palimpsests of the 
maps of yesteryear. Thus not only would a purely tropic analysis be short and rather dull, but 
more importantly such an approach would only focus on Panofsky’s primary meaning. And 
as we have identified, both the primary and secondary meanings are crucial if we are to 
interpret a squiggle of lines and colours as a map of the Union. Similarly, we must treat the 
map not as the main component of our study, but as part of a complex whole. Instead, we will 
examine a selection of Union maps in their context as part of a broader network whose 
components, combined, convey a discourse.  
We will examine both print-copy and digital maps used by the Union’s institutions. 
Not only does cartography appear in both formats, but EU publications frequently appear in 
both media. As the European Commission’s Communication and Visibility Manual makes 
clear, ‘all material produced in paper form should also be made available in electronic 
form’;921 and also, as the Commission lethargically reminds readers, because ‘A great deal of 
additional information on the European Union is available on the internet’.922 
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All of these maps are official products of the European Union and its institutions, and 
all appear on either physical or digital publications – or both – of the Union. Similarly, all of 
these maps appear as part of a network of signs and signifiers which collectively convey 
meaning. Like the man and his hat, the actual object in question – be it chart or cap – is only 
one component of a wider network which conveys a discourse. In the case of the pedestrian’s 
hat, the discourse conveyed is affability. In the case of the Union’s map, the discourse is 
empire. It is thus to the network of political discourses in which Union maps are presented 
that we initially turn. 
 
 
5.1 ‘Flagging empire daily’923 
 
‘We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians.’924 
Massimo d’Azeglio 
1861 
 
 Thus spoke the first Prime Minister of a united Italy in 1861. Having corralled the 
various states of the Italian peninsula through war or diplomacy, and having expelled both the 
Austrian enemy and French allies, King Victor Emmanuel I’s new government faced the 
prospect of governing a large and fractious population who had not been united as one since 
the Caesars, fourteen centuries earlier. The Italian elites’ solution was simple – the mass 
manufacture of national icons. And while Italy’s flag, anthem, coat of arms, and all the other 
paraphernalia of nationhood – national dress, national cuisine, national bird, national 
language – were modified from local customs, interpreted from the past to try and resurrect 
history, or simply plucked out of thin air in the 1860s, only sixty years later Mussolini’s 
fascists treated these manufactured icons as sacred treasures to be defended to the death, 
handed down through the millennia from generations lost in the mists of time. This strange 
state of affairs was by no means exclusive to Italy. Precisely the same phenomenon occurred 
in European nations in the nineteenth century, as vague identities coalesced into uniform 
nationalities, across the world from the United States to the Republic of China – and now, a 
similar process is occurring in the European Union. 
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Europe in the twenty-first century is post-national. Long-gone are the days when the 
waving of flags and the chanting of xenophobic hymns to accompany Europe’s endless and 
savage wars were deemed not only acceptable, but mandatory, in public discourse. The 
theatrical props of national identity – flags, anthems, and parodies of Victorian ideas of 
traditional ethnic signifiers
925
 – still exist. But instead of being waved daily they are now only 
occasionally dusted off for antique ceremonies, or to cheer our state’s athletes at sporting 
events. But this does not render them any less powerful. Michael Billig describes such 
moments as ‘rehearsals for the extraordinary times of crisis when the state calls upon its 
citizenry... to make ultimate sacrifices in the cause of nationhood’.926 This may be a little 
alarmist, but whether Billig is justified in his assertion or not, one thing is clear. The Age of 
Nationalism, in Europe, is over. 
It is not merely the apparently progressive and enlightened march of globalisation 
which has brought this about. As Europeans, our collective continental experience from 1914 
to 1945 has left nationalism as, at best, an unpalatable remnant upsetting the self-proclaimed 
harmony of post-Modern Europe. Yet while the tools of national identity may appear today to 
be troublesome social deviants, released on parole for football matches and probationed on 
newspaper sports pages
927
 until they are locked away again in our collective subconscious, 
this is an illusion. 
‘Nationalism’, writes Billig in his study of identity formation, ‘has seeped into the 
corners of our consciousness’, reminding us that in the contemporary West, nationalism is 
popularly held to exist only on the spatially and socially distant peripheries of the 
community.
928
 He reassures us that the kind of fierce, xenophobic nationalist rhetoric which 
still lurks beneath the thin veneer of Western civilisation is most triumphantly proclaimed by 
those furthest from the geographical and/or social “centre” – those members of the Self who 
are in greatest contact with the Other. In the apparently post-nationalist European Union, 
nationalism is consciously denied. It appears instead to be something not possessed by us, 
something found only among the barbarian Others. Yet as Billig demonstrates, this is not the 
case. Nationalism is just as readily visible in the apparently politically neutral “centre”, albeit 
in a bland, banal, overlooked form. And the reason it is so overlooked is that it is forgotten. 
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 This act of collective forgetting is essential not only for understanding the power of 
EU maps, but for appreciating the nature of Europe’s ‘imagined community’. For as Benedict 
Anderson writes, it is the act of forgetting which allows a community to be formed in the 
public imagination. Collective forgetting is, for Anderson, just as important to forming a 
national identity as is the act of collectively remembering our history. Let us explore this 
further. We ‘forget’, to take Billig’s and Anderson’s view, two key points. Firstly, we forget 
that even in a nation-state we are not all one group, with one identity. Except for rallying to 
the national flag in periods of national emergency, such as the threat of invasion,
929
 we do not 
think of ourselves as a single, indivisible nation every waking moment. Secondly, we forget 
that even post-1945, nationalism lurks in our collective consciousness.
930
 This is precisely the 
case in the European Union. ‘We Good Europeans’931 of today do not wave EU flags at 
military parades, we refrain from loud public adulations wherein We proclaim ourselves 
better than Them, and our Europe-wide anthem does not even have lyrics,
932
 let alone stanzas 
which we must diplomatically overlook or alter.
933
 Yet the sense of community remains. 
In his theory of the formation of nationhood, Anderson argues that the modern 
concept of the nation, and by extension nationalism, are not natural. For Anderson, the nation 
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‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign’.934 Nationalism, as Ernst Gellner argues, does not awaken nations so much as 
invent them.
935
 The result was the creation of ‘imagined communities’ assembled in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. And this nation exists, officially, as a unified and 
homogenous unit. The nation is an exclusive and bounded group with one language, one 
faith, one voice: a community wherein members speak, dress, worship, read, eat, behave, and 
believe in the same way.
936
 Contrast is made not with each other but with the foreigner from 
beyond the frontier, the figure who behaves according to the different norms of their own 
nation. In the nation, then, there is room only for one community. 
Anderson’s discussion of how nations are imagined is pertinent to the European 
Union. Like nations, ‘the members of [the Union] will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion’.937 And like the nation, we do not need to peer too deeply into EU philosophy to 
see that the Union is imagined as a community. We might very well argue that the Union is 
an imagined community, wherein maps act as visual ties connecting three hundred million 
inhabitants who do not personally know more than a tiny handful of fellow Europeans. Visual 
ties which establish a mental bridge between Europeans and allow them to see themselves as 
part of a single community. Europe, we might well argue, is an imagined nation – one whose 
visual cartographies can be assessed via the framework of Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’. But 
this suggests a problem.  
 Separating nation and empire is no easy task, particularly as nation and nationalism 
have ‘proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse’.938 Querying even further 
into the field, Gerald Webster gives a nuanced review of scholars’ distinctions between 
nationalism and patriotism.
939
 It comes as little surprise to discover that, like definitions of 
empire, there is limited academic consensus on the meaning of the terms, other than that 
some sort of difference exists. Even Anderson concedes that every community above the 
smallest village is ‘imagined’.940 However, by considering visual and verbal representations 
we can distinguish between the two.  
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 Anderson identifies the concept of nation as a bounded and exclusive body of people 
apparently sharing common cultural facets distinguishable from their neighbours: a 
constructed concept which emerged from state formation during the printing
941
 and 
gunpowder
942
 revolutions of the Early Modern Period, and which coalesced into a critical 
mass – the “nation-state” – during the economic, social, and political revolutions of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
943
 The ‘nation’ is new – an imagined sovereign 
community whose advocates triumphantly proclaim their ethnic antiquity,
944
 blissfully or 
deliberately ignorant that their apparently ancient nation, as demonstrated by the Italians in 
1861, is not even as old as the steam engine. Yet it is not the case that nations are new while 
empire is old. Empire as a discourse exists outside of both time and space. It is a concept not 
primarily concerned with history or territory but with that simple division of humanity into 
two categories – civilised and savage, right and wrong – and the self-assurance that it is 
empire’s duty and destiny to bring order, sovereignty, and legitimacy to the world. To 
illustrate, let us briefly reconsider Cicero: 
 
‘Our Senate is the harbour and refuge of kings, tribes, nations… 
[seeking] to obtain the highest praise from this one thing – the guarding 
of the interests of our provinces and our allies by equity and good faith. 
Our sovereignty might then be termed the patronage, rather than the 
imperium, of the world’.945 
 
In his address, Cicero touches upon what is one of the defining characteristics of the 
discourse which would later emerge into what we now term empire – it is not ethnically 
based, nor is it exclusive. At least not permanently. “Roman” for the Romans was not an 
ethnic group, but a status as civilised people. We need only recall how the very words Rome 
and Romans were appropriated by later groups to validate this. The concept of Rome was 
open to all. It was not merely by personal whim that Caracalla bestowed Roman municipal 
citizenship upon the polyglot, polycultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic population of the 
imperium in 220 AD.
946
 It was not out of nationalism that the peoples of a besieged and 
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beleaguered Britannia wrote to Rome begging for the legions to return and save those 
Romans still inhabiting the damp, foggy islands on the imperium’s periphery.947 And 
similarly it was no foolish philosophy that prompted the Byzantines to perceive themselves as 
God’s select guardians, nor the Holy Romans to dream of Universal Monarchy. Nation is 
exclusive, but empire is open to all – if they are willing to accept subordination and 
probation.  
Both nation and empire are imagined and assembled. Neither is natural. Yet each has 
a different form of legitimacy. The nation is legitimate, in the eyes of its adoring masses, as it 
is perceived to be natural – the sovereignty of a cultural or ethnic group which is imagined to 
stretch back into the mists of time. Empire, though, is very different. It is legitimate precisely 
because it is un-natural. Empire – as Cicero’s speech suggests – has constructed itself to 
combat a chaotic nature, empire is the discourse of civilisation against the chaos of nature and 
savagery. The discourse of empire, then, freely concedes and even applauds its artificiality as 
it is the highest form of assembled, manufactured order whose inhabitants have united to 
pursue a common duty and destiny of safeguarding civilisation.  
The European Union, as we have seen, fits three of Anderson’s criteria – imagined, 
sovereign, and community. Yet there is a fourth aspect of nations, according to Anderson, 
which is not synonymous with the European Union. Anderson argues that the nation is 
imagined as having clear limits; ‘no nation imagines itself as coterminous with mankind.’948 
The discourse of nation, he argues, ‘has finite, if elastic, boundaries’.949 But the discourse of 
empire is quite different. As a discourse appealing to unity and superiority, empire – as a 
concept, not a territorial unit – has no fixed boundaries. A boundary does exist, but it is 
characterised by two phenomena not distinguishable in the nation-state. Firstly it is a 
boundary not between one ethnic group and its surrounding neighbours, but between a 
simplistic dichotomy – civilised and savage. This border may have a vague spatial 
connotation, as we saw with the Babylonian World Map and Leo Belgicus but it is inherently 
a frontier of the mind rather than of territory. Secondly; while the national frontier is fixed, in 
line with the perceived antiquity of the group within, the imperial frontier is perpetually 
shifting as the imperials promote their self-congratulatory version of order over chaos. The 
result is that the Union spreads its arms to encompass all – on condition. The Union has 
‘confounded its monarchy with the globe of the Earth’,950 and imagines itself as ‘coterminous 
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with mankind’951 – to a point. The Union expands, but only to include those deemed 
sufficiently civilised.
952
 We could easily imagine that Switzerland or Ukraine might one day 
take their seats in the European Parliament, but as illustrated by the Union’s 1988 rejection of 
Morocco’s membership application on the grounds that Morocco is not European,953 the 
Union is not open to all. Europe is not fixed in time or space, but it is in terms of civilisation 
and superiority. It is fluid and flexible, inviting the kings, tribes, and nations of Europe to its 
harbour and refuge – on condition that they demonstrate equity and good faith by adopting 
Europe’s standards. It is, in principle, nation-less. 
In his speech, Cicero makes this clear. The Senate represents the idea of Rome, and as 
such it is the harbour of diverse peoples who are united not by their race, language, religion, 
or any other arbitrary characteristics, but by their belief that they are superior and civilised. 
They are the defenders of civilisation against the barbarians beyond – barbarians who are also 
not defined by any of our modern, Industrial-Age concepts such as race or nationality, but 
simply because they have been declared as such by the self-congratulatory society which 
perceives itself as the sole guardian of order. This is a crucial element, and has three aspects 
which must be considered. Firstly, the belief that empire transcends trivial social divisions to 
unite the civilised against the savage, is a key component of the translatio imperii. Secondly, 
it is an element which distinguishes nation and empire – both are artificial, imagined 
constructs, but for different reasons. And thirdly, as this chapter will subsequently argue, it is 
an element which is alive and well in modern European mapping. 
 Much of Anderson’s theory concentrates on the development and/or imposition of 
single languages as forces to unify groups into “nations”. In the Union, this is demonstrably 
not the case as the Union operates in six official languages. Yet there is a single language 
unifying its inhabitants, one which we examined in detail in Chapter Three – visual language. 
The Union itself acknowledges four official symbols – the flag, the anthem, the motto, and 
‘Europe Day’.954 There are other, unofficial symbols, such as the epsilon.955 Yet as shall be 
demonstrated, none of these are as powerful an emblem as the map. 
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 As visual language, the Union’s cartography and iconography are vehicles of 
discourses. And as such, they can be approached using Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’. We must 
be wary, though, of the subtle distinction. Icons of the nation stress sameness within the 
community, and exclusivity of those who are different. Superiority, where it exists, is 
proclaimed as the superiority of one ethnic group over another. Icons of empire stress a 
similar homogeneity/heterogeneity dichotomy, and the exclusion of those beyond, but for a 
different reason – not because one ethnic group is better than its neighbours, but because one 
community has come together and achieved a status of civilisation while its neighbours 
languish in savagery. 
The Union is, as we have argued, post-national. Or as the manifestation of empire, we 
might think of it as meta-national. Yet as was stated above, nationalism is more than mere 
flag-waving at military parades. Public appeals to the imagined community, using visual 
icons, are everywhere. Billig describes this as ‘banal nationalism’; the ‘endemic condition’ 
whereby ‘daily, the nation is indicated, or “flagged”, in the lives of its citizenry’.956 The 
image he provides is highly suggestive in the case of the Union; ‘the metonymic image of 
banal nationalism’, argues Billig, ‘is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent 
passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building’.957 Icons and images of the 
state and the constructed community lurk in the peripheries of our vision and consciousness, 
perpetually appearing yet not being acknowledged. They consequently lie so deep in our 
conscious minds that we cease to question, criticise, or even acknowledge them.  
It might be argued at this point that, like ‘imagined community’, banal nationalism is 
an inappropriate concept within which to investigate the Union. Unlike its nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century ancestors, the Union does not promote aggressive nationalism. Similarly, 
such phenomena of banal nationalism as the cult of symbols are, in comparison to the zealous 
fanaticism of other nation-states generally and the United States in particular,
958
 absent from 
the Union. Notwithstanding the Europhilic and Europhobic factions inherent to Union 
member-states, the Union is frequently overlooked. 
Yet it is precisely this trait which renders power to the Union’s visual emblems. Banal 
nationalism is not present exclusively in those nation-states established by Victorians. 
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Fanatical flag-cults may be consigned in Europe to extreme nationalists, but this does not 
render the power of symbols – visual, vexillographic, and cartographic – any less significant. 
As Chris Sibley, William Hoverd, and John Duckitt demonstrate in their study of New 
Zealand state iconography, national symbols ‘automatically activate normative values for 
ingroup members, and this effect is not limited to nations with a high frequency of flag-
display behaviour like the United States’.959 
It is all too easy for us to forget the presence of Union icons. We do not – and cannot 
– sing the European Anthem, we do not salute the flag as the troops of EUROFOR march 
down boulevards and avenues, we do not pledge allegiance to the Union in classrooms and 
canteens. But its presence remains. Hanging limply outside public buildings are European 
flags, adorning the letterheads of Union stationery are maps. With the exception of occasional 
journalistic rants about Union icons,
960
 we forget both their presence and their contents. 
Forgetting occurs in EU maps, on both the tropic and meta-tropic levels. In terms of 
meta-tropes we forget – if we were even aware – that maps are not reflections of reality but 
merely representations of it; we forget that maps are not value-free constructs but are vehicles 
whose very nature prohibits them from conveying discourses. Tropically, we forget that the 
Union is not Europe and that Europe is not the Union, yet as shall be demonstrated below, the 
Union’s cartographies create exactly this synecdoche whereby Union and continent become 
entwined, brushing non-EU Europe out of visibility and out of the collective memory.  
 The answer to our initial questions, on whether we can understand the Union as an 
imagined community wherein banal nationalism exists, rests in our understanding of the 
Union. The consequence is that at present, the Union defies classification. There are of course 
problems in interrogating the Union using established techniques, but as such apparently 
simple constructs as nation, state, and nation-state are equally contested and ill-defined, the 
same could be said of investigating any political organisation. Concepts of nation and 
nationalism may not be flawlessly appropriate in investigating the Union, but neither are they 
without issue in any political quest. Both nation and empire, as discourses, are justified by 
appropriating select elements from – or entirely fabricating – imagination. The past is used to 
legitimise the present; in the case of nations by appealing to an apparent antiquity specific to 
the ethnic group, and in empire by the antiquity of the group’s rightful status as guardians of 
civilisation. This allows us to answer our earlier quandary. If the European Union is not a 
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nation, can it be assessed using the tools and techniques of nationalism? The answer is yes. 
Both empire and nation are constructed, but their inhabitants perceive different imagined 
histories. It is this last characteristic which is crucial. Regardless of whether their advocates 
acknowledge or erase memory of their recent formation – the act of collective forgetting – 
both are constructed communities whose identity is formed by contrast to those beyond their 
frontier. Whether the frontier exists in space-time or the mind, is unimportant. A line is 
proclaimed, a community imagined, and the community unified by symbols. And just as 
Panofsky’s iconography allows us to critically interrogate Union emblems, so too does 
Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’ help us to understand the extraordinary power of EU maps.  
 
Today’s European Union is paradoxically proud of its lack of national pride.961 
Through our apparent transcendence beyond the old nation-states constructed by eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century Europeans, we are assured that we should, and do, embrace a meta-
identity beyond nations.
962
 Yet in doing so, we have simply replicated the same phenomenon 
as Europeans of yesteryear. Just as Prussians, Saxons, and Würtemmbergers transcended their 
previous loyalties to emerge as Germans;
963
 just as Venetians, Neapolitans, Modenans and 
Genoans abandoned archaic affiliations to become Italians;
964
 old identities as Swedes and 
Spaniards, Poles and Portuguese are coalescing into a single new identity as Europeans. 
Since 1945 we have witnessed a gradual but evident coming-together of Europe which would 
be familiar to those of Bismarck’s reichsgründung, Garibaldi’s risorgimento, or Ben-
Gurion’s kibbutz galuyot. And liberally sprinkled amongst Europe’s latest political primordial 
soup are emblems and maps suggesting to Europe’s mobile, post-national, self-adulatory 
citizenry that We are better than Them.  
 Of course, this is not, and never was, a conscious and devious scheme by Europe’s 
mapmakers. And despite the vigorous calls from some political figureheads in the Union to 
form a single identity, it would be inappropriate to point to some illusory “elite” and accuse 
them of manipulating our thoughts. Maps can be warped to suit political agendas, but this 
does not necessarily mean that they are. Yet this is a moot point, for no map is neutral.  
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 The choice of maps as bold images on Europe’s new media has created an inescapable 
political problem. No map is neutral, and as we saw in Chapter Four, even those charts drawn 
simply to scientific specifications of graticules and gradients are saturated with political 
messages both subtle and gross. Raento and Brunn argue that it is precisely the mundanity of 
these emblems, couple with our individual perspectives, which imbue these images with 
power. Because of their mundane nature and because we see each image slightly differently, 
they argue, we forget that these icons are official, state-produced (or state-approved) icons 
saturated with the political messages which, conscious or not, all state-associated imagery 
contains.
965
 Because we forget this, we are less aware of the political discourses embedded 
within. This is pertinent for any political emblem but as we have seen, the map is a special 
case – because we instinctively trust the map to be a mirror of reality. When this map appears 
within a visual spider’s web of state-approved iconography, the act of forgetting is doubled. 
We forget that maps are not mirrors, and we forget that state-approved maps are, even with 
the best of intentions, inextricable from political discourse. They ‘seek to unite and foster a 
common heritage and “an imagined community”, raising heroic stories to visibility and 
erasing shameful ones’.966 In Europe’s maps, the heroic tale raised to visibility is that of 
unity, sovereignty, legitimacy and monopoly – only the Union has the right to rule Europe, 
and it is not merely the Union’s right but indeed its destiny. Meanwhile the shameful stories –
non-EU Europeans, the remnants of Soviet rule, the savages lurking in the wilderness beyond 
the self-anointed civilisation of the Union – are visually ignored. The power of a 
manufactured memory is visible in all of the Union’s iconography, but is most visible in 
Europe’s maps. 
 ‘Only if people believe that they have national identities,’ writes Billig, ‘will ... 
homelands, and the world of national homelands, be reproduced’.967 This is what Billig calls 
‘deixis’; a device continually placing the readers of public media as inhabiting a specific and 
exclusive homeland.
968
 Deixis lies at the heart of Union cartography and its inherent 
discourses; the cartographic juxtaposition of people, civilisation and destiny. In his analysis 
of the visual iconography of newly-emergent states, Stanley Brunn identifies some curious 
phenomena. Such iconography invariably features ‘important symbols, thereby strengthening 
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its expression of sovereignty’,969 and new polities frequently adorn their official visual 
materials with maps, ‘including those saying “we are not part of the world” or “here we are 
and we want you to know it”’.970 Deixis between map and symbol emerges, morphing into a 
political emblem. The consequence of official visual materials, such as cartographic icons, 
‘may not have the overt symbolic value and appeal of a flag, national anthem, national coat of 
arms, or monument, but they are subtle but important symbols’.971 These symbols are the 
tropes and meta-tropes of Union cartographies. 
 We will not, as specified earlier, focus on the tropes of EU mapping. Yet we must 
acknowledge the components of cartography. Just as we cannot appreciate the symbolic 
gesture of Panofsky’s hat-wearing pedestrian without understanding the actual objects and 
physical actions involved in his gesture, we cannot identify discourses in cartography without 
being aware of its basic elements. 
 
 
5.2 European Tropes 
 
At first glance we might consider that maps convey their meaning only through their tropes: 
or the sum thereof. Whether seeking spatial information or simply appreciating the artistry of 
cartography, we absorb their symbols, colours, and words, subconsciously assembling 
iconographic meaning from the tropes.  
One of the first points we must consider is that the Union uses remarkably few maps. 
And alone, there is little which can be commented upon in the tropes of the Union’s maps. To 
illustrate this, let us consider the figures below: 
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Fig. 5.1 – Europa map I972 
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Fig. 5.2 – Europa map II973 
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Fig. 5.3 – Europa map III974 
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  Fig. 5.4 – Ezilon map975 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.5 – Bannerhead map976 
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Here we see several maps used by the Union’s institutions. The first four are internet 
maps which appear on the Union’s europa web portal and affiliated sites, facilitating 
understanding of the Union by presenting a pair of convenient, simple charts. Beneath we see 
a universal letterhead for European Commission documents and websites. Their tropes are 
simple, and quickly considered. 
The first trope to investigate is script. In the uppermost two maps, place-names are 
rendered using the Latin alphabet, in local tongues. Thus Italy is Italia, Germany is 
Deutschland, and so forth. Most non-Union states are also named, again using the Latin 
alphabet. The only tropes worthy of comment are that some countries do not even warrant a 
name – and while Union states which use the Cyrillic or Hellenic alphabet are rendered as 
such, and a non-Union candidate country is rendered in its own Turkic script, Russian and 
Arab-speaking neighbours receive no such special labelling. Instead they are assigned 
Europeanised names rendered in Latin script. It must be conceded that whether mapmakers 
try to acknowledge local ethnographies or not, they run the risk of being accused of 
unflattering portrayals. Eric Worby points out that the use of local names and alphabets is 
both a colonial and postcolonial practice depending upon the perception of the viewer and the 
prevailing zeitgeist,
977
 either emphasising the power of the colonised or the indigenous 
peoples. We could dissect this phenomenon indefinitely and not arrive at a satisfactory 
conclusion – as Barthes underlines regarding visual artefacts generally,978 and as Monmonier 
expresses specifically to cartography,
979
 we run the risk of reading meanings and intentions 
into the object which may not really be there. Yet we are able to identify one curious trope.  
While members or prospective members of the Union receive special alphabetical 
treatment, those who are not even considered potential members are barely even 
acknowledged. We can clearly connect this to Anderson’s theory of the collective act of 
forgetting, and what Raento terms ‘raising heroic stories to visibility and erasing shameful 
ones’.980 The Union is proudly proclaimed in bright colours, and its Unity in Diversity is 
alphabetically acknowledged for those deemed part of the collective civilisation, while the 
“shameful” tale of non-EU Europe is casually, almost lazily, overlooked. In this way, the 
Union is prominently displayed in a way that acknowledges the individuality of members but 
still categorises them as components of a larger supra-polity; a map which fully displays a 
realm of visually superior civilisation contrasted against the barbaric beyond.  
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One penultimate trope is worthy of consideration. Cyprus, currently the subject of a 
geopolitical contest between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, is depicted as a single state in defiance of Turkish claims. Yet we need not speculate 
as to a reason. Lowell Johns makes it clear that their cartographers must adhere to the 
Union’s political principles981 and in issues pertaining to Cyprus, the Union officially 
recognises the de jure complete sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the entire island 
– and expects the Republic of Turkey to defer to Union diplomacy.982 In all others cases and 
in the letterhead, we see internationally-recognised borders. The letterhead, though, does not 
feature Africa – we will return to this in due course. 
The final trope, and arguably the most visible in these maps, is colour. We live in an 
ocularcentric age, and EU citizens are exposed to an incessant daily bombardment of exciting 
images and bright colours in all mass media; including maps. Bright colours enliven icons 
and maps, catching our attention and rendering objects visually appealing.
983
 Colour is, as 
Kress and van Leeuwen identify,
984
 both a powerful signifier as well as a semiotic signifier in 
visual language – and especially so in cartography where it can become powerful discourse in 
its own right.
985
 But despite its omnipresence, colour – as Monmonier argues – is ‘a 
cartographic quagmire’.986 
Philip and Juliana Muehrcke claim that ‘colors … are often manipulated on maps to 
produce the desired psychological response’.987 No support is given for this assertion, but it is 
reflective of much critical cartographic thinking on colour. Alongside Muehrcke and 
Muehrcke, Monmonier,
988
 Wood,
989
 and Virga
990
 all devote space to discussions of how 
colour energises a map and makes it eye-catching – but with different conclusions about the 
connotations of colour. As Kress and van Leeuwensummarise, ‘literature on the emotive 
meanings of colour is quite inconsistent’.991 Thus, having spent most of cartographic history 
as a rare and expensive application only used for special purposes,
992
 colour now dominates 
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maps. Since the nineteenth- and twentieth century advent of mass mapping and 
chromolithography, colour has become an aspect of maps that viewers expect to see – and for 
good reason.
993
 Charles Riley asserts that ‘colours arrive charged with so much emotional and 
symbolic weight that they tend to overburden the thin barrier of demarcation between the 
viewer and the image’.994 a phenomenon which Kress and van Leeuwen term ‘the psychology 
of perception’.995 This in itself is nothing new, as humans have been using public displays of 
bold colour to grab attention since recorded history began.
996
 But as Monmonier states, ‘little 
is known about the effects upon map users of a variety of subjective reactions to color’.997 
Despite the best efforts of anthropologists and commercial marketers, there is not even a 
universal consensus on how many colours exist,
998
 let alone what association exists between 
colours and emotions; and it is ultimately futile to attempt to reach such a consensus. 
However, we can identify political discourses inherent in the trope. 
As John Gage highlights, ‘colour language has never been adequate to create 
symbolic associations’.999 We will examine this in the context of cartography specifically, 
and iconographically. Consider Figs. 5.6 and 5.7 below: 
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Fig 5.6 – Europa Map I1000 
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Fig. 5.7 – Europa Map II1001 
 
 In the above maps, the cartographers at Lowell Johns have wheeled out colour, one of the 
big guns of what Monmonier terms ‘a cartographic arsenal’,1002 in order to communicate a message. 
But what message? 
Let us initially adopt Panofsky’s natural meaning. What do we see? A hypsometric 
scheme of yellows and browns, a shade of blue or a greyish-white, and white. At this level of 
interpretation the colours have absolutely no meaning. They are purely biomechanical 
illusions: light from the Sun reflects from printed colours or electrophotonic pixels on a 
computer screen, with different coloured inks or pixels reflecting light at different 
wavelengths. These waves enter our eyes at different refractive indexes and our brains 
distinguish between these different frequencies of light to suggest colours.
1003
 Like the 
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pedestrian lifting his hat, it is a purely physical phenomenon with no inherent meaning. 
Perhaps on the second level of conventional meaning, we might unpick some inherent 
message. Yet even on this level of associative themes,
1004
 there is no consensus on the 
meanings of yellow, blue, and grey. Monmonier and Schnell assure us that yellow and brown 
invoke ‘feelings of pleasure, happiness and comfort’,1005 but no supporting evidence or theory 
is provided. Blue is even more problematic. For Monmonier, the blue used for EU candidate 
states represents ‘coldness, depression… and submissive faith’;1006 for Carolyn Anderson it 
conveys a sense of political authority,
1007
 while for Muehrcke and Muehrcke  the same hue 
elicits ‘a sense of comfort’.1008 As Panofsky reminds us in his hypothetical scenario, the 
pedestrian’s lifting of his hat is culturally bound – an Australian bushman or an ancient 
Greek, to use Panofsky’s words, would not understand it as a greeting even though we do; 
because the same action, image, or trope can have wildly different meanings in different 
cultures. We need only think back to the Polynesian stick-chart (Fig. 4.6) or the Babylonian 
world map (Fig. 3.7), to be reminded of how even the simplest tropes are perfectly 
comprehensible to one culture but baffling to another. This is clearly the case with colour. As 
John Gage makes clear,
1009
 there simply is no universal theory of colour.
1010
 In light of what 
MacEachren terms the ‘cultural specificity of colour’,1011  there is little point in trying to 
unpick the unconscious associations of this trope.  
Thus concludes our analysis of the tropes of Union maps. We have examined the 
maps’ legends, their projections, their depictions of international frontiers, and their colours; 
and at this point, many a cartographic study would terminate. Yet this is merely an 
investigation on the level of Panofsky’s primary or factual meaning. We can go one step 
further to the level of secondary or conventional meaning, and examine the maps in their 
context as visual artefacts bound up in a complex web of visual language, semantics, and 
iconography. And just as this level of meaning transforms the passing pedestrian’s hat from a 
purely bio-mechanical movement into a friendly gesture of greeting, so too does an 
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iconographical analysis transform a collection of colours and lines into icons of empire. The 
conventional meaning is hiding in this rich tapestry of meta-tropes. 
However, before examining the meta-tropes of the maps we must consider a meta-
trope of cartography itself. As we identified in Chapter Three, ‘maps’ can take a wide variety 
of forms, including media which at first glance we might never consider maps. When we ask 
directions, we receive a verbal map. When we use Google Earth, we gaze upon a 
photographic map. And when we look at a flag or political emblem, we not only see a map 
but also a political vehicle which continually establishes Billig’s deixis, merging people, 
place, civilisation, sovereignty, legitimacy, and destiny into one. Before examining EU 
cartographies, then, we must first investigate the deixical nature of EU icons. 
 
 
5.3 European Meta-Tropes 
 
Existing studies of cartography and iconography – especially those in relation to the 
Union
1012
 – operate according to tropes. To a degree, this is not only understandable but 
indeed essential as the aspects of an image are of great significance.
1013
 But as argued in 
Chapter Three, maps are much more than a mere collection of graticules, gradients, and 
scales. They are complex syntheses of visual language, which must be read as texts. The 
tropes of European maps must of course be investigated, but these are of less significance 
than the meta-tropes. Where the maps are found, and what other texts (such as official 
symbols and writing) intersect with them, is of great importance. 
  Maps on EU websites do not appear in isolation. They are always depicted in relation 
to symbols and text. To understand the maps’ discourses, we must consider them as part of a 
structure formed from various types of language. 
The bodies of the European Union recognise a variety of official symbols. These are: 
the circle of twelve stars (which appears both on the EU flag, and as a separate symbol), the 
European anthem, and the European motto (“United in Diversity”).1014 For our purposes the 
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anthem of Europe – Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ode to Joy1015 – is of limited importance. 
Notwithstanding Billig’s assertion that national anthems are powerful unifiers of the state – ‘a 
prayer sung by people worshipping their country’1016 – and other than its implicit tropes of 
equality in that the European anthem has no lyrics,
1017
 the anthem is a symbol mostly absent 
from this study as, unlike maps or icons, it does not suddenly appear in the background 
whenever an inquisitive reader looks at a billboard, clicks a hyperlink to an EU website, or 
opens an official EU leaflet. Yet the other two symbols warrant examination in their context 
of cartography. These are: the flag of the European Union, and the visual language which 
accompanies official publications.  
The power of images and icons is clearly of importance to the European Union, 
whose bodies and institutions issue rigid guidelines on “Visual Identity”,1018 strictly 
governing the use of images and icons harking back to the European flag, and whose 
meanings are emphatically asserted
1019
 and which have to be clear, simple, and immediately 
recognisable. Consider as an example Figs 5.8 and 5.9: 
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Fig 5.8: Logo pre-2012           Fig. 5.9: Logo post-2012 
 
Here we see the pre- and post-2012 logos adopted by the Union’s border control 
agency, Frontex. In Frontex’s words, the former image ‘represents land border (green line), 
sea border (blue circle) and air border (background) linked by EU stars. There is also the self-
explanatory inscription: Libertas, Securitas, Justitia’.1020 However these abstract references to 
an imagined community in geographical terms, along with an imagined community in 
historical terms denoted by a collective Latin motto, were apparently inadequate expressions 
of unity. In 2012 the agency adopted a new logo which is ‘easier to read and more cost-
effective to reproduce, combining an image of interconnected bridges in different colours, 
representing – following the rationale of the old logo – the three different borders (air, land, 
sea), with Frontex displayed in a new font. The logo is endorsed by the European Union flag 
to underline that Frontex is an EU agency’.1021 Irrespective of how we interpret the paradox 
of borders being replaced by bridges for a Frontex logo, this case is replicated in the visual 
guidelines of other Union bodies, which emphasise simple icons which can be instantly 
recognised as symbols of the Union.
1022
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It is important to note that the Union’s main icons and artefacts were not imposed 
from above, but rather were the product of public contests. The flag,
1023
 anthem,
1024
 and even 
the maps adorning Euro currency – which will be examined in the next chapter – were all 
selected by committees from entries into public contests.
1025
 It is equally interesting to note 
that many entries borrowed heavily from the iconography of Charlemagne, as emblems of 
European universality and unity.
1026
 This raises a critical point. 
 Alongside a legal disclaimer, the flag is only one of two EU symbols which must, by 
Council and Commission
1027
 graphic guidelines, appear on every piece of Union-affiliated 
media or merchandise. We must thus consider the power of official Union symbolism in 
cartography. 
 
 
5.3.1  Symbols of Empire 
 
As we identified in Chapter Three, maps are merely one dialect within a rich visual language. 
And like other forms of visual language, they are only comprehensible within a framework of 
semantics and visual grammar embodying various other forms of visual representation. 
Significantly for our study, this includes political symbolism. It might be asked why a study 
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of European Union maps is veering into vexillology, symbology, and iconography – 
apparently unrelated areas. The answer to this is twofold. 
 Firstly, symbols and icons are essential to understanding any maps. Maps are 
ultimately a form of image, and as Marina Bagnoli asserts, ‘the meaning of images [is] clear 
only in relation to each other and to the world’,1028 and ‘it is the interaction of the image with 
its surrounding that constructs meaning’.1029 These operate, in the public sphere, on a 
collective level at which symbols are mutually recognised by the public. ‘Symbols,’ confirms 
Longina Jakubowska, ‘evoke shared meanings, shared not because they are common to 
different groups, although they may be, but because they overlap and thus enable 
communication between them’.1030 Thus maps do not appear alone, but with a host of 
intersecting and overlapping visual and verbal determinatives to help the viewer make sense 
of their implicit meaning. Indeed the Visual Identity Guidelines of the Union stress the 
importance of multiple interlinked symbolic, visual means of communication over writing, 
which reveals much about the power of accompanying marginalia.
1031
 
A cursory glance at a European Union map in comparison to the cluttered 
cartographies of yesteryear, reveals a sharp difference. From the first reprintings of Claudius 
Ptolemy’s rediscovered world map in the early fifteenth century1032 through the emerging 
maps of the Age of Discovery
1033
 and into the pompous, grandiose cartographic conquests of 
the late nineteenth century,
1034
 modern Western maps were littered with jumbled imagery and 
a chaotic clutter of icons surrounding, surmounting, and intersecting the map in a baffling 
palimpsest of visual imagery. But the Union’s maps are sleek, clear, and devoid of what 
Monmonier calls ‘dysfunctional clutter’.1035 Indeed the Union’s own Visual Identity 
Guidelines stress the following: 
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‘Except for flat colour tints and drop shadows on the text (use sparingly 
– never use outlines), no other graphic effect is allowed in this visual 
identity. A limited use of visual elements is allowed to create a visual 
environment appropriate to the target audience of a given 
communication initiative. “Less is more” is the motto. It is important that 
covers, posters, and others are not cluttered with any superfluous 
elements.’1036 
 
However, this does not mean that Union maps are apolitical, neutral, scientific 
cartographies. The maps themselves may be uncluttered and even the broader visual context 
in which they use may be sleek, modernist, and visually efficient; but they do not appear 
alone. Visual and textual messages accompany them. 
The Union’s internet maps come with convenient translations of the accompanying 
text, but text on the maps themselves is by necessity limited and multilingual. It is primarily 
through symbols – using the semantic and semiotic mechanisms which we explored in 
Chapter Four – that we make sense of the otherwise chaotic jumble of shapes and colours 
which are EU maps. Understanding their accompanying iconography is not only useful, but 
indeed essential. 
 Our second reason for studying European symbols is that they are not merely parts of 
maps, they are maps. And just as maps and icons convey discourses, they are discourses in 
themselves.
1037
 Symbols which may bear no resemblance whatsoever to Earth’s topography 
can nevertheless express spatial and political information. Let us consider an example. In the 
preceding chapter we encountered Lieutenant George and his military map. The mushroom-
shaped symbols on it are mere signifiers, indicating a threat. These symbols are so neutral 
and devoid of emotional baggage that the hapless Lieutenant completely misinterprets their 
meaning. However, not all symbols are this abstract. If the Lieutenant’s map had featured, for 
example, a British flag to denote its institute of origin, encourage conscious affiliation with 
the British Empire, or simply as a familiar, colourful image to cheer up its users in the 
trenches, then his map would contain an entirely different discourse. Unlike the frequently 
random symbols which make up map language, political symbols such as flags
1038
 – or coats 
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of arms,
1039
 portraits,
1040
 even the lettering and typography, on which the European Union 
does have guidelines
1041
 – are neither neutral nor value-free. Flags are recognised not only by 
the populations they represent but by wider international communities; and on maps they 
come with existing political connotations which reinforce the mapreader’s faith in the map, 
and connote political control. The evolution of this theme is that the flag itself not only 
explains the map, it becomes the map. 
 
 
5.3.2 Waving the Flag 
 
‘The EU flag constitutes the main element of the European visual identity.’1042 
 
Flags are only one tool in an iconographic arsenal, but with the rise of nationalism in 
the nineteenth century, flags have evolved from the barely-beheld banners of barons and 
bishops in the Middle Ages, and the gaudy gonfalons and princely pennants on the 
battlefields of Early Modern monarchs, to the most visible and recognised emblems of a 
country.
1043
 The quotes with which we began this chapter emphasised the quest, in a Europe 
rebuilding itself from its own apocalypse, for an emblem which would complement the 
European flag as a visible signifier of the European people.  
As Billig discusses at length, flags are vital components of manufacturing the 
community.
1044
 Europe is no exception. In Chapter Three we examined the multifarious 
nature of maps – maps can be gestured, performed, drawn, thought, or spoken. Icons of the 
community such as the anthem and the flag are kinds of map; delineating a community 
which, while abstract in the form of an icon or a song, corresponds to a parallel counterpart in 
space. Let us clarify this.  
 ‘Flags,’ writes Gerald Webster, ‘are symbolic containers that “condense a range of 
meanings and emotions pertaining to a group’s perceived historical experience, real or 
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imagined cultural homogeneity, and efforts to define a similarity of outlook for the 
future”’.1045 Similarly in his study, Sibley identifies ‘the ability of the national flag to activate 
prescribed values ... not only in situations where peoples’ attention is explicitly drawn to the 
national flag but also in conditions where people are not necessarily aware of recent 
exposure to the flag’.1046 We see a clear link here to the concept of banal nationalism. Like 
the omnipresent flag ‘hanging unnoticed on the public building’,1047 the EU flag appears 
alongside cartography. Thus a deixis is established; the flag and the map, both of which are 
spatial representations of the imagined community of the Union, become intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing. Both express where Europe is, and who is and is not considered 
“European”. 
 This in itself is nothing new. Flags – religious, dynastic, and national – have long 
appeared on maps, performing the same function of associating, in the mapreader’s mind, 
space and power, and is especially visible in maps of overseas territories claimed by a distant 
homeland.
1048
 In this latter case, as Harley argues, the discourse of dominance and destiny is 
unavoidable – the territory represented is, by all apparent rights, the property of the state 
whose flag appears on or alongside the map.
1049
 The flag acts as a symbol of sovereignty, 
offering an easily-recognisable symbol which assures the viewer – through an unquestioned 
cartographic medium – that the state is right to do this.1050 The discourse represented is one 
of sovereign inequality; the essence of empire. In the case of the Union, not only does this 
discourse lurk in the visual rhetoric, but the ideology expressed by the flag becomes entwined 
with the map. To understand this, let us investigate the same tropes of the EU flag as the 
maps – colour, and iconography.  
In his study of the iconography of Early Modern cartography, Toby Lester argues that 
certain political icons may be treated as “maps”. To illustrate this Lester examines the 
Reichsadler, the double-headed eagle of the Holy Roman Empire, in its context as a symbol 
not only of the entire Empire but of the Empire’s claim to Universal Monarchy over the 
world itself: 
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Fig 5.10: Reichsadler (Aquila Imperialis) of the Holy Roman Empire
1051
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In the above image, the double-headed eagle – a symbol which Charlemagne had 
borrowed from medieval Byzantium wherein the two-headed bird had symbolised the 
Basileus’ temporal and spiritual authority and Byzantium’s claim to rule both the Eastern and 
Western Roman Empire – transcends the boundary between political symbol and map. There 
exists today a multitude of political emblems ranging from the abstract and symbolic to the 
recognisable and iconographic. Initially we might consider that the Imperial Eagle is little 
more than a symbol. Yet even without the map, the eagle’s representation of the regions of 
the Reich transforms the eagle itself into a form of map. All maps, as we have argued, are 
representations rather than reflections. Here, the most significant component-states within the 
Reich are represented via their heraldry on the eagle’s wings. Not all states, though, are 
included: at the time of the image’s creation in 1510, hundreds of small, petty states made up 
the Holy Roman Empire.
1052
 Representing this number is no mean feat. Instead, the eagle 
represents the entirety of the Empire through its portrayal of specific parts – it becomes what 
we have now identified as a synecdochal metonym; the use of a part to represent the whole. 
As Lester argues,
1053
 the double eagle was such a recognisable symbol in Early Modern 
Europe, representing the Holy Roman Empire’s sovereignty, that it became indelibly 
associated not merely with the legal territories of the Reich but with the Emperors’ still-extant 
claims to European universality and Universal Monarchy. By selecting a political symbol to 
represent all the peoples of the Sacrum Imperium, framed within the visual symbology of a 
powerful crowned eagle looking to East and West, to the past and the future, and to the 
sacred and the profane, the symbol became a form of map even before it was explicitly 
stamped on cartographies of Germany,
1054
 Europe,
1055
 and even Earth
1056
 later in the period. 
The same phenomenon occurs today. Lester describes the Imperial Eagle as ‘visual shorthand 
for the Holy Roman Empire’.1057 We might well consider that the flag of the Union performs 
the same function as shorthand for Europe: 
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Fig. 5.11: Flag of the European Union
1058
 
 
 
 Here, the discourse of legitimacy through superiority and universal sovereignty is less 
immediately obvious than in the gaudy zoomorphs of avian art, but the discourse is 
nevertheless prevalent. Firstly we will examine the tropes, starting with colour. 
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5.3.2  Imperial Iconography 
 
‘Against the blue sky of the Western world, the stars represent the peoples 
of Europe in a circle, a symbol of unity. Their number shall be invariably 
set at twelve, the symbol of completeness and perfection.’1059 
 
Resolution (55) 32 
 
Thus proclaimed the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8
th
 
December 1955, in selecting a flag for the Union’s ancestor. The symbol chosen was selected 
as unifying emblem for the Union, but on maps it becomes associated not only with the 
Union but with all of Europe. In its iconography we see a single symbol – a gold star – 
replicated to form a circle. This symbol itself is a map, and as such is no different to the 
Imperial Eagle as a symbol of unity, legitimacy, authority, and an appeal to imagination; this 
time deliberately associated also with perfection. The circle of stars is the most omnipresent 
symbol of the Union,
1060
 and its significance is explained by the Union as:  
 
“The European flag is the symbol not only of the European Union but  
also of Europe's unity and identity in a wider sense. 
The European flag consists of 12 golden stars in a circle on a blue  
background. The stars symbolise the ideals of unity, solidarity and 
harmony among the peoples of Europe. 
The number of stars has nothing to do with the number of member  
countries, though the circle is a symbol of unity.”1061 
 
 Similarly, the European Commission’s question-and-answer guide on European 
symbols describes that: 
 
                                                 
1059
 Resolution (55) 32 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (8 December 1955). Documents 
of the Committee of Ministers 1955 - II (July - December, 1955) = Documents du Comité des Ministres 1955 II 
(Juillet - Décembre 1955). 1955. Strasbourg: Council of Europe = Conseil de l'Europe.  Available at: 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/resolution_55_32_of_the_committee_of_ministers_of_the_council_of_europe_8_decem
ber_1955-en-cbb0826e-81ea-4209-8bfa-0a644c0817de.html.  
1060
 As the circle of stars is used in other media than physical flags, the symbol is technically a charge. But for 
the purposes of this chapter, the word flag will be used to minimise confusion. See Arthur Fox-Davies, A 
Complete Guide to Heraldry (London: Elibron Classics, 2006 [orig. 1909]), pp. 176-80. 
1061
 European Union, Europa Portal: The EU at a glance: The symbols of the EU. Available at:  
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm. 
234 
 
“The design symbolises the peoples of Europe, with the circle 
representing their union. The number of stars never changes – it is 
always 12: representing perfection and entirety, like the twelve apostles, 
twelve months of the year, twelve signs of the zodiac”1062 
 
 The discourse prevalent in this icon is clear – the symbol (which itself is a form of 
map) and the recognisable “map” come to represent all of Europe as one community – a 
community which does not exist. This is noted by Fornäs, who details that according to Union 
websites and literature, these artefacts are not listed as “the European Union flag”, for 
example, but as “the European flag”.1063 This synecdoche is not merely of the European 
Union but of a larger imagined community whose creation is the apparent duty and destiny of 
the EU: the self-anointed guardian of civilisation whose obligation it is unite the continent in 
‘unity, solidarity and harmony’, in a quest for ‘perfection and entirety’. The message behind 
the flag is clear – the EU, and only the EU, must unify all under its hegemony. This is a 
manifest destiny which would have been recognisable to Charlemagne, Napoleon, or any of 
the men who took up the translatio imperii in a quest to remake Europe in their own image. 
Thus the flag itself is a synecdoche, a hyperreality. When combined with a map, this is 
amplified. 
As with maps, the tropes here require consideration. Since the 1950s, blue has become 
the colour most associated with the Union, selected either for its apparent religious 
symbolism,
1064
 perceived historical association with Europe,
1065
 or as a representation of ‘the 
blue sky of the Western world’ – an emblem of freedom offset against that portion of Europe 
then imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain.
1066
 This is indicative of a conscious desire to 
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establish a trope laden with meaning – in this case, appealing to freedom – but it is also a 
powerful indicator of how devoid of meaning individual tropes are. The politicians and 
heraldrists of 1950s Europe chose blue, but it is clear from the above reasonings that nobody 
quite knew why blue should be associated with Europe. As suggested by Robert Escarpit, 
blue may have been ‘a bit bland’1067 but was the only colour left which did not already have 
geopolitical connotations.
1068
 In light of this, we ought not ascribe too many associations to 
the colour. The intentions of and influences upon the authors, which they themselves appear 
to have been unaware of, are irrelevant, as blue is now associated with the Union by virtue of 
sixty years of history. But while the trope alone is unimportant, the meta-trope of the flag 
itself is worth investigating in full. For while there may be almost no understanding of the 
relationship between colours and emotions, the link between flags and ideologies has been 
investigated. 
The circle has long been a common symbol for unity, universality, eternity, and 
perfection.
1069
 In adopting this symbol the Union is simply perpetuating a common visual 
trope throughout human history. Like other symbols of the Union, the flag was chosen from 
designs submitted to a public competition to express ideas of unity,
1070
 and thus there is no 
apparent devious conspiracy. But as we have already identified, intention is subordinate to 
interpretation – including the official interpretation of the EU. 
 Of interest is the Union’s own explanation for the flag. We might well expect a body 
such as the EU to select a symbol which expresses unity, solidarity, and indivisibility – hence 
the circle. Yet the Union consciously declares that the flag does not represent only the 
peoples of the EU, but all Europeans. This synecdoche is of great significance. The Imperial 
Eagle of the Reich depicted geographical parts of the Holy Roman Empire in order to 
represent the whole. Similarly, the European flag depicts the entirety of Europe, regardless of 
their Union status.
1071
 However, the original design chosen was to be fifteen stars in order to 
represent the fifteen member-nations of the Council of Europe.
1072
 When this design was 
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rejected by West Germany,
1073
 and the inclusion of a symbolic cross rejected by Turkey,
1074
 
the design was modified to reduce the number of stars to twelve. Thus the current flag does 
not represent states, but it evolved from a design which did. It is a synecdoche, a hyperreality, 
of all Europe. Like the Reichsadler of yesteryear, spreading its wings to encompass all of 
Christendom in disregard of those dozens of European states which ignored or fought against 
the Holy Roman Empire’s self-anointed supremacy, the EU flag is an expression not of what 
is but what should be. In this case, as with the Reich, that all Europe should be contained 
within. In this representation rather than reflection of Europe, and this imagination of 
Europe’s existence and destiny, the flag is invoking the discourse of empire. 
 The vexillological significance of the EU flag cannot be understated, yet as with the 
map we are not examining the flag in isolation. In many media the flag intersects with maps. 
What we see in this collision of map and flag is in essence no different from the Reichsadler. 
On the map of the Holy Roman Empire, the symbolism is clear – a snarling Imperial Eagle 
frames the map, proclaiming that all territories depicted therein fall under the exclusive 
sovereignty of the Heiliges Reich. Here, the gold stars perform precisely the same function 
even if that is not the intended consequence. Whether EU members or not, all Europeans are 
represented as belonging to the Union, with the Union visually proclaimed to be the sole 
authority, the sole possessor of legitimacy, and the sole body with the right and the duty to 
unify the continent under the self-proclaimed enlightenment of its own hegemony. The flag 
expresses that imperium is exclusive to the Union. 
Early proposals for a European flag either drew upon existing vexillology and 
heraldic norms to suggest complex and gaudy flags, or appropriated historical banners – 
including those of Charlemagne and Constantine the Great – as emblems of European 
unity.
1075
 Yet even though original designs bear little or no resemblance to the chosen flag, 
their goal was the same – to encapsulate unity in a single symbol.1076 And this unity was not 
merely that of the Union, but all Europe; or at least “Europe” as defined by the bearers of the 
new imperium. As Harley identifies, the appearance of national flags on maps – especially 
maps depicting territories other than those directly administered by the state whose flag is 
depicted – is an unambiguous statement of power and possession; that that state, and only that 
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state, has legitimate authority over the places and peoples depicted.
1077
 Like the triumphant 
Imperial Eagle of yesteryear uniting noble houses, bishoprics, free cities, and entire kingdoms 
under one supreme sovereign, the emblem of the EU does not merely clarify maps: it is a 
map. It is a map whose dominant discourse expresses destiny, sovereignty, a quest for 
legitimacy, and an inequality between those whose duty it is to unify, and those whose duty it 
is to succumb.  
‘The country’s flag’, Webster writes, ‘may be viewed daily by the country’s citizens 
in repetitive fashion, creating a sense of nation and providing the cement needed to guard the 
nation or state against the centrifugal forces of dis-union’.1078 Given the cult-like following 
which national flags have generated, and continue to spawn,
1079
 it would be difficult to deny 
Webster’s assertion. Yet the Union’s flag goes beyond this, for it is not national but supra-
national or even meta-national, representing neither a nation nor state fixed in time and space, 
but rather an ideology, a principle, an imagination which transcends time and place. We 
might argue that while the national flag, as Webster writes, cements an established group 
which has distinct boundaries in geography and history, the Union – or imperial – flag 
cements an idea. The idea of legitimacy, of destiny, of sovereignty over those who already 
belong and those who do not – yet. 
The deixis of flag and map is a powerful imperial discourse, and the suggestiveness of 
the discourse is only increased with additional tropes. Flags express political ambitions
1080
 – 
in this case, aspirations of the Union’s self-anointed European universality. 
 In the Union, it must be borne in mind that Union iconography coexists alongside the 
established symbolism of member-states. We might well consider that this signifies a 
difference between national and imperial forms. In the nation, there is only one set of 
prescribed symbols – the flag, anthem, heraldry, and established paraphernalia of the state; 
unifying all members within the bounded territory. Regional and local variations may exist, 
but ultimately it is the national symbols to which allegiance is due, and around which citizens 
rally in times of crisis. In the Union, though, this is not the case. National emblems co-exist 
alongside the iconography of the Union, but they are not on equal terms. The symbols of the 
state are territorially bounded; those of the Union transcend territories and borders to appeal 
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to a manufactured identity as Europeans, tolerating variance within, so long as the Union is 
visually acknowledged.  
 On maps of the Union, the EU’s position is made quite clear. States and nations are 
plotted with their borders, with a single external frontier denoting the Union from the 
wilderness beyond. The visual discourse present is that all members of the Union are equal to 
each other, and equal in their superiority over the barbarians languishing in non-EU Europe. 
But the EU, on these maps, is not a peer. It is primus inter pares, first among equals: the only 
entity with the legitimacy to hold sovereignty over not only EU members but over all 
Europeans. Non-EU Europe, these maps declare, is not only uncivilised – it is illegitimate, 
and must be absorbed into the sole legitimate heir to the translatio imperii. Let us consider a 
manifestation of this discourse. 
In the previous section we rejected the idea that there is any natural meaning to 
colour. We also argue that there is no secondary meaning, as there is no universal theory of 
colour. But iconographical theory can direct us to a more valuable meta-tropic assertion – the 
connotations of who is coloured in, and who is not. Let us reconsider the Europa maps: 
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Fig. 5.12 - Europa Map I
1081
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Fig. 5.13 – Europa Map II1082 
 
Again, these maps use bold colours to visibly separate the Union and the non-Union. 
On a conscious level, this is to be expected – any state map has to distinguish its territories 
from those of other states. But on Panofsky’s intrinsic and conventional levels less concerned 
with functionality, the maps’ use of bright colours for the Union and a drab, aesthetically 
unappealing tint for the surrounding ‘blandmass’1083 carries both positive and negative 
connotations. They are little different from the imperial maps of yesteryear in that ‘this 
mapping helped to legitimize imperial expansion by making the world appear empty, or at 
least uncivilized, unless under European control’.1084 It may seem to be a stretch of the 
imagination to state that the above use of colour subliminally engenders a sense of positive 
feelings towards the EU and a sense of disinterest, wariness, or even revulsion of the non-EU, 
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but such use of colour has been used for centuries in cartography.
1085
 We may not be 
consciously aware of the conventional meaning of colour in a cartographic context, but this 
does not mean that such a meaning does not exist. 
It is noticeable how the effort to convey this imagined collective identity conveys 
what we have identified as a characteristic of empire; borders which draw a line not in space, 
but between Us and Them, civilised and savage . The Union’s imagined community, 
composed of a coloured tint scheme,
1086
 is contrasted against the stark, bland, uninviting 
‘non-Europe’ beyond. But these are not the only two zones on the map. Candidate countries – 
Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia – appear in a different shade, which simultaneously separates 
these countries from the community but grudgingly acknowledges them as being 
hierarchically higher than the bland landmass surrounding the Union. They are in a form of 
cartographic probation – not quite European, but making sufficient progress on the road to 
attaining Europe’s own vision of ‘civilisation’ to be picked out in a colour and thus presented 
to the mapreader as areas moving away from the barbarian realm and towards the self-
anointed supremacy of the Union. 
This issue of portraying prospective members as existing in a cartographic limbo 
between the imagined community and the barbarians continues in other internet maps. 
Conveying an imagination of collective identity is one of the core tenets of cartoimperialism, 
and the pursuit of a ‘European’ identity can be powerfully conveyed by simple cartographic 
tropes. Rather than acknowledging the EU’s diverse unity, this genre of cartography 
emphasises homogeneity in the style of what Macaulay termed ‘assimilationist 
imperialism’;1087 the absorption of new territories, cultures and identities into a single 
imagination of belonging to the single imagined community of Europe: 
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Fig. 5.14 - Europa Map I
1088
 
 
Let us examine the conventional meaning of this map. The chart asserts ‘ethnic 
identities and territorial claims’1089 through its depiction of a homogeneous and communal 
Union, with a clear distinction between the implied collective identity of ‘European’ and the 
separate identity beyond. This is a frontier emphasised again by colour and cartographic 
inclusion. The community’s frontier is very clearly marked through colour; a bright, 
stimulating tone for the Union and a drab, unappealing hue for a non-Europe apparently too 
uninteresting and unworthy of mention to even warrant place-names. This style of map 
further emphasises the connection of territory and polity, and reveals the early stages of the 
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map becoming not a geographical tool, but a political icon. Internal individuality is 
minimised, prospective members are again given a mere acknowledgement, and those areas 
not part of the Union are pushed further into the cartographic background. The emphasis of 
this category of map is overwhelmingly a focus on the imagined community, and the implied 
power of the bounded frontiers encompassing it. 
Monica Smith highlights this common feature in imperial mapping of implying 
territorial control - the use of clear lines and careful colouring to ‘convey the impression of 
comprehensive political entities having firm boundaries and uniform territorial control’1090 
when in reality, imperial authorities are unable to assert their power evenly across the polity. 
Fig. 5.14 is itself an example of what Smith terms the ‘absolutist variety’, a style of mapping 
wherein such simple tropes as colour and lines present a display not only of universal and 
absolute political control over a territory, but the existence of a single universal community 
within.
1091
 A conceptual comparison can be easily drawn between these style of EU maps and 
maps of now-defunct empires; claiming a territory on paper by simply drawing a line around 
it and shading it in one colour does not mean that the polity has total power in that area.
1092
 
In her study of ancient imperial cartography, Smith raises the point that such 
‘absolutist’ mapping fails to portray the multiple stages of the polity’s growth, expansion, and 
consolidation of acquired territories. Indeed, as she argues, the use of such cartography 
implies that from its early stages, the polity was methodically pursuing ‘a kind of long-term 
manifest destiny’ to reach a pre-determined frontier.1093 It is perhaps unsurprising to discover 
that the Union employs precisely just a style alongside its other maps.  
This process of cartographic expansion is more clearly seen in traditional maps which 
seek to portray chronological change in the limited frame of a single image. Fig. 5.15 
provides an example: 
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Fig. 5.15: Mapping Manifest Destiny
1094
 
 
Here, a single hue is used not only to clearly define a collective Union against a drab, 
homogeneous ‘Other’ beyond the frontier, but is also used to depict a pre-determined project 
of expansion. In older member-states of the Union, a heavy saturation of colour is used while 
different hues are used to depict newcomers absorbed in the aftermath of Soviet collapse. It is 
curious to note that Turkey, which remains a non-member, is depicted in the same colour as 
states which have now acceded to the Union; again, it is evident how desired states are 
identified and marked as such on the map as areas ripe for expansion, and remain so even if 
their accession to Europe is not as swift as anticipated, but remains ‘an advance of the 
frontiers of civilisation’.1095  
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The theme continues in other charts of the Union which map chronological expansion 
through different colours. Fig. 5.16 demonstrates this, and also implies hegemony, by using a 
relief-map to depict the Union’s core as higher than new members of the imagined 
community and non-Europeans: 
 
 
Fig. 5.16: Mapping Hierarchies
1096
 
 
 In addition to the two significant tropes of hue and saturation depicting a 
homogeneous (yet hierarchical) polity contrasted against a monotone ‘outside’, a third related 
trope can be identified in these maps. Prospective members are clearly identified on the map, 
and through the use of graded hues and varied saturations to depict chronological expansion, 
the discourse of empire – destiny, duty, legitimacy, and sovereignty – is mapped. Here, only 
two types of states are coloured and thus contrasted against a drab non-EU landmass. First is 
the polity itself, displaying a dominant core. Second are newcomers, those recent members 
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who, as in other maps, are subject to a form of imperial patronisation as they are made 
sufficiently ‘civilised’ to join their elders. Third to be depicted are prospective members, 
those states whose absorption into the Union is actively sought, and thus are deemed 
sufficiently ‘civilised’ to warrant their own eye-catching colour, but which have not yet been 
judged by the EU to be sufficiently similar to the Union to be depicted in a similar colour. It 
is arguable that in this style of map, the Union is making a clear statement of the territories 
into which it wishes to expand, but reminds the viewer that these territories are somehow ‘not 
like’ the Union – at least not yet. These are undeniably imperial meta-tropes. While the 
Union may proclaim that it is United in Diversity, such unity is only conferred on newcomers 
once they have been sufficiently Europeanised to fit the standards of those established 
Western members of the Union who form the aristocracy of the imagined community. 
Finally, a significant sub-section of the genre is that of the animated interactive map – 
a cartographic interface which enables the viewer to see, on one map, the chronological 
expansion of the Union. It is not easy to replicate an animated map using the medium of a 
static page, and portraying different frames of the animated map defeats the purpose. Part of 
the hypnotic power of an animated map is its ability to move through time while remaining 
fixed in space (one frame). While the discussion of animated maps must subsequently be 
reserved for a more concentrated study on virtual cartography, the EU’s one animated map 
deserves a mention as it unequivocally portrays Europe’s self-declared duty and destiny to 
unify the continent: 
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Fig. 5.17: Three frames of the EU’s animated map depicting the EU in 1995, 2004, and 
2007
1097
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This example of targeting desired territories, assimilating them on a ‘probationary’ 
status expressed by the use of a different colour, and the subsequent assimilation of 
newcomers into a universalist polity, conveys a stark discourse. This animated map’s 
overtones are evident – the Union is destined to unify all Europeans, and this manifest 
destiny is unarguable and unstoppable. The discourse embedded within is clear. Europe and 
the Union are synonymous, a metonymic synecdoche, and it is the destiny of the Union to 
spread its borders and embrace the peoples of Europe into the imagined community they have 
constructed; a community which declares that only Our way is legitimate, that only We are 
sovereign, and that the duty to unite is taken up by Us. There is no room for alternatives. 
There is only the Union, and those whose ultimate destiny is to take their rightful place as 
members of one imagined community. Yet the discourse does not exist alone. Another is 
embedded within maps as well; and this discourse is an apparent paradox.  
Not all EU maps perform this same trick of establishing a hierarchy between Union 
members, candidate countries, and non-members. A curious paradox exists wherein official 
cartographies map not a dichotomous Europe split between civilised and savage, but a single 
Europe wherein the entire landmass becomes associated with the Union. It is on these maps 
that we see most clearly the hyperreal deixis between cartography, empire, and iconography. 
One particularly curious map is found on the European Union’s “404” page. In its 
official publications, the Council of Europe repeatedly refers to the wealth of EU information 
which can be found online.
1098
 Yet one problem of this vast digital repository is that, from 
time to time, domain names change or internet addresses become lost in the terra incognitae 
of the world-wide web. When a page goes missing, the following error page appears: 
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Fig. 5.18: “404”1099 
 
In association with this, we will reconsider the standard full-width banner headline 
whose use is compulsory
1100
 at the top of all displays, banners, brochures, press releases, 
leaflets, newsletters, and websites produced and maintained by the European Commission:
1101
 
 
 
Fig. 5.19: Page banner for European Commission1102 
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1100
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 In these two maps, the paradoxical discourse is apparent. In contrast to the maps seen 
previously, which distinguished between civilised and savage, these maps conflate the Union 
and Europe by merging political place and geographical space, framed within the political 
iconography of the Union’s flag. The discourse apparent in these maps is that the Union is 
Europe. Each makes a distinction – the upper image includes all of continental Europe 
alongside Council of Europe members Turkey and Russia, but stops there. The second image 
depicts Europe and western Russia, but Africa is absent. The implication is that these 
territories are destined to become members of the imagined communities; to join the Union as 
it is their ineluctable destiny.  
 Maps which merge Europe and the European Union are not confined to a deixis of 
map and flag. Other visual elements are included to hammer home a discourse that the Union 
is legitimate, and that the Union should be sovereign, because it is good. This is achieved 
through merging map, flag, and visual images. 
 
 The motto of the Union, as has been previously stated, is the paradoxical slogan 
‘United in Diversity’, an expression of identity implying a collective identity which, while far 
from homogeneous, is bound by a shared contrast to the identity of those ‘non-Europeans’ 
living beyond the imperial frontier.
1103
 This issue of diversity within the European Union 
highlights a significant aspect of imperial mapping; that of depicting a homogeneous interior. 
As Smith points out, ‘states are not homogenous entities, and can be subdivided along … 
different planes’.1104 This is perhaps even truer in the context of empire, which by definition 
are more culturally heterogeneous than nation-states. As Black points out, ‘it is difficult to 
make a man-made construct such as the European Union seem natural’,1105 a claim which 
arguably applies to all imperial maps. How then, can this oxymoron of ‘United in Diversity’ 
be mapped? 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the discourse of empire relies heavily on spectacle. And 
as we identified in Chapter Four, spectacle is prevalent in cartography. A cursory glance at 
historical maps of empire reflects the sort of pomp and pageantry on which empires rely, 
manifest in maps. Long-gone are those maps decorated with national personifications and 
excessive decoration continually – and consciously –  associating territory, empire, and 
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legitimacy in the mind of the reader.
1106
 But the juxtaposition of cartography and political 
symbolism remains visible in European maps even without the gaudy marginalia typical of 
earlier styles. The admission that the connection is not so blatantly reinforced in Europe’s 
maps as in its imperial predecessors does not detract from the continued link between space, 
place, duty, and imagined community.  
One notable feature of the Union’s maps is that they are free of ‘dysfunctional 
clutter’,1107 ignoring elements such as scales, legends, and elaborate marginalia in order to 
emphasise the Union. Yet the deixis of map, icons, and visual imagery remains. 
It is clear that the Union takes its emblems very seriously. According to the European 
Commission’s Visual Identity Guidelines, the flag logo ‘gives the European Commission a 
recognisable image... both serious and elegant’,1108 with the stark warning that ‘It is 
absolutely prohibited to modify the logo in any way. There should be no reason to do so 
under any circumstances’.1109 Yet while the logo of the flag remains prominent and 
untouched, it is not alone. 
Images of people and their produce have long been a feature of cartography.
1110
 
Today, these images no longer appear in the maps but rather surrounding it, in a form of 
meta-marginalia whose icons, as has been the case for millennia, act as a form of visual 
determinative. Like the various gestures involved in the encounter with Panofsky’s 
pedestrian, these elements combine to help the mapreader draw meaning from the map by 
visually associating certain parts with particular traits. On medieval mappaemundi, non-
Europe was a land of savage peoples and unholy monsters;
1111
 on Victorian cartography, 
colonies were synonymous with images of produce and plenty, the oppressed natives 
depicted as happy, servile underlings beneath their apparently benevolent occupiers.
1112
 
These images form part of what Ziegler calls ‘persuasive cartography’;1113 images which 
accompany maps to determine their content and meaning. Union maps continue this trait as 
they do not appear alone, but alongside images of people. Invariably, these images show 
happy scenes. Consider Figs 5.20 and 5.21 below: 
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Fig. 5.20: Imperial Federation
1114
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 “Imperial Federation – Map of the World Showing the Extent of the British Empire in 1886”, supplement in 
The Graphic 34, no. 869, July 24 1886. Courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago. See Akerman et al., The 
Imperial Map, plate 2. 
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Fig. 5.21: Guide for Americans
1115
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 At first glance examining only the tropes, these two images are only vaguely similar. 
Each combines a map with images of people, but there appears to be a clear distinction 
between the serious Steam-Age figures and the smiling Digital-Age assembly. One is a 
cluttered palimpsest of Victorian vainglory, the other is a sleek, digitised style. The maps 
were not even designed for the same purpose – the former is blatant propaganda for the 
British Imperial Federation, the latter is a handy guide to the European Union designed for 
citizens of the United States. It might be considered, then, that the two maps are inherently 
dissimilar. Yet meta-tropically they are much closer than we might consider, for each of these 
is ‘perhaps less a map than an icon, for so rarely can a map have expressed a political 
philosophy so clearly’.1116 
 Each of the images shows a particular style of map. They depict the world as bland, 
empty, inhabited only by a single polity – the British Empire and the European Union 
respectively – which have frontiers against the outside world but no internal boundaries. Each 
map cartographically annexes parts of the world not belonging to the polity – note how Fig. 
5.20 seizes part of Danish Greenland (and includes a convenient mini-map showing how 
much territory the Empire has acquired in the last century) – while Fig. 5.21 focuses on the 
British Isles and Scandinavia, with the inclusion of non-members Norway and Iceland. These 
tropes alone are worthy of comparative comment, yet it is the deixis of maps and icons which 
is most significant. 
 Firstly, we see in each map the appearance of the issuing polity’s flag. Britannia, in a 
monument of visual arrogance, sits atop the globe while clutching a shield bearing the flag of 
the Union of Great Britain, her trident pointing to the British Isles.
1117
 Like the spectators in 
The Coronation of Napoleon, all eyes are fixed on the Imperator. In the second image the 
now-familiar stars of the EU encircle the continent. It is worth noting that while the flag of 
the United States also appears, it does not overlap territory in the same way as the emblem of 
Europe. A hyper-real deixis is established – territory, and the flag as representative of the 
polity. The two become entwined, and a powerful discourse is projected: Earth belongs to 
Britain, and Europe belongs to the Union. At the same time a synecdoche is created – Britain 
is the world, and the Union is Europe. The maps become hyper-real. And the justification 
underpinning this discourse is reinforced by the second meta-trope: people. 
 In the British map, an imagined community is visually proclaimed. Under the 
watchful eyes of Britannia the peoples and races of the Empire – and by extension, the world 
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– exist in apparent harmony, surrounded by a cornucopia of icons suggesting progress, 
plenty, and supreme power (note the redcoat with a rifle, holding the universal Victorian 
symbol of India – a tiger1118 – on a very short chain). They are united in diversity: all are 
different, but all are members of an imagined community as subjects of Britannia who, by 
association with the visual images of peace and plenty, acquires a self-anointed legitimacy as 
Imperatrix of Earth. This theme is equally visible in the European Union image. Here the 
same phenomenon occurs – happy, smiling figures from a multitude of races,1119 all encircled 
by the stars of the Union. The discourse here is indistinguishable from that of the British map. 
Like Britain’s self-important assurance that it is uniting the disparate inhabitants of 
nineteenth-century Earth, the Union declares that it is legitimate, and that the Union should 
rule, because it is uniting the diverse peoples of twenty-first century Europe in happiness and 
harmony. Both appeal to an imagined community and both perform Anderson’s act of 
collective forgetting.  
The first map visually forgets the horrors of Victorian colonial conquest to insist that 
Britain’s rule is righteous. It also visually forgets that the world is inhabited by other, bigger, 
rival powers to Britain. The second map, despite its cheerful appearance, does exactly the 
same. It forgets that not all Europeans live in the Union, and not all inhabitants of the Union 
live in happiness and prosperity. It forgets that not all Americans can come to the Union – or 
are welcome – and by including Norway and Iceland, it forgets that there is a Europe beyond 
the Union. The discourse in both maps insists that the community is good, it is peaceful, it is 
happy, that there are no dissenters, and most significantly, that there is no obstacle to the 
polity’s apparent destiny to unite those it sees fit.  
 It might be argued at this stage that, like those cartographers who read into colours 
intrinsic meanings where none exist, perhaps we are seeing too much here. After all, not all 
maps of the Union feature pictures of people showing off their suspiciously perfect dentistry. 
Yet the deixis of map, icon, and images of harmony is not simply a meaning that we are 
imposing. It is considered by the Union itself. Consider Fig. 5.22, a page from the European 
Commission’s Visual Identity Guidelines: 
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 A familiar meme from British cartoons of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Bryant, Wars of Empire in Cartoons, pp. 
40-49. 
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 We might note that the figures are predominantly Caucasian, with the two non-white characters pushed to 
the very back. But, like Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon’s green beans (see p. 107, footnote 510), we might be 
seeing too much here. 
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Fig. 5.22: Visual Guidelines
1120
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What do we see here? Firstly, we see an intersection of landscapes, political 
symbolism, flags, and images – all framed within strict guidelines. Secondly, we see images; 
smiles, laughter, multiple cultures and multiple ethnicities, groups, and connections dominate 
the images. We see images of children laughing and dancing, pictures of snappily-dressed 
characters on the prow of a ship, Arcadian pastoral scenes and utopian technoscapes, and 
bridges stretching into infinity.
1121
 The discourse proclaimed within is clear. The European 
Union is to be visually associated with peace, progress, and positive emotions – and with the 
map and flag included alongside these images in Union print media and on Union websites, 
the discourse is that the only polity to bring these benefits to Europe is the Union.  
Yet it does not end here, as maps perform an additional trick. They give a sense of 
permanence, propagating the message that the political community it represents has always 
existed and that it always will. By their very nature, maps – even those interactive, pixellated 
pictures of the Digital Age which proudly boast of progress and absorption – are frozen at 
one point in time. Indeed this was one of the defining characteristics of ancient and medieval 
maps: the message that the world had always been a particular way and always would be – 
part of the imperial discourse. By selecting maps as the first and dominant image which their 
website visitors encounter, the commissions of the European Union are – perhaps unwittingly 
– propagating the message that the Union is eternal.  
The merging of such elements of visual language with cartography publicly proclaims 
that the Union is a happy place. The continuation here of imperial themes is subtle, but 
nevertheless exists. The accompanying marginalia on the maps and visual artefacts of 
Byzantines and Holy Romans, Napoleonic French and Steam-Age Britons was rather more 
gaudy, pompous, and militaristic than that of the Union, but the message was the same. The 
visual images stressed that the polity depicted or represented within was something to aspire 
to – it was the sole holder of imperium, of the legitimacy and power to uphold the highest, 
self-anointed principles of civilisation. Whether that self-righteous, self-serving principle was 
the self-declared continuation of Rome in the Reich, the status of God’s Byzantine regent on 
Earth, the defenders of Les Droits de l’Homme, the British bearers of mission civilisatrice, or 
the sole rightful guardian of Europe’s post-national peace, is irrelevant. The visual language 
stresses that the polity is right, righteous, and rightful: it is legitimate, powerful, its people are 
united in superiority over all others as they, and only they, have attained the supreme status of 
civilisation, legitimacy, and sovereignty – imperium. 
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5.4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
‘[The] imperial project affected the everyday in ways that shaped what was 
“taken-for-granted” and thus was not necessarily a matter of conscious 
awareness or deliberation. With the exception of those in some official or 
quasi-official roles, for most people, empire was just “there” – out there. It 
was ordinary.’1122 
 
Thus write Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose on the visual presence of the British 
Empire in the daily lives of its inhabitants. For Hall and Rose, the Empire was best served by 
a banal presence: overt, grand displays of imperium drew praise and criticism from all 
corners, and one result of such public discourse was that the rights and wrongs of Britain’s 
rule had to be deliberated. But if imperium was banal, idling passively in the background, it 
became so everyday, so natural, so ordinary, that the discourses of sovereignty and inequality 
were barely noticed, let alone criticised. And for Hall and Rose, the ultimate strength of 
banality lies in apparently mundane symbols. 
 ‘Symbols’, opines Jakubowska, ‘are by their nature ambiguous and general’.1123 We 
saw this in the previous chapter in which Lieutenant George misread his map, and we saw it 
in the records of perplexed 1950s researchers seeking to identify a root meaning in the 
colours and emblems chosen for a unifying continental flag. It would be hard to deny that 
symbols, whose meaning and associations rapidly change once they are released into public 
discourse, can be ambiguous. We need only return to one of the quotes with which we began, 
Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s call for a symbol to unify Europe’s ideology in the same 
manner that the swastika was hijacked to signify an abhorrent pan-European ideology. 
As Panofsky demonstrates, symbols alone do not carry any connotations whatsoever. 
The circle of stars, the swastika, the hammer and sickle, the cross or the crescent or any 
emblem conceivable, is nothing more than a geometric jumble of lines and angles which is 
entirely neutral to one who has never before encountered it.
1124
 It is only through the 
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interaction of multiple forms of visual, verbal, and textual language that we come to ascribe 
connotations. Like Panofsky’s pedestrian, many forms of visual language are at work and 
while none of them have intrinsic meaning on their own, when combined they convey a 
meaning which we can elucidate. 
Maps of the European Union perform precisely this function. Acting as the public site 
of a deixis in which territory, ideology, and imagination collide, the map, flag, and emblems 
of the Union fulfil the prophecy of Raento and Brunn that ‘looking, seeing and knowing... 
become perilously intertwined’.1125 Through cartography, a metonymic synecdoche appears 
wherein the Union and the European peoples become conflated. There is only one legitimate 
sovereign in Europe, these maps proclaim, its legitimacy assured by a manufactured memory 
cementing an emergent imagined community, its presence guaranteed through the banal 
nationalism of political symbolism so ubiquitous as to be almost invisible. We glance at 
charts, we gaze upon the flag, and a hyperreal mental map is formed: a map which declares 
that the Union is Europe, that Europe is the Union, and that it should be this way. 
The creation of this European community, tied to a specific European homeland, is 
perhaps not a conscious project. It would be grotesquely unfair to accuse such cartographers 
as Lovell Johns of deviously pursuing a sinister, Machiavellian agenda whereby maps are 
manipulated to bring about the psychosocial critical mass which will give birth to a European 
identity – assuming that such a transubstantiation has not already happened. Indeed the 
Union’s contracted mapmakers clearly establish that their agreement required simply the 
production of spatially and geopolitically accurate maps, not warped icons of propaganda.
1126
 
And yet the discourse remains embedded, regardless of intent. Like national monuments,
1127
 
maps function as a part of what David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove term ‘memory theatre’: 
those public displays of iconography and symbolism designed to convey ‘official rhetoric’ to 
the people through the process of banal nationalism.
 1128
 
What is of note is Billig’s description of banal nationalism as being ‘Janus-faced’,1129 
a form of ‘Jekyll and Hyde duality’.1130 Nationalism in all forms, he argues, is both adored 
and abhorred in public discourse at the same time – and this is particularly evident in the 
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above maps. As European citizens we reject national identities as shameful relics of our 
belligerent and bloodstained histories; yet in the same instant we embrace an identity as 
Europeans, a Self contrasted against the Other beyond the new Iron Curtain separating self-
congratulatory civilisation from the barbarians beyond. This almost schizophrenic perception 
of the world is most tellingly conveyed by the EU’s cartographies. All at once the Union’s 
maps proclaim harmony, inclusivity, and a benign ethos of comradely partnership between 
our nations – yet at the same time, the maps proclaim that while We are one, They are not. If 
we believe our maps, a dichotomy emerges. Europe ‘seems to possess a reassuring 
normality’,1131 while the barbarians hammering at Europe’s gates lack cohesion, lack 
civilisation, and even lack names. They are an alien, chaotic Other to be contrasted against 
the familiar, ordered Self of the Union.  
The Union appropriates ‘the anthem, national colours, and images of historic 
events’1132 to unify the population. Yet what renders this act imperial rather than merely 
national is that the imagined community is unequal. It is unequal spatially between the 
established core and the parvenu peripheries. It is unequal temporally, between those who are 
already in the Union and those whose destiny is that they are yet to be absorbed. It is unequal 
ideologically, between those who may be deemed civilised, and those whose savagery is 
swept aside. However it is not simply actual flags which advertise the EU emblem. On a 
broad array of paraphernalia – from press releases and websites to bags, coffee mugs,1133 
umbrellas and t-shirts,
1134
 the circle of stars appears. These ‘banal maps’, as Dudley Stamp 
theorised, ‘can also be used – and have been used – as a subtle form of propaganda, 
especially in spreading knowledge worldwide of territorial claims’.1135 This is achieved 
through the blending of cartography with ‘important symbols and images,’ which, as Stanley 
Brunn argues, ‘provide identities, allegiances, and feelings of belonging with a nation and a 
state’.1136 Chief amongst these is the flag, which becomes a synecdochal map: an emblem to 
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represent not only the Union but all Europe. The fact that not all Europeans are citizens of the 
Union is irrelevant – the map makes it clear that it is the Union’s destiny to unite them all.  
The use of maps-as-icons as part of the imitatio imperii is not new. Einhard describes 
three enormous dining tables owned by Charlemagne, inscribed (in ascending order of size 
and value) with maps of Constantinople, Rome, and the Universe.
1137
 The use of the map as a 
banal artefact, one which embodies an expression of power, is evidently not a modern 
phenomenon. Precedent – be it the map on Charlemagne’s dining tables, the Reichsadler, or 
the deixical, synecdochal, hyperreal maps of the British Empire – clearly exists. And it 
continues today. Like their ancestors, these maps express the discourse that this is not only 
how Europe does look, but how it should look.  
A particular feature connecting all styles of Union cartography is that the EU’s maps 
serve not as geographical tools but as political icons, objects largely devoid of scientific 
cartographic elements and instead emphasising community and collectivity. Ultimately the 
separate categories of map merge, through what Pomper terms ‘convergent evolution’.1138 
Map, flag, and image combine with banality and imagined community; and this is not without 
precedent in cartography. Lennox highlights how the British Empire’s maps of Halifax 
evolved in stages, from reconnaissance maps of new and unexplored territories, into settler 
maps emphasizing the empire’s ownership of the territory, and finally mass maps which 
‘rallied imperial support… and influenced the British vision of space.’1139 This progressive 
evolution is equally discernible in EU maps which have made an evolutionary leap from 
geography to politics, becoming graphic icons of power and possession, legitimacy and 
sovereignty, and an appeal to an imagined community which collectively forgets the less 
desirable aspects of its laudatory, self-adulatory project.  
  
 We return at the end to the quotes with which we began. In 1950 Count von 
Coudenhove-Kalergi stressed the need to adopt an emblem to represent Europe. His vision 
has been fulfilled, for Europe now has an emblem, one which fulfils the various Visual 
Guidelines’ and Visual Identity Manuals’ quest for a simple, instantly-recognisable symbol 
which viewers immediately associate with the Union. Not the epsilon. Not the circle of stars. 
Not even the blue banner. Europe’s emblem is the map – the map which triumphantly 
proclaims that the Union is Europe, that Europe is the Union, and that the two are destined by 
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history to become synonymous. The map declares the Union’s legitimacy and sovereignty by 
appealing to a manufactured memory which exists outside of Europe’s own history and 
indeed outside of space-time itself: the Union, via this cartography, is shown to be 
simultaneously eternal and temporal, motionless and in motion, territorial and de-spatial. 
Perhaps the Union would have been better served by adopting, in response to Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s appeal, the double-headed Imperial Aquila rather than the circle of stars. For the 
deixis of symbol and map is a public proclamation not only of the temporal and non-
temporal, spatial and non-spatial universalism of the European Union, its universal and sole 
legitimacy over a manufactured community, but indeed of the precise nature of imperium.  
 The deixis of cartography and political icons, most notably the flag and the map, 
constructs a manufactured memory. Flags on maps reinforce visual impact by associating 
state and space in one indelible public image.
1140
 As we have seen, this is held in the 
scholarly community to be a signifier of nations and nationalism. But the specific deixis of 
the Union’s politicised maps constructs a unique form of deixis; maps which simultaneously 
proclaim that the Union has always existed, that it is not yet complete but it will be, and it 
should be. These maps exist outside of time and ultimately, outside of space, for they depict a 
Union which is simultaneously static and mobile, concurrently territorial and non-territorial. 
Thus like all maps, European Union cartographies in public space are not reflections of 
reality but representations of it. And they represent a specific view of how reality should be – 
one Europe united under one sole sovereign with legitimacy, whose viewers aspire to the 
imagined community constructed by the intersection of cartography, iconography, and 
images. They are deliberate appeals to a manufactured memory of a Europe which never 
existed, a Europe whose history is utterly erased and a new imagination assembled, a Europe 
whose savage antithesis is barely even acknowledged to be lurking beyond the bright, 
appealing visage of the Union.  
This chapter has examined the various maps of the Union propagated through the new 
social and political fora of Imperium Europaeum. Like those maps which once adorned the 
Forum, the throne-room, and the gallery, the Union’s cartographies dominate the new public 
spheres of the printed pamphlet and the virtual realm. Their existence and expression within 
these public spheres is no different to the crumbling remains of empires past; they are 
deliberate invocations of power and legitimacy, authority and ambition. They show a 
European Union which is not one polity amongst others. They show the Union as primus 
inter pares, first among equals, the one and only rightful sovereign of Europe. 
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Yet these maps are not the ultimate expression of cartoimperialism. There is another 
realm of European cartography so prolific, so mundane, and so saturated with imperial 
ideology that more than three hundred and thirty million Europeans do not even notice 
cartoimperialism passing between their very fingers on a daily basis, every single transaction 
reinforcing the imagined community of the Union. It is to this realm that we penultimately 
turn. 
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Chapter Six 
Render unto Caesar 
 
“None of the cities should be allowed to have its own separate coinage or  
system of weights and measures; they should all be required to use ours.”1141 
 
Attributed to Julius Caesar 
Cassius Dio, second century AD 
 
“1. The European Central Bank shall have the exclusive right to authorize the issue  
of bank notes within the Community. The ECB and the national central banks may  
issue such notes. The bank notes issued by the ECB and the national central banks  
shall be the only such notes to have the status of legal tender within the Community. 
 
2. Member States may issue coins subject to approval by the ECB of the volume of 
the issue. The Council may, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 189c and after consulting the ECB, adopt measures to harmonize the 
denominations and technical specifications of all coins intended for circulation to the 
extent necessary to permit their smooth circulation within the Community.”1142 
 
Article 105/a of the Maastricht Treaty 
February 1992 
 
 The former words attributed to Julius Caesar, chronicled by the Roman historian 
Cassius Dio in the heyday of imperium, and the latter text from the 1992 amendment to the 
Maastricht Treaty, were written almost eighteen centuries apart. Yet the message contained 
within both is exactly the same. In the above extracts, the central authorities of the dying 
Roman Republic and the nascent European Union establish specific rules for the minting and 
printing of state-mandated currency to replace existing systems. In doing so, both Rome and 
Brussels adopted a medium of exchange and propaganda which from its very inception has 
been among the most powerful – perhaps the most powerful – of vehicles for the transmission 
of political ambitions and imperial dreams. This vehicle is a single currency. 
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 Empire, as we have seen, may best be understood as the result of a political and 
conceptual critical mass born of the complex, squabbling international relations between 
Germans and Greeks in the Early Middle Ages. Maps, meanwhile, are among the most 
ancient non-biological means of communication between humans,
1143
 and the most powerful 
discourses of politics. Chronologically, currency rests between the two. The little metallic 
discs which glide between our fingers each day are a phenomenon of the Bronze Age 
Mediterranean,
1144
 while paper money only appeared in the West in the seventeenth century 
and was not widely accepted until the nineteenth.
1145
  The appearance of maps on currency is 
even more recent and remarkably rare,
1146
 a cartographic curiosity which, with the exception 
of modern euro (€) coins and banknotes, has had only a brief and fleeting history among 
forms of mapping. But as this chapter demonstrates, numismatics – the study of currency – 
offers what is arguably the most visible demonstration of cartoimperialism. For as 
Christopher Howgego declares, ‘numismatics ... illuminates the exercise of power’.1147  
 
 We have established that maps are a critical component of constructing banal 
nationalism. Of the various technologies deployed – wittingly or unknowingly – in the 
construction of this artificial adhesive, maps have an unparalleled power. Yet they are not 
alone, and one technology of the state by which ideas of nationhood are encouraged, a 
technology frequently overlooked is currency.
1148
 And in the case of the European Union, 
whose currency was designed specifically to be apolitical,
1149
 that most political of vehicles 
boldly adorns objects which, every time they pass between citizens’ fingers, contributes to 
the discursive construction of an imperial identity. The maps on EU currency thus require 
their own investigation to identify not only the aspects of banal nationalism promoted within, 
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but also the specific discourses pertaining to the use of currency. That currency is a powerful 
vehicle of discourse is already well-attested.
1150
 Our study, therefore, turns to iconography. 
At this point it might well be asked what fresh insights can be gleaned from a study of 
European currency. Groundbreaking research has already been performed on the iconography 
of euro coins and banknotes, and how such icons convey political messages both explicit and 
subtle.
1151
 Peter Barber and Tom Harper acknowledge that maps on currency have been 
historically rare,
1152
 as coins and notes have been overwhelmingly dominated with 
portraiture, images of monuments, or allegorical symbols of religion or politics.
1153
 None of 
these appear (universally)
1154
 on euro currency. In addition, despite a handful of pioneering 
papers there is a comparative lack of scholarly analyses on euro designs. This could be 
attributed to a variety of factors – the currency’s youth, the decline in studies of material 
culture,
1155
 and the relative apathy towards currency iconography in general. Even the United 
States dollar has received remarkably little attention, its iconographies (and by extension, 
those of other national currencies) instead generating interest mainly from pro- or anti-
nationalists,
1156
 art critics,
1157
 and the recycled ramblings of paranoid conspiracy theorists.
1158
 
The dollar, though, is past its 1990s prime as the world’s sole global currency. The euro is 
now traded more widely and more frequently than the US dollar, and even with prophecies of 
Eurodämmerung
1159
 and the possible abandonment of the euro and its relegation to the 
footnotes of history, the importance of the euro’s cartographic iconographies cannot be 
understated. What then is the value of interrogating its iconography? 
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 The answer to this question is twofold. The first, drawn from sociology, is that 
acceptable norms in public political discourse have shifted. Both Ronald Inglehart’s 
modernisation theory and John Meyer’s world society norms theory offer explanations. States 
which today utilise public iconography to boast of power or might – as Jacques Hymans 
notes
1160
 – are quick to earn the ire of other countries and their own populations.1161 As 
Inglehart’s and Meyer’s theories advocate, acceptable public norms in Western contexts 
transformed in the twentieth century, particularly in a Europe struggling to emerge from the 
ashes of two world wars triggered, in part, by precisely this sort of political posturing.
1162
 
Brash political statements are no longer the order of the day, and neither is a focus upon 
individual holders of political power.
1163
 Instead, as Hymans identifies, twentieth-century 
European currency on both sides of the Iron Curtain quickly abandoned such designs in 
favour of apolitical portraits or bland depictions of nature.
1164
 It was from this context that the 
euro emerged – a prevailing ethos of attempting to depict apolitical themes on currency. 
Hence the map. But, as we shall see, the noblest intentions cannot disentangle currency and 
its images from politicking; and no map is devoid of politics.  
The second answer to the question rests in the discussion of empire recounted in 
Chapter One. In pursuit of an ontology, it was argued that empire is a discourse, an imagined 
link to a manufactured history. The symbolism of empire is ubiquitous, in fields ranging from 
architecture and vexillology to poetry and prose, with such imperial visual memes
1165
 as we 
encountered in Chapter Two harking back to the imagination of a legitimate link with an 
artificial Rome. Yet the majority – perhaps all – of these media, from buildings to paintings, 
are geographically restricted. The majestic monuments of Georgian, Victorian, and modern-
era Europeans – as grandiose and politically overt as they are – are all too often restricted to 
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capital cities, unseen to many members of the state. Portraits and paintings gather dust in 
private galleries while those in public exhibitions are only fleetingly glimpsed by a 
handful.
1166
 Even in a Digital Age imperium with its television channels, websites, magazine 
covers and mass education, not all inhabitants will regularly encounter icons of the state. 
Euronews, the Union’s Europa web portal, and the proliferation of pamphlets and political 
paraphernalia coming out of Brussels and Strasbourg are, to those who choose not to tune in, 
as distant to them as were the metropolitan monuments of the Emperor to a provincial 
plebeian in the Roman Empire. Yet there is one medium of propagating political discourse 
which, barring a relative lull – but not absence – in Europe from the fifth to thirteenth 
centuries,
1167
 few Europeans have been able to do without since the Caesars conquered the 
continent. This medium is money. 
 
As Simon Coupland states, ‘coins ... convey an ideological message’1168 and the 
importance of numismatic iconography to our understanding of cartoimperialism cannot be 
understated. Indeed, Hariklea Papageorgiadou-Bani highlights the lack of scholarly interest in 
the discourses of power which every day pass between our fingers; a relative absence which 
has been identified and lamented for decades.
1169
 Such seemingly innocent images are 
possibly the most powerful conveyors of political – and by extension, imperial – imaginations 
and thus warrant a full study. In the previous chapter we examined the continuing historical 
importance of maps in the public sphere; in this case, in the context of maps in official 
European Union media.  
 It is not the intention of this chapter to perform an exhaustive critique of how money 
has been, and is, used to promote politics in different places and eras. Our focus remains the 
European Union and its maps. Yet we cannot even understand, let alone appreciate and 
analyse, the persuasive power of Europe’s coinage cartographies without first investigating 
the roots of the phenomenon. Like empire itself, numismatic politics are the product of a long 
and complex evolution of different discourses; and just as an historical investigation 
suggested that the roots of “empire” are found in the international politics of Early Medieval 
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Europe, so too does a numismatic study reveal the origins of explicitly “imperial” currency in 
precisely the same place and time.  
This chapter begins with an investigation of numismatic theory before assessing the 
historical context of numismatic power. Like the discourse of empire, the discourse of 
imperial imagery did not appear overnight but is the product of centuries of intellectual 
evolution, and thus it is vital to understand its macrohistorical origins
1170
 in order to 
appreciate the unique power of euro maps. Subsequently, using the methods established in 
Chapters Three and Four, the maps appearing on euro coins and banknotes will be 
interrogated in search not only of cartographic constructs and imperial imaginations, but the 
synthesis of elements which render euro coins and banknotes the very pinnacle of 
cartoimperialism. Thus we begin with an overview of the nature and importance of 
numismatics. 
 
 
6.1 In Europe We Trust 
 
In 1963 at the height of the First Cold War,
1171
 numismatists at the United States Federal 
Reserve altered the motto of the US dollar to contrast Soviet atheism – changing the legend 
from E Pluribus Unum
1172
 to In God We Trust.
1173
 Notwithstanding the sociopolitical circus 
this triggered between America’s endlessly squabbling theists and secularists, the motto is an 
interesting choice. For it is not in God that we the public place our numismatic trust, but in 
the state which issues these artefacts. 
The act of creating a state currency is what Andrew Stewart terms a ‘universalizing 
technique’ to centre political power in a particular body, a political trick traceable to 
Alexander the Great and beyond.
1174
 This technique only functions if we, the users of these 
otherwise worthless little discs and slips of paper, believe that they have value. This value is 
only constructed through trust, and such trust, as Josh Lauer argues, is created only by the 
issuing authority adorning currency with the symbols, icons, and emblems of the state. Such 
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icons become runes of power, which the users of money revere with an almost religious faith 
as we collectively agree – and believe – that it is these pictures and patterns which trigger a 
transubstantiation of money from small, valueless trinkets, to holders of such economic 
power that these worthless objects can be exchanged for the very means of sustenance and 
existence, all backed up by the power of the state. It was not by coincidence that foreign, or 
privately- or regionally-issued currencies in nineteenth century polities were quickly phased 
out in favour of a single, state-approved format,
1175
 for one of the byproducts of Western 
modernisation was the growing acceptance of currency issued only by the state. And just as 
currency only works by virtue of those magical symbols anointing it with the power of the 
state, so too can the state only engender the public’s trust by peppering its coins and 
banknotes with easily- and universally-recognised icons of the supreme sovereign. It is not in 
God we trust to back up the socially-agreed value of the clinking discs and rustling papers in 
our purses and wallets; it is in the State that we trust – and it is in the recognisability of 
certain images that the state trusts. For as Sutherland notes, ‘neat and well-chosen pictorial 
symbolism explained itself’.1176 
While this usually goes unnoticed, it nevertheless occurs. Let us consider an example: 
one which most of us, at some point in our lives, will have experienced. 
For whatever reason, we have arrived at an airport in some faraway land. One of the 
first things we do after collecting our luggage, as Simon Hawkins identifies,
1177
 is to visit the 
bureau de change and exchange our familiar old banknotes for the cash of our temporary 
host. After leaving the bureau we gawk at the exotic and unfamiliar money in our hands, 
memorising the size, shape, colour, and value of each note and coin; scrutinising its exotic 
political symbols and complex iconographies offering a visual narrative of the state and its 
sovereign, history and inhabitants.
1178
 We rarely, if ever, do this in our own countries. Yet 
overseas we take time to visually dissect the political icons stamped onto notes and coins. 
The simple reason is that, contrary to the ambitious aspirations of nineteenth-century bank 
managers,
1179
 money is not something which is studied or queried by those whose fingers it 
regularly passes between. As Lauer highlights, ‘physical circulating money is often taken for 
granted; it is ubiquitous and prosaic to the point of invisibility’.1180 Wambui Mwangi explains 
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this as the difference between seeing and looking; that cash ‘is usually seen only incidentally 
in the process of being transacted, in other words “seen” as a matter or habit and not as the 
result of concentration.’1181 Excepting our visit to the bureau de change, we generally do not 
study the images on money, including the euro. Yet this does not render the power of the 
currency any less significant. Indeed, the truth is quite the opposite. For it is in the everyday 
banality of the images passing between our fingers that power lies. Our religious faith in the 
value of cash is so strong that we do not need to examine each coin and note in a transaction 
– a brief glance for the purposes of some quick mental arithmetic is all that we deem 
necessary. Our trust in currency is total – and by extension, so is the trust of issuer and user in 
the icons adorning its surfaces. And there is no more effective vehicle of trust than the map. 
 The use of the map as a numismatic icon is old, but remarkably rare. Indeed prior to 
the introduction of the euro in 1999, maps on currency were very much the exception. 
Vincent Virga notes the use of crude cartographies on Ionian coins of the fourth century 
BC,
1182
 but in the face of a cartographically illiterate public with infrequent access to 
coinage,
1183
 such iconography remained virtually unheard-of. Barber and Harper discuss the 
somewhat broader use of maps on European Early Modern coins between the fifteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; reminding us that such iconography was for purposes not practical, but 
political. Individual Freie Reichsstädte and sovereign Herrschaftsgebiete
1184
 within the 
moribund, post-1648 Heiliges Römisches Reich minted such coins as ‘civic pride could be 
expressed through a miniature town view’ to declare sovereignty in the face of the impotent 
and increasingly ignored Reich,
1185
 while larger-scale cartographies of regions, nations, or 
even the entire globe, served a dual purpose of commemorating voyages of exploration 
alongside expressing claims of possession or acquisitorial rights. However, these were 
designed for collection by an elite, rather than circulation among the populace. The proud 
political discourse proffered by them, while quite evident, was not one for public 
consumption. 
 Banknotes were even less prone to depict the country. With the exception of 
occasional national personifications pointing at their country’s position on a globe,1186 or 
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maps used to demonstrate the site of scientific events or achievements within a state,
1187
 maps 
are almost invisible from notes. At first glance this is remarkable, considering that maps 
appeal to moneymakers’ desire for complex images which deter forgers.1188 The euro, 
though, not only features maps – it is emblazoned with cartography. Indeed, the only 
universal image amidst the otherwise varied iconography issued by the ECB, aside from the 
twelve gold stars of the Union,
1189
 is a map. As we shall see, it is the one connecting icon, 
and the only icon recognisable to anyone who looks at it. 
 We might well be forgiven, then, for initially thinking that cash is politically neutral; a 
harmless assortment of paper quadrangles and small metal circles which nestle quietly in 
purses and pockets until we approach a shopkeeper or a customer approaches us, whereupon 
they disappear from our sight in a quick, apparently apolitical transaction which requires no 
more conscious thought than the basic addition and subtraction we learned before we could 
read and write. But this is not so. Numismatic theory emphasises to us that currency and its 
iconography are far from apolitical; indeed it is so highly politicised that we are no longer 
aware of its indissoluble associations with state, government, legitimacy, and the invocation 
of imaginary pasts to justify the present. The bits of folded paper in our wallets and the 
clinking discs in our purses are supreme emblems of state and sovereignty. As they are the 
exclusive monopoly of the state and as they circulate between the purchasing publics of 
Earth’s one hundred and ninety-four sovereign states on a daily basis, coins and banknotes 
are, arguably, by far the most powerful vehicles for the expression of authority and ambition, 
power and propaganda. Coins are a powerful vehicle for the promotion of political 
messages
1190
 but far more significantly, they are the ideal vehicle of cartoimperialism.  
In her critical study of Scottish banknote iconography, Jan Penrose laments that 
‘scholars tend to evoke ill-defined notions of “the state”, “the national elite” and/or some 
unspecified part of “the government” to explain who determines banknote iconography and 
how this is achieved’.1191 This is a fair criticism and one which must be borne in mind when 
considering the European Union, whose government structures are still fluid and emergent. 
This brings us to the questions of who selected the map as the dominant feature of euro 
currency – and why – and how this might affect a cartoimperial interpretation of euro maps. 
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The first question is readily answered by Robert Fishman and Anthony Messina, 
whose study of the manifold aspects of the euro outlines the selection process followed by 
European Central Bank directors in choosing the map as an icon.
1192
 Significantly, the 
decision rested with one individual: Robert Kalina of the Austrian National Bank.
1193
 This 
will be examined in greater detail throughout the chapter.  
The second question is less directly answered, as a cartoimperial interpretation of EU 
maps would inevitably raise more than a few eyebrows in Brussels. The idea that European 
Bank directors and European cartographers are pursuing a deliberate policy of encouraging 
an identity based on legitimacy through association with a constructed past – the essence of 
empire – warrants similar caution.1194 As Kalina himself specifies, the map was chosen for its 
apparent neutrality, and a single graphic artist commissioned to produce a suitable piece of 
seemingly bland, inoffensive cartography.
1195
  
In the light of such an apparently innocent process, we must query why we are 
examining euro maps. Interrogating coin iconography, whether cartographic or not, is a field 
fraught with its own potential pitfalls. As Richard Reece suggests, ‘there are all sorts of 
different ways of looking into this [iconographic interpretation]’1196 and subsequently a 
purely tropic approach to coin maps – notwithstanding the invaluable foundation laid by 
other scholars’ studies of tropes alone1197 – does not go quite far enough. Joseph Galloy 
additionally argues in his study of the political iconography of South American currency, 
analysis of tropes alone – colour, shapes, and symbols – does not suffice.1198 Similarly, we 
are not primarily concerned with the proliferation of local designs on the reverse of Euro 
coins. Our object of study is the cartography depicted on obverse faces of coins and notes, 
and it is not enough to merely examine the gradients, projections, and cartographic clutter of 
Euro coin-maps, as it is the meta-tropes which are of importance. 
 Of course, there are drawbacks to such an approach. One curious problem is that 
engaging with the makers of such icons may only further muddy the interpretive waters. 
Tonio Hölscher emphasises that visual language is not consciously devised, but instead 
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emerges and evolves of its own accord,
1199
 while the creation of a visual language is itself ‘a 
largely unconscious process’.1200 The intention of the designer becomes, as a consequence, 
negligible compared to the interpretation of the viewer. Penrose is right to remind us that it is 
inadequate to simply claim that maps are produced by a faceless state, but it is equally 
problematic to inquire of ECB directors, and the cartographers they commissioned, why they 
selected such designs; as such an approach will quickly flounder in the psychological morass 
that Gadamer terms the effective historical consciousness. 
It may be perfectly possible to engage with the individuals responsible. We know that 
the directive for producing a map originated with Robert Kalina, in response to a committee 
choosing designs submitted as part of a public competition.
1201
 And we know who drew the 
map in question: Luc Lucyx of the Royal Belgian Mint, a graphic artist rather than a 
cartographer.
1202
 We need not fear Penrose’s warning about creating a lumpencategory lazily 
called “the state”. But the problems identified are only exacerbated. 
In his study of ancient coins, Christopher Howgego laments the lack of evidence on 
who chose particular iconographies, and why. While there is evidence that deliberate political 
messages were occasionally propagated,
1203
 the historical record is incomplete. In the absence 
of such records, the best that iconographers can do is make educated guesses based on cross-
referencing against the few scraps of literature which, unlike their coinage cousins, have not 
aged well. In the case of the Union, nothing could be further from the truth. We are well 
aware of who chose and designed the coins. Yet as Gadamer’s ‘effective historical 
consciousness’ reminds us, a direct approach of questioning Messrs. Kalina and Lucyx could 
easily be counter-productive. The relevant individuals might consider the influence of 
different reasons for selecting a map, rather than those subconscious issues and aspects of 
mapping, identified in Chapter Three, of which they may have been unaware. Penrose 
identifies this also, reminding us that ‘banknote design can be arbitrary, ad hoc, inconsistent 
and highly personalized’,1204 and it is for this reason that she bemoans the ‘limited and often 
tangenital insights into design processes’ which characterise those studies whose focus, in 
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contrast to vague ideas of “the state”, are ‘too explicitly concerned with the individuals 
involved in creation and selection’.1205 In visual language there are few, if any, definites, and 
it is a poor approach to assume that those who choose and create visual language are aware of 
all the reasoning behind their final decision.  
 Finally, and arguably most importantly, is the context of the euro’s design process. 
Far from being a propaganda project imposed by what Penrose rightly discerns as a formless 
“state” or a vague “elite”, designs for the euro were selected – not for the first time in 
numismatic history
1206
 – from entries to a public competition.1207 The creation of the 
continental currency was not part of a Machiavellian project wherein an amorphous group 
establishes propaganda, but a quasi-democratic structure. The result is what Fareed Zakaria 
termed ‘Money for Mars’;1208 a currency whose iconography is so bland as to be, with the 
exception of the map, almost unrecognisable as European. While there is still a powerful 
political discourse inherent to the maps on EU currency, there is certainly no grandiose 
proclamation of superiority and inferiority such as the overt, divisive, and sometimes sinister 
images which adorned the national currencies of the past.
1209
 Robert Kalina offers all the 
“insider knowledge” we need when he explains, that other competition entries were rejected 
by the ECB’s selection board on grounds of political correctness,1210 leaving the map as the 
most suitable image for expressing European togetherness. The ECB’s directors chose a map 
on the presumption that it would be less overtly political than images tied to nation-states or 
previous attempts to unify Europe under one banner
1211
 – and this reasoning is all that is 
required.  
Yet as this chapter demonstrates, the selection of the map as the dominant icon of 
European currency is neither apolitical nor even neutral. Individually, currency and maps are 
two of the most powerful vehicles for the construction of political discourses. Combined, the 
result is that Europe’s common currency becomes the site of cartographic control; the 
channelling of an emergent identity based upon imperial maps.   
 Not only is the Union’s continental currency emblazoned with cartographies 
appealing to the imperial imagination – as this chapter shall argue – but money itself is a 
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peerless vehicle for the promotion and encouragement of political imaginations which are, as 
Greirson argues, neither intended nor even realised by those who design currency.
1212
 Since 
the Bronze Age, cash has been a political artefact as a tool of the state, and Europe’s common 
currency, for all its noble intentions of political neutrality and the encouragement of themes 
of cohesion and peace among its users, cannot escape the tangled semiotic web of discourses 
and imaginations which have accompanied currency since the first metal discs were stamped 
out in a Lydian palace lost in the mists of time.
1213
 The ECB’s intentions may have been 
neutral, but the vehicle they chose is anything but. 
The imagery of currency is of crucial importance to understanding the formation of 
Europe’s emergent imperial imagination, but in contrast to the maps we examined in the 
preceding chapter, the maps on euros are not meant to be visual spectacles. ‘Not all images’, 
writes Mwangi in her analysis of the colonial currencies of imperial Britain, ‘are meant to be 
looked at. Some, like those on banknotes, are only meant to be seen.’1214 Currency images are 
not intended to be the focus of direct attention; a fact attested since at least the Roman period, 
if not earlier.
1215
 And it is because currency images are not designed to be scrutinised that we 
can impart in infinity of interpretations upon them.
1216
 That currency imagery can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways is attested by the case of Roman coinage, which since its very 
minting has been the subject of disagreements between handlers as to the messages contained 
within, and modern antiquarians are no more immune to these loud debates than the market-
browsers of an Iron Age day in the Roman Forum.
1217
 Indeed, given the infinite 
interpretability of images – regardless of the intentions of those who designed them – it could 
be argued that there is little point in analysing euro currency maps.  
‘The problem,’ argues Richard Reece, ‘as always with interpretation, is that 
[iconographic analysis] is a matter of thought, behaviour and concepts, none of which can be 
approached logically through material. You can sit and gaze at the material, commune with it, 
subject it to stringent statistical analyses, or absorb its vibrations, but none of these, or any 
other procedures, will lead logically to an interpretation. Once you have taken in what 
material there is, and where it is, you are free to fantasise; and your fantasies can only be 
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proved wrong, they can never be proved right.’1218 We identified in Chapter Three that check-
list analyses would lead us nowhere: similarly, engaging on a personal level is similarly 
futile. A focus group on the meanings of euro cartographic iconographies would be an 
exercise in futility – whether the survey was of thirty Europeans or three hundred million, the 
variety of answers would remain the same. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is no 
universal consensus on the meanings of something as everyday as colour: it is wishful 
thinking to imagine that there is a universal law of map interpretation. In the face of this, 
what then is the purpose of interrogating currency maps? 
 The answer is that, as has been identified, maps are a uniquely powerful vehicle of 
political messages: messages which Sutherland is reluctant to term ‘propaganda’,1219 but 
which remain political discourses regardless of what word we employ. Furthermore, the 
suggestion that currency maps are seen rather than looked at is no reason to discount a study. 
Indeed, the opposite is true. As vehicles of political discourses which are so prolific as to be 
physically handled by three hundred million Europeans every day; artefacts whose every 
passage between fingers creates an infinity of brief moments wherein two strangers are united 
as Europeans – moments whose increasing frequency leads inevitably to the critical mass of a 
European identity emerging – the maps on European currency are contributors to 
cartoimperialism. To commission a Forma urbis Romae, a Leo Belgicus, or a L’Empire 
d’Allemand and proudly place it in the Roman Forum, the town hall of Utrecht, or the lobby 
of the Nuremberg Rathaus, is to make a bold political statement, couched in visual language, 
seen by tens of thousands of eyes. But as we shall see, to commission a denarius, a thaler, or 
a Napoleon with a proud imperial portrait is to create an object which, due to its perpetual 
motion, reaches far more people than the public proclamation of identity on the walls of a 
state building can, and whose perpetual motion creates infinite, fleeting moments of political 
kinship between people who, biology aside, have nothing in common. Similarly, to 
commission a map of the European Union for a website or a pamphlet is to make a political 
statement which, even if it is unintentional, remains a political vehicle seen by countless eyes. 
But to commission a currency icon whose reproductions circulate every second from Porto to 
Poznan is, like the imperial currencies of yesteryear, to create moments of unity. And what 
better emblem of unity, what better icon to say who is one of the group – and who is not – 
than one whose perceived authority, on state-stamped objects, is unquestioned and accepted 
as gospel truth by its handlers, than the map? 
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It is evident that understanding the macrohistorical context within which currency-as-
politics emerged is of inherently greater significance than shallow querying of the ECB’s 
conscious choices. We turn now to understanding currency maps themselves. 
The pre-eminent pioneer of semiotics, Georg Simmel, offers a critical insight into the 
importance of currency. While Simmel’s study of over a century ago does not explicitly focus 
on the iconographies of money, it is his understanding of money as a form of social contract – 
which we examined above – which is enlightening. For Simmel, money is ‘fundamentally a 
measure of social trust’,1220 a medium of exchange and communication in which we citizens 
of the state place an almost religious faith.
1221
 We trust currency to have value, when it has 
none;
1222
 we trust money as it is provided by the supreme authority of the state. And a 
consequence of this is that coins ‘have basically two functions: (1) to identify coins to users 
... and (2) to disseminate propaganda’.1223 As currency is the sole prerogative of the state, and 
‘since coins circulate widely through the population, they can be used to provide an image of 
the ruler and express government policies’.1224 This lends coins and banknotes a very 
powerful place in geopolitical iconography. Consequently, we trust the images on money to 
be as legitimate, powerful, and permanent as the institution which issued it – even though the 
images (and maps) on money are as devoid of verisimilitude as the metal discs and paper 
rectangles upon which they await interpretation. 
The methods of semiotics and semantics for interpreting hyperreal visual language are 
already well-established in the field of numismatics.
1225
 Mwangi’s research points our inquiry 
in a direction which scholars of cartography frequently overlook; that is, the location and use 
of currency maps rather than their actual features. Or, to use terminology with which we are 
by now familiar, we will examine the meta-tropes of euro currency maps – such as their 
location, usage, and position within optical and tactile transactions
1226
 – rather than 
examining the mere tropes of colour, gradient, and projection. 
 Like the cartographies of websites and pamphlets, maps on euro currency are easy to 
examine. Only seven denominations of euro banknote exist, and only eight denominations of 
coin. To further assist, the European Central Bank graciously maintains an easy-to-access 
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website which gives helpful facsimiles of all of its currency. As in the preceding chapter, this 
enables us to search for what Gillian Rose describes as ‘recurring themes and visual 
patterns’1227 within this powerful discursive vehicle.  
 As physical objects, currency falls into the category of material culture. And as such, 
as Joseph Galloy recounts, currency ‘has the potential to transform societies through concepts 
and ideologies’.1228 This is due to the symbolic and transformative power of artefacts of 
material culture which, as Roland Barthes identified, ‘have a substance of expression whose 
essence is not to signify; often, they are objects of everyday use, used by a society in a 
derivative way, to signify something’.1229 
 Existing studies of euro currency are, in relation to the paucity of texts on general 
numismatic iconography, somewhat prevalent. Several scholars have approached the images 
on euros as vehicles of messages both subtle and overt.
1230
 Yet there remain two noticeable 
gaps. The first is that despite the relative attention given to euro symbolism, existing studies 
only briefly refer to cartography
1231
 if at all. As we have identified in previous chapters, maps 
are a form of icon and a unique vehicle more powerful than, and distinct from, abstract 
symbols or other representational icons. They require specific analysis on their own basis. 
The second gap concerns the focus on tropes alone at the expense of meta-tropes. 
 The tropes of Europe’s currency maps are of course significant and require critical 
investigation based upon their own merits, but the meta-tropes of where the maps are located 
is of equal, if not greater importance. Mwangi reminds us why; while the icons on currency 
share the same ‘insubstantiality’ of their paper and photonic counterparts on the Union’s 
websites and literature, there is a subtle yet essential difference. The maps examined in the 
previous chapter are designed to be looked at, as evidenced by the richness of their tropes and 
saturation with eye-catching aesthetics. Yet the maps on currency, as is the case with all 
numismatic icons, are designed to be seen. They are devoid of specific tropes – especially 
since the currency change of 2007 – and their function, as Mwangi identifies, is to be seen 
without being looked at. 
 In addition, currency is a moving vehicle. It is true that virtual money is as, if not 
more, prolific than hard cash, but cash is still sufficiently important as a means of economic 
transaction that the Union felt it necessary to release a new series of coins and banknotes in 
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May 2013.
1232
 The maps on EU websites and literature are static, unmoving, unchanging. 
Like the proud public cartographies of yesteryear, examined in Chapters Three and Four, they 
are immobile emblems of permanence and authority designed to stand the test of time and be 
absorbed by the eyes of innumerable viewers. But coins and banknotes are constantly moving 
‘in and out of one’s presence, in and out of one’s touch, in and out of pockets, wallets, banks, 
cash drawers, mattresses and so forth’.1233 The result is that the tiny, apparently unremarkable 
maps on Europe’s hard cash are in perpetual motion. As Mwangi argues, this permanent 
movement creates its own politics. Constant circulation of cash not only means that the maps 
are passing in and out of Europeans’ (and non-Europeans’) vision and consciousnesses on a 
daily, if not hourly, basis; but also means that an imagined community is assembled. 
 Mwangi identifies cash exchanges as one of the few instances wherein two inhabitants 
within the same polity – who are otherwise strangers by virtue of infinite factors – 
momentarily exist in the same identity as citizens of the state.
1234
 This occurs at the level of 
the nation-state, and the phenomenon has been remarked upon by numismatic and 
iconographic scholars (and cartographers)
1235
 studying that heyday of identity-building, the 
nineteenth century. But in the case of the European Union it is supra-national. Just as the 
transaction of state-stamped currency between a Gaul and a Greek in a Roman market, or a 
Picardian and a Parisian in a Victorian café, helped form an identity as inhabitants of the 
same political community, the act of exchanging an EU banknote or EU coins between an 
Italian and an Irishman – or even two members of the same Eurozone country – creates a 
moment, a space, in which two otherwise different individuals are briefly part of the same 
pan-continental group. As the ECB itself phrases it, this creates the possibility that ‘a French 
citizen can buy a hot dog in Berlin using a euro coin carrying the imprint of the King of 
Spain’,1236 cementing the concept of community. An identity begins to emerge, fluid and 
nascent, but quickly forming into a recognisable shape. The transactors in our hypothetical 
Roman market, the conjectural fin de siècle French café, and the ECB’s imaginary Bratwurst 
stall on Unter den Linden, form a collective identity. For a brief moment they are not 
individuals – they are both subjects of the Imperator on the Palatine Hill, citizens of the 
Republique Française, or members of the continental community. Yet these moments, while 
brief, are not isolated. They occur with great regularity, each time allowing this momentary 
collectivity to emerge. 
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 Eric Helleiner postulates that in times past, ‘policymakers recognised that exclusive 
and standardised coins and notes might provide an effective vehicle for their project of 
constructing and bolstering a sense of collective tradition and memory’, as ‘it was thought 
that territorial currencies might encourage identification with the nation-state at a deeper 
level.’1237 At first glance, this is a very tempting proposition, which appears to be supported 
by historical evidence. Yet in spite of authoritative statements supporting this notion,
1238
 we 
must be careful not to be seduced into the realm of unquestioned assumptions regarding 
agency and intent.
1239
 As Jan Penrose is right to point out, numismatic scholars are too hasty 
in their presuppositions that currency is part of a deliberate propagandising project overseen 
by a Machiavellian agency such as “state”, “elite”, or “sovereign” – even though these terms 
are woefully vague.
1240
 Similarly it must be borne in mind, as Howgego points out, that just 
because currency depicts political icons it is not necessarily the case that there is a deliberate 
and sustained policy of promoting propaganda in this way.
1241
  
‘Money’, writes Simon Hawkins in his study of identity and banknotes, ‘is too 
valuable to ignore’.1242 In the case of the European Union, this is demonstrably true, and an 
investigation of its currency iconography is essential. The consequence is, as Philip Reece 
identifies, that ‘the way forward is to ask questions rather than to accept statements’.1243 In 
the murky realm of visual rhetoric, semantic iconographies, and cartographic interpretation, 
there are no right or wrong answers. Attempting to identify or impose the perceptions of the 
makers only exacerbates the problem. Yet while there may not be universal laws of 
cartography-as-iconography, themes can be identified and distinguished. In order to 
understand the Union’s money maps, then, it is critical that we place coins as discourses of 
political imaginations, in the historical context from which they emerged. It is thus to 
macrohistory that we turn. 
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6.2 The Priests and the Portrait 
 
‘Then the Pharisees went out and laid plans to trap Him in His  
words.
 
They sent their disciples to Him along with the Herodians.  
“Teacher,” they said, “we know that You are a man of integrity and  
that You teach the way of the LORD in accordance with the truth. 
You aren’t swayed by others, because You pay no attention to 
who they are. Tell us then, what is Your opinion? Is it right to pay 
the tax to Caesar or not?” 
But Jesus, knowing their evil intent, said, “You hypocrites, why are  
you trying to trap Me? Show Me the coin used for paying the 
tax”. They brought Him a denarius, and He asked them “Whose 
portrait is this? And whose inscription?” 
“Caesar’s”, they replied. 
Then He said to them, “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and  
render unto the LORD what is the LORD’s”.’ 
         Matthew 22:15-21 (NIV) 
 
 Since their inception in Bronze Age Anatolia, coins have been used for the promotion 
of political messages. In the above snippet of Scripture Christ uses the denarius, Rome’s 
basic unit of currency, to illustrate a theosophical argument. Insodoing he inadvertently 
illustrates the long-recognised political power of currency.  
 The Pharisees give Christ a coin, and in answer to their question Christ points to the 
image of Caesar. But it is not Julius Caesar. It is Tiberius, whose title – a discourse which 
looks back to an imaginary past to justify the present – is “Caesar”.1244 The point Christ 
inadvertently makes is that the iconography on the coin does not represent a particular 
political figure but rather represents the entirety of the Roman state. The image of the 
emperor – Caesar – acts as a synecdoche for the state apparatus and an emblem of the general 
sovereignty of the Eternal City, not the restricted, particular sovereignty of a temporal 
emperor.
1245
 This is of importance. 
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Numismatic theory offers some invaluable insights into the role and impact of images 
on coins, which since their inception, have been used to communicate subtle political 
messages of power, legitimacy, and prestige – the troika of what we have termed 
cartoimperialism – and this is applied to Union currency as a prime area for the propagation 
of imperial discourses. This is particularly so in the context of metatropes, as Union currency 
circulates between the fingers of some 332,000,000 euro users every day:
1246
 thus the location 
of these maps is of critical importance when considering the expression of empire. 
Christ’s remarks on the denarius are not a mere account of an episode one sultry day 
in Iron Age Judea. They provide an overview of the unique power of coin iconography; a 
power which has passed down through the ages to the maps now adorning the continental 
currency. As with the very discourse of empire, it is in the frosty relations between Germans 
and Greeks in the ninth century that empire’s expression in currency originates. But as with 
the discourse, it is essential to understand the manufactured past which is appropriated. In our 
quest to understand this vital aspect of European Empire, all roads once again lead to Rome. 
 
6.2.1 The Eternal City 
 
“It can now be taken for granted that in antiquity coins were one of the principal means by 
which central authority disseminated all kinds of messages. Their role as a substantial vehicle 
of propaganda attained its fullest flowering in the Roman period, when the imperial elite used 
them in every conceivable way, alongside literature and architecture, as an effective means of 
publicizing and articulating the official point of view about a variety of matters. The coinage 
was always under the absolute authority of the central imperial authority and subordinate to 
its purposes, notably to convey information in a subtle form to the citizenry of the entire 
Roman Empire.”1247 
 
 Papageorgiadou-Bani’s above assessment of the power of monetary iconography in 
antiquity is as true today as at the time of the Caesars. As Sutherland notes, ‘coinage is the 
prerogative of the supreme authority of the state’,1248 and coins have always been conveyors 
of political messages. Christopher Ando’s study of contemporary Roman documents 
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concludes that Romans themselves – whether patricians or plebeians – were perfectly aware 
that coins were vehicles of political discourse: even if that nature of those discourses was, and 
remains, contested.
1249
 
It has been argued that the genesis of explicitly imperial coinage was the Early Middle 
Ages, as the squabbling courts at Constantinople and Aachen sought to legitimise their claim 
to the title of Imperium Romanorum, the defenders of civilisation. Philip Grierson points us to 
the legacy of Roman and Byzantine imaginations of power, and their impact upon 
iconography; while in his study of imperial numismatics, Christopher Howgego argues that 
‘the imperial coinage of Rome parades an imperial ideology in by far the most blatant and 
systematic way’.1250 As scholars identify, Roman coins promoted clear imperial messages, 
establishing a precedent which continues to this day. 
In his study of ancient polities, Howgego argues that more than military power, 
cultural dominance, or economic hegemony, it is the legal right to mint and distribute coins 
which defines state sovereignty, legitimacy, and power
1251
 – and by extension, defines who is 
not considered legitimate through denial of the right to mint coins. One of the first acts of a 
newly-independent polity, besides producing such artefacts of manufactured modernity as 
flags, anthems, and all the associated paraphernalia of industrial nationalism, is to produce a 
currency. This is a remarkably universal phenomenon, visible as recently as the creation of 
the new South Sudanese Pound by the newly-independent Republic of South Sudan,
1252
 and 
as far-distant as the coins shaped and stamped by Cilicians, Syrians, and Phoenicians 
following the withdrawal of Seleucid power in the first-century BC Levant.
1253
 In its late 
1990s creation of a continental currency, the European Union was simply following an 
ancient legacy of defining and asserting the uniqueness and independence of a new state, 
while simultaneously proclaiming unity and sovereignty through the replacement of local 
currencies with a single unit.  
Yet just as it was the retrospective imagination of Rome, rather than the historical 
reality itself, which spawned the discourse of empire, so too was it the imagination of public 
legitimacy which spawned modern political numismatics. Seeking an overt connection to an 
imagined past is only one aspect of the phenomenon. And it was in Charlemagne’s Europe 
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that the modern-day phenomenon of political currency emerged. As Kent highlights,
1254
 the 
coinage of more modern empires – from the Holy Romans and Napoleonic France to 
Victorian Britain and Fascist Italy – testifies to deliberate attempts to connect the imperial 
present with an imagined past. 
‘It is with the imagery of the world’, asserts Howgego in his discussion of the 
iconography of legitimacy, ‘often represented as a globe, that the right of the Romans to 
universal rule is most clearly expressed ... Rome had a mission and a right to rule.’1255 As we 
have seen, the use of maps on coins was comparatively rare prior to the Modern period, and 
even today remains uncommon. Yet the Romans’ use of such iconography as the globus,1256 
globus cruciger,
1257
 and such inscriptions as RESTITUTORI  ORBIS  TERRARUM ,
1258
 
established a tradition which survives today, albeit marginally, of using territorial markers to 
signify legitimacy of rule. As Howgego identifies, ‘the visual and verbal languages of 
imperial ideology were used (deliberately or not) to construct images of the emperor and 
empire,
1259
 a phenomenon whose legacy has given currency its unrivalled power. 
 The maps displayed on euro coins continue this tradition in a more subtle form, while 
those on euro banknotes are blatant depictions of an imperial manifest destiny that would not 
be unrecognisable to the triumviri monetales of Rome.
1260
 The maps of euro currency may 
not go quite as far as their distant Roman ancestors by depicting a figure, sword in hand, 
standing with her foot on the globe in a powerful personification of Rome’s omnipotence,1261 
but the message proclaimed by euro notes is precisely the same. The boundaries of the 
imperium have been expanded, and the imperium is the sole legitimate sovereign of the 
assimilated and remaining territories.  
Legitimacy is a powerful element of political iconography, particularly where the 
state is concerned. It comes as little surprise that it is also an ancient aspect. Grierson 
highlights the Byzantine approach whereby ‘in order to assure the succession, emperors 
associated their sons with them as co-emperors, and the coinage was intended to advertise the 
dynasty’.1262  
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This trait of depicting the body politic as a natural, unbroken succession became yet 
more significant during Byzantine iconoclasm; when coin portraits were reduced to an 
abstract, uniform depiction representing the office of emperor rather than the particular 
individual holding it.
1263
 Thus the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy – emphasised 
through repetition of universally-recognisable symbols
1264
 depicting the Byzantine basileus 
as God’s vicegerent – were depicted via emblems encapsulating the idea of power and the 
idea of empire as a light against the non-Byzantine darkness. What is of particular interest is 
that such coins used recognisable symbols to perform what we identified in Chapter Four as a 
synecdochal metonym. Let us explore this further. 
 As identified, the apex of Byzantine iconoclasm in the eighth century – a period when 
lifelike images of God, saints, and the emperor were demolished as heretical – saw the 
emergence of a new style of coin iconography. The specific emperor was not depicted, but 
rather a representation of imperial power via a bland, “one-size-fits-all” silhouette of a 
generic ruler. Recalling the earlier discussion of synecdochal metonyms – a phenomenon 
whereby a part comes to represent the whole, and a practice wherein depictions of that part 
come to represent the whole – we clearly see a political synecdoche in Byzantine coinage 
which influenced political iconography for centuries to come, in the form of portraiture of the 
sovereign as representations of the body politic and the nation. And even today, some six 
centuries after Byzantium was consigned to the history books, the same political synecdoche 
occurs. The image of the sovereign – a part representing the national whole – no longer 
appears in human form. Yet it endures in a new, more powerful format. This is the map – a 
political part representing a continental whole, and vice-versa – an emblem sufficiently 
similar to a specific image for its viewers to recognise it, yet sufficiently abstract to convey 
political unrealities. Indeed the icon must be vaguely recognisable, for currency iconography 
functions according to what Karen Strassler terms ‘mimetic verisimilitude’;1265 the public’s 
ability to recognise symbols and icons in state-affiliated media as expressions of authority 
and assurance. The symbols are not only recognisable but deliberately so, for as 
Papageorgiadou-Bani asserts:  
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‘Deeply rooted in the consciousness of the rulers was the conviction that the 
symbolic means offered by the iconography of coins were sufficiently strong 
to communicate to the people messages that the central authority wished to 
convey – regardless of the actual impact enjoyed by ... inscriptions’1266 
 
 Bani’s words could describe imperial iconography at any point in history. Of course, 
Papageorgiadou-Bani writes in specific relation to Greek colonies in the Roman Empire; but 
the sense that emblems can convey powerful messages in visual rather than verbal language 
which can transcend local interpretations and languages, remains true in the case of the 
Union. The message of Rome’s currency was unity in an apparently globe-spanning 
civilisation. The message of the Union is, as we are by now familiar, being “United in 
Diversity” in the continental community. The most effective means of transcending local 
variations in polyglot, polycultural Europe is visual, and has been so since the days of 
Augustus and Nero. 
 On the surface, the modern euro bears only passing resemblance to the coins of 
yesteryear. There are no portraits of sovereigns, like those on imperial predecessors or even 
contemporary currencies used by non-Eurozone EU members. There are no adulatory 
religious images nor ‘laudatory epithets’1267 to aggrandise the ruler, and especially no images 
of violent aggression against neighbours.
1268
 Indeed it would appear that there is nothing 
besides shape and function to connect modern Union currency with the coins of long-
forgotten societies. Yet this benign perception is inaccurate. Just as the discourse of empire 
itself has evolved and transformed from the primordial politics of Franks and Byzantines; just 
as the function of maps has morphed and adapted to suit political and ideological purposes, so 
too is currency the product of a long and complex development saturated with inescapable 
political motivations and ideologies – a truth as valid in today’s Union as it was at the apex of 
power wielded by Rome or Constantinople. 
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6.2.2 The Continental Currency 
 
Europe is no stranger to continental currencies. Under Bonaparte, Europeans traded gold 
Napoleons from Madrid to Moscow,
1269
 while under the Caesars denarii passed between the 
fingers of Caledonians as much as Corinthians. At its military and political height before its 
post-1648 decline, the Holy Roman Empire’s thaler was a universal, if unofficial, European 
currency.
1270
 Yet of significant interest to this study is the obscure and mostly forgotten 
continental currency which followed in the wake of empire’s birth. 
In Chapter Two we grappled with the concept of empire, ultimately arriving at the 
discourse’s simultaneous evolution and genesis in the subtle, back-stabbing diplomacy 
between swaggering Franks and haughty Byzantines over a millennium ago. The apex of this 
discourse was that moment at the high altar of St Peter’s when Pope Leo slipped an old 
crown scavenged from the coffers of the Vatican
1271
 onto Charlemagne’s brow and recited a 
borrowed Byzantine rite, thus proclaiming the Rex Francorum the new Imperator 
Romanorum. It comes as no surprise that one of the first acts of the new Imperator 
Charlemagne, the first emperor of the first manifestation of Western empire, was to issue a 
distinctly imperial currency.
1272
 
 Of course, this is not a study of historical numismatics. But nevertheless a critical 
examination of Charlemagne’s currency is essential to our understanding of cartoimperialism 
in the modern-day successor to that new polity proclaimed twelve centuries ago.   
Simon Coupland points us to the monetary changes resulting from the Carolingian 
Renaissance. There was, of course, nothing new about coinage in Charlemagne’s realm prior 
to 800. Martin Price draws attention to Charlemagne’s coinage reforms of 794, which set a 
universal standard for designs,
1273
 some six years before the events of Christmas 800. What is 
curious is the sudden change in design in 812, following Constantinople’s grudging 
acceptance of Charlemagne as Emperor of the West; as portrayed by Figs 6.1 and 6.2: 
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   Fig. 6.1 – Pre-812 coin1274           Fig. 6.2 – Post-812 coin1275 
 
 It must be stressed that Figs 6.1 and 6.2 above are not two sides of the same coin. 
They are both obverse faces of two separate coins; one pre- and one post-812. Fig 6.1 is 
representative of many coins of the Early Middle Ages; an abstract design using a universally 
recognisable Christian icon – in this case, the Gothic cross – to express Christ’s dominion of 
the world and unity under Christ Pantocrator, along with lettering expressing the King’s 
sovereignty. Yet following Constantinople’s reluctant recognition of Charlemagne’s imperial 
title, as Fig 6.2 demonstrates, the iconography undergoes a radical change by appropriating a 
selective history to validate the present.
1276
  
 What, it might be asked, is explicitly imperial about this new currency? One face on a 
coin, to paraphrase Aristotle, does not empire make.
1277
 The answer is twofold. The discourse 
of empire lurks in both the tropes and the meta-tropes, for it is not only in maps that we find 
these phenomena, but in all forms of visual language. Using a portrait of a ruler for the 
obverse face of a coin was certainly not new in 812 – as we discovered above, the Romans 
had done so centuries before while the Byzantines continued to emblazon their coins with 
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crude renderings of the reigning basileus or generic office-holder. What is significant about 
Charlemagne’s adoption of the style is that it is a deliberate hearkening back to classical 
Rome, as Fig 6.3 shows: 
 
             
      Fig. 6.3 – Roman imperial denarius                      Fig. 6.4 – Frankish imperial denarius 
 
 The similarity here is striking, and as Coupland emphasises, quite deliberate.
1278
 The 
tropes of the iconography – Charlemagne in profile, wearing an antiquated costume and the 
laurel wreath of the long-extinct Caesars – are a powerful expression of the imperial 
discourse. It is a deliberate, visual expression of a yearning for power, legitimacy, and 
authority by deliberately associating the present with an imagined and reconstructed past; and 
in doing so, visually insisting that the new Imperium Romanum in Gothic Europe was just as 
legitimate as the still-extant Imperium Romanum under the rulers of Constantinople. And we 
know that the Carolingians themselves were aware of the power of such images, as Roman 
coins appear in post-Roman artefacts
1279
 while a cameo of Augustus holding an Imperial 
Aquila takes pride of place in the Reichskreuz, the grandiose crucifix placed on the altar at 
the coronations of subsequent Holy Roman Emperors.
1280
 The coins are merely a 
continuation of this. By dressing the King of the Franks in classical costume and inscribing 
KAROLUS IMP.AUG. – Charlemagne, Emperor and Augustus – a clear visual connection is 
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made between a manufactured and appropriated history to legitimise an equally manufactured 
present. It is an appeal for legitimacy vis-à-vis the contemporary Byzantines by 
manufacturing a collective history to claim that the toiling peasants of Early Medieval Europe 
were one people, descendants of Rome. It is a deliberate appeal to the masses – who 
increasingly used actual coins alongside barter
1281
 – and those beyond Charlemagne’s 
imperium, particularly the stagnant society under the basileus in faraway Byzantium, in order 
to claim that the present was justified as it was a continuation of the past. Even though the 
shared spatiotemporal community of Charlemagne’s united Europe was every bit as artificial 
as the metal disc on which it appeared. Nevertheless as Coupland states, ‘in putting his stamp 
so firmly on the Frankish coinage, Charlemagne’s people, rich and poor alike, cannot but 
have been impressed by the emperor’s power and prestige.’1282 
 At this point we might wonder what, if any, connection there is between the 
archaeological finds of a defunct and obscure fiefdom of the first millennium, and the sleek, 
polished currency adopted by European states at the beginning of the third. The answer is 
hiding in the meta-tropes.  
As is the case with the very discourse of empire and all its attendant paraphernalia, 
currency is as powerful a vehicle of political imagination today as it was millennia ago. And 
just as the discourse itself has evolved from Charlemagne, so too has the iconography which 
propagates that discourse. Consider Figs. 6.5 and 6.6 below, examples of currency from much 
later leaders who entertained aspirations of Imperium Europaeum: 
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Fig. 6.5 – Silver thaler of Leopold I1283 
 
 
Fig. 6.6 – Napoleon; coin of Emperor Napoleon I1284 
 
 The discourse of empire continues here, and the icon of the state’s leaders – Leopold I 
of the Holy Roman Empire and Napoleon Bonaparte, appearing in Roman imperial dress  
(notably the laurel wreath with which Julius Caesar, and by extension, all Imperators were 
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depicted) remained in European coinage until the last decades of the twentieth century.
1285
 
This trope, which Michelle Gannon calls the iuxta morem Romanorum,
1286
 is merely one 
aspect. Like Charlemagne’s coins, it is the meta-trope of depicting the reigning sovereign on 
the front of the coin, which is most powerful. As we discovered earlier, the only reason that 
currency functions as a medium of exchange is that we trust the sovereign to back up the 
constructed value of otherwise worthless little trinkets and scraps of paper. By imprinting the 
sovereign on the face of the coin – or banknote – this trust is reinforced. A trust that declares 
the current sovereign to be both legitimate and powerful; stretching back to Charlemagne’s 
portrait as a means of visually insisting to the Holy Roman population that he, and his polity, 
were both legitimate and powerful. Indeed ‘Charlemagne’s ... coinage type, bearing the 
imperial portrait,’ argues Coupland, ‘is arguably ... ideologically the most important. Its 
purpose was undoubtedly to convey an image of imperial power and prestige, depicting 
Charlemagne as successor to the Roman emperors on whose coinage this type was 
modelled.’1287 
Thus for the entirety of twelve centuries following the first imperial coin being 
stamped out in a forgotten Frankish mint, national currencies have strengthened the social 
contract between state and shopper, sovereign and subject, by imprinting their currency with 
a clear, and recognisable, image of the supreme sovereign’s legitimacy, power, and in many 
cases, appeal to an imaginary imperial history. 
Coupland notes that it was the success of Charlemagne’s imperial iconography that 
prompted his successors – and ultimately, other European states and their own successors 
from the High Middle Ages to the present day – to adopt portraiture as the prime symbol of 
their coins.
1288
 Even in societies which had lost all connection to Rome or had been enemies 
of it, as Anna Gannon and Anthea Harris point out, the use of imperial motifs on coins in 
order to deliberately associate themselves with an imagined Roman past
1289
 or an imagined 
Byzantine present,
1290
 was clear – even to the extent, as Gannon highlights, of relatively petty 
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contemporary rulers producing coins which suggested that they held more power than the 
Imperator Romanorum, Charlemagne.
1291
 
Portraits of reigning monarchs impressed upon the people whose fingers and purses 
they passed through an image not only of the ruler but of the state and its power, legitimacy, 
and supremacy. Coins were, as they always have been and still are, extraordinarily powerful 
vehicles for promoting a political discourse; whether that discourse be the proclamation of 
legitimate imperium, the affirmation of God’s rule on Earth, the claim to be the rightful 
inheritor of an ancient and imagined Imperium Romanorum, or brave gestures of petty kings 
claiming superiority over the new Caesar. What connects the diverse iconographies of Rome, 
Byzantium, and Early Medieval Europe, though, are the threefold themes with which we are 
by now familiar – legitimacy, power, and unity; and the desire for all three. These are the 
defining characteristics of the discourse of empire and the foundations of cartoimperialism. 
And as shall now be argued, these themes are very much alive and well in today’s new 
imperium. 
 
 
6.3 Blood of the Commonwealth 
 
‘Coinage may be seen as symbolic at two levels. The use of a single coinage 
throughout an empire (whether exclusively or not) is a symbol of cohesion 
and belonging, affirmed by constant use. It is part of the active definition of 
what it means to be a subject/citizen of the empire. At the second level, the 
typology of the coins may itself be symbolic. This is most obvious in the case 
of portraiture, which implies that the individual represented is in some way 
symbolic of the state.’1292 
 
We have now identified what Howgego’s above quotation points to. Namely, that 
pan-European currencies – whether Denarius, Thaler, or Napoleon – are vehicles of political 
messages both subtle and brash, all proclaiming unity under a single spatiotemporal 
sovereign. But what is the connection to the contemporary currency issued by the latest pan-
European hegemon? Charlemagne may be the father of European Empire, but we might well 
wonder what significance his coinage has today. The current continental currency – not the 
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first, and undoubtedly not the last, in Europe – has a distinctly different iconography. With 
the exception of a handful of reverse faces minted by individual member-states – an ancient 
and almost universal practice which enables coinage to express ‘both the unity of the [polity] 
as a whole and the parity of its constituent parts’1293 –  euro coins do not depict a person on 
their obverse side. The portrait of the sovereign has disappeared, to be replaced by the 
seemingly neutral image of a map. At least, so it might appear if we assess only the tropes 
while ignoring the meta-tropes. Let us examine this a little further. 
 On the surface, there is nothing connecting the coins of the European Central Bank to 
those of Roman, Byzantine, or Carolingian mints. All such historical coins made an explicit 
proclamation of state power enshrined in the body of the sovereign. While some euro coins 
do feature images of people, they are historical personages of cultural or intellectual interest, 
rather than holders of any kind of political imperium.
1294
  
One answer lies in the Byzantine coins we examined above. In the nomismata of 
Byzantium, the image of the emperor changed from that of a specific reigning monarch to a 
generic emblem of the office of emperor. While this may have been no more than a hurried 
Byzantine response to the cycle of financial crises their embattled empire faced, the practice 
established a legacy of substituting a particular image for a general icon. It was for this 
reason in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that coins featuring a recently-deceased 
monarch remained legal tender – the bond of trust between state and user remained the 
concept of the sovereign, not the specific man or woman on the throne.
1295
 The presumed 
reflection of reality, as with maps, is in truth merely a representation. 
The representative symbol of the sovereign is analogous to the Blackadder sketch we 
examined in Chapter Four. The mushrooms on Lieutenant George’s military map are not 
symbols of real mushrooms, they are representations of something distinctly less pleasant. 
Yet they sufficiently resemble a concept – a mushroom – for him to recognise the shape. 
Inglehart’s modernisation theory provides a foundation for understanding this in relation to 
the euro – the makers of currency must ensure that the images on them can be interpreted and 
understood by their users.
1296
 For the almost religious faith we have in our currency to work, 
we must trust it to be valid; and the most effective means of doing this is to emblazon the 
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currency with a picture of the supreme sovereign. Whether this is the Princeps of the world, 
the cross of Christ, or the Corsican artilleryman who imposed a new imperium across Europe, 
the principle remains the same – it must be recognisable. For ‘currency’, write Unwin and 
Hewitt, ‘is one of the fundamental expressions of the sovereignty of any state’.1297 
As Thomas Hobbes identified, ‘Mony [is] the Bloud of a Common-wealth’, the 
binding agent without which the commonwealth will disintegrate for want of trust in its 
sovereign.
1298
 Even amidst a population otherwise stricken with cartohypnosis and graphic 
illiteracy, the map serves this purpose. We have been so bombarded with cartography in our 
ocularcentric present that, while we may not understand the map, we can recognise it. Thus 
the symbols of emperor and territory on imperial and euro coinage are sufficiently similar to 
that which they represent, rather than reflect, that the observer can elucidate their meaning – 
assuming of course, that the reader does not fall into the same synecdochal trap as Lieutenant 
George.  
As Howgego reminds us, coins are a powerful symbol of identity, defining this by 
deliberate association with a collective idea of unity.
1299
 In the case of historical coins this has 
been collective unification under a single sovereign body, while under the Union it is a 
collective idea of belonging to a bounded, bordered, exclusive community formed of 
Europeans; a people defined by a collective landmass. Charlemagne’s numismatic legacy of 
returning to Rome was not simply to pass down a tradition of depicting the sovereign’s face 
to emphasise the imagined legitimacy of his imperium. The tradition established was to 
represent the sovereign itself, the temporal body politic, in a single, instantly recognisable 
icon proclaiming power and legitimacy. For most of numismatic history the monarch’s body, 
as Ernst Kantorowicz demonstrates, was the sovereign.
1300
 But no longer. 
In a decentralised government such as the EU, in which sovereignty is not held by a 
single physical body – regardless of whether that body is the representation of mere 
ceremonial or actual power – a portrait will not suffice. What is important is depicting the 
body politic. In the EU’s case this is the European population. The idea that the new 
sovereign upon euro coins is the people rather than the ruler, or indeed the very notion that 
the euro is representing sovereignty in any way, might be thought excessively radical. Yet 
clear precedent exists.  
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In his monumental Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes equates state-produced money to the 
blood of the body politic, uniting and nourishing all parts of the sovereign – which itself is 
formed from the entirety of the state’s society.1301 Building upon this, Eric Hobsbawm 
demonstrates how the nineteenth century saw the transformation – sometimes gradual, 
sometimes rapid – of sovereignty in Europe from monarch to demos;1302 the evolution from 
personal sovereignty to popular sovereignty. And as Eric Helleiner argues, this was not only 
reflected in European national currencies, but acknowledged by contemporary observers.
1303
 
‘Many of those committed to this new sense of “popular sovereignty”’, as Helleiner argues, 
‘came to see territorial currency as an important tool that could help contribute to its 
realization’.1304 At the time of Roman, Byzantine, or Carolingian hegemony, power was 
indeed expressed in the form of a single individual – the Princeps of Rome, the Basileus of 
Constantinople, and the Imperator of Aachen. The sovereign of Europe, though, is not a 
single physical body. Like Hobbes’ Leviathan, the sovereign of Europe is a body politic; 
currently formed from a third of a billion individuals. This sovereign must be portrayed for 
our trust in scraps of paper and chunks of metal to be upheld. But depicting this number of 
humans on the face of a coin, is something of a challenge to even the most skilful of graphic 
artists. 
 For most of European history the visual emblem of power was the sovereign. But 
long-gone is the age when the European body politic was expressed in the physical bodies of 
individual Grand Dukes, Most Catholic Majesties, and Holy Roman Emperors. Since the 
Enlightenment, Europe has experienced a transference of sovereign power from a single 
individual to an impersonal multitude expressed through Assemblies, Parliaments, 
Directoires and Bundestage. Expressing sovereign power in the form of a single individual – 
even mythical personifications of Europa, Marianne, Britannia
1305
 – is a difficult task. The 
consequence is that as sovereign power spreads further from the body of one person, creating 
a recognisable emblem to symbolise that power becomes increasingly difficult. The 
nationalist regimes of twentieth-century Europe sought abstract symbols pillaged from the 
mythologies and iconographies of whatever ancient, half-fantasised civilisations with which 
they wished to associate themselves, but as a consequence such abstract political symbols are 
no longer appropriate. Something with less sinister connotations is needed. 
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 Josh Lauer argues that in contrast to national currencies which continue to embody 
sovereign power in portraits, ‘the faceless euro ... suggests the disavowal of national 
authority’.1306 Yet in contrast to Lauer’s argument, the euro continues to express authority; 
simply in a more subtle manner, and one far more appropriate for suggesting the power of the 
European Union than could be provided by a portrait. In the euro, sovereign power is once 
again expressed in a single, recognisable symbol which encapsulates the power, legitimacy, 
and authority of the new body politic. 
The most effective way of depicting the new body politic, the sovereign populace, is 
the map. As the currency is only legal tender within the countries of the Eurozone, anyone 
using the coin is, at the moment of using it, somewhere on that map. Yet while the map 
encapsulates the nation, it simultaneously divides the emergent community from those who 
do not belong. The map can only portray the nation through separation and inherent 
superiority, and by appealing to an imagined past through which to legitimise its bold 
cartographic claims, cartoimperialism emerges on currency:  
 
 
Fig. 6.7 – European Sovereign  
 
Coins, argue Pauliina Raento and her associates, are the most effective transmitters of 
political messages. Unlike banknotes, coins are accessible to ‘even the most marginalized 
citizens and small children’.1307 And as artefacts embedded within political imaginations, the 
circulation of these artefacts within the public realm lends them an immediate political nature 
regardless of whether or not this was the intention of their producers. Indeed, the political 
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implications of euro iconography were, as Hymans specifies, carefully considered
1308
 and the 
result is a currency designed to be territorial yet deterritorial; one which tries to break with 
the conventions of currency design yet is constrained by the semiotic circumstances from 
which no public image can escape. And in a monument of political irony, the icon chosen to 
apolitically represent the European people – the map – is the most politicised icon in the 
visual lexicon. 
 Helleiner is right to lament the absence of scholarly studies of currency iconography 
and its relationship to collective identity,
1309
 and offers rigorous accounts of how Victorian 
currencies helped foster such imagined communities. Yet curiously, Helleiner discounts the 
euro, stating that ‘it would be difficult to argue ... that the imagery on the euro ... is meant to 
foster a strong sense of common European identity’,1310 and focusing on the apparent 
dominance of the reverse, national faces of coins as opposed to the obverse, common face. 
Yet while Helleiner is partially right to point out that euro currency is devoid ‘of images of a 
common history, landscapes, or culture of the kind that is found on most national 
banknotes’,1311 it is precisely this bland ambiguity which affords euro iconography its 
imperial power. The landscape depicted is atemporal and spatially inaccurate – while also 
simultaneously collectivising and exclusionary – and a common history is not expressed, but 
alluded to in the depiction of a form of territoriality which includes, by the very fact that they 
are on euro currency, all Europeans who use euro coins. We might go so far as to argue that 
contrary to Helleiner’s assertion, it is the reverse faces of euro coins, rather than the obverse, 
which are frequently vague. The majority have only peripheral, symbolic connections to the 
nation which produced them,
1312
 and the very obscurity of unexplained icons on euro coins 
means that the dominant image is the one which is instantly recognisable, and the only 
universal icon to appear on every coin. By appearing on an everyday item, the map is visible 
to a potentially unlimited number of people for a potentially unlimited period of time. It is 
because of this omnipresence that coins are such an effective method – conscious or 
unrealised – of promoting political discourse. As currency itself is a fairly mundane, 
everyday item, it is especially suited to this sort of mundane promotion. Secondly, currency is 
much more of a ‘concrete link to the EU’1313 because unlike the flag, anthem, passports, or 
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the various other paraphernalia through which the Union manifests itself, currency is the most 
visible.  
 Prior to 1
st
 May 2004, three types of map appeared on the obverse faces of Euro coins. 
The ECB’s website describes these categories as ‘[1] the European Union before its 
enlargement on 1 May 2004, [2] a geographical image of Europe, [3] Europe in relation to 
Africa and Asia’.1314 Figs 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 demonstrate these three styles of map: 
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 European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/common/html/index.en.html.  
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Fig. 6.8 – Contrasting images: pre-2007 (left) and post-2007 (right) Euros; common 
face (€2 and €1 coins) 
 
         
Fig. 6.9 – Pre-2007 (left) and post-2007 (right) Euros; common face  (50c, 20c, and 
10c coins) 
 
         Fig. 6.10 – Common face of 5c, 2c and 1c coins, post-2000.1315  
                                                 
1315
 Figs. 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 retrieved from: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/common/html/index.en.html.  
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As stated, it is the iconography’s meta-tropes rather than the tropes, which primarily 
interest us. It is an acknowledged reality that with the exception of tourists idly staring at the 
currency of a new country, we generally do not examine currency iconography. In Mwangi’s 
words, it is seen but not looked at. But here, the tropes of the maps require some detailed 
consideration as they reveal intriguing imperial imaginations. 
In their study of the political iconography of Euro coins, Raento et al discuss in-depth 
the variety of symbols and images which appear on the obverse side of the coins – the side 
left for individual member-states to decorate with images of their own choosing – with some 
intriguing findings.
1316
 But the most significant feature of coin cartography, arguably, is the 
domination of the map on the common face of euro coins. The map of Europe is immediately 
recognisable and, unlike a reading of the various national figures and images on the reverse 
sides of the coins, requires no esoteric knowledge on the part of the reader to understand what 
the image is. It is as universal an image of Europe as can be conceived; and one which links 
closely to the identity-territory symbiosis of empires.  
Significantly, neither the pre- nor post-reform maps depict only the countries of the 
European Monetary Union: those states in which the coins were, and remain, legal currency. 
On the pre-2007 reform coins we clearly see the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden; 
three members of the European Union but not of the Monetary Union. Following the 2007 
reforms, not only does the common map continue to depict these three states but has included 
additional Union, non-Eurozone countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia. Of the Union’s current twenty-six members, ten do not use 
the common currency; yet the coin maps clearly depict these states alongside EMU nations. 
The ECB’s official explanation for this cartographic discrepancy is to ‘symbolise the unity of 
the EU’.1317 We could accept this at face value, as it is intended; or like Jacques Hymans, we 
could take a somewhat more cynical interpretation that the redesigned map is a deliberate 
intention to ‘increase their [the EU’s] legitimacy by using the currency to signal their 
embrace of values in tune with the “spirit of the times”’.1318 For as Sutherland remarks, the 
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language of currency is allusive rather than specific.
1319
 It is perhaps telling that the ECB 
explains that: 
 
‘€2 and €1, 50, 20 and 10 cent show either the European Union before its 
enlargement on 1 May 2004 or, as of 1 January 2007, a geographical 
image of Europe.’1320 
 
 The ECB distinguishes, here, between a portrayal of the Union (notably, not the 
Eurozone) and ‘a geographical image of Europe’. Africa is clearly absent from the map, 
providing some indication that the cartographic icon is merely meant to show the European 
states; but there is no distinction between EU Europe and its non-EU, yet “European”, 
neighbours. A discourse is embedded within these lines. Encircled by the stars of the Union 
flag, criss-crossed by connecting lines, and emblazoned with ‘EURO’, the communication 
expressed here can be read as one of connectivity, inclusion, sovereign power over all of the 
European landmass regardless of the membership status of polities, and a conflation of space 
and place. The visual discourse is one of indissolubility and permanence. It is perhaps an 
irony that when Raento and her associates, prior to the 2007 reforms, asked whether future 
EU expansion would generate ‘pressure to modify the cartography on the common sides of 
the coins’,1321 an answer would be quickly given in the form of ECB visual rhetoric. The 
post-2007 maps require no significant modification. They are permanent and immobile; any 
future European states acceding to the Union are already portrayed on the coins. Iceland and 
Turkey may require inclusion in the event that they join, but this would not necessitate a 
significant cartographic alteration like that of 2007: only a couple of quick outlines and a 
nudging of the map slightly further to the left of the coins.  
The cartography on Europe’s lowest-value (and physically smallest) coin is the only 
which has such features as a graticule, an oblique azimuthal projection,
1322
 and crucially 
shows Europe as a physical landmass in relation to much of its continental neighbours Africa 
and Asia. Europe is of course at the centre of the projection, thus minimising distortion of the 
European landmass. It is noteworthy, however, that the appearance of something resembling 
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an actual map is confined to the lowest-value coin, at a scale so small as to be barely 
recognisable. But on coins larger in both value and size, the map becomes much more than a 
mere crude, six-millimetre rendering of Europe and its neighbours. 
 Perhaps the most striking feature of post-2007 maps is that not only do they portray a 
single, homogeneous Union, but they fuse space and place into one image. Three tropes stand 
out most visibly. First is the inclusion of the EU component-states Denmark and the United 
Kingdom – which do not use the Euro currency – alongside the members of the Eurozone, 
bypassing awkward questions from the mapreader as to why the Union as portrayed on the 
coins is not the same as the Union as portrayed in other media. Second is the inclusion of 
areas of Europe which are not part of the Union; the Balkans and Eastern Europe up to the 
Moscow Meridian (again, curiously, neither Iceland nor Turkey are included).
1323
 Third is the 
absence of Africa, and fourth is the implied synergy between space (landmass) and place (the 
polity) through the depiction of the EU’s twelve stars intersecting the continent. This change 
is even clearer in the 50c coins; the depiction of the Union’s component states has been 
discarded in favour of an identical map of the European landmass as being the Europe. 
Raento suggests that this form of conflationary map between “Europe” and the EU is a 
deliberate quest to look into the future, to a time when EMU and EU will be one and the 
same.
1324
  
Clearly, the maps produced by the EU are not simple direction-finders. Instead, the 
maps which dominate the Union’s cartography are closer to pictures and artistic 
representations than scientific charts. They are representations of Europe. This phenomenon 
of maps as political icons is not new. John Pickles highlights the problem that while 
cartography and cartographic theory remain focused on approaching maps as images 
mirroring nature and reality, and the technical aspects of creating maps, relatively little 
attention is given to maps as icons of thought.
1325
 And these discursive icons are not confined 
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to the front. The tropes of the map on the coins’ universal face, and even the meta-trope of its 
use, are not the only revealing aspects of the coins. Their reverse is every bit as imperial as 
the obverse. 
In his examination of Roman coins, Howgego argues that with such infinite diversity 
of designs on the rear of coins, many of which appear to have been political dialogues 
between rivals and designed for the benefit of the political elite,
1326
 it was only the obverse 
face – carrying the portrait of the sovereign – which would be understood by the vast 
majority of users. A similar phenomenon exists with euro coins. 
 Under ECB regulations, each member-state of the Eurozone is entitled to choose its 
own national design for the reverse of coins. The practical and theoretical limits of this 
chapter prohibit a comprehensive overview of all reverse images on euro coins,
1327
 thus we 
shall consider a random sample. These are; the German Bundesadler, the Spanish King, and 
the Italian Homo Vitruvianus: 
 
 
        
Fig. 6.11 – Reverse faces – Germany, Spain, Italy 
 
 
 At first glance, some – perhaps, depending on the viewer, all – of the reverse images 
of euros are recognisable. Famous monuments, persons of note, and a smattering of political 
emblems. Yet many, as Raento et al point out, are abstract or outright unrecognisable without 
an accompanying explanation which is not provided on the coin; there is no handy KAROLUS 
IMP.AUG. to tell us what the image is meant to be. The result is that, as with Roman or 
Byzantine imperial coinage, reverse designs on the euro may be recognisable to people from 
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the area in which they were minted but more broadly, are baffling to those not embedded 
within the specific situated knowledge of their cultural context. The outcome is the same as it 
has always been with imperial coinage – the only design universally recognised is that of the 
obverse face; the supreme sovereign:
1328
  
 
 
 
   
Fig. 6.12 – United in Diversity 
 
 
 It is perhaps appropriate to consider that local variants on a common coin is far from a 
new phenomenon. Romans, Byzantines, and Carolingians
1329
 performed precisely the same 
function of promoting what Howgego terms ‘benevolent ideology of rule’;1330 the central 
authority allowing local imagery as a sop to regional identities – often entwined with more 
recognisable local emblems of power, from Thracian kings on local Roman coins
1331
 to the 
Bundesadler on German-produced euros – thus encouraging the imagination of local and 
imperial power. As Papageorgiadou-Bani puts it, ‘the native populations, when they got the 
chance, resurrected images from their glorious past in order to express their own ethnic 
pride’.1332 While Papageorgiadou-Bani is speaking of Greek citizens under the Romans, her 
words are as accurate a description of ECB policy today.  
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What makes such local variation imperial, or if we will, cartoimperial, is that such 
local imaginations of power were, and are, only permitted on the rear of the universal, 
imperial image on the obverse face. The juxtaposition of local emblems of power and identity 
alongside that of the central authority are no more equal on euros than on denarii – the 
emblems of the imperium are dominant, thus demonstrating unequivocally the superiority and 
authority of the sovereign depicted on the front – whether it be Imperator, Basileus, Kaiser, 
or Union.  
Alongside the obverse image of a unifying and unified central polity, it is perhaps this 
lack of uniformity among the reverse images of euro coins which define them as imperial. 
The coexistence of the collective and individual in coin iconography is a trait discernible 
from Roman currency: a reminder that while local identity exists and is benevolently 
protected by the archon, it is the collective polity as a whole which holds political supremacy 
over the locals. Individual communities may decorate their coins with their Brandenburg 
Gates, their Leonardos da Vinci, their marsh-birds in flight; but it is the map as icon – an 
imperial icon – which dominates the coins and ties all together in perpetuity.  
The permanence – or rather, longevity – of these media is a curious area with 
implications for cartoimperialism. Galloy notes that metal coins are designed not only to 
spread throughout space, but also through time – the issuing authority creates objects 
designed to last for some time, with subsequently semi-permanent iconographies.
1333
 This 
overlooked meta-trope is revealing – even in cases where their lettering or iconographies are 
unintelligible to those who use and preserve them, coins retain a powerful symbolic value.
1334
 
Indeed, the preservation of imperial coins is well-recorded as a means of legitimising the 
present by visibly connecting with an imagined past. Roman coins found their way into 
Byzantine tableware,
1335
 while Byzantine coins appear as elements of the personal 
ornamentation of tribal chiefs and local kings as far away as Saxon England.
1336
 In these and 
similar cases the purpose is evident: appropriating the symbols of a past (or present) seen as 
legitimate in order to justify the present. And in the case of imperial coins, the iconographies 
retain their power.  
Certainly in the case of the euro, permanence and durability are factors to be 
considered. In the twelve years of the euro’s existence, the obverse map designs have only 
been changed once. As Figs 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrated, this change was tropic rather than 
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meta-tropic in nature. The tropes of the maps changed, but the meta-trope of having a map of 
the EU as image of the sovereign remained. 
 What can we identify in these subtle changes? The first is obvious; the transition from 
a fragmented jigsaw map to a contiguous shape. The implication is that of unity; a coming-
together of European states. The second is perhaps more revealing. Non-Eurozone countries 
are included on the map. The message promulgated here is quite different. On the post-2007 
maps, the distinction between European Union and Eurozone disappears. A geopolitical 
synecdoche emerges as all the states of the Union are included, regardless of their currency of 
choice.  
 
Coin cartography has evolved from depictions of the sovereign holding the map as a 
symbol of power and legitimacy, to merely the map itself as the same symbol. Minting coins 
with actual maps on them is a relatively recent practice, which Barber ascribes to the 
difficulty of producing such small maps, and the inevitability that the mostly illiterate, rural 
populations of pre-industrial societies would not have understood what they were looking 
at.
1337
 As Grierson reminds us, part of the purpose of state-issued currency is spread a 
discourse of power and legitimacy,
1338
 not abstract symbols which mean nothing to those who 
see them. Yet there is a precedent for abstract, spatial emblems of power. Byzantine coins 
occasionally depicted the imperial regalia, such as the crown and sceptre, without a 
corresponding emperor:
1339
 a form of abstract symbolism. More significantly, late Roman and 
Byzantine currency sometimes hosted images of the globus cruciger – the orb of the Earth 
surmounted by a cross, to symbolise the emperor’s right to rule and his mandate over the 
spatial realm, a trope carried on into medieval and Early Modern European coinage
1340
 as a 
public celebration of the peace, prosperity, and victory of the polity. 
In his discussion of Roman iconography, Sutherland writes that ‘[coins] would 
quickly tend to make most men reasonably familiar with the simpler conceptions in the 
political vocabulary of the Empire. Above all, Pax and Victoria [peace and victory] would be 
universally recognised’.1341 The modern euro currency is, like its Roman forebears, as much a 
public celebration of Pax and Victoria as it is a medium of economic exchange. Its coins 
proudly proclaim a unified, borderless, peaceful Europe – including those who are not 
members of the Eurozone or even the Union – as defined by contrast to those deemed too 
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insignificant or barbaric to appear on the map. In so doing they preach a political propaganda 
which would be recognisable to the scrinii a pecuniis
1342
 of Rome, Byzantium, and Aachen.  
 This returns us to the question of whether cartography is being deployed in order to 
foster a sense of collective identity. Notwithstanding the current debate between scholars as 
to whether or not this is a deliberate policy or to what extent it occurs,
1343
 the consensus is 
that to some degree a sense of communal identity is fostered. The ECB’s explanations for the 
imagery and cartography on their currency is very vocal, and their insistence that “unity” is 
the theme is at times a little desperate. The ECB’s highly dubious explanation for national 
images on the reverse of coins pleads this case, claiming that Germany’s choice of the 
Brandenburg Gate, France’s selection of the national personification Marianne, and even 
Austria’s national flower, the edelweiss, are not really relics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Romanticism, nationalism, or customs charges, but are in fact post-national 
expressions of the countries’ dedication to European unity.1344 Examining the coins here, the 
hypothesis that the ECB is urgently promoting the discourse of unity certainly appears to be 
true. The map alone is enough. As identified in Chapter Two, maps are extraordinarily 
powerful vehicles for promoting a vision of collective belonging (and by extension, 
exclusion), and the maps on these coins are no exception. Even if these maps do pass beneath 
three hundred million and thirty-two pairs of eyes each day without being remarked upon, the 
visual bombardment of a trusted vehicle – the map – on a trusted artefact – the coin – remains 
potent.  
 Yet the map is not alone on euro coins. As Raento argues, ‘maps are among those few 
EU symbols that are systematically repeated in a plethora of EU-themed merchandise and 
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events’.1345 Alongside the map appear other icons which function as a form of semiotic 
determinative, clarifying the meaning of the visual “word” represented by the map. The stars 
of the European flag stress the link between territory, polity, and demos. The word ‘EURO’ is 
both a semiotic signifier and a synecdochal place-name for the land which the map portrays. 
If we believe Carlo Gialdino’s analysis of EU documents, the name ‘euro’ was chosen at a 
meeting of European Heads of State in Madrid, in December 1995, for two reasons. Firstly 
the delegates squabbled so much over names – including backwards-looking names such as 
florin, ducat, and solidus – starting an argument between the British and French over 
medieval geopolitics – that there were very few options available. Secondly, according to the 
minutes of the meeting, the summit dragged on for so long that eventually the hungry 
statesmen simply settled on “euro” because they wanted to finish the meeting before the 
cafeteria closed for the day.
1346
 But whether the name was selected due to careful 
deliberation, petty one-upmanship, or rumbling stomachs, is peripheral. What is important is 
that a name was chosen which not only bounded the currency to the entirety of the European 
continent, but a name which itself is a form of map. 
Both of these tropes, the flag and the name, insist upon a sense of imagined 
community. Finally the epsilon symbol, €,  is the invocation of an imagined common past. In 
the ECB’s own words, the epsilon is ‘harking back to Classical times and the cradle of 
European civilisation’.1347 The insistence is clear – there is one Europe, with one common 
ancestry. This is a curious claim to make, given that such Union and Eurozone members as 
Sweden, Latvia, Britain, or Romania were somewhat distant from the orbit of Classical Greek 
civilisation. Appealing to this imagined collective identity is unequivocally imperial. It is the 
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appropriation of an imagined past in an attempt to validate the present and the future, to forge 
a false link with a vision of how it should have been. Cartoimperialism saturates these maps. 
We identified, in Chapter Two, how maps are merely one subset within visual 
grammar, and frequently operate in tandem with other forms of iconography and visual 
language. Leo Belgicus combines a map with the icon of a lion rampant, to express a 
powerful discourse. The maps of the Holy Roman Empire synthesise cartography with 
snarling Reichsadler to insist upon an imagined strength. These are merely two examples of 
what Benedict Anderson, as we saw, terms the act of forgetting. Forgetting that 1560s 
Holland was a weak and sickly newborn wracked by internecine strife, forgetting that the 
Heiliges Reich of the eighteenth century was the geopolitical laughing-stock of Europe. In 
these coin maps, iconography encourages us to forget – to forget that the Union is not as pan-
continental as the maps make it appear to be, forget that in spite of elite protestations,
1348
 
Europe is not a single community. As Hymans wryly observes, the maps ‘reflects the highly 
egalitarian idea that “Europe” is all around us’,1349 yet dictated and delineated by the map. 
 In the previous chapter’s examination of EU maps, time and space were quite clearly 
marked. Whether static and unmoving, presenting an image of the Union as permanent and 
immobile, or whether bravely marching eastward in the quest to gobble up the relics of the 
Soviet Union, the spatial and temporal boundaries of the Union are clearly plotted and 
confidently proclaimed. Yet the maps on euro coins, since the 2007 reforms, are utterly non-
temporal and almost non-spatial. There are no internal boundaries, no acknowledgement of 
other landmasses, no sense of Europe’s expansion or its relationship with either space or 
time. There is simply an icon, a shape recognisable by a public at least sufficiently familiar 
with maps to understand what it is, an entity existing out of history and yet reliant on a 
constructed past represented by the accompanying, artificial imagery. It is the icon of a new 
and emergent nation, bounded and bordered; the emblem of an empire legitimised by its link 
with an artificial past. This is prevalent on the coins issued by the ECB. But the cartographic 
iconographies of Europe’s banknotes are one step beyond these already-imperial icons.  
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6.4 Money for Mars 
 
‘A descriptive analysis of bank notes is needed. For nowhere more naïvely 
than in these documents does capitalism display itself in solemn earnest. 
The innocent cupids frolicking about numbers, the goddesses holding tablets 
of the law, the stalwart heroes sheathing their swords before monetary 
units, are a world of their own: ornamenting the façade of Hell.’1350 
 
Walter Benjamin 
 
The above words of German philosopher Walter Benjamin in 1936 may appear, at 
first glance, to be a little exaggerated, even alarmist, for a sober investigation into numismatic 
cartography. His words might seem even less relevant when we consider that euro banknotes 
are hardly the site of such ostentatious Victorian imagery as he describes. Yet despite this, the 
pressing need he identifies remains. Euro currency is adorned with imagery which is 
grandiose in its discursive implications, all entwined with and framed by the map. And 
although Benjamin identifies capitalism as the dominant metanarrative of banknotes, the neat 
lines and colourful versos of Brussels’ banknotes convey a very different discourse – empire. 
 ‘Banknotes’, states Barnaby Faull, ‘are an advertisement for a country’.1351 They 
encapsulate the nation’s history, and governments – particularly those of European nations – 
treading careful paths in selecting which of their historical figures can and cannot appear on 
these advertisements of the nation. The currency commissioners of the European Union were 
keenly aware of this, testifies Kalina,
1352
 and in order to avoid controversial figures not 
merely from current nations but anyone associated with Europe’s quarrelsome past, euro 
banknotes appear, at first glance, to be the most apolitical produced by any issuing authority 
in history. Not a single human, animal, or even plant appears on euro banknotes, no images of 
real architecture or landscapes, no allegories of virtue and no personifications of the nation. 
The result is what journalist Fareed Zakaria calls ‘Money for Mars’: cash which is so 
unrelated to anything human, let alone specifically European, that the banknotes circulating 
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today in Europe look as though they were designed as low-budget props for a 1960s episode 
of Star Trek.
1353
 Or indeed, might as well be from another planet.  
While studies of the iconographies of coinage have been largely relegated to 
antiquarians, the imagery of banknotes has received, as Lauer outlines, even less attention.
1354
 
Indeed for Karen Barrett, paper money does not need ‘visual charm or aesthetic appeal to 
help it sell. The effectiveness and worth of paper currency does not depend on visual 
presentation or rhetoric. Unlike advertisements or posters, paper money has no overt need to 
delight, amuse, or convince its audience’.1355 
This is certainly a bold claim to make. As the few iconographic studies of coinage 
testify, the iconology of coins is an extraordinarily powerful discourse of politics. The even 
rarer studies of contemporary national banknotes also offer compelling arguments on the 
importance of imagery in the inclusion and exclusion of individuals, peoples, and entire 
regions.
1356
 Frances Robertson asserts in her exhaustive study of Europeans’ slow, grudging 
acceptance of paper money over metal coins in the nineteenth century, ‘the authenticity of a 
banknote [depends] on the image printed upon it’.1357 It is only through the symbols of the 
state stamped upon their surface that we accept these ‘flimsies’ – as Victorian Britons 
disparagingly termed banknotes
1358
 – as legal currency. What, then, can be learned from the 
almost alien iconographies of the Union’s banknotes? 
The first consideration is that euro banknotes fall into the same category of material 
culture as coins. Mwangi is not restricting her study to coins when she argues that currency is 
seen but not looked at, and similarly in their studies of numismatic iconography, Galloy and 
Lauer do not dismiss paper currency as being iconologically unimportant. Second is the 
element of trust.  
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6.4.1 Cash Value 
 
‘Money is no use unless it can get you what you need. The moment that you 
can’t buy bread with it, iron becomes more valuable than gold. During the 
Russian campaign of 1812, soldiers passed by the paymasters’ wagons 
abandoned along the road without touching a centime – because there 
wasn’t any sort of bakery in the neighbourhood.’1359 
Capt. Elzéar Blaze 
Military Life under Napoleon 
 
The above memoirs of one of Napoleon’s old officers highlights a fundamental 
characteristic of cash – it is completely worthless. As the starving soldiers retreating from 
Moscow in 1812 recognised, currency is merely a means of representing value, not reflecting 
some inherent wealth. The moment when there is nothing to buy, or the moment its users’ 
faith in its value falters, currency is worthless.  
Coins still retain a hypnotic value. Traditionally they had a marginal value in that they 
contained a quantity of precious metals deemed religiously significant by those societies 
using them – but this is no longer the case with today’s ‘token coins’ made from alloys 
devoid of gold, silver, or platinum.
 1360
 Euro coins, for example, are made of various alloys of 
copper, nickel, and brass
1361
 which, while retaining a marginal value in that the metals can be 
melted down and sold,
1362
 do not amount to the value stamped on the coin’s face. Banknotes 
are even less valuable than coins. With the exception – as demonstrated in Weimar Germany 
from 1922 to 1924 – of being used as fuel, handkerchiefs, or toilet paper,1363 banknotes have 
no value whatsoever. A consequence of this, as Lauer identifies in his study of early 
European and American banknotes,
1364
 is that paper money requires even more validation to 
enforce the implied contract between user and state. ‘State money’, comments Lauer, ‘is 
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characterized above all by its legal or administrative justification rather than any link to 
intrinsic value’.1365 Thus as Robertson states, ‘to accept the authenticity and value of flimsy 
[banknotes] required a continuous act of collective faith’.1366 The purchasing public must 
believe in the value of the money, and this belief is only enabled via the presentation of the 
magical icons of the sovereign – icons which themselves must be believed.  
Like early cartographers peppering their maps with political icons,
1367
 early bankers 
‘embellished their intrinsically worthless paper notes with heraldic emblems, government 
insignia, and ornamental borders’1368 to reinforce this link. The same still occurs in euro 
notes: the twelve stars of the Union appear. But a new trope has also emerged. As banknotes 
require additional validation, an icon is required which embodies the state, associates the note 
with said (presumably powerful and sovereign) state, and is unquestioned – the perfect 
assurance of the authority and value of a scrap of paper. This most trusted of icons is, of 
course, the map – and it is upon euro banknotes that we find the most imperial of maps. In the 
case of the European Union the requisite belief in the veracity of the map returns us to a 
phenomenon identified in Chapter Two. This is what we identified in Chapter Three as 
‘cartohypnosis’; the instinctive belief that the map is a true and accurate reflection of reality. 
It is no glib prophecy when Penrose warns us that ‘banknote iconography is not always what 
it seems’.1369 The maps of euro currency may fulfil their goal of expressing unity, but this 
unity is not the only message the maps suggest. The discourse of an imaginary past, 
appropriating the past to validate the present, is a powerful theme. 
Euro banknotes, as the following seven figures demonstrate, are exemplars of this 
phenomenon. Juxtaposing the map of Europe alongside the twelve gold stars of the EU flag 
and a variety of fictional bridges and gates intended to express ‘the European spirit of 
openness and cooperation’,1370 the maps on Euro banknotes similarly fuse territory and polity 
on an artefact which not only symbolises the Union and regularly passes through the hands of 
the majority of European citizens, but which reinforces even in the minds of non-EU 
recipients the notion that Europe as a space and Europe as a place are inextricably linked: a 
hyperreality in which Europe and EU are the same:   
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Fig. 6.13 – 5 euro banknote 
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Fig. 6.14 – 10 euro banknote 
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Fig. 6.15 – 20 euro banknote 
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Fig. 6.16 – 50 euro banknote 
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Fig. 6.17 – 100 euro banknote 
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Fig. 6.18 – 200 euro banknote 
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Fig. 6.19 – 500 euro banknote1371 
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Simon Hawkins’ study concludes that similarly to national currencies, the icons on 
euro banknotes are designed to encourage concepts of communication between Europeans, 
access to the Union, and the bridging of differences
1372
 – a thesis supported by Kalina’s 
words: 
 
‘The idea was to create a feeling of commonality, of belonging. I worked hard 
so that either an Italian or a Frenchman could look at the Gothic windows on 
the 20 and say “That could be here in France” or “That could be here in 
Italy”. It was very difficult to make each universal.’1373  
 
Kalina specifies that the selection of unreal architecture is designed to appeal to all 
Europeans. Real monuments cannot appear. An image of the Eiffel Tower on currency, for 
example, would imply the perceived superiority of Paris over the rest of France, and France 
over the rest of the Union.
1374
 It is simply too specific. The same would occur for any 
European edifice: indeed this is cited as a reason for the ECB’s rejection of real-world 
architecture.
1375
 An image of non-existent yet representative architecture, though, seemingly 
appeals to all inhabitants of the Union in a hyperreal map. It is what Helleiner describes as 
‘Europe ... all around us, yet nowhere in particular’.1376 Yet a division remains.  
The map may include the entire physical topography of the Western Eurasian 
landmass, but not all peoples of the Union are represented. As Figs. 6.13 - 6.19 demonstrate, 
Western and Southern Europeans are represented iconographically but the Union’s Eastern 
newcomers are utterly absent. We have now identified that euro currency, through maps, 
spread an imagination of empire. We might be tempted to go one step further and argue, as 
does Mwangi, that the imperial image therein is specifically colonial.  
In her study of the British Empire’s colonial currency, Mwangi argues that money is 
rendered “colonial” in its ‘evocations of distance, of spatial separation, between metropole 
and colony’.1377 Euro currency maps convey the ideology that all Europeans are part of the 
same metropole, but the images entwined with the map are exclusive of those areas of the 
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Union which were not part of the Union and did not, as Kaelberer alludes,
1378
 experience the 
same historical epochs as Western and Southern Europe. The map may benignly embrace all 
Europeans, but a discourse of superiority and inferiority lurks within its images. As Helleiner 
identifies, the sanctioned messages propagated by euro iconography are ‘transparency, 
represented by windows; and communication, cooperation, and a forward-looking spirit, 
represented by doors and bridges’.1379 But the architectural styles represented are unreal. 
According to the ECB, the notes ‘feature architectural styles from different periods in 
Europe's history’. In ascending order of value they are, Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, 
Renaissance, Baroque, ‘The Age of Iron and Glass’, and the twentieth century.1380 These 
correspond to an imaginary teleological development of Europe from Antiquity to the Early 
Middle Ages, High Middle Ages, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, and 
Modern eras, a progressive march towards destiny with the accompanying suggestion that all 
Europe experienced the same neat path of development at the same time. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the bridges and gateways adorning these notes are a chronological account 
stretching back to an imagined beginning – Rome. But the discourse seen in these images is 
unequivocally imperial. It is the appropriation of an imagined past to validate the present. The 
imagination of history invoked here is clearly fabricated: history is not a teleological, 
progressive march towards a pre-defined, Whiggish goal, and not all areas of Europe 
experienced this neat transition from one period to another – if any did at all.  
Kaelberer argues that the iconography ‘deliberately constructs a common European 
historical memory’1381 by appealing to common experiences in Europe’s development from 
the decaying marble temples of Athens to the grim Khrushchevian apartment-blocks of the 
Eastern bloc. But this is simply not true. It is quite a stretch to claim that Sweden or Latvia 
were part of the same Classical world as Greece and Rome, equally problematic to visually 
proclaim that the eras depicted were single, homogenous affairs. The Industrial Revolution, 
to cite but one example, was spatially complex and temporally varied across the British 
archipelago upon which it began, let alone across the entire European landmass. Yet the 
discourse remains – the proclamation that all Europe has experienced the same history, that 
all Europe is the same, that all Europe stands in contrast to those beyond the collective – the 
Russians, the Turks, the North Africans
1382
 – who did not share in this censored, sanitised, 
whitewashed version of a communal continental history which never existed, but nevertheless 
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is assembled and appropriated to give the illusion of sovereign legitimacy. Entwined with the 
map, that icon of unity in diversity which is not to be questioned, the discourse these notes 
suggest is powerful indeed. All Europeans are equal, but Western Europeans are more equal 
than others. And Europe may be open, but only to those who adopt the imagined collective 
culture of the West. 
Even the name of the currency – “euro” – warrants examination. ‘The name of the 
currency’, write Unwin and Hewitt, ‘[is] its salient feature’.1383 “Euro” serves as a collective 
name appealing across the polity, but it does so by subordinating local and national identities 
in its appeal to an imagined common link of territory and ancestry as Europeans, and a 
continual implication that Europe is defined by clear ethnoterritorial boundaries – to the 
exclusion of those deemed unworthy of inclusion on the map. But as Barbero argues,
1384
 
“Europe” is itself a construct, a manufactured imagination stretching back to Charlemagne 
and possibly beyond. It is an imagination, the appeal to which hides not only in imaginary 
bridges and unreal maps; the very nomenclature of the currency appeals to and appropriates 
an artificial past – all for legitimacy. 
 
It is notable, as Gustav Peebles argues, that in the special case of currency semiotics 
takes on another dimension; that of state control of identity formation. ‘The state’, argues 
Peebles, ‘comes to control semiotic processes, in effect, appropriating an international sign of 
value held by its citizens (e.g. gold or silver) and replacing it with a national sign on value 
held by its citizenry (paper or token coins)’.1385 The citizenry becomes bound to the state as 
well as to each other; a phenomenon which Peebles identifies as a case of the state colonising 
the future. The emergent national identity encouraged by the production and circulation of 
state-mandated money is an identity characterised by citizens within, and beneath, the 
state;
1386
 in this case, an identity emerges of being European, under the European Union. The 
consequence is that, in Peebles’ view, ‘this paper money system in turn contributes to the 
production of spatiotemporal boundaries that mark the nation-state’.1387 As citizens cannot 
use their cash beyond the boundaries of the issuing authority, money creates its own national 
boundaries. When that money is emblazoned with cartographic proclamations of who is, and 
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is not, ‘European’ – including those Europeans who are not able to use the euro in their 
nations, and entirely discounting the landmass beyond the EU – a unique political discourse 
is created. This discourse proclaims who is and is not worthy of being considered ‘European’, 
the social, spatial, and spatiotemporal frontiers vigilantly patrolled by citizens whose concept 
of the community is created by cartography. This discourse is, ultimately, cartoimperial. 
 A significant aspect of money’s authority is the language it uses. In his pioneering 
scholarship on ‘imagined communities’, Anderson argues that printed language is one of the 
core components of the construction of national identities.
1388
 In the nineteenth century, it 
was the printing of vernacular national languages on banknotes which helped solidify the 
nation-state by subsuming all into the metropolitan identity.
1389
 In the polyglot, ocularcentric 
European Union, it is printed visual language which performs precisely the same function. 
Money, and the icons enshrined upon its surfaces, not only standardise notions of economic 
value and the relationship between citizen and state – they homogenise thought by declaring 
the authority of the state. Money maps go one step further; they standardise thoughts of who 
is and is not a part of the collective society. And euro money maps take an additional step by 
declaring, through the medium of an unquestionable icon emblazoning a medium already 
regarded with semi-religious faith, who should and should not be part of the collective.  
 In the heyday of European integrationism, proponents of the euro argued that the euro 
would be a distinctly deterritorial currency, one to replace the factious and competing 
national currencies of the continent. Yet the euro has quickly evolved into a currency as 
distinctly territorial as any of its predecessors, if not more so. Earlier currencies may have 
depicted portraits of ruling or past sovereigns to create spatiotemporal boundaries within 
which the money could circulate; but the euro is the first currency to go one step further and 
actually show the borders in the form of a map. The creation of any currency, as Helleiner 
identifies, is a chaotic amalgam of ‘intensely political processes’,1390 and although Helleiner 
argues that supra-national currencies are a distinct category from territorial equivalents,
1391
 
the euro is arguably no exception. By virtue of its false maps, the euro is arguably the most 
territorial and politicised currency yet created, and one which adopts precisely the same 
imperial discourses as its Byzantine, Frankish, Roman, and British antecedents. The euro and 
its maps are not a different category from other currencies: the euro is merely the most 
evolved form of an ancient means of publicly proclaiming the imagination of empire. 
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In his study of the imagery of Tunisian banknote iconography, Hawkins makes a 
curious observation. In the aftermath of overtly nationalist or colonialist numismatic 
iconographies in European nations and their colonies, banks have turned to a ‘juxtaposition of 
seemingly disparate images and genres ... in which multiple voices and perspectives highlight 
differences and discontinuities.’1392 The result, he argues, is that banknotes appear as 
‘heteroglossic artifacts’ designed to reflect the diversity of the populations they represent: the 
reality is that the identity they encourage is ‘monoglossic and standardizing’.1393 A single 
state identity is promoted, and the standardisation of iconography promotes a discourse of 
standardisation of the population. This is encouraged not only by the single, borderless, 
standardised map, but also by the icons with which it is combined. 
The maps on euro currency are the ultimate stage in cartoimperialist evolution. They 
have long ceased to be simple geographical tools, and instead the common map depicting all 
of Europe regardless of countries’ status in the Eurozone or the Union, has become the 
defining marker of what Europe is and what it is to be European. The ‘European Identity’ is 
inclusion within the collective populace of a polity pursuing Manifest Destiny as it seeks to 
expand according to the teleology of its own artificial history into all areas of the European 
landmass, appropriating the magical insignia of a constructed state and a constructed history 
to legitimise the present. 
This is not a new phenomenon. The mappaemundi produced by medieval European 
cartographers, as David Woodward points out, were designed not only to depict 
topographical reality to the best of existing knowledge, but also to convey multiple levels of 
thought with the intention ‘to provide illustrated histories or moralized, didactic displays in a 
geographical setting’.1394 Like their medieval ancestors, modern maps of the Union pursue a 
normative aspiration; the portrayal of Europe in such a way as to emphasise Europe’s self-
perceived superiority over its savage neighbours. The EU’s graphic icons continue to link 
reality with imagination, territory with identity; a worldview in which ‘civilisation’, 
progressing teleologically, is synonymous with the territorial landmass of Europe, while 
barbarism and chaos became inextricably associated with the barbarians lurking in the 
uncharted wilderness beyond, who did not share in Europe’s apparent, artificial development. 
In such a respect, these maps of the Union are not only imperial, they are latter-day 
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mappaemundi imperialis. For they map not the European historical experience, but rather 
what it ought to have been. They are cartoimperial artefacts par excellence. 
The polity of Europe and the landmass of Europe have become inextricably linked, 
reinforcing in the viewer’s mind that the EU is Europe and that Europe is the EU. Ultimately, 
maps of the Union depict not the physical toposphere of Earth nor even the anthroposphere, 
the realm of human activities overlapping the planetary crust.
1395
 Instead they map the 
noösphere – the realm of the human mind as conveyed in territorial terms.1396 The link 
between territory and polity could not be more explicitly expressed through the EU’s own 
cartographic icons; the anthropic, noöpic, imperial iconography of European Empire. 
 
In his study of euro imagery, Helleiner claims that ‘it would be difficult to argue that 
the imagery on the euro has been designed in a way that is meant to foster a strong sense of 
common European identity’.1397 In contrast to the richly-decorated cash of yesteryear, the 
euro appears bland, even boring, with its pale colours, simple maps, and unfussy geometric 
patterns. It is little wonder that Zakaria terms it ‘Money for Mars’. 
Yet as Jacques Hymans argues, this is merely a change in style from modernist to 
postmodern currency – a historical rejection among late twentieth-century European 
numismatists of pompous imagery and national personification in favour of sleek, almost 
empty designs which invite the viewer to form their own individual impressions of their 
relationship to the polity.
1398
 
 Empire, as has been discussed, relies heavily on visual symbols, and the European 
Union is no exception. Indeed, the EU’s own webpage offers a convenient guide to the 
symbols of the Union; its flag, anthem, and ‘Europe Day’, heralding these three elements of 
political discourse as its primary symbols.
1399
 The map is consciously not included as a 
symbol. However, as the above discussions of the identity-polity-territory praxis demonstrate, 
the EU map is more a political symbol. It is part of ‘the governmentalisation of culture’1400 
using what Ferdinand Braudel terms the basic ‘structures of everyday life’.1401 
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Mwangi is arguably correct in her assertion that banknotes are merely seen rather than 
looked at, suggesting that the maps adorning euro currency are relatively inconsequential. Yet 
it is only through collective faith in the iconographies of money that we trust in its value, 
hence the yearning for legitimacy is a core component – if perhaps not always consciously 
realised – of collective currencies.1402 The result is a cycle – we trust money because it is 
embossed with the symbols of the state, and we trust those symbols of the state because they 
are on sanctioned currency. Consequently the map of the European Union is both the 
supporting symbol of the state and the state-supported symbol of authenticity. Maps, as 
Monmonier reminds us, are perceived as artefacts not to be questioned. Nowhere is this more 
true than in the cartographies of European currency; maps so entangled in a complex web of 
materiality, iconology, and a quasi-religious faith that they become supremely authoritative 
emblems of Europe’s authority, legitimacy, and geopolitical yearnings; the very essence of 
empire.  
The iconography of the euro was designed to ‘get something that captured what 
Europe was all about’:1403 a phenomenon which Hawkins identifies as the construction of ‘an 
imagined homogeneous history’.1404 The images chosen to represent Europe’s past never 
existed. They are merely an imagination of what the past was, an appeal for legitimacy by 
connecting the present to an artificial history. This is what Benedict Anderson rightly 
describes as the act of ‘forgetting’ aspects of history, a crucial component in the 
manufacturing of identity – perhaps nowhere more so than among Europeans, whose 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century affairs oblige the Union to gloss over the darker chapters in 
our collective recent history. The maps-as-icons, and their affiliated images, on euro 
banknotes promote the precise discourse of empire which we encountered in Chapter One. 
Just as Pope Leo invoked an imagined past, a history which never existed, to grant legitimacy 
upon Charlemagne, euro currency invokes its own manmade backstory to justify the policies 
of the present, and the ambitions of the future, by appealing to a construct which legitimises 
its very existence. Yet while the Pope needed nothing more than a foraged crown and a Latin 
liturgy plagiarised from peeved Byzantines to legitimise his manufactured history of 
Imperium Romanum to the small crowd huddled against the draughts in St Peter’s twelve 
centuries ago, the European Central Bank has achieved a great deal more. By appropriating 
the unquestioned medium of cartography, on the apparently infallible vehicle of state 
currency, the ECB can reach far, far more people across far greater lengths of time – all day, 
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every day, for the foreseeable future – than those assembled for a few hours in a cathedral 
nave, to invoke an imagined history and thereby legitimise an emergent present. Money, as 
Hawkins justly concludes, is too valuable to ignore.
1405
 Nowhere is this more so than in the 
case of European currency. 
 
 
6.5 RESTITUTORI  ORBIS  EUROPAEUM 
 
‘Put simply, their iconographic language was more immediately intelligible 
to people ... Indeed, its stylised simplicity was the key to its effectiveness ... 
The rapid diffusion of imperial imagery in this form created a visual 
language whose very simplicity rendered it almost universally intelligible 
and universally flexible’.1406 
 
As we approach the end of the investigation, we might well assume that Clifford 
Ando’s above words describe euro currency. Yet Ando is speaking not of euros, but of 
Roman denarii. The simple design of euros is merely one connection to their premodern 
predecessor; another, and far more potent, connection is that by assembling and then 
appropriating an artificial past and an artificial sense of community, euro coins are just as 
powerful vehicles of political thought as were the coins of the imperial past.  
The intention of the euro currency’s iconography, as its makers testify, was to 
promote a sense of collective belonging; a conscious and benevolent agenda pursued by well-
meaning agents desirous of transcending the rivalries, squabbles, and conflicts which, for the 
millennia of recorded history up to 1945, characterised the peoples of Europe. But however 
well-meaning this project may have been during its conception, the reality is quite different. 
 The choice of currency as a vehicle for promoting political messages was problematic 
from its very inception because, as we have seen, coins have always been caught up in a 
complex web of political discourses and propaganda, while their very nature as artefacts of 
the state precludes their being detached from notions of sovereignty and legitimacy.  
 The maps on euro currency were intended to promote cohesion – and they have 
worked. They have achieved this by a conscious visual policy of imagined coherence and 
enforced exclusion. They promote the message that Europe’s sovereign is, to one extent, its 
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populace as expressed through the map; yet to greater extent they suggest that the rightful, 
legitimate sovereign of the landmass is the Union itself. And only the Union. This insistence 
is most noticeable on banknotes – while the maps on coins deliberately exclude non-Union 
Europe while simultaneously corralling non-Eurozone EU nations, the maps on banknotes 
proclaim that all Europe is to be imagined as one polity, one people, one civilisation under 
the hegemony of the Union. The placement of these maps on EU banknotes merely reinforces 
this visual assertion that it is the Union, and only the Union, which is the legitimate heir and 
rightful sovereign to the European continent and its inhabitants. Whether this is a deliberate 
or accidental gesture is a moot point, as it is the mere existence of these maps and the 
message they proclaim, which characterises European currency as cartoimperial. The themes 
we identified in the first chapter – a yearning for authority, legitimacy, and power, all bound 
up in the discourse of the state and the discourse of an imagined present – are clearly visible 
on the coins and notes minted and printed daily in Brussels. 
 
 
   
 
“This was intended not to portray the real physical appearance of Augustus ... 
but an Augustus whose physique embodied a new political ideal”1407 
Fig. 6.20 – A new political ideal 
  
 
 The net result is that the coinage of modern Europe is little different from that of the 
EU’s long-departed forebears. Barbara Levick emphasised how the coins of Rome – and by 
extension, the coins of those polities which adopted the self-anointed status of Rome’s 
descendant – ‘can be seen to make up a composite portrait of the ruler as he liked to think of 
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himself’.1408 Minting and printing Euro currency which depicts a false cartography of the 
Union is indistinguishable from those coins which depicted weakling imperators as 
Alexandrine conquerors, Frankish chieftains as classical Romans, and Byzantine 
backstabbers as God’s handpicked viceroys.1409 The image of desired (and perhaps 
inevitable) sovereignty rather than real sovereignty is as alive and well in today’s euros as it 
was in the eras of denarii, nomismata,
1410
 and thalers; and it is this manufactured memory of 
legitimacy and unity, expressed through a map on objects rubbing against the fingers of a 
third of a billion humans each day, which renders Europe’s currency the pinnacle of 
cartoimperialism. 
It is difficult to deny the phenomenal power of numismatic iconography, no less so in 
contemporary Europe than in the empires of ages past. Indeed, Howgego goes so far as to 
question whether, rather than empire defining currency, it is currency which defines empire – 
suggesting that the existence of a unified currency explicitly promoting visual messages of 
political unity across a vast and infinitely diverse population is what defines “empire” as 
opposed to poleis or hegemonia.
1411
 
European Union currency is the apex of cartoimperialism, for its coins and notes 
combine the utmost authoritative expression of political discourse – the map – with what is 
arguably the most powerful state vehicle for transmitting ideologies – currency – in the most 
powerfully expressive forum – the public sphere. Together these three elements – maps, 
currency, and the public gaze – combine to transform European Union coins from mundane 
tools of transaction into icons of imperium as powerful as any Aquila.  
 
What are we to make of this? It is true that we must avoid the pitfall identified some 
forty years ago by A.H.M. Jones, who warned that although coins ‘were intended to be 
vehicles of propaganda... their importance can be exaggerated’.1412 But while this caveat 
might have been true for the premodern world, in which coins circulated among uncaring 
elites and illiterate masses,
1413
 in the modern world it would be hard to deny the political 
messages embedded in currency used daily by hundreds of millions of cartographically 
literate people within the European Union and beyond. 
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Was there ever a realistic alternative to the map of Europe? Jacques Hymans wryly 
concludes that, had the euro been conceived in other eras, it would have looked quite 
different. But in the 1990s, following the shift in European zeitgeist towards postnational 
themes,
1414
 this was not possible. Images of ‘women lolling about in flowing robes’ – notably 
the classical Greek Europa, the woman riding a bull
1415
 – hearken back too far to those 
Victorian visuals of empire we now sweep, shame-faced, under the historical carpet.
1416
 In 
spite of the antiquity of allegorical personifications of abstract concepts
1417
 or geographical 
and geopolitical constructs, it would be difficult to conceive of Europa as embodying 
sovereignty. To the untrained eye, the image of a woman riding a bull might well appear all 
too abstract, esoteric, or frankly bizarre to symbolise the European Union. Furthermore, 
choosing a rape victim
1418
 to represent the Union might have been a little insensitive. 
Unusually the European Central Bank ignored the implication, and in May 2013 the ECB 
indeed included Europa as an icon symbolising European integration – an even more 
emphatic visual statement that all Europe developed from one point in space and time. 
Similarly, images of European flora and fauna were rejected
1419
 while images of 
national figureheads of science or art – still very much the norm in non-Eurozone EU 
currencies – were considered by the ECB, but rejected for fear that obscure details of their 
personal lives might offend.
1420
 Hence, in-keeping with the spirit of the times, the ECB 
selected representations of reality – a phenomenon which is the fundamental nature of 
empire, and the map. Unreal architecture and an unreal map; icons which, although artificial, 
are recognisable, and appeal to Europe’s imagined common past.1421 As a consequence 
cartoimperialism has colonised that most powerful of discursive vehicles. Since its inception 
by potentates and metallurgists in Bronze Age Anatolia, and since its formalisation by the 
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restitutorii of Rome and the bureaucrats of Byzantium, currency has always been inextricably 
entangled with politics. We might even be justified in arguing that no matter what emblem 
the Union had selected for its currency, said icon would be inherently political. Yet the map 
is a unique case. 
The era of explicit ideology in Europe may be consigned to the continent’s troubled 
twentieth-century past, but the project of nation-building continues. The new nation is that 
loudly proclaimed by currency maps – the territory of Europe, populated by the nation of 
Europe, identified and boundaried by mass maps and subsequently inaccessible to those not 
included on the maps, while including by association those Europeans who are not members 
of the Eurozone, or even the Union itself.  
Like the Union itself, the European identity is still being formed. Penrose opines that 
‘state involvement in considerations of iconography is most intensive when the state is new 
and its symbolic repertoire is first being devised, or when the state is in crisis or 
transition’.1422 At present, the European Union is in all three stages. It – or at least, its 
currency – is new, in crisis, and in an unusual semi-permanent transition as the EU marches 
slowly eastwards towards an as-yet unspecified, but cartographically implied, frontier. But as 
studies of the power of currency iconographies from places and times as dissimilar and 
diverse as Ancient Rome,
1423
 medieval Germany,
1424
 colonial Africa,
1425
 and industrial-age 
South America
1426
 have demonstrated, the cartographic iconographies of contemporary 
Europe suggest that the Union is following the same precise pattern identifiable to the origins 
of empire, and beyond.  
 Penrose and Cumming further argue that variations in currency iconography ‘reflect 
the different political contexts in which [coins and notes] were produced’.1427 Mwangi’s 
exploration of the evolution of Kenyan currency supports this,
1428
 as does Howgego’s 
examination of Byzantine currency.
1429
 Currency iconography reflects the dominant political 
discourse of its day, whether said discourse be religion, colonialism, nationalism, or any of 
the myriad of political metanarratives found on currency. In the case of the EU, the discourse 
is perhaps less evident at first glance. The ages of empire and nationalism may be officially 
                                                 
1422
 Penrose, ‘Designing the Nation’ p. 432 [emphasis added]. 
1423
 Andrew Erskine, Roman Imperialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 71-72, 166-167. 
1424
 Price, Coins: An Illustrated Survey, pp. 142-178. 
1425
 Mwangi, ‘The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant’, pp. 31-62. 
1426
 Galloy, ‘Symbols of Identity and Nationalism’, pp. 15-34. 
1427
 Penrose and Cumming, ‘Money talks’, p. 821. 
1428
 Mwangi, ‘The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant’. 
1429
Howgego, Ancient History from Coins; Peter Volz and Hans-Christian Jokisch, Emblems of Eminence: 
German Renaissance Portrait Medals in the Age of Albrecht Dürer [trans. Andrew Jenkins] (Stuttgart: Lübke 
and Wiedemann, 2008). 
335 
 
over in Europe, but their legacy is alive and well in the cartographic iconography of the 
currency. Overt iconographies of perceived superiority, division, hierarchy, and other aspects 
of unpalatable political projects whose ghosts still haunt Europe’s history, are no longer 
acceptable in the public discourses of the Union. The discourse of today appears, on the 
surface, to be very different. The metanarrative of Digital Age Europe is peace, progress, and 
collectivity; ‘United in Diversity’, as the Union so proudly declares. The borderless map of 
the Union is the apparent ideal emblem of this perceived new age for the continent; a map 
which expresses unity, peace, and cohesion. But as we are by now aware, far more messages 
than those intended lurk within the gradients and graticules of cartography. None more so, 
than in those maps used as icons of the nation. 
 Are European currency maps nationalist? Given the preponderance of emperors, 
kings, and tyrants to use currency as vehicles for insisting upon the legitimacy, authority, and 
imagined succession of their dynasty, party, or ideology, we might be tempted to answer; yes. 
And this answer would be partially correct. Yet they are not merely national. As we 
identified in the preceding chapter, one of the hallmarks of the nation is the suppression of 
difference; the establishment of a single identity within the borders of the state. Yet in 
empire, multiple identities are tolerated, even encouraged; these identities are not 
geographical, but temporal. The imagined identity of the present coexists with the imagined 
identity of the past, a coexistence of history which, through its appropriation, legitimises the 
present. Euro coins perform precisely this function. By combining local icons with a single, 
universal map recognisable to all, multiple identities exist until the moment a coin or note is 
handed over – at which point we become simply Europeans, with an equally shared, equally 
imagined, equally invoked identity. The ability of money to cement a single identity is well-
attested; from Romans and Franks to nineteenth-century Canadians, Germans and Italians 
seeking to foster a sense of unity in their newborn nations.
1430
 The euro performs the same 
function, encouraging a single identity. Like earlier currencies, the euro seizes an artificial 
past with which to form a social solvent, encouraging isolation and the exclusion of those not 
considered part of the collective. Like a colonial power, the euro’s maps annex territory in 
which the currency cannot be used, or which is not even part of the Union. It is this 
appropriation and annexation of time and space, in the quest for legitimacy, which renders the 
Union’s common currency an imperial artefact, one whose power rests heavily on the 
phenomenon of cartoimperialism. 
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 Currency can be, and is, used to draw together disparate peoples by encouraging the 
formation of a single identity.
1431
 In the case of the Union, this identity is not merely 
prefigurative – neatly replacing the nation-state with the Union – it is imperial. 
 Since their genesis, coins and banknotes have been the sole prerogative of the state. 
the appearance of maps on euro currency is inherently authoritative and the political 
messages of authority can in no way be extracted from this meta-trope; that no matter what 
the map depicts, its location is a public proclamation of power. 
 Legitimacy is an additional area of inquiry. Contemporary currency lacks any sort of 
value and it is only through the collective belief of its users in the currency’s legitimacy, that 
it is able to function as a medium of exchange. We have no choice but to trust the currency – 
to trust it as a means of existence, and by extension – conscious or otherwise – to trust the 
iconographic paraphernalia which accompany and adorn the metal discs and paper slips 
nestling in our pockets. The maps on euro currency are hyper-real. They depict not merely 
the Eurozone, as on pre-2007 coin maps, and not even the entirety of the European Union but 
the entire landmass. The message promulgated herein in one of inherent legitimacy – the 
Union and its currency are trustworthy and legitimate as they represent the whole of the 
European Union’s populace. They are stamped with the image of the sovereign – not an 
individual monarch, but the third of a billion humans who form the European demos – and it 
is this authority, this apparent legitimacy, which lends the cartographic currency its 
unparalleled power. The map is legitimate because it is approved by the state. The state is 
legitimate because it has a map. As Hawkins describes the phenomenon, ‘the standardisation 
of the form of banknotes themselves leads to the images on the notes taking their meaning 
from the notes’.1432 The message proclaimed by these mutually interdependent discourses is 
clear. This is Europe, and this is the one common bond spontaneously created when coins and 
notes change hands. 
 Finally, euros appeal to an imagination of the past. It is an irony that while the euro’s 
designers selected bridges as a metaphor for bridging the differences between Europeans, the 
inescapable mechanisms of numismatics give these bridges a very different potential 
meaning. With the map, and the fake architecture, the bridges span the distance between an 
imaginary past, an artificial present, and an anticipated future. This has been a characteristic 
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of currency for millennia.
1433
 James Sidaway and Jane Pollard wryly observe that the Union 
ought to have chosen walls and barriers as accompanying icons to the map of Fortress 
Europe,
1434
 yet the bridges are equally appropriate – for it is along these viaducts of the mind 
that the discourse of empire travels, appropriating an unreal past to legitimise an uncertain 
present.  
If the euro does indeed crumble, it will not mark the end of the Union. Neither will it 
mark the last attempt to unify the European landmass under one currency. It will merely join 
the denarius, nomisma, thaler, and Napoléon – and form another precedent for whatever new 
currencies are concocted in the centuries and millennia of European history yet to occur – as 
another attempt at constructing an identity via currency iconography: an identity rendered 
imperial by its fabrication of a false history to justify the present, fated to be dissected and 
discussed in future scholarship on the historical precedents for whatever new currency is 
eventually touted across Europe.  
 
 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
At the end, we return to the two quotations with which we began. Is there a link between the 
words of Caesar, dictated in a gloomy Gaulish tent as his legions trudged across the continent 
over twenty centuries ago, and the bureaucratic grandstanding of EEC administrators in a 
Brussels office-block in those heady months following the fall of the Iron Curtain? The 
answer is yes.  
On the surface there is nothing to connect the euro to its distant ancestors, an apparent 
discontinuity which leads one of numismatics’ foremost scholars, Eric Helleiner, to declare 
that the euro is not designed to facilitate identity construction.
1435
 But the reality is that, 
whether part of the Machiavellian plot of a self-anointed elite seeking to build a new nation 
or simply an honest desire to create a postmodern, neutral currency, the euro can do nothing 
but encourage the formation of an imagined identity – and an imperial one at that. The 
portraits of Princeps, Imperators, and Kaisers may have been consigned to history, but the 
euro cannot escape the macrohistorical context out of which it emerged. The maps proudly 
adorning euro coins and banknotes have become what Stewart describes as 
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‘cryptoportraits’:1436 emblems of the state in the form of a recognisable figure. Remembering 
Chapter Four, we might well consider this a synecdochal metonym. Just as the ubiquitous, 
“one-size-fits-all” portraits adorning Roman, Byzantine, and Carolingian coins conveyed – as 
the Gospel of Matthew inadvertently illustrates – the idea of the state and its power rather 
than the individual ruler, so too does the map of the Union appropriate an artificial past to 
legitimise the present and justify the future, conveying the idea of collective, imperial, 
sovereignty.  
Were Julius Caesar to peer through the looking-glass of an Iron Age oracle and see 
the coins currently clinking in pockets from Lisbon to Ljubljana, Limerick to Lemesos, he 
might not be particularly surprised. And nor ought we be surprised to find that, like the 
citizens of an extinct polity in the mists of history, every time a coin passes between 
European fingers we are rendering unto the modern Caesar: for euro currency has evolved 
into the ultimate expression of cartoimperialism. 
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Conclusions 
A New Race of Pilgrims 
 
‘They persisted in the design of maintaining the dignity of the empire, without attempting to 
enlarge its limits. By every honourable expedient they invited the friendship of the 
barbarians; and they endeavoured to convince mankind that the Roman power, raised above 
the temptation of conquest, was actuated only by the love of order and justice. The Roman 
name was revered among the most remote nations of the Earth. The fiercest barbarians 
frequently submitted their difference to the arbitration of the emperor; and we are informed 
by a contemporary historian that he had seen ambassadors who were refused the honour 
which they came to solicit, of being admitted into the rank of subjects.’1437 
 
Edward Gibbon, 
Decline and Fall I.i 
 
 Writing in the late eighteenth century, Edward Gibbon asserted that under the first 
dynasty of emperors, the Antonines, Rome underwent a transition from an expanding realm 
of republican virtues and democratic, civilised liberties to a static, dogmatic fortress defined 
no longer by welcoming newcomers with open arms, but by warding outsiders off with 
legions, laws, and jealously-guarded frontiers. Yet – with the exception of enlarging its limits 
– his words might prove to be as accurate a description of the European Union today, as of a 
civilisation half-lost in the mists of time. 
After five centuries of Republican expansion, Rome declared its final frontiers and 
from Hadrian’s Edict of 117 AD onwards, ceased to expand. What had once been vague and 
temporary boundaries between the world already civilised by Rome, and the world yet to be 
incorporated, became static limes defined not by temporality but by permanence – earth 
parapets, wooden palisades, and stone walls.
1438
 In doing so, Rome made a public declaration 
of where civilisation ended and barbarism began. What we see in today’s European Union is 
precisely the same. The EU may lack the physical fortifications and professional garrisons 
which marked the self-imposed limit of Rome, but the principle of drawing a line and 
declaring it to be the boundary between civility and savagery remains. It is not on the ground 
that we should look for the public declarations of Europe’s frontier. It is in the map. 
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Since its inception as the Coal and Steel Community in a continent fearfully emerging 
from the ashes of Armageddon, to an apparently welcoming polity opening its arms to the 
states wrestling out of Moscow’s iron grip, the European collective has always been an 
expanding and morphing entity. And, as recent enlargements and continuing membership 
negotiations with non-EU states demonstrate, Imperium Europaeum has not yet reached its 
frontiers. But the Union is running out of places into which it can expand.  
The Union has not yet decided where the final frontier lies – but it has started to 
identify that line. The European Union will not, unlike Rome, confound its monarchy with 
the globe of the earth. Europe is very much aware that there is a world sharing a peripheral 
border – a world which is to be held up as a dark mirror-image of Europe’s self-anointed 
status as exemplar and guardian of civilisation. For on those hundreds of millions of little 
maps clinking between the fingers of its citizens, on those countless cartographies folded in 
wallets and purses, and those Theatra Orbis Europaeum boldly dominating the limitless 
spaces of the internet and print publications, the frontiers are already clear. The line between 
civilisation and savagery is protected not by fortifications but by ratifications, and that line is 
publicly declared by maps.  
The EU seeks, in its own words, to unite a continent. And while the EU is yet to 
officially absorb the whole European landmass, its maps have already done so. Jeffers 
Lennox reminds us that conquering space on paper is every bit as powerful as absorbing 
territories in real geopolitics. The maps have been drawn, the new provinciae pronounced, 
and the gates locked against the barbarians. And acting as a unifying force for the whole 
project, Imperium Europaeum – wittingly or not – issues maps which proudly proclaim that it 
is inevitable, that it is good and that like the Imperium of the Early Middle Ages, only the 
Union has the legitimacy, authority, prestige and right of empire. 
Frances Yates writes that one of the defining characteristics of international politics in 
European history was that the Heiliges Reich – which under previous emperors had 
maintained at least an illusion of universality and the rule of one Dominus mundi, one Lord of 
the World, uniting the disparate groups of humanity under the banner of a self-proclaimed 
civilisation – turned inwards.1439 The change of name in 1512 from Heiliges Römisches Reich 
to Heiliges Römisches Reich deutscher Nation – the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation
1440
 – was a mere formality. The shift in Imperial philosophy from universalism to 
particularism – from an Imperium of the entire human race to Imperium possessed by 
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Germans only – was perhaps a portent for what is beginning to emerge in the political 
philosophy of the European Union. Once an entity which entertained aspirations of universal 
union, the Union is now defining its ethnic, territorial, and philosophical frontiers by 
declaring its borders. The Romans abandoned their aspirations of civitas orbis Terrarum in 
order to fortify their frontiers, to draw an eternal line between civilised and savage. The Holy 
Romans set aside dreams of Universal Monarchy to become a distinctly German society. And 
now we Europeans increasingly renounce universalism through maps which proclaim not 
only that there remains a barbaric wilderness lurking beyond our frontiers and that it is our 
duty and destiny to encompass a new civitas orbis Europaeum, but also that we must unite 
against the barbarians who will not be drawn into our orbit simply because They are not like 
Us: while We must impose our norms upon those deemed worthy of admission, because We 
are the standard by which They will be measured.  
These maps declare that the translatio imperii has taken a new step, one which 
medieval chroniclers would recognise. Imperium emerged with Rome, passed to the Greeks, 
thence to the Franks, and after the interregnum in which vying factions from Napoleonic 
French to Italian Fascists appropriated the claim to reinforce their self-anointed supremacy 
over Europe, that same imperium has passed to its new bearer; the new sole sovereign of the 
continent whose duty and destiny it is to unify all Europeans into one imperium orbis 
Europaeum – the European Union.  
  
 This thesis sought to address the question of what the European Union is. A number 
of conclusions have been reached. 
 First, we have demonstrated that the European Union defies categorisation. It 
combines features from a wide spectrum of forms of political organisation, but it cannot be 
neatly defined. Increasing academic and public discourse frames the European Union as 
empire, a word whose contested nature and ugly connotations generate debate. This warrants 
investigation. 
Second, the thesis has established that empire is a discourse. Empire is neither a form 
of social and political organisation nor a method of governance. It is a deliberate harking 
back to an imagined history and an imagined sense of a collective civilisation, defined by 
open inequality and a contrast with barbarian outsiders. It emerged in Europe as a status of 
prestige in the Early Middle Ages, from whence it has evolved and been carried to the non-
European world and non-European, pre-medieval history as a marker of supreme power. 
Empire’s sovereignty is imagined to be exclusive and absolute, its legitimacy underpinned by 
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claiming descent from history, its exclusivity and inequality freely admitted – unlike nations 
– because of, and in turn justifying, a manifest destiny to unite an imagined community. This 
discourse, to be accepted, must be propagated to powerbrokers. While coronations and court 
ceremonials once fulfilled this task, the age of mass media and mechanical reproduction, 
popular sovereignty, and instant communications have altered the format. The new means of 
propagating the discourse is the mass visual image. 
 Third, we have established that effective vehicles of discourse are maps. Maps were 
once the near-exclusive preserve of priests and princes – but since the nineteenth century 
maps have been a part of everyday public communication. As part of our instinctive psyches 
and as tools which we consult on an almost daily basis, even without realising it, we believe 
that maps are reflections of reality. But they are not. Because of their inherently restricted 
nature, they are representations of a form of reality, distorting the world into synecdoches and 
hyper-realities. However, mapreaders tend to treat maps as apolitical mirrors of the world, 
assigning them an almost unquestioned faith. 
 Fourth, it has been argued that maps must be deconstructed with semiotics. Maps are a 
means of communicating information, and thus they are a form of visual language. There is 
merit in investigating the individual features of maps, but like individual spoken or written 
words, these features only make sense in the context of a broader visual grammar. The 
intentions of the map’s creators are almost irrelevant because like any form of spoken, 
written, visual, or audio communication, original meanings evolve extremely quickly once 
maps have been released into public discourse. 
 Fifth, it has been demonstrated that the EU’s public maps convey political discourse. 
All maps are hyperreal synecdoches, with EU maps substantially so. European Union maps 
combine with political iconography and aesthetically pleasing visual images to present an 
idealised imagination which blurs “European Union”, “Europe”, and “Europeans” into a 
hyperreal ideal. EU maps are inextricable from the macrohistorical roots of using maps to 
express supreme and exclusive sovereignty, legitimacy, destiny, and internal unity defined by 
contrast to a freely-acknowledged, unequal, hierarchy of insiders and outsiders. It does not 
matter what the maps are intended to show, as the very use of maps creates this division. 
 Sixth, it is argued that EU currency maps are the ultimate expression of empire. Maps 
on the EU’s coins and banknotes combine maps’ existing synecdoche, metonymic deixis, and 
public faith to depict not what the Union is, but what it should – and will – be. This is not 
reality but hyperreality. The essentially worthless nature of currency requires significant use 
of icons of power and statehood to encourage public trust, while the imagined value of cash 
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gives the icons depicted therein a degree of persuasive public perception. Both combine: 
maps validate the Euro and the Euro validates maps, portraying a European Union which 
wields supreme power, has exclusive sovereignty over the European continent, gains 
legitimacy as the apex of an imagined European history, and whose iconography unites all 
Europeans in an unequal spatio-temporal partnership while visually declaring the exclusion 
of those who will never be welcome in the hyperreal, synecdochal, imagined community of 
the European Union.  
 Thus the final conclusion to the thesis is that, simply, the European Union is Empire. 
 
 
7.1 Towards the Horizon 
 
We have encountered some colourful characters on our journey, from both fiction and fact. 
José Barroso and Julius Caesar, Liudprand of Cremona and Lieutenant George, Panofsky’s 
pedestrian and Prester John. It is fitting that as we approach the end, we will take a final 
opportunity to peer over the shoulder of one of our familiar companions – Edward Gibbon, 
penning the penultimate paragraph to his Decline and Fall by the shores of Lake Lucerne on 
a June morning in 1787: 
 
‘The map, the description, the monuments of ancient Rome have been 
elucidated by the diligence of the antiquarian and the student; and the 
footsteps of heroes, the relics not of superstition but of empire, are 
devoutly visited by a new race of pilgrims from the remote, and once 
savage, countries of the North.’1441 
Decline and Fall VI.lxxi 
 
The citizens of today’s European Union, we barbarians of yesteryear from those once-
savage countries of the North who schizophrenically ‘looked up to the image of Rome’1442 
while simultaneously tearing down its monuments,
1443
 are indeed standing amidst the relics 
of empire. The pull of the translatio imperii, the transfer of Roman power, is, as it was to 
Greeks and Germans, Byzantines and Britons, French and Fascists, too strong to resist. And 
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the relics of empire amidst which we Europeans wander are, by their nature, relics of verbal 
and visual language. It is not in the glass and chrome of Strasbourg that we find empire. It is 
not exclusively in the proclamations and decrees of Brussels that the discourse of superiority, 
legitimacy, and power lies.
1444
 It is in maps. Through their tropes and meta-tropes, their 
embedded suggestions and overt declarations, their placement and circulation, cartography 
continues and constructs empire. And as such this study raises many avenues for future 
research. 
One question which certainly needs to be addressed is the extent to which EU 
currency maps influence childrens’ relationships with politics and identity. The same might 
be done with maps and icons used in childrens’ textbooks in the Union – assuming that the 
Union has any say in such things. Pioneering work has been published on the dynamic 
between children and political discourses,
1445
 and with so much theory to build upon, an 
ethnographic empirical study among European children may reveal hidden consequences of 
political mundanity and “banal empire” on the next generation of European voters and 
visionaries. 
There is scope for research beyond the Union and beyond official EU icons. Are 
perceptions of EU cartoimperialism and iconography different in non-EU European states? 
And to what extent do other realms of material culture – passports, driving licences, 
European Defence Force badges, and so forth – act as vehicles of cartoimperialism?  Again, 
there is a substantial theoretical grounding in place for a broader material culture study 
beyond maps. 
The European Union may be the first supranational organisation to issue a single 
currency which supersedes all previous systems within its own economic orbit, but it is 
doubtful that Europe will be the only body to do this. Even in the face of potential 
eurodämmerung, other regions are considering monetary union in the EU’s image.1446 
Economist Paul Krugman terms this ‘monomoney mania’,1447 a phenomenon spreading 
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across the North American Free Trade Association, the Economic Community of West 
African States, Mercosur, East Asia, and the African Union. Understanding the political 
cartography and cartoimperialism inherent to Europe’s money is merely the first step. It is 
only a matter of time before similar organisations institute their own collective currencies, 
connecting their fragile present to an imagined past as part of a yearning for legitimacy and 
authority. When that happens – which it will – the methods and techniques employed in this 
thesis could provide a useful template. 
Similarly a study is required on whether, and to what extent, cartoimperialism exists 
in the states of the African Union. Modelling itself on the EU,
1448
 the AU has adopted maps 
in its flag, coat of arms, and website iconography. As the maps in question depict the entire 
African continent despite not all African countries being in the AU,
1449
 a very similar 
situation exists in both Europe and Africa. An analysis of the theory and impact of 
cartoimperialism in Africa is thus called for. 
This study also calls for an examination of discourses of legitimacy in non-European 
history. How is the discourse publicly proclaimed in other powerful societies such as China, 
India, and the Islamic world? Like Europe, the civilisations in these areas cannot be divorced 
from their regional histories, and there is a potential to investigate whether there is a parallel 
of the translatio imperii outside of a specifically European, Christian, historical setting. 
Finally, this study suggests the possibility of further discourse analysis in the 
European Union. EU studies remain dominated by policy analysis and political science, 
focusing on what the Union creates rather than what it is. Discourse is of course a matter of 
perception, but there is the possibility that discourse analysis in relation to the EU, from 
perspectives within and beyond the Union’s borders, can be expanded. 
 
The future of the EU is not something which a study can examine, but rather is a 
consideration which should be borne in mind by all studies. Timothy Luke asks where, in the 
modern world, empire goes to expand.
1450
 The days of territorial annexation are over – almost 
– and the Union has no empty space left into which to expand.1451 Instead the Union, through 
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its hyperreal, synecdochal, metonymic discourses, expands into non-spatial space. It expands 
not into the toposphere or anthroposphere but into the artificial, human-built noösphere – the 
realms of language, perception, and imagination. And the discourse which colonises these 
realms is not nation or alliance or federation, it is empire. The discourse of empire itself is a 
linguistic, imaginative construct. It was born of a Christmas morning more than twelve 
centuries ago to begin its evolution into the discourse with which we grapple today. Empire’s 
progeny, cartoimperialism, is just as much a construct. Formed from visual linguistics and 
couched in the grammar and rhetoric of cartographic semiotics and map semantics, the 
modern EU map is the creator and purveyor of empire. Via the ocularcentric bombardment of 
its mass-produced maps and by the millions of coins and banknotes circulating between 
European fingers, these new discourses of empire are as much relics of an imperial past as are 
the tumbled temples and shattered statues of Gibbons’ memory – for, like such ruins, our 
modern artefacts cannot be disentangled from the political and geographic history which 
created them. Yet such maps are also so much more than mere relics. They are vibrant and 
powerful, spreading an imagination which is simultaneously old and new, each time a coin 
changes hand and each time a pair of eyes glances across a Union map: the imagination of 
superiority, sovereignty, legitimacy, and destiny which, like the double-headed eagle of 
empire, simultaneously looks to Europe’s collective future and Europe’s imagined history. 
 
 
7.2 The Ghosts of History 
 
In his epic poem The Aeneid, the first-century BC Roman poet Vergil
1452
 created his own 
manufactured history for an audience of Romans who, having endured a century of civil wars 
and dictatorships which had transformed their ancient Republic into Augustus’ personal 
possession, sought to understand their identity and destiny in a new world order.
1453
 Vergil’s 
poem recounts the adventures of the Trojan prince Aeneas who, leading his young son 
Ascanius
1454
 and carrying his aged father Anchises on his back, escapes Troy with a rag-tag 
huddle of refugees fleeing the wrath of Agamemnon and Menelaus. They ultimately settle in 
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Italy and found what, according to their myth, later becomes Rome. Like any good story the 
poem has many climactic moments, perhaps most tellingly when, following Anchises’ death, 
Aeneas is given the gods’ permission to visit his father’s ghost in the Underworld. After a 
tearful reunion and having shown his son a parade of future Romans – phantoms of the 
ancient kings, the famous consuls and imperators of the Republic, and finally an 
overflowingly obsequious cameo by the spectre of Augustus himself – the ghost of Anchises 
makes to his son a perceptive prophecy:  
 
‘Others will cast more elegantly in bronze 
Their breathing figures, I can well believe. 
And bring more lifelike portraits out of marble; 
Argue more eloquently, use the pointer 
To trace the paths of heaven more accurately, 
And foretell the rising stars. 
But you, Roman, remember by your imperium to rule 
Earth’s peoples – for your arts are to be these: 
To pacify, to impose the rule of law, 
To spare the conquered, and battle down the proud.’1455 
The Aeneid  
VI.847-856 
  
Anchises’ prophecy has proved more accurate than even Vergil dared imagine. Where 
other peoples will devote themselves to sundry skills, the destiny of Rome is to establish its 
imperium. Rome has indeed pacified and imposed the rule of law.
1456
 It has spared the 
conquered and battled down the proud.
1457
 But this did not stop with Aeneas and Augustus, 
nor with the abdication of Romulus Augustulus in 476 nor the death of Constantine XI 
Palaiologos in 1453. Via the translatio imperii Rome has been variously situated not in a 
central Italian town but in places both real and imagined: in Constantinople and Aachen, in 
Nuremberg and Moscow, in Vienna, Paris, London, and Washington. Rome – whoever, 
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whenever, and wherever “Rome” might be – has existed in proclamations and decrees, 
coronations and parades; it lived on in literature, statuary, currency, and cartography. And as 
this thesis argues, Rome now finds itself in the office-blocks of Brussels. Rome has colonised 
the mind and, as Anchises prophesies, all those who have consciously or unconsciously been 
aware that they hold the mantle of translatio have sought to pacify and to impose their own 
imperium. This is as true for the European Union as it was for Vergil’s Rome, and for 
imperium in the past, the present – and the future. 
 
 
7.3 Charlemagne’s Shadow 
 
We have reached the end, and we complete our circumnavigation by returning to where we 
started – José Barroso, and his comment to the assembled journalists in 2007. The European 
Union as a non-imperial empire. Is this a fair description?  
Perhaps it is. In his conclusion to The Atlas of Empires, Peter Davidson argues that 
with the dismantling of the European colonies and the death of the Soviet Union, only a faint 
spectre of empire remains, Anchises’ phantom merely whispering in the courtrooms and 
corridors of Brussels and Strasbourg. ‘The age of European imperialism is past,’ Davidson 
writes, ‘but it has left a ghost’.1458 Judging by the dull reaction to Barroso’s comment it 
appears that Davidson is right. Empire may be thought to still linger in Europe, but it is a 
fading memory soon to be consigned to oblivion. Yet if we were to make this conclusion, we 
could not be more wrong. What we see in the Union’s cartography is quite the opposite.  
Davidson is right, but for the wrong reason. There indeed is a political poltergeist in 
Europe. European Empire is a faint phantom, but it is not fading – it is emerging, returning 
once more to its birthplace. The discourse of empire is alive and well in the Union: as the 
period of accession and expansion draws to a close and the EU approaches its frontiers in 
space, time, and imagination, morphing from a Union of open arms to a fortress of 
perceptions, the discourse’s appearance in powerful public media becomes ever-more 
apparent.  
 The days of formal European imperialism within and beyond Europe may, as 
Davidson suggests, be dead. Long-gone are those mariners who, in the name of mission 
civilisatrice or malevolence, consulted their Mercator maps, steered their ships towards the 
distant horizon, and planted flags on faraway beaches in the names of European kings. But 
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Europe yet remains imperial. Imperium is made today not by Caesar’s legions nor 
Napoleon’s grenadiers, nor on rolling gundecks by merchants and militarists, but in 
comfortable conference rooms by councils and committees. And like the imperialism of 
yesteryear, this practice is reaching around the globe. Since the establishment of the Union, 
the ideal of creating a pan-national bloc with bounded geographic and demographic borders, 
has spread across the world. This is to be one legacy of the European Union, over which 
future scholars will pore and debate long after the Union has passed into history.  
The European Union and its imperium will, one day, cease to exist. Whether this 
occurs next month or next millennium is not particularly important. History demonstrates that 
a unified Europe – which even the EU has not yet achieved, and perhaps never will – is only 
a temporary phase. Like the fiery death of the Eastern Roman Empire in 1453, the passing of 
the EU may be interpreted by contemporaries as an event so significant it alters the course of 
human history,
1459
 or like the legal technicalities which ended the Western Roman Empire in 
476, the EU might become so obsolete that its demise will ‘excite barely a ripple of interest at 
the time’.1460 Like Charlemagne’s realm in 840, the EU might be woefully lamented by those 
who outlive it,
1461
 or like the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the Union may 
be bid a good riddance by disgruntled inhabitants.
1462
 The EU’s epitaph will undoubtedly be a 
mixture of these. But regardless of how it ends, and how and by whom it is remembered, the 
European Union will live on as a new element of the translatio imperii – one more link in a 
continuum which stretches back in time past Napoleon, Charles V, and Charlemagne to 
Aeneas and Anchises in the Underworld, and which reaches beyond Brussels in the Digital 
Age to inevitable future attempts at unifying Europe – a translatio imperii which links all 
attempts past, present and prospective, to unify Europe under a single rule. It will not be at all 
surprising if, centuries in the future, new statesmen seeking to unite the Europeans look back 
to the European Union and try to legitimise their actions by publicly parading the symbols of 
the current Rome: the European motto, the European currency, the European flag, the 
European anthem, and the European map; appropriating that most unprecedented, yet most 
familiar, of contemporary political imaginations – Tabulae Imperii Europaei: 
Mapping European Empire. 
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